Post on 27-May-2020
Analyst information production and the timingof annual earnings forecasts
Sami Keskek • Senyo Tse • Jennifer Wu Tucker
� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract We investigate whether the reputation-herding theory or the tradeoff
theory explains variation in the timing of individual analysts’ forecasts. Using
forecast accuracy improvements, forecast boldness, and the price impact of fore-
casts as measures of forecast quality, we find that in the information discovery phase
that precedes an earnings announcement, earlier forecasts have higher quality than
later forecasts. We also find a similar pattern in the information analysis phase that
begins with the earnings announcement date. Our findings suggest that consistent
with the herding theory, analysts who are more capable participate early in dis-
covering and analyzing information, and therefore earlier forecasts in the infor-
mation discovery and analysis phases are of higher quality than later forecasts in
that phase.
Keywords Financial analysts � Timing � Earnings announcements �Information discovery
JEL Classification G14 � G20 � D82 � D83
S. Keskek
Department of Accounting, Sam Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,
AR, USA
e-mail: keskek@uark.edu
S. Tse (&)
Department of Accounting, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX,
USA
e-mail: stse@mays.tamu.edu
J. W. Tucker
Fisher School of Accounting, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
e-mail: jenny.tucker@warrington.ufl.edu
123
Rev Account Stud
DOI 10.1007/s11142-014-9278-7
1 Introduction
Sell-side security analysts perform two distinct tasks in predicting earnings:
information discovery and information analysis. Chen et al. (2010) conclude that
analysts focus on discovering private information before a corporate earnings
announcement and switch to analyzing information immediately afterwards. Prior
research compares the contribution of analysts as a group in the information
discovery and analysis phases (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al. 2010;
Livnat and Zhang 2012). We extend this research by examining the timing of
individual analysts’ forecasts within the information discovery and information
analysis phases. Our interest is to better understand how the timing of an analyst’s
forecast may be used to gauge its quality. In our empirical analysis, we infer
forecast quality from forecast accuracy improvements, forecast boldness, and the
price impact of forecasts.
Two theories link analysts’ forecast quality with the timing of their forecasts. The
reputation-herding theory argues that agents who are more capable act earlier and
base their estimates on their private information, whereas less capable agents
subsequently herd as they seek to hide their low ability (Scharfstein and Stein 1990;
Trueman 1994).1 The theory predicts that earlier forecasts in the information
discovery and information analysis phases are issued by analysts who are more
capable and are therefore better than later forecasts in the same phase. In contrast,
the tradeoff theory predicts that analysts with more precise private information
forecast earlier and those with higher learning ability forecast later (Guttman 2010).
So earlier and later forecasts could both be informative, but for different reasons,
and thus there should be no clear relation between timeliness and forecast quality.
Our findings are consistent with the predictions of the herding theory.
We focus on a uniform task performed by analysts—predicting earnings for the
fiscal year. Analysts compete to issue high-quality forecasts.2 This task requires an
analyst to discover private information and analyze public information. In principle,
information discovery never ceases—analysts discover new information about a
firm and its transactions throughout the year. Routine information discovery is
disrupted, however, by corporate disclosure events such as earnings announcements
for the previous fiscal year and the fiscal quarters of the current year. Analysts then
switch from discovering information to analyzing the corporate disclosure. We refer
to this phase as information analysis. After analyzing the disclosure and refining
their predictions of annual earnings, analysts resume information discovery. We
expect information discovery immediately after the analysis period to be less
intensive than at other times, however, because there are relatively few transactions
1 Several studies explore this theory’s predictions about analyst herding behavior. Hong et al. (2000);
Clement and Tse (2005); and Clarke and Subramanian (2006) all examine analyst characteristics
associated with herding and the career consequences of herding. They find that experience, prior forecast
accuracy, and brokerage size are negatively associated with an analyst’s tendency to herd. In contrast, we
use the herding theory to predict timing-related differences in forecast quality within the information
discovery and analysis phases.2 Researchers cannot directly observe this competition. We infer the effects of competition from
analysts’ timing patterns and ex post forecast quality.
S. Keskek et al.
123
and hence little new private information to be discovered about the new quarter.
(Prior-period earnings are typically announced 20–30 calendar days into the new
period.) We label the phase after information analysis as post-analysis and, for
completeness, consider it the third phase of analyst information production.
Analysts go through the three phases of information production in sequence. Their
activities in a year constitute cycles demarcated by prior-year and interim earnings
announcements.
We examine the timing of a forecast within an information production phase—
information discovery, information analysis, and post-analysis—with a focus on the
first two phases. We consider forecasts issued earlier in an information production
phase to be more timely than those issued later in the same phase. In other words,
our concept of timeliness is based on calendar time, where timeliness declines as
each day passes. This differs from the leader–follower relation examined by Cooper
et al. (2001) and Shroff et al. (2013), who classify analysts as leaders if their
forecasts prompt a string of forecasts by other analysts (followers). Cooper et al.
(2001) find that leaders have a larger price impact than followers. Shroff et al.
(2013) find that followers’ forecasts also affect stock prices, because they convey
private information, and reaffirm leaders’ information, and conclude that both
leaders and followers contribute to price discovery. The leader–follower relation is
based on the idea that followers quickly issue their forecasts after the release of a
forecast by a leader but not after other followers release forecasts; it does not predict
whether a leader or a follower issues an early forecast in calendar time. Analysts
identified as followers may issue early forecasts but would prompt few forecasts by
other analysts if they do so; analysts identified as leaders may forecast late in the
period, but their forecasts would prompt forecasts by other analysts.3 Thus calendar
timing in our study is distinct from the leader–follower concept in prior studies.
Moreover, those studies do not distinguish among analyst activities in the three
information production phases. We extend Cooper et al. (2001) and Shroff et al.
(2013) by separating forecast quality differences attributable to the leader/follower
status from those attributable to analyst herding in calendar time within an
information production phase.
We test the predictions of the herding and tradeoff theories using forecast-
property-based and returns-based forecast quality measures. In a given information
production phase, we examine the relation between forecast timing and the
likelihood that the forecast is more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts (a
forecast property that we refer to as ‘‘forecast accuracy improvement’’). We also
examine the relation between timing and the likelihood that the forecast is bold and
thus innovative. For the return-based forecast quality measures, we examine
whether the intraday absolute stock returns immediately after a forecast vary
systematically with the timing of the forecast within an information production
phase. We conduct similar analysis for daily forecast response coefficients to
forecast revisions.
3 We observe such leader and follower forecast patterns in our sample.
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
We collect analyst forecasts of annual earnings issued during a fiscal year,
identify the earnings announcement that is closest to each forecast, and count the
number of trading days between the forecast and the announcement (which is
designated as day 0). We follow Chen et al. (2010) in defining the starting and
ending dates of the information discovery, information analysis, and post-analysis
phases (see details in Sect. 3.2). The information discovery phase is the 30 trading
days before each earnings announcement. The beginning of this period roughly
coincides with the end of the fiscal quarter whose results are announced on day 0.
