Operations Research Approaches to Cyber Conflict

CCW Short Course 21 September 2011

CDR Harrison Schramm

Lecture Goal

• To provide an executive overview of Operations Research…

…And the application of these techniques to problems in the cyber domain.

Introduction

• Who am I and Why am I here?• How did I get interested in Cyber?

• What are sorts of approaches might the OR community have to offer?

• Future ideas in OR

Outline

Big Questions• What is OR and how

can it be applied to the cyber problem?

• What specific problems are amenable to analysis?

Applications• Network Flow Models

– Formulation– Interdiction

• Game theory and deterrence– How cyber conflict is

different

• Epidemic Models

History of Operations Research

• Origins in WWII – Convoy Planning (Royal Navy)– Anti-submarine warfare (USA)

• Quick case study: Should Air Defense guns be placed on Merchant Vessels?

Difficulties: • No clear-cut ‘one-to-one’

mapping between traditional models and cyber conflict

• Uncertainties in cyber conflict make problem difficult to parameterize.

Approaches:• Lanchester Equations• Game Theory• Attacker / Defender

Modeling• Applied mathematics

from other disciplines

Ultimate Goal: to integrate cyber conflict into Campaign Analysis to inform investment and tactical decisions for DoD.

Military OR and Cyber Conflict

• Fluidity of arsenals– Adversaries’ discovery of vulnerability may make

opponents weapon useless. – Deterrence implications

• Difficulties with detection and attribution– How do you know when you’re under attack?

• Wide estimates of ‘how bad could bad be’– What is a ‘cyber pearl harbor?’

How cyber conflict is different(And why our old tools don’t work)

Our purpose

• Is the application of the scientific method to military / policy problems to inform better decisions.

• OR is ‘The Science of Better’

Part I a. Networks

What is a Network?

• A NETWORK is any system that can be described as a set of Nodes and Arcs.

• Arcs have attributes:– Capacity– Cost

• Nodes are where Arcs meet– We’re interested in the relationship between the

‘inflow’ and ‘outflow’ at each arc.

Network Example

• Example: Driving to San Jose International Airport

Mathematical Representation

1

2

3

4

5

6

(1, 2)

(1, 1)

(2, 1)

(3, 1)

(1, 4)

(2, 2)

(2, 2)

(1, 2)

i j

(cij, qij)

The math (in words)

• We seek to minimize costs across the network• Such that:

– Demand is met– Supply is not exceeded– The net flow at a ‘transient’ node is zero– No arc’s capacity is exceeded– No arc has negative flow.

• This becomes a Mathematical Programming problem and is easily solved.

Network Questions

• How much can we push through? – Maximum Flow

• What’s the cheapest way to move one unit?– Minimum Cost

• What’s the cheapest way to move supplies from one or more sources to multiple destinations

• What’s the best way to schedule jobs?

Network Flow Problems - Practical

• Obvious Networks:– Electrical systems– Road Systems– Computer Networks

• Non-obvious networks:– Schedules…– Like a weapons development program

Intermission

• Gee, Harrison, that’s really cool. Why are we talking about this?

• Glad you asked!

Part Ib. Network Interdiction

Using attack-based strategies to identify critical infrastructure components is not a new idea

• Harris, T.E., and Ross, F.S. (1955), Fundamentals of a Method for Evaluating Rail Net Capacities (SECRET, declassified 1999), RM-1573, RAND Corp.

• As documented by Schrijver (2002).

This math used to be Classified!

(Sorry, I just have to say that every chance I get)

How is this approach different than others?

