Can we avoid SPAD

presentation by ELTC/TATA

TIGER

LURKS

ON YOU

BEHIND

THE

RED SIGNAL

Loco pilot shall responsible for a large number of cases of Signal Passing At Danger (SPAD) and if a engine crew overshoot the signal, their own lives are at stake. Hence the procedure of avoiding such accidents must be initiated by the engine crew themselves.

Therefore we should find out the root causes of the SPAD, and chalk out an action plan to ignite each and every mind of loco pilot to avoid SPAD cases.

SPAD CASES OVER INDIAN RAILWAY

Since Dt: 01.04.13 to 30.09.13

Total No. of cases-26

RESPONSIBILITY

-92%

8%

(Till date)

(3)

(0)

(4)

(0)

(1)

DUTY HOURS-WISE (S E RAILWAY)

AGE-WISE (S E RAILWAY)

DRIVING EXPERIENCE-WISE

(S E RAILWAY)

BLOCK WORKING-WISE

(S E RAILWAY)

57

BLOCK WORKING WISE

AUTOMATIC BLOCK SYSTEM OTHERS

SPAD ?

Let us see

Through the

Case study

CASE NO-1

A

Issued Caution Order

to LP

On dt.3.4.2013, PUI-DURG Exp stopped at

MCS at 20.03Hrs.On duty Dy.SS. issued a

sectional caution order stating

“you will passAS-8 and AS-10

at danger aspect”.

A

18425 Exp

After taking OFF the signal train left

MANCHESWAR

and proceeded towards

BARANG

A A A A A A A

MCS Adv.

starter BRAG

Home

AS 2 GSA

4

GAS

6

AS

8

AS

10

GAS

12

Signaling arrangement in between

MANCHESWAR & BARANG

Double line Automatic block system

DN Line

A A

AS

8

AS

10

Train no DN TLHR BOBRN (E) started

at 20.12Hrs after following the rule

passing Auto signal at ON

Km. No.

423/32

A

AS

8

Train No.18425 Exp while proceeding

to wards BRAG, passed AS-8 at

Danger and while on run between

AS-8 & AS-10the train dashed at a

speed of 41Kmph with B/V of

TLHR/BOBRN(E) at about 20.15 Hrs.

Could the accident

have been averted ?

1) Yes, the accident could have

been averted had the rules

prescribed in GR & SR 9.02

were followed by the LP and

Gd. Of 18425 Exp.

2) The Dy. SS had not issued the

mislead caution order stating

“you will pass AS-8 & AS-10 at

danger aspect.”

Lesson learnt:-

1) Always pass a signal at ON/

Defective with applicable

rule/proper authority.

2) LP & Gd. Read the caution

order carefully and understand

the instructions properly

before starting the train.

3) SM should not issue mislead

caution order to LP & Gd.

CASE NO-2

DN Line-2

DN Line-1

RNG

Starter

On dt:19.12.2012 train No. DN/HDCG

was standing on DN line-2 at starter

signal of RNG from 00.30Hrs

RNG

Home

DN Line-2

DN Line-1

Train no. DN/BTPC stopped at

DN line-2 Home Signal at 00.44Hrs as

the signal was danger.

DN Line-2

DN Line-1

RNG

Home

LP of DN/BTPC started the train

without authority to proceed at about

1.12Hrs. from DN line-2 Home signal

by possible misreading the aspect of

Home signal of DN line-1, which was

taken OFF for MEMU(E) and bumped

with B/V of DN/HDCG

Yes, the accident could have been

averted if the LP/ALP of DN/BTPC

identify & call out the aspect of signal to

each other after checking the aspect of

the signal pertaining to them .

Could the accident

have been averted ?

Lesson learnt:-

1) The LP of a train shall not pass a

Home signal at ON or defective

unless he is either authorized by a

written authority/ Calling ON

signal/ authorized by signal post

telephone along with proceed

hand signal where required.

2) The LP shall not however trust

entirely to signal but always be

vigilant and cautious

CASE NO-3

DN Line- 3

RKSN

Starter

On Dt: 02.05.2008, BCN/RXL was stabled

at RKSN on L-3.

Gd & LP conducted GDR ‘A’ check.

The Brake power was as per check

memo 97%. After taking of signal, train

left RKSN at 13.05Hrs

Train passed AS-38,AS-36 & GSA-34

at One Yellow.