The information analysis phase is the five trading days starting with day 0. The post-
analysis phase is trading days 5–29. A fiscal year typically has 252 trading days and
includes four such 60-trading-day windows. We indeed observe four similar cycles
of analyst activities around each earnings announcement during the fiscal year and
therefore pool observations from the four windows for most of our analysis. We
measure the timing of each forecast relative to the closest earnings announcement
and thus forecast timing ranges from -30 to ?29 trading days.
Using forecast accuracy improvement and forecast boldness as measures of
forecast quality, we find that forecast quality declines over time in the information
discovery and analysis phases, with steeper declines in the information analysis
phase than in the longer information discovery phase. These results suggest that
well-informed analysts issue their forecasts early and then leave the field to less-
informed analysts. For our return-based measures of forecast quality, we find that
earlier forecasts have greater price impacts than later forecasts in the second half of
the information discovery phase and in the information analysis phase. In particular,
the price impact of forecasts declines as the earnings announcement date
approaches, sharply increases at the announcement date (reflecting a large dose of
news in the corporate disclosure), rapidly declines over the next few days, and then
gradually recovers over the next few weeks as the next analyst activity cycle begins.
Overall, these findings support the reputation-herding theory as an explanation for
individual analysts’ timing in information production and are inconsistent with the
tradeoff theory.
Our study makes three contributions. First, we contribute to the understanding of
individual analysts’ behavior by establishing that the timing of individual analysts’
forecasts within an information production phase is strongly related to forecast
quality. A large proportion of research on individual analysts’ behavior examines
the determinants of cross-sectional variation in forecast quality and finds that
several analyst characteristics such as brokerage size, experience, all-star status, and
the number of firms or industries followed are associated with forecast quality
(Stickel 1992; Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Clement and
Tse 2003; Bonner et al. 2007). We show that the timing of a forecast within the
information discovery and information analysis phases is another important
determinant of forecast quality.
Second, our findings complement Cooper et al. (2001) and Shroff et al. (2013),
who show returns-based evidence that an analyst’s leader/follower status provides
incremental information about the quality of the analyst’s forecast. We find that
both leaders and followers appear to recognize information discovery and
information analysis as distinct information production phases and engage in both
S. Keskek et al.
123
activities with roughly similar patterns. That is, leaders and followers exhibit the
same downward trend in the relation between timing and forecast quality within the
information discovery and information analysis phases as we observe for all
analysts. Although on average leaders’ forecasts generate a stronger price impact
than followers’ concurrent forecasts, the price impact of followers’ forecasts in
most of the information discovery phase is higher than that of leaders’ in the second
half of the information analysis phase. These results indicate that it is important to
separate the information production phases and that forecast timing within a phase is
incrementally informative about forecast quality beyond an analyst’s leader/
follower status.
Finally, our study highlights the importance of analysts’ information discovery
and information analysis roles in the capital market. The literature has advanced
from determining whether analysts’ primary role is information discovery (Brennan
et al. 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995; Frankel and Li 2004) or information
analysis (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 1999; Francis et al. 2002; Zhang
2008) to determining when analysts perform these roles (Chen et al. 2010). Recent
studies examine the relative importance of analysts’ roles using returns-based tests.
Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) conclude that analysts’ information discovery is more
useful to investors than their information analysis, whereas Livnat and Zhang (2012)
conclude the opposite. Our study shows that information discovery and information
analysis both decline in importance with time in the respective information
production phases and thus provides researchers with a new metric (i.e., timing) for
evaluating forecast quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
background and hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample selection, identifies analyst
information production phases, and discusses analyst forecast timing patterns.
Section 4 discusses the research design, and Sect. 5 presents the test results.
Section 6 examines the relation of timing within an information production phase
and the analyst’s leader/follower status and provides further analysis regarding
when the information analysis phase ends. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
Analyst earnings forecasts help investors predict a firm’s future cash flows and are
most useful if they are accurate and timely.4 All else being equal, forecast accuracy
increases with the amount of information that analysts use. Assuming a steady flow
of information to the market, the longer analysts wait to issue forecasts, the more
information they would have for predicting earnings. By waiting, analysts can also
glean information from their peers’ forecasts to improve their own forecast
accuracy. Therefore analysts who are solely concerned about accuracy would prefer
4 Bias and accuracy both contribute to forecast quality, but we focus on accuracy in this study. Forecast
bias may reflect analyst incentives (e.g., investment banking relationship and favored access to
management). Chen and Jiang (2006) examine analyst incentives to issue forecasts that overweight
favorable private information and underweight unfavorable information. We examine forecast timing
patterns in the general population, so such incentives are beyond our scope.
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
to delay their forecasts. On the other hand, investors value timely information
because it facilitates trading in real time. Analysts who delay their forecasts to
improve accuracy would risk having their information preempted by other sources
and deprive their clients of opportunities to generate trading gains.
Analysts face the tradeoff between accuracy and timeliness in two key
information production phases: information discovery and information analysis.
Guttman (2010) models the tradeoff between accuracy and timeliness for analysts
endowed with ability on two important dimensions: the precision of analysts’
private information and their learning ability. He shows that in equilibrium analysts
with more precise private information forecast earlier and those with higher learning
ability forecast later. Intuitively speaking, analysts with precise private information
have little to gain from waiting and analysts with high learning ability can benefit
from the additional public information that is yet to arrive as well as the information
that they can extract from their peers’ forecasts. Therefore both early and late
forecasts could be informative but for different reasons. Under this theory, there
should be no clear relation between forecast timeliness and quality.
The reputation-herding theory offers different predictions. This theory posits that
agents who are more capable act early and base their estimates on their private
information, whereas less capable agents herd to hide their low ability (Scharfstein
and Stein 1990; Trueman 1994). Under this theory, earlier forecasts in an
information production phase are expected to be issued by financial analysts who
are more capable and thus to be better than later forecasts.
It is unclear which theory better describes individual analysts’ behavior in
forecasting earnings. The herding theory is well established and has been tested in a
variety of other contexts. For example, Graham (1999) finds that investment
advisers herd to protect their reputations. Hong et al. (2000) find that young and
inexperienced financial analysts are more likely to herd and issue less-timely
earnings forecasts. However, the herding theory assumes that an analyst’s
information set is fixed. In contrast, Guttman’s (2010) tradeoff theory additionally
considers the dimension of active learning—a benefit of waiting. The herding and
tradeoff theories provide conflicting predictions about the relation between forecast
timing and forecast quality, so we do not offer directional predictions.
We operationalize these predictions by inferring forecast quality from two
forecast properties—forecast accuracy improvements and forecast boldness—and
the price impact of forecasts. First, we examine whether earlier forecasts are as
likely as later forecasts to improve on the accuracy of peers’ outstanding forecasts in
the same information production phase. Researchers have traditionally viewed
forecast accuracy as an essential property of analyst forecasts. We expect high-
quality forecasts to be more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts and explore
how this tendency changes with forecast timing. Second, we examine the relation
between forecast timing and boldness. Prior studies classify a forecast as bold if it
differs markedly from peers’ outstanding forecasts (Hong et al. 2000) or from both
peers’ expectations and the analyst’s previous forecast (Gleason and Lee 2003;
Clement and Tse 2005). Bold forecasts indicate that the analysts provide new
information to the market, reflecting either their superior private information or
unique insights and data analysis skills. In contrast, the other forecasts mostly reflect
S. Keskek et al.
123
information already revealed by other analysts’ forecasts (Gleason and Lee 2003).