Decision Making

Certainty Uncertainty

Mother Nature(non-deliberate)

Enemy(deliberate)

Optimization

Probability Game Theory

Assess the “Worst Case”• Model the system• Evaluate potential damage by

adversary (capability-based) • Relies on system knowledge

Assess “What is Likely”• Model the threat• Evaluate expected outcome• Relies on historical record, SMEs,

“crystal ball”

Non-Deliberate

Hazard

DeliberateThreat

Probabilistic Risk Analysis(Natural Disasters)Safety (Accidents)

Reliability (Failures)

Intent-Based Analysis(e.g., predicting terrorists)

Short-term planning onlyRequires strong intelligence

Works for long-term & short-term planning and resource allocation

Capability-Based Analysis (e.g., game theory)

Might not be conservative enough (Limited by imagination)

Might be too conservative (Impractical to mitigate)

Different Approaches to Assessing Risk

Risk = f (T, V, C)

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011

A Fundamental Question:Is defending a system…• More like protecting against Mother Nature?• Or more like defending against an intelligent

adversary?

• This is a fundamental issue in the use of risk analysis techniques, but it is not the only one…

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011

Attacking an Arc

What does it mean to ‘attack an arc’?

Two interpretations:• The Black Knight Method “NONE SHALL PASS”

– set it’s capacity to zero (this is the same as removing it from the model)

Or• “The Tollbooth Method”

– place an unaffordable tax on the arc to make it cost-prohibitive.

Suppose someone hands you a network model

Network Operator (Defender) problem

• How do I continue to operate my network under attack?

• Mathematically: How do I minimize total cost given a set interdicted arcs?

Interdictor (Attacker) problem:

• Which arc(s) are the best to attack in order to minimize the operators’ best performance

• Mathematically: How do I choose a set of arcs to attack?

Math Slide Master Problem Sub Problem Decision Variable

Y X

Formulation

max

. .

0,1

Y

kk k k

z

s t

z cX qX Y

Y

Y Atks

., ,.

, , ,

, ,

min

. .

1

1

0

0

X

i ii i

i j i j i j

i j i j

c qY X

s t

source

X X drain Balanceof flow

transient

X u Flow Constrant

X Non Negativity

Attacker / Defender Schematic

Operator Attacker

Operator shows attacker ‘best’ system operation under attack

Attacker shows defender ‘best’ attack

for system configuration

Okay, so why all the math?

One Attack

Two Attacks

Three Attacks

“Punch line”

• Added numbers of attacks may lead you to attack different things

• An attacker with more resources may attack different things than a less capable attacker; both may be acting optimally!

Example: PORT OF LOS ANGELES

33

Attacker’s problem: find attack paths for multiple,

simultaneous attackers that minimize getting stopped.

Defender’s problem: preposition radar and small boats to

maximize early detection

NPS OR Department 34

Example II: Building a first nuclear weapon

• A regional power seeksinternational prestige and influence

• Growing industrial base• Well-funded research universities• Several civilian power reactors

under IAEA safeguards• Established, high-volume producer

of uranium ore and yellowcake

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011

Gantt chart

Operator’s problem is to managehis project to minimize thecompletion time of his first weapon

Attacker’s problem is to delay thecompletion time of his first weapon

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011

Part II: Deterrence

• “Deterrence, it seems, works better in Practice than in Theory”

References

• Thomas Schelling: Arms and Influence• Herman Khan: On Thermonuclear War• Glenn Kent: Thinking about America’s Defense

Deterrence:Is..• A coercive strategy which aims to

maintain the status quo by forcing an adversary to re-consider the costs and benefits of their actions

• Requires:– The ability to inflict harm to

something the adversary values– The Will to inflict this harm– Effective communication of the

ability and will

• Can sum these up in one word: CREDIBILITY

Is challenging to study because…• We only gain partial information

about effectiveness.– When we (or others are attacked)

we can conclude that our deterrence was insufficient

– When attacks to not happen, it may be because of our deterrent, or another effect.

• We never truly know the motivations / utilities of our adversaries. – Their private utilities are probably

‘unknowable’

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No one wants to be in the position of finding a problem both important for study and without good analytic methods to tackle it. - Jervis

Analytic Methods

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• Critical Thinking / Systems Analysis– Kent’s First Strike Stability

• Statistical Analysis: fitting models to datasets – Difficulties: Coding data, model specification, descriptive statistics.

