Persuasion & Authority

2

Milgram experiment

Subjects believe they are participants in a study of effects of punishment on learning

They are asked to shock a partner (stooge) when the partner makes learning mistakes

Dependent variable is number of subjects who “go all the way”, delivering 300+ volts of electricity

Qu ickTime™ an d a decomp ressor

are needed to see th is p ictu re.Qu ickTime™ and a

decompressorare need ed to see th is p ictu re.

Qu ickTime™ and a decompressor

are n eeded to see th is p ictu re.

• Strapping the learning in

• Teacher experiences shock

• Teacher refuses

• Milgram video

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Obedience to authorityIn Milgram shock experiments, all teacher subjects did some shocking and 65% shocked at the maximum level (450 volts), even when thinking the learner was suffering a heart attack

• Experts predicted 1-2% compliance rate

Effects greater• When "commander" is an

authority figure• When "commander" is

physically & psychologically close to the teacher

• When victim is physically & psychologically distant from the teacher

% of subjects shocking at various voltage levels

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

15 75 135

195

255

315

375

435

Voltage

Perc

ent s

till s

hock

ing

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Compliance decreased as closeness to victim increased

Teacher's proximity to victim

0 20 40 60 80

Remote fmvictim

Voicefeedback

Same room

Touch

% stopping the experiment

• Compliance increased as closeness to authority increased

Teachers proximity to experimenter

0 50 100

Sameroom

Telephonecontact

Taperecorder

% stopping the experiment

Variations

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• Social pressure defining the situation?• Authority & expertise?• Willing suspension of disbelief?

• Reward & punishment compliance?• Social contract & embarrassment?• Teacher's personality

• Evilness• Uncaringness

What produces this effect?

7

Latane’s Social Impact Theory

Impact of social influence attempt on an individual increases with – Number of influencers

Up to a point– Strength

Status Ability Relationship to target

– Immediacy Proximity in time Proximity in space

Modality Effectiveness

In person canvassing 1 new voter per 14 contacts=$18.67/new voter

Personal phone calls 1 new voter per 50 contacts=$45/new voter

Robo-phone calls No discernable effect=infinite cost

Direct mail 1 new voter per 200 contacts=$100/new voter

Email No discernable effect=infinite cost

• Effectiveness of Get Out the Vote Techniques

8

Challenger Disaster, 1985 Video Jan 28, 1986, Space Shuttle

Challenger takes off from Kennedy Space Center

Explodes 73 seconds after take-off

Dead: – Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, pilot

Michael J. Smith; specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ronald E. McNair and Ellison S. Onizuka; payload specialist Gregory B. Jarvis, a Hughes Aircraft Corp. employee.

Resnick, BS in EE, CMU 1970.

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Background

O-rings seal sections of booster rocket

Morton Thiokol had evidence since Jan, 1985 of damage to O-rings (Flight 51E)

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Memo Excerpt

"Subject: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality. This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing."

"If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order---of of human life."

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Damage to O-rings & link to cold weather noted by March, 1985

No problems at 100F, loss of seal for 2.4 sec at 75oF & for 10 sec at 50oF

7/1/1985 , M-T provides results of weather tests to NASA

7/31/1985 , M-T engineer writes memo to VP of Engineering

“Management at Thiokol and NASA shows no interest in planning a design change”

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Dramatization of final teleconference, night before launch Weather on launch day

predicted to be 18oF Two teleconferences

btw Kennedy Space Center, Marshal Space Flight Center & Morton Thiokol to determine whether to lauch

Video

• Roger Boisjoly• M-T Engineer reporting failures

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Discussion

Why did this decision happen?–     ...failures in communication... resulted in a

decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers (Rodgers Commission)

What should the engineers have done?