Consistent with this view, Gleason and Lee (2003) and Clement and Tse (2005) find
that bold forecast revisions are more accurate and generate a stronger price impact
than other forecast revisions. Accuracy and boldness are complementary properties
that jointly capture forecast quality better than either of them alone. We state the
first set of hypotheses with the suffix ‘‘a’’ for the information discovery phase and
‘‘b’’ for the information analysis phase in the null form:5
H1a The timeliness of a forecast in the information discovery phase is not
associated with whether it is more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts and
whether it is bold.
H1b The timeliness of a forecast in the information analysis phase is not
associated with whether it is more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts and
whether it is bold.
Last, we examine the association of forecast timing with the price impact of
forecasts. If, consistent with the herding theory, analysts who are more capable
participate early and investors rationally anticipate this timing pattern, investors
would respond more strongly to earlier forecasts.6 If investors are unaware of
analysts’ behavior or do not perceive timing-related differences in forecast quality,
the price impact would be unrelated to forecast timing. If the tradeoff theory
explains individual analysts’ behavior, earlier and later forecasts could have similar
impact on stock prices because investors value information from all sources,
including private information revealed in earlier forecasts and synthesized public
information revealed in later forecasts. We state the second set of hypotheses:
H2a The timeliness of forecasts in the information discovery phase is not
associated with the price impact of forecasts.
H2b The timeliness of forecasts in the information analysis phase is not
associated with the price impact of forecasts.
3 Sample selection, analyst information production phases, and timingpatterns
3.1 Sample selection
Our sample is comprised of firms whose fiscal years end between 1999 and 2008.
We begin the sample period in 1999 because the I/B/E/S time-of-day stamps for
5 In a different setting, Gul and Lundholm (1995) demonstrate that analysts with extreme news (i.e.,
innovative estimates) are likely to forecast early. Their prediction is consistent with the prediction of the
herding theory.6 Trueman (1994, p. 109) argues that ability cannot be the sole determinant of forecast timing. If it were,
then investors could infer analyst ability from timing, removing analysts’ ability to hide low ability and
hence the incentive for delaying forecasts. Thus analysts must have other (exogenous) reasons to release
forecasts at certain dates for the reputation-related timing incentives to function.
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
quarterly earnings announcement dates that we require for the returns tests are
incomplete before 1999. We include a firm-year in our sample if (1) it has the
earnings announcement dates for the preceding fiscal year (t - 1) and interim
quarters of the current year (t) in I/B/E/S, (2) its fiscal year-end month as reported
by Compustat is the same in years t - 1 and t, (3) it announces earnings for years t
and t - 1 within 90 days after the respective fiscal year-ends, and (4) its realized
earnings per share number for year t is available in I/B/E/S. We collect individual
analysts’ forecasts of year t’s earnings issued during the fiscal year from I/B/E/S and
exclude forecasts with an analyst code of ‘‘0,’’ which I/B/E/S uses for unidentifiable
individual analysts. We require a firm to have at least five forecasts for year t.
Finally, we identify the earnings announcement event that is closest to each forecast
and retain forecasts issued within 30 trading days before and 29 trading days after
the announcement.7 In the rest of this paper, we use ‘‘day’’ to mean ‘‘trading day’’
and refer to the earnings announcement day as day 0. Thus forecast timing ranges
from -30 to ?29. These procedures give us 712,946 individual analyst forecasts
provided by 9,369 unique analysts for 6,330 unique firms and 28,010 firm-years
around 97,005 earnings announcement events. The number of observations for
specific tests varies from the full sample when we impose further data requirements,
such as the existence of an outstanding forecast for testing forecast accuracy
improvements and boldness and the availability of intraday returns for testing the
price impact of forecasts.
3.2 Analyst information production phases
We identify analyst information production phases based on Chen et al.’s (2010)
findings and our conjecture about analyst activity cycles. Chen et al. (2010) examine
the association between a firm’s absolute stock return at the earnings announcement
date and the absolute stock returns on days with analyst forecasts in the surrounding
weeks. They interpret a negative association as evidence of information discovery
and a positive association as information analysis.8 They find a significantly
negative association in the six calendar weeks (equivalent to 30 trading days) before
the earning announcement, suggesting that analysts engage in information discovery
during this period. Thus we label days -30 to -1 as the ‘‘information discovery’’
phase and set the indicator variable Before30to01 to 1 for days in this interval and 0
for other days. Chen et al. (2010) find a significantly positive association in the first
calendar week (equivalent to five trading days) immediately after the earnings
announcement suggesting that analysts focus on analyzing public disclosure in this
period. They find only a marginally significantly positive association in the second
week and mark this week along with the following 2 weeks with a ‘‘zero’’ relation
in their summary figure in the introduction, leaving ambiguity regarding whether
week 2 resembles the preceding week or the subsequent week. In our primary
analysis, we label the first calendar week, days 0–4, as the ‘‘information analysis’’
7 There are 252 trading days in a typical year and an average of 62 trading days between two quarterly
earnings announcements. Almost all forecasts fall in one and only one 60-trading-day window.8 Chen et al. (2010) refer to ‘‘information analysis’’ as ‘‘information interpretation.’’
S. Keskek et al.
123
phase and set the indicator variable Aft00to04 to 1 for days in this interval and 0 for
other days. We group week 2, days 5–9, with the subsequent weeks and refer to days
5–29 in the 60-trading-day window as the ‘‘post-analysis’’ phase with the indicator
variable Aft05to29 being 1 for these days and 0 for other days.9 In supplementary
analysis, we separate week 2 from the information analysis and post-analysis phases;
our results suggest that week 2 is best characterized as a transition from information
analysis and thus its inclusion in the post-analysis phase seems appropriate.
Table 1 shows the percentage of analyst forecasts from each phase by the four
earnings announcement events in a year. Across all events, 26.5 % of the forecasts
come from the information discovery phase, 57.8 % from the information analysis
phase, and 15.7 % from the post-analysis phase. Analysts are more active in the
second half of the information discovery phase than in the first half. Within the
information analysis phase, more than half of the forecasts are issued on the first day
after the earnings announcement.
3.3 Analyst forecast timing patterns
We observe variation in analyst forecasting activity during the year. In Fig. 1, we
plot the distribution of analyst forecasts of fiscal year t’s earnings in the 60-trading-
day windows (about three calendar months) around earnings announcements for
year t - 1 and the first three quarters of year t. The graph shows that analyst
forecasting activity increases slightly over the information discovery phase, declines
modestly in the 10 or so days before the earnings announcement, spikes at the
earnings announcement, and then drops drastically in the next few days. The decline
continues at a more gradual pace, reaching the lowest point about 30 days after the
announcement for year t - 1’s earnings and 20–25 days after the announcements of
interim earnings. The next analyst cycle then begins. The pattern suggests that
analyst information production runs in cycles anchored at earnings announcement
events and that analyst forecasts follow clear timing patterns.