Presupposes model format.– Huth, Signoriono

• Game Theory– Difficulties: presupposes an ability to compute utilities– Schelling, Zagare and Kilgour

• History– Difficulties: May not be applicable to future campaigns– Meershimer, Keegan, others

General Conclusions

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• Deterrence requires all the levers of national power – it is not simply a military problem – (all methods)

• Deterrence is most likely to fail when:– At least one side perceives the campaign will be ‘quick’

and ‘easy’ (History, Strike Stability)– At least one side perceives the campaign feels that they

are in a ‘use or lose’ situation (History, Game Theory)– Deterrence postures irrelevant if not effectively

communicated (History, Statistics) – Communication Fails (History)

• The objective of deterrence cannot be ‘Everything – Everywhere’ – we should prioritize what we wish to deter.

Who is deterrable? Deterrable• Nations that seek to

minimize costs

• Nations that feel secure in their nuclear (and other) deterrents

Not deterrable• Groups who do not seek to

minimize costs– Because they don’t count

them– Because they have ideological

imperatives to act– Because they seek conflict

• Nations who feel they are in a use / loose situation.

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Nuclear Deterrence: The Gold Standard?

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•Kent’s model of Nuclear Deterrence•Advantages: tractable, simple, elegant•Disadvantages: Measures the ‘costs’ of attacking first versus the ‘costs’ of attacking second•The closer this ratio is to unity, the more stable the system is.

• Sources of Stability:– Clear Communications– Assured Retaliation

• Sources of Instability: – “Splendid First Strike”– Deterrence capability made

irrelevant:• Communication lapses i.e.

Saddam Hussein– “Mandates” – Political or

personal motives that force a solution

• Germany WWII?

Kent’s Model of deterrence

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First strike Stability Index:

Where: C represents costs; several definitions have been used

Ratios don’t tell the whole story; magnitude of potential costs key as well.

,1 ,1

,2 ,2

A B

A B

FSSIC CC C

Missing Rungs on the “ladder of Escalation

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Nuclear Exchange

Conventional War

Limited Retaliatory Strike

Diplomatic Censure

Adversaries’ Provocation

Blue left with the choices of increasing

escalation beyond their desires or simply

‘taking it’

Blue has no appropriate response

Discussion:

• What are the prospects for deterrence in cyberspace?

Research Question

• What sorts of actions will best enable deterrence of hostile acts in cyberspace?

Part III: Epidemic Models and Applications

• Used to study the transmission of disease from antiquity.

• Separate a closed population into groups or ‘Cohorts’

• Here we will discuss the simplest model.

The ‘Simple’ Epidemic

• The story:

There is a population with a fixed number of members, some of whom are infected with a virus for which there is no cure. Population members meet and mingle with some intensity.

Members

S

I

Susceptible. Does not have the disease, but may become infected if encounters an Infective

Infective. Has the disease and may spread it to any susceptible he meets.

Stick Figure Dynamics

S S+ = No Change

I + I = No Change

S + I =

I + I

S + I

With some Probability, S converts to I

Math Slide

dSSI

dtdI

SIdt

Sapphire Growth

Courtesy: Stefan Savage.

DShield is the Distributed Intrusion Detection System Project (www.dshield.org)

Applying this to Stuxnet…(Unclassified data in Symantec Dossier)

0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00 400.00 450.00 500.000

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

Stuxnet Propagation by Country

IranindonesiaIndiaAzerbaijanPakistanMalaysiaUSAUszbekistanRussiaGreat Britain

Days since zero

Mac

hine

s Inf

ecte

d

You could also do this…

Iran

indonesia

India

Azerbaij

an

Pakist

an

Malaysi

aUSA

Uszbek

istan

Russia

Great B

ritain

0

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.008

0.01

0.012

0.014

0.016

0.018

Iranindonesia

IndiaAzerbaijan

PakistanMalaysia

USAUszbekistan

RussiaGreat Britain

Stuxnet infectivity parameters (Least Squares Fit)