Noticing AS-32 at Danger, LP tried to

control the train but failed & overshoot

AS-32 at about 13.28 Hrs.

A A A A

AS

38

GSA

34 AS

36 AS

32

RKSN MMV

MMV

Home

Resulting BCN/RXL collided in rear of

NSL/BURN which was standing at

Out side of MMV Home signal as it was

Danger.

A

Km. No. 285/22-18

The accident took place due to total loss

of brake power caused by discontinuity

in the brake pipe near to the train engine

and subsequent failure on the part of LP

& Gd in not ensuring brake continuity

test before starting

1) Yes, the accident could have been

averted if the LP/ALP & Gd of BCN/RXL,

had checked brake continuity before

starting, they could have detected the

discontinuity in the brake system and

rectified it.

2) If the LP had been vigilant enough to

do the brake feel check immediately

after starting.

Could the accident

have been averted ?

1) Perform GDR check properly and

ensure prescribed brake power during

clearing of stable load with invalid

BPC.

2) Before starting do the brake

continuity test.

3) The LP of a train shall invariably test

the adequacy of brake power of his

train at the start of his journey, before

hitting continuous down gradient.

Lesson learnt:-

CASE NO-4

On 30.6.2011 train no 12073 UP

(Janastabdhi Exp) was programmed to

cross with 18425 Exp and 58514 Pass at

GBK. 12073 Exp left CTC at 19.53Hrs

and kept outside Home of GBK for

admiting 18245 Exp. On R/1 L/Line.

18425 Exp

18425 Exp arrived on R/1 L/line at

19.59Hrs.

After taking OFF H/Signal for admitting

Janasatabdhi Exp on M/Line and Starter

was kept Danger as per program, but the

LP without stopping overshoot the

Starter & Adv Starter signal and passed

the station.

The LP & ALP of 12073 Exp have not

given attention to the aspect of signals

and callously gave attention to the VHF

instructions which was not meant for

them and speeded up the train with out

ensuring the aspect of Starter signal.

1) Yes, the accident could have been

averted if the LP & ALP had paid

immediate attention to and obeyed

the signal aspect following the rule

GR 3.78(i),GR 3.81 & GR 3.83

2) If they were vigilant and cautious.

3) If they were not attentive to the

instructions given on VHF.

4) Gd. Fails to obey GR 4.45 and

OPM 17.25(c)

Could the accident

have been averted ?

1) The LP shall pay immediate attention

to and obey every signal whether the

cause of the signal being shown is

known to him or not.

2) ALP shall callout the aspect of signal

sighted by him to LP who after

checking the aspect himself, shall

repeat the same.

3) VHF sets should not be used for

communicating the aspect & as an

alternative to written authority

to proceed, authority to pass a signal

at danger etc.

Lesson learnt:-

4) The Gd. Should attract the attention

of LP when he sees reason to

apprehend danger or consider it is

necessary for any reason to stop the

train.

Lesson learnt:-

COLLISION OF GOODS TRAIN

Date & Time of accident:- 08.10.2013

at 5.35 Hrs

Division:- BSP

Sec:- BSP Jn- GEVRA Road

Station:- KORBA at Km- 702/04

System of Working:- D/L Abs. block system

Train No.:- 1) DN BOX(N)/E-HC

2) DN BOX(NHL)/E-16148

Loco No:- 1) 28536 (WAG-7)

2) 28595 (WAG-7)

Other information:-

Duty of LP 13.00 Hrs.

VCD isolated since last 10 days.

Brief particulars:-

While the train No. DN BOXN/E-HC was

approaching KORBA Stn. Its loco pilot

disregarded the danger aspect Of DN

H/Signal and dashed with B/V of train No.

DN BOXNHL/E-16148 on line No.-2,

resulting which the B/V and ‘3’ BOXN of

DN BOXNHL/E-16148 derailed out of which

‘2’ wagons capsized blocking DN line No-

1(L/L) and DN line No-2(M/L).

Prima facie cause:-

Overshooting of H/Signal by LP.

ROLE OF CC/CCC : Proper learning road of the crew in all section of their jurisdiction

must be ensured. Also ensure that running staff are booked on all the routes so that their LR does not become overdue.

Close monitoring of PR, H/Q and Outstation Rest in accordance to duty hours must be ensured.

Breach of rest booking should be avoided.