4 Research design
We use our measures of forecast quality—forecast accuracy improvements,
boldness, and the price impact of forecasts—as dependent variables in separate
models. The explanatory variable in each model is the timing of a forecast measured
by the number of days between the forecast and the closest earnings announcement;
we label this variable as Day. We use separate intercepts and slope coefficients for
the information discovery, information analysis, and post-analysis phases to allow
the relation to vary for each phase. We use the information discovery phase as the
base estimation period. The effect of forecast timing in this phase is captured by the
slope coefficient on Day, with a negative coefficient indicating a declining effect
9 Chen et al. (2010) find no statistically significant association in weeks 3 and 4 (i.e., trading days 10 to
14) and a significantly negative association in weeks 5 and 6 (i.e., trading days 15 to 29), suggesting that
analysts resume information discovery by day 29.
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
Tab
le1
Distributionofanalystforecastsaroundearningsannouncements
Day
(EA
isonday
0)
Earningsannouncement(EA)event
Prioryear
First
quarter
Secondquarter
Thirdquarter
All
1.Inform
ationdiscoveryphase
Early
inform
ationdiscovery
-30to
-16
8.5
%9.8
%13.2
%14.0
%11.7
%
Lateinform
ationdiscovery
-15to
-1
14.3
%15.3
%14.3
%15.4
%14.8
%
2.Inform
ationanalysisphase
Early
inform
ationanalysis
Earningsannouncementday
013.4
%14.0
%14.3
%13.1
%13.7
%
First
day
after
135.1
%33.2
%32.5
%31.2
%32.8
%
Secondday
after
28.1
%7.0
%7.1
%7.3
%7.3
%
LateInform
ationanalysis
3–4
4.6
%3.9
%3.6
%4.1
%4.0
%
3.Post-analysisphase
5–29
16.1
%16.8
%15.1
%14.9
%15.7
%
Totalpercentage
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Totalobservations
141,902
172,902
188,294
209,848
712,946
Thesampleincludes
analystforecastsoffiscalyeart’searningsissued
duringfiscalyeart,wherefiscalyeartendsduring1999–2008.Duringfiscalyeart,weidentify
four
earningsannouncementeventsandclassify
each
analystforecastto
theclosestearningsannouncementevent(‘‘event,’’day
0).Ifan
earningsannouncementisreleased
afterthemarketcloses,thefollowingday
isconsidered
theeventday.Wekeepforecastsissued
between-30and?29tradingdaysrelativeto
theeventday.Ifaforecast
isissued
afterthemarketcloses,itiscountedas
aforecastonitsfirstavailabletradingday.The60-trading-day
windowisabout90calendar
days.Thefour60-trading-day
windowscover
mostofthetypical
fiscal
yearlength
of252tradingdays
S. Keskek et al.
123
over time. The indicator variables for the information analysis and post-analysis
phases are Aft00to04 and Aft05to29, respectively. We interact Day with the
indicator variables so that the coefficients on the interactions represent incremental
effects in the information analysis and post-analysis phases over that of the
information discovery phase. Our interest is in the slope coefficients for the
information discovery and analysis phases; we include the post-analysis phase for
completeness of an analyst activity cycle.
Although we define the information discovery phase for each quarter as
beginning 30 days before that quarter’s earnings announcement date, it is unclear
when analysts start competing to discover private information about the quarter.
This may not occur immediately on day -30, which is typically 20 calendar days
before the fiscal quarter ends: analysts may not have a confident view of the
quarter’s performance because some transactions would not yet have occurred. To
reflect this uncertainty, we assume that competition for information discovery starts
on day -30 or alternatively on day -15, which is about three days after the end of
the fiscal quarter. We report results for the ‘‘day -30’’ assumption when the ‘‘day
-15’’ assumption yields similar inferences and discuss both sets of results when the
two assumptions yield different inferences.
4.1 Forecast timing and forecast properties
Our H1a examines the association between forecast timeliness and forecast quality
in the information discovery phase; our H1b examines the association in the
Fig. 1 Forecast frequency and standardized forecast accuracy around earnings announcementsthroughout the fiscal year. Earnings announcements are for the previous fiscal year (Q0) and interimquarters of the current year (Q1 to Q3). Day 0 is the earnings announcement date. Trading days relative today 0 are marked. The peak forecast frequency occurs on day 1. Forecast accuracy is the absolutedifference between a forecast and the realization and is standardized for each firm-year so that the mostaccurate forecast has a value of 1 and the least accurate forecast has a value of 0. The mean value offorecast accuracy is used if there is more than one forecast for the firm-year on a given trading day
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
information analysis phase. We estimate the following logit models that use all
annual forecasts (k) for a given firm (i) in the 60-day window around an earnings
announcement event (j):10
ProbImproveijk
Boldijk
!¼ F
a0 þ a1Aft00to04ijk þ a2Aft05to29ijk þ a3Dayijk
þ a4Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ a5Dayijk � Aft05to29ijk
!:
ð1ÞOur measure of forecast accuracy improvements is Improve. We set this variable
to 1 if a forecast is more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts, calculated as the
most recent forecast by a peer analyst (we use the mean estimate if more than one
analyst issues a forecast for the firm on that day) and 0 otherwise.11 By definition,
Improve is 0 if a forecast merely mimics recent forecasts. Improve is a relative
forecast accuracy measure and allows us to focus on the forecast’s contribution to
overall forecast accuracy. We do not use absolute forecast accuracy (i.e., the
absolute difference between a forecast and the realization) because it might reflect
analysts’ collective accuracy at the time of the forecast. Absolute forecast accuracy
increases during a year as information about the firm’s economic activities becomes
available. Late forecasts are typically more accurate than early forecasts because
analysts who issue late forecasts will have observed and therefore incorporated in
their estimates the information revealed in other analysts’ early forecasts.12
Our forecast boldness variable is Bold. Following Clement and Tse (2005), we
set Bold to 1 if a forecast is outside the interval defined by the analyst’s previous
forecast and the most recent forecast by a peer analyst and 0 otherwise. Intuitively
speaking, bold forecasts reflect new information, whereas the other forecasts move
towards peers’ forecasts, perhaps reflecting a compromise between the analyst’s
previous forecast and peers’ forecasts.
The herding theory predicts a positive association between timeliness and
forecast quality in the information discovery phase and therefore a negative a3coefficient, whereas the tradeoff theory predicts no association and thus an
insignificant a3. Similarly, the herding theory predicts a negative coefficient of
a3 ? a4 for the information analysis phase, whereas the tradeoff theory predicts no
association and thus an insignificant coefficient.