IranindonesiaIndiaAzerbaijanPakistanMalaysiaUSAUszbekistanRussiaGreat Britain

S-I-R Model

Whiteboard

)(

)()()(

)()(

tIdt

dR

tItStIdt

dI

tStIdt

dS

How to Mitigate the Worm Threat?S(0) = N = / Ml probe rate of wormM total population (=232 IPv4) “removal” rate

3. Reduce # of infected hosts(containment)

2. Reduce rate of infection(suppression)

1. Reduce # of susceptible hosts(prevention)

Research Question

• What are the tradeoffs between speed of detection, speed of development, and speed of deployment of patches to minimize the infectiveness damage from a virus-like attack?

Wrap-up

• Today we’ve discussed:• Network Attacker Defender models: A

method for determining vulnerabilities that doesn’t depend on knowing intent

• Deterrence: How Cyber is similar to, and different from, nuclear deterrence.

• Epidemic Models: One way to consider the problem of virus spread.

Synthesis

Highlighted Areas are tensions amenable to analysis.

Highlighted Areas are tensions amenable to analysis.

Game Theory Approach• More mature effort• Explores trades at the

National Level between discovery of vulnerabilities, speed of development and policy

• Implications for policy and deterrence

Epidemic Approach• Explores trades at the

tactical level between discovering an attack and sending a patch

Current Efforts

• CDR Harrison Schramm – hcschram@nps.edu– 831 656 2358

• Professor David Alderson– dalders@nps.edu– 831 656 1814

Points of Contact

Selected References

Early Work on Network Interdiction Problems:Interdicting Drug Smuggling Operations

• Wood, R.K., 1993, “Deterministic Network Interdiction,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 17, pp. 1-18.

• Washburn, A. and Wood, K., 1995 “Two-Person Zero Sum Games for Network Interdiction,” Operations Research, 43, pp. 243-251.

• Cormican, K.J., Morton, D.P. and Wood, R.K., 1998, “Stochastic Network Interdiction,” Operations Research, 46, pp. 184-197.

• Israeli, E. and Wood, R.K., 2002, “Shortest-Path Network Interdiction,” Networks, 40, pp. 97-111.

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011

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Selected References on DAD Modeling

• Alderson, D.L., Brown, G.G., Carlyle, M.C., and Wood, R.K., 2011,“ Solving Defender-Attacker-Defender Models for Infrastructure Defense,” To appear in Operations Research, Computing and Homeland Defense, K. Wood and R. Dell, eds., Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, Hanover, MD, 2011.

• Brown, G., Carlyle, M., Salmerón, J. and Wood, K., 2006, “Defending Critical Infrastructure” Interfaces, 36, pp. 530-544.

• Brown, G., Carlyle, M., Salmerón, J. and Wood, K., 2005, “Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack, and Planning Defenses,” in Tutorials in Operations Research: Emerging Theory, Methods, and Applications, H. Greenberg and J. Smith, eds., Institute for Operations Research and Management Science, Hanover, MD.

Selected References: Delaying a (Nuclear Weapons) Project

• Brown, G.G., Carlyle, W.M., Harney, R.C., Skroch, E., and Wood, R.K. 2009, “Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project,” Operations Research, 57, pp. 866-877.

• Brown, G., Carlyle M., Harney R., Skroch E., Wood, K., 2006, “Anatomy of a Project to Produce a First Nuclear Weapon,” Science and Global Security, 14, pp. 163–182.

• Brown, G., Carlyle, M., Royset, J. and Wood, K., 2005, “On The Complexity of Delaying an Adversary's Project,” in The Next Wave in Computing, Optimization and Decision Technologies , 2005, eds. B. Golden, S. Raghavan and E.Wasil, Springer, New York, pp. 3-17.

David Alderson – NPS – 22June2011