Condition of crew booking lobbies and running rooms should be improved to ensure proper quality of rest.

Posters, narrating accident cases and action taken by crew to avoid such occurrences should be displayed for mass awareness in liaison with safety department.

Ensure breath analyzer test of crew before SIGNING ON and SIGNING OFF.

Over due PME/CRC crew should not be booked on line.

Signal defects register entries should be dealt with promptness to rectify the defect. Proper redressed mechanism for Crew grievances should be

improved. Ensure all the competency / training imparted on due date. The activities of welfare inspector deputed for each lobby to be

closely monitored.

Date Tr. No.

Signal No. Nature of defect

30.12.09

K-103

EMU

KGP inner

Home Signal Signal was lowered to admit EMU on P/F-

1 but path was obstructed by 2810 Exp.

01.09.10

MH-131

EMU

PKU UP

Middle Line

Home Signal

After passing MH-131 signal became

yellow instead of getting back to danger.

27.10.10

MH-101

EMU

KGP Inner

Home signal

LP passed the signal one yellow but point

was set for P/F-1 instead of CTC-2

25.11.10

K-102

EMU

AS-98/2 &

AS-96 AS 98/2 was double yellow but AS-96

danger.

19.01.11

12444

DN

KGP H/S On approaching put back to danger from

yellow but it was showing one yellow on

RRI panel.

SIGNAL IRREGULARITIES

REPORTED BY LP

ROLE OF CLI : Do the effective counseling to develop safety consciousness

among crew and identify their personal weakness and rectify the same. A regular inspection and ambush checks including night

footplate to ensure that staff follow regular and sound practices . Surprise breath analyzer checks to be carried out during

footplate.

ALP needs to be counseled applying Emergency brakes by opening RS valves quickly in case they find lack of alertness on the part of LP while approaching signals .

CLI should ensure during footplate ALPs are calling signal aspects loudly with pointing out and LPs are also acknowledge the same after ensuring the same .

Increased interaction with family members of crew for bringing about an awareness of the need for proper rest of crew at the home station.

Regular inspection to be carried out for proper up keeping of running rooms and crew lobbies .

Categorisation of engine crew should be done as per the RB’s guideline.

ROLE OF LOCO CONTROLLER :

Monitor properly the distress train and Loco. Minimize the pre-departure detention of train and long

hours duty. Check and avoid unnecessary harassment of crew.

ROLE OF ENGINE CREW

Take proper rest at home and out station.

Keep yourself healthy and active.

Don’t take sedative, narcotic and stimulant drugs.

Go through the current circulars during signing on.

Ensure that the Engine is in good working condition , the braking apparatus is in efficient and effective working condition before leaving the shed.

Before starting of train read caution order carefully and

observe it meticulously.

Before starting the train satisfy yourself that all correct fixed signals are given and where necessary hand signal are given and line is clear of visible obstruction and guard has given signal to start.

Callout each and every signal aspect clearly and loudly by each other pointing out with finger.

Don’t fail to exchange hand signals with the Station and Cabin staff.

Do the brake feel test to check the adequacy of brake power at first opportunity.

Always obey authorized speed limit.

Don’t use mobile phone and misuse VHF set during footplate duty.

Engine crew should acquainted themselves to the topography

and terrain and location of signals of section properly.

Always try to keep the train under your control whenever the view of signal is obstructed due to fog, storm or any other reason.

Keep a sharp lookout for each signal. Don’t take off your

mind and eyes while approaching the signal.

Don’t presume that the train will run through because daily it is passing through.

Be more vigilant and cautious during abnormal working. Don’t entirely trust on signal but be vigilant and cautious.

Defective signals should identified in time and pass it as per prescribed rules and report the same.

Perform GDR check properly.

Do the air pressure continuity test whenever required.

Before negotiating descending gradient, ensure that the brakes are working efficiently.

Avoid strictly packing of bag and baggage before the halt. Stay alert when driving .

Sec : TATA TO CKP Running time for super first train : 53 min. Total Stations : 06 Total Signals : 50 Neutral sections : 04 (16 Boards) Manned Level crossing : 08 Un Manned Level Crossing : 22 Permanent speed Restrictions : 02(08 boards) Temporary Speed Restrictions: 04 (16 boards)---(On date 11/10) Grand total : 114

BOX N SER 17128

Alone, we can do so little, Together, we can do so much