4.2 Forecast timing and the price impact of forecasts
H2a examines the association between forecast timing and the price impact of
forecasts in the information discovery phase; H2b examines this association in the
information analysis phase. We measure the price impact of forecasts in two ways:
10 We pool four earnings announcement events in a year because we find almost identical results when
we analyze the prior-year announcement and the interim announcements separately.11 Our proxy for peers’ outstanding forecasts is consistent with Brown and Caylor (2005, see footnote 8),
who argue that this measure is superior to the often-used analyst consensus because long-window
consensus forecasts may include stale forecasts. Moreover, this proxy better captures the daily change in
information than does the analyst consensus in our setting.12 This conjecture is confirmed by the upward trend in the absolute forecast accuracy chart in Fig. 1.
S. Keskek et al.
123
(1) the absolute stock return right after an analyst forecast and (2) the forecast
revision coefficient (FRCs) estimated from daily regressions of stock returns.
Our test using absolute stock returns is Eq. (2):
jReturnijkj ¼ b0 þ b1Aft00to04ijk þ b2Aft05to29ijk
þ b3Dayijk þ b4Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ b5Dayijk � Aft05to29ijk þ eijk:
ð2ÞReturn is the 2-h intraday return after an analyst forecast or in the first two trading
hours on the next trading day if the forecast is issued after the stock market closes.
The intraday returns data are from the TAQ database. We eliminate forecasts that
are within 2 h of the earnings announcement to avoid confounding news. |Return| is
the absolute value of Return.
The absolute returns test ignores the consistency between the forecast news and
price change. To address this issue, we estimate a forecast revision coefficient for
each trading day, t, by regressing returns on forecast news in Eq. (3). The
explanatory variable, Revision, is the difference between the analyst’s current and
prior forecasts, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the return window. We
include the earnings announcement surprise, Surprise, to control for potential
leakage or lingering effects of the earnings announcement news. Surprise is the
difference between reported earnings for the announced quarter and the pre-
announcement consensus forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the
return window. We estimate Eq. (3) for each of the 60 trading days.
Return ¼ a0 þ a1Revisonþ a2Surpriseþ e: ð3ÞWe then regress the FRC estimates on the information production phase indicators
and forecast timing variables in Eq. (4) with each trading day, t, being one
observation:
FRCt ¼ c0 þ c1Aft00to04t þ c2Aft05to29t
þ c3Dayt þ c4Dayt � Aft00to04t þ c5Dayt � Aft05to29t þ et:ð4Þ
The herding theory predicts a positive association between timeliness and return
response in the information discovery phase and therefore negative coefficients of
b3 in Eq. (2) and c3 in Eq. (4), whereas the tradeoff theory predicts no association
and thus insignificant b3 and c3. Similarly, the herding theory predicts negative
coefficients of b3 ? b4 in Eq. (2) and c3 ? c4 in Eq. (4) for the information analysis
phase, whereas the tradeoff theory predicts no association and thus insignificant
coefficients.
5 Test results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our key measures for the information
discovery, information analysis, and post-analysis phases. To investigate how
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
Table
2Descriptivestatistics
Inform
ationdiscoveryphase
Day
-30to
Day
-1
Inform
ationanalysisphase
Day
0to
Day
4
Post-analysisphase
Day
5to
Day
29
Entire
period
Early
[-30,-16]
Late
[-15,-1]
Early-late(t-stat.)
Entire
period
Early
[0,?2]
Late
[?3,?4]
Early-late(t-stat.)
Improve
0.50
0.51
0.50
0.01***
(2.66)
0.52
0.53
0.45
0.08***
(25.74)
0.48
Obs.
179,999
80,485
99,514
383,137
305,761
77,376
110,223
Bold
0.58
0.59
0.57
0.02***
(7.65)
0.59
0.60
0.51
0.09***
(30.71)
0.57
Obs.
179,999
80,485
99,514
383,137
305,761
77,376
110,223
|Return|(%
)1.70
1.70
1.70
0.00
(0.24)
1.71
1.78
1.23
0.55***
(44.82)
1.40
Obs.
159,122
70,115
89,007
307,901
245,770
62,131
91,702
Improve
isan
indicatorvariablethattakes
thevalueof1iftheforecastismore
accuratethan
peers’outstandingforecasts,proxiedbythemostrecentforecastissued
bya
peeranalyst.(Themeanestimateisusedifmore
than
onepeerforecastisissued
onthatday.)Bold
isan
indicatorvariablethattakes
thevalueof1iftheforecastisoutside
theintervaldefined
bytheanalyst’spreviousforecastandpeers’expectations.|Return|istheabsolutestock
return
inthe2hafteraforecastandissetto
bemissingifthe
forecastis
issued
within
2hofan
earningsannouncement.Thenumbersin
parentheses
arethet-statistics
totestthehypothesisthat
thedifference
inmeansis
zero
S. Keskek et al.
123
forecast quality changes over the information discovery and analysis phases, we
compare values of each of the key measures in the early and late periods of the
information discovery and analysis phases. We split the information discovery
phase in the middle into the early period (days -30 to -16) and the late period
(days -15 to -1) and split the information analysis phase into the early period (days
0–2)—a typical three-day window for event studies—and the late period (days 3 and
4).
The mean of Improve is 0.50 in the information discovery phase, 0.52 in the
information analysis phase, and 0.48 in the post-analysis phase. Improve is
significantly higher in the early period than in the late period for both the
information discovery and information analysis phases. The percentage of bold
forecasts ranges from 57 to 59 % across the three phases. Bold is significantly
higher in the early period than in the late period for both the information discovery
and analysis phases. These patterns indicate that analyst forecasts issued early in
these phases are more likely to improve on the accuracy of peers’ outstanding
forecasts and are more likely to be bold than those issued late in the phases. The
mean absolute return, |Return|, is approximately 1.7 % in the information discovery
and analysis phases and is 1.4 % in the post-analysis phase. Early returns in the
information discovery phase are no different from late returns in the phase, whereas
early returns in the information analysis phase are much higher than late returns in
that phase.
5.2 Forecast timing and forecast properties
To illustrate the effects of timing on forecast quality, we plot the daily mean of
Improve in Fig. 2 after pooling all earnings announcement events. The daily mean
of Improve measures the percentage of forecasts from all analysts on a given trading
day that are more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts. Between announce-
ments, the measure peaks at 53 % about 25 days before the upcoming announce-
ment. A downward trend ensues until the earnings announcement date. The measure
jumps to a high of 60 % at the announcement date and slumps quickly to a low of
45 % 5 days after the announcement. Figure 2 also plots the daily mean of Bold,
corresponding to the percentage of bold forecasts on a given day. This measure
starts at about 60 % at the beginning of the information discovery phase and
declines noticeably during this phase. It then spikes to about 70 % on the earnings
announcement day and declines rapidly to its lowest level of 50 % in 3 or 4 days.
After that, the measure climbs gradually to 60 % at the end of the post-analysis
phase. We conclude from these patterns that analyst forecast quality declines over
both the information discovery and analysis phases, suggesting that analysts with
superior information tend to provide their forecasts earlier in each phase than the
other analysts. The discontinuity in earnings quality at the earnings announcement
and the increase over the post-analysis phase indicate that analysts conduct distinct
activities in the information discovery, information analysis, and post-analysis
phases.
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the relation of forecast timing with
forecast accuracy improvements in the first two columns and with forecast boldness
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
in the last two columns. We cluster standard errors by analyst and year in all
analyses unless otherwise noted. For the ‘‘Improve’’ estimation, the Day
coefficient is -0.002, statistically significant, indicating that analysts are less
likely to issue more accurate forecasts than peers’ outstanding forecasts as time
elapses in the information discovery phase. The sum of coefficients on Day and
Day 9 Aft00to04 is -0.192, indicating that forecast accuracy improvements
decline rapidly in the information analysis phase.13 For the ‘‘Bold’’ equation, the
Day coefficient of -0.005 is statistically significant, indicating that earlier
forecasts are more likely to be bold than later forecasts in the information
discovery phase. The sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft00to04 is
-0.254, significantly negative, indicating that the likelihood of a forecast being
bold declines rapidly in the information analysis phase. These results suggest that
analyst forecasts issued earlier in the information discovery and analysis phases
are more likely to improve on the accuracy of peers’ outstanding forecasts and
Fig. 2 Proportion of forecasts that are more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts or that are bold.Observations for the prior-year announcement and current-year interim announcements are pooled in thisgraph. Peers’ outstanding forecasts are proxied by the most recent forecast issued by a peer analyst. (Themean estimate is used if there is more than one forecast on that day.) A forecast is ‘‘bold’’ if it is outsidethe interval defined by the analyst’s previous forecast and peers’ expectations. The improvement ratio isthe percentage of forecasts from all companies on a given day that are more accurate than peers’outstanding forecasts. The bold ratio is the percentage of forecasts that are bold on a given day
13 Although it is not our focus, the steeper negative slope for the information analysis period than for the
information discovery period suggests that analysts compete much more intensely in information analysis
than in information discovery (perhaps because information analysis is confined to a very short window).
Such intense competition facilitates price discovery after corporate disclosure.
S. Keskek et al.
123
be bold than those issued later in the same phase. These findings are consistent
with the predictions of the herding theory.14
Managers favor prior-year and interim earnings announcement events as a venue
to provide annual earnings guidance (Anilowski et al. 2007; Lansford et al. 2013).
Forecasts issued soon after the earnings announcement may improve on the
accuracy of peers’ outstanding forecasts or be bold because they incorporate
Table 3 Forecast timing and forecast properties Logit model: ProbImproveijk
Boldijk
!¼
Fa0 þ a1Aft00to04ijk þ a2Aft05to29ijk þ a3Dayijk
þ a4Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ a5Dayijk � Aft05to29ijk þ eijk
!
Improve Bold
Coefficient Coefficient sum Coefficient Coefficient sum
Intercept -0.022
(-1.34)
0.237***
(13.13)
Aft00to04 0.322***
(12.60)
0.418***
(18.63)
Aft05to29 -0.208***
(-6.46)
-0.156***
(-5.39)
Day -0.002***
(-3.50)
-0.005***
(-6.41)
Day 9 Aft00to04 -0.189***
(-17.80)
-0.192***
(-18.75)
-0.249***
(-26.39)
-0.254***
(-28.28)
Day 9 Aft05to29 0.012***
(9.06)
0.009***
(8.53)
0.018***
(18.21)
0.013***
(14.09)
Pseudo R2 1 % 1 %
The estimations use all annual analyst forecasts (k) for a given firm (i) around an earnings announcement
event (j, such as 2007Q1) and that have a prior forecast by any other analyst for calculating forecast
accuracy improvement or boldness. Improve is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
forecast is more accurate than peers’ outstanding forecasts, proxied by the most recent forecast issued by
a peer analyst. (The mean estimate is used if more than one peer forecast is issued on that day.) Bold is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the forecast is outside the interval defined by the analyst’s
previous forecast and peers’ outstanding forecasts. Day is the number of trading days relative to the
closest earnings announcement date and its value is negative for observations before the earnings
announcement, 0 for the announcement date, and positive for observations after the announcement date.
The information discovery phase (days -30 to -1) is the baseline period in the estimation. We use the
indicator variables Aft00to04 for the information analysis phase and Aft05to29 for the post-analysis phase.
The slope coefficient for the information analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and
Day9 Aft00to04, and the slope coefficient for the post-analysis period is the sum of coefficients on Day
and Day 9 Aft05to29, as indicated in Columns 2 and 4. The estimations use 673,359 observations with
standard errors clustered by analyst and year. We report z-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively
14 A concern arising from our measurement of Improve and Bold is that the arrival of corporate news may
bias these measures upward at the earnings announcement date. Our results are similar if we exclude
forecasts issued on days 0 and 1 (untabulated).
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
managers’ guidance rather than analysts’ insights. Managers’ guidance issued
outside an earnings announcement window may also enhance the quality of analyst
forecasts issued after the guidance. We partition the sample into analyst forecasts
issued in a 60-day earnings announcement event window in which managers
provided guidance and forecasts in windows without such guidance. Results for the
two subsamples are similar to those for the full sample, suggesting that our results
are robust to managers’ guidance (untabulated).
We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of Bold
and Improve. Instead of using the most recent forecast by a peer analyst to proxy for
peers’ outstanding forecasts, we use a consensus calculated as the mean estimate in
the preceding 60-calendar-day window. We find similar results and conclude that
our measures are robust.
5.3 Forecast timing and return responses
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the relation between forecast timing and
absolute stock returns. The coefficient on Day is not statistically significant from 0,
indicating no evidence of a downward slope in absolute stock returns over the
information discovery phase. The sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft00to04
is -0.269 with a t-statistic of -12.13, significantly negative, suggesting that
investors respond more strongly to earlier forecasts than to later forecasts in the
information analysis phase. The positive coefficient on Aft00to04 indicates a jump
in return responses soon after the earnings announcement due to the arrival of
corporate news.
To understand the absence of a downward slope in the information discovery
phase, we use the alternative assumption regarding when analyst competition starts
in this phase. Instead of assuming that it begins on day -30 as in Eq. (2), we
investigate whether competition differs in the two halves of the phase, centered on
day -15. We add an indicator, Bef30to16, for the interval of days -30 to -16, and
its interaction with Day. The model is:
jReturnijkj ¼ b0 þ b1Bef30to16ijk þ b2Aft00to04ijk þ b3Aft05to29ijk þ b4Dayijk
þ b5Dayijk � Bef30to16ijk þ b6Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ b7Dayijk
� Aft05to29ijk þ eijk: ð5ÞWe report the results in the third and fourth columns of Table 4. The Day
coefficient now represents the slope for the second half of the information discovery
phase, days -15 to -1, and is significantly negative at -0.026. In contrast, the
coefficient for the first half of the information discovery phase (the sum of
coefficients on Day and Day 9 Bef30to16) is statistically insignificant at -0.002.
These results indicate that analyst competition is absent in the first half but occurs in
the second half of the information discovery phase.
We plot absolute stock returns around analyst forecasts in Fig. 3 and find a
pattern consistent with the regression results. Specifically, returns exhibit a
downward slope in the second half of the information discovery phase, spike at
the earnings announcement date, fall rapidly in the next four to 5 days, and then
S. Keskek et al.
123
recover gradually from about day 10 onward. We conclude that investors respond to
analyst forecasts as if they recognize differences in forecast quality related to the
timing within each analyst information production phase.
In Table 5 we report regression results for Eq. (4) in the first two columns. The
slope on Day is -0.011, weakly significantly negative, indicating a downward slope
in the information discovery phase. The sum of coefficients on Day and
Day 9 Aft00to04 is -0.281, statistically significantly negative, indicating a
substantial decline in return responses as each day passes in the information
Table 4 Forecast timing and absolute stock returns
jReturnijkj ¼ a0 þ a1Bef30to16ijk þ a2Aft00to04ijk þ a3Aft05to29ijk þ a4Dayijk þ a5Dayijk
� Bef30to16ijk þ a6Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ a7Dayijk � Aft05to29ijk þ eijk
Coefficient Coefficient sum Coefficient Coefficient sum
Intercept 0.016***
(9.64)
0.015***
(9.97)
Bef30to16 0.002
(0.98)
Aft00to04 0.004***
(4.13)
0.005***
(5.81)
Aft05to29 -0.005***
(-5.81)
-0.004***
(-5.00)
Day -0.004
(-1.27)
-0.026***
(-6.03)
Day 9 Bef30to16 0.024**
(2.48)
-0.002
(-0.30)
Day 9 Aft00to04 -0.264***
(-11.71)
-0.269***
(-12.13)
-0.243***
(-11.60)
-0.269***
(-12.13)
Day 9 Aft05to29 0.022***
(6.98)
0.018***
(7.24)
0.044***
(7.29)
0.018***
(7.24)
Adjusted R2 1 % 1 %
|Return| is the absolute stock return in the 2 h after an analyst forecast or in the first two trading hours on
the next trading day if the forecast is made after the stock market closes. The variable is set to be missing
if the forecast is issued within 2 h of an earnings announcement. Day is the number of trading days
relative to the closest earnings announcement date and its value is negative for observations before the
earnings announcement, 0 for the announcement date, and positive for observations after the
announcement date. The full information discovery phase (days -30 to -1) is the baseline period in the
first estimation, and the late information discovery phase (days -15 to -1) is the baseline period in the
second estimation. We use the indicator variables Bef30to16 for the early information discovery period,
Aft00to04 for the information analysis phase, and Aft05to29 for the post-analysis phase. The slope
coefficient for the early information discovery phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9
Bef30to16. The slope coefficient for the information analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and
Day 9 Aft00to04. The slope coefficient for the post-analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and
Day 9 Aft05to29. The coefficients on Day and its interaction terms are multiplied by 100 for presen-
tation. The estimations use 558,725 observations with standard errors clustered by analyst and year. We
report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 level,
respectively
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
analysis phase. As in Table 4, we present the estimation results in the last two
columns of Table 5, with the assumption that analyst competition begins midway in
the information discovery phase. The coefficient on Day is -0.047, significantly
negative, indicating a decline in return responses that is concentrated in the second
half of the information discovery phase. Our return-based test results in Tables 4
and 5 are largely consistent with the predictions of the herding theory.
Figure 4 plots FRCs, estimated from Eq. (3), in the 60-trading-day window and
shows that FRC decreases as time elapses in the second half or the last third of the
information discovery phase. Although FRC increases sharply at the earnings
announcement date, it drops quickly over the 5 days of the information analysis
phase before climbing to just below the level of the early information discovery
phase by the end of the post-analysis phase.15 The patterns in the figure are
consistent with the regression results and support our conclusion that investors
recognize timing-related quality differences in individual analysts’ forecasts.
The return-based test results could be influenced by management earnings
guidance. Earnings guidance preceding analyst forecasts may inflate the reported
information content of analyst forecasts because investors might be responding to
corporate news as well. For robustness, we eliminate all forecasts that were issued
on the same day as management earnings guidance or on the next 2 days. Our
original sample of observations with available intraday returns is reduced to 467,590
Fig. 3 Absolute stock returns around analyst forecasts. This figure plots the daily mean of absolute stockreturns in the 2 h after an analyst’s forecast. The stock return is set to be missing if the forecast is issuedwithin 2 h of an earnings announcement
15 Although it is not the focus of our study, we observe that FRC is higher on several days in the
information discovery phase than in the entire information analysis phase, suggesting that investors
sometimes value information discovery more highly than they do information analysis.
S. Keskek et al.
123
observations, but our results remain unchanged (untabulated). We therefore
conclude that our findings are unaffected by management earnings guidance.
In our primary analyses, we measure returns in the 2-h window and eliminate
forecasts that are within 2 h of the earnings announcement to avoid the confounding
effect of earnings announcement. As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis
Table 5 Forecast timing and forecast response coefficients
FRCt ¼ a0 þ a1Bef30to16t þ a2Aft00to04t þ a3Aft05to29t þ a4Dayt þ a5Dayt � Bef30to16t þ a6Dayt
� Aft00to04t þ a7Dayt � Aft05to29t þ et
Coefficient Coefficient sum Coefficient Coefficient sum
Intercept 1.051***
(9.97)
0.827***
(5.66)
Bef30to16 -0.153
(-0.38)
Aft00to04 0.048
(0.20)
0.272
(1.07)
Aft05to29 -0.933***
(-5.23)
-0.709***
(-3.53)
Day -0.011*
(-1.88)
-0.047***
(-2.92)
Day 9 Bef30to16 0.022
(0.97)
-0.025
(-1.55)
Day 9 Aft00to04 -0.270***
(-3.03)
-0.281***
(-3.16)
-0.234***
(-2.71)
-0.281***
(-3.31)
Day 9 Aft05to29 0.043***
(4.35)
0.032***
(4.04)
0.078***
(4.43)
0.032***
(4.23)
Adjusted R2 61 % 61 %
Forecast response coefficient (FRC) is the estimated coefficient on Revision in the model
Return ¼ a0 þ a1Revisonþ a2Surpriseþ e. Return is the stock return in the 2 h after an analyst forecast
or in the first two trading hours on the next trading day if the forecast is made after the stock market
closes. The variable is set to be missing if the forecast is issued within 2 h of an earnings announcement.
Revision is the difference between the analyst’s current and prior forecasts. Surprise is the difference
between earnings and the pre-announcement consensus forecast. Revision and Surprise are deflated by the
stock price at the beginning of the return measurement window. We estimate this regression on each
trading day and obtain the daily FRC estimates. The 60 daily FRC estimates are regressed on the
information production phase indicators, Day, and the interactions. Day is the number of trading days
relative to the closest earnings announcement date and its value is negative for observations before the
earnings announcement, 0 for the announcement date, and positive for observations after the
announcement date. The full information discovery phase (days -30 to -1) is the baseline period in the
first estimation and the late information discovery period (days -15 to -1) is the baseline period in the
second estimation. We use the indicator variables Bef30to16 for the early information discovery period,
Aft00to04 for the information analysis phase, and Aft05to29 for the post-analysis phase. The slope
coefficient for the early information discovery phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and
Day 9 Bef30to16. The slope coefficient for the information analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on
Day and Day 9 Aft00to04. The slope coefficient for the post-analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on
Day and Day 9 Aft05to29. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
after eliminating forecasts issued on the earnings announcement day and the next
day.16 We still find strong negative trends in return responses in the information
analysis phase (untabulated). Thus our primary results are not driven by
confounding earnings announcement news.
6 Further analyses
6.1 Leader versus follower analysts
In this section, we distinguish the herding phenomenon documented in our study
from the leader–follower phenomenon in Cooper et al. (2001) and Shroff et al.
(2013). Following Shroff et al. (2013), we identify leader/follower analysts in a
series of steps. We require that at least five analysts follow a firm during the fiscal
year and eliminate forecasts issued on days 0 and 1. We calculate a leader–follower
ratio (LFR) as the ratio of the cumulative number of days by which the two prior
forecasts lead the forecast to the cumulative number of days by which the next two
Fig. 4 Forecast timing and forecast response coefficients. FRC is the coefficient estimate on Revision inthe regression: Return ¼ a0 þ a1Revisonþ a2Surpriseþ e. Return is the stock return in the 2 h after aforecast and set to be missing if the forecast is issued within 2 h of an earnings announcement. Revision isthe difference between the analyst’s current and prior forecasts. We control for earnings surprise(Surprise), the difference between announced earnings and the pre-announcement consensus forecast, inthe regression. Revision and Surprise are scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the returnmeasurement window. The regression is estimated for each trading day
16 This test addresses three issues: (1) confounding corporate news in the earnings announcement, (2)
after-hour announcements (Berkman and Truong 2009), and (3) exclusion of earnings announcement date
by prior studies.
S. Keskek et al.
123
forecasts follow the forecast.17 If an analyst issues more than one forecast for the
firm-year, we sum the numerators and denominators of LFR of the multiple
forecasts for that analyst. We identify the analyst with the highest LFR rank as the
lead analyst for the firm-year if the number of analysts following the firm ranges
from five to nine and identify an additional analyst as a lead analyst for each
succeeding five-analyst increase in following up to a maximum of eight lead
analysts. These requirements significantly reduce our intraday returns sample to
439,503 analyst forecasts with LFR available, including 66,261 forecasts by leaders
and 373,242 forecasts by followers.
In Fig. 5, we plot leaders’ and followers’ activities in the 60-trading-day window
pooled over the four earnings announcement events during the year. Because there
are fewer leaders than followers, we convert the raw number of forecasts to a
percentage of each group’s total forecasts to facilitate comparison. The bar charts
show that leaders’ and followers’ forecast patterns during an analyst activity cycle
are remarkably similar and closely match the pattern for all analysts in Fig. 1. This
similarity suggests that both leaders and followers recognize information discovery
and information analysis as distinct information production activities and do both.
Next, we investigate the absolute return responses to leaders’ and followers’
forecasts in Fig. 5 by adding line charts of the mean absolute stock returns measured
in the 2 h following leaders’ and followers’ forecasts. The returns for leaders exceed
those for followers at most points of the analyst activity cycle, indicating that
leaders have superior private information or public information processing skills
than followers given the same set of public information. When we compare forecasts
over the entire analyst activity cycle, however, we find that the returns depend more
on the information production phase of the activity cycle and the timing within the
phase than on the leader/follower status. For example, the return responses to
followers’ forecasts in most of the information discovery phase are higher than
those to leaders’ in the second half of the information analysis phase and in the post-
analysis phase.18
Finally, we test the associations of forecast timing and absolute returns for
leaders and followers separately and report the results in Table 6. For both groups,
we find a decline in return responses over time in the second half of the information
discovery phase and in the information analysis phase.19 We obtain similar results
for forecast accuracy improvement and forecast boldness (untabulated). These
findings indicate that forecast timing matters for both groups and that timing within
an information production phase is an incremental determinant of forecast quality
beyond the leader/follower status.
17 We use annual earnings forecasts to construct our measure for consistency with our other analyses.
Shroff et al. (2013) use forecasts of quarterly earnings.18 The differences are statistically significant at better than the 1 % level (untabulated).19 Similar to Shroff et al. (2013), we require that the firm be followed by at least five analysts to calculate
the leader–follower ratio. When we estimate our primary models on a sample of firms with too few
analysts to calculate the leader–follower ratio, we still find results consistent with the herding theory,
indicating that our timeliness measure provides a measure of forecast quality for a broader sample than
the method of Shroff et al.
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
6.2 The length of the information analysis period
In our primary analysis we include week 2, days 5–9, in the post-analysis phase.
Now, we examine whether the forecast quality patterns in this interval resemble
those in the preceding information analysis phase. The indicator variable Aft05to09
is 1 for days in this interval and 0 otherwise. We modify the returns model, Eq. (5),
by adding Aft05to09 and the interaction between Day and Aft05to09. Equation (6) is
the new regression:
jReturnijkj ¼ b0 þ b1Bef30to16ijk þ b2Aft00to04ijk þ b3Aft05to09ijk þ b4Aft10to29ijk
þ b5Dayijk þ b6Dayijk �Bef30to16ijk þ b7Dayijk �Aft00to04ijk
þ b8Dayijk �Aft05to09ijk þ b9Dayijk �Aft10to29ijk þ eijk: ð6ÞThe estimation results, reported in Table 7, show that the slope coefficient for the
interval of days 5–9 is -0.011, statistically insignificantly different from 0, in
contrast to the significantly negative coefficient for the first week after earnings
announcement. We obtain similar results for week 2 from the augmented accuracy
improvement and forecast boldness models (untabulated). These results suggest that
week 2 does not belong in the information analysis phase and that analyst
competition in this phase ends in week 1.
Fig. 5 Forecast distribution and absolute returns for leader and follower analysts. The bars show thedaily percentage of forecasts issued by leader and follower analysts within the respective group. The linesare the daily mean absolute stock returns in the 2 h after the forecasts of leaders and followers,respectively. The leader–follower analyst status is determined from clustering patterns in forecasts ofcurrent fiscal year earnings following the procedures in Shroff et al. (2013)
S. Keskek et al.
123
7 Conclusion
Financial analysts contribute to informational efficiency in the capital markets by
uncovering new information and analyzing public disclosures. Prior research
examines the relative importance of information discovery versus information
analysis for analysts as a group. We extend the literature by examining the timing of
individual analysts’ activities within the information discovery and information
analysis phases. Consistent with the reputation-herding theory, we find that earlier
forecasts in an analyst information production phase have higher forecast quality (as
Table 6 Forecast timing and absolute stock returns for lead and follower analysts
jReturnijkj ¼ a0 þ a1Bef30to16ijk þ a2Aft00to04ijk þ a3Aft05to29ijk þ a4Dayijk þ a5Dayijk
� Bef30to16ijk þ a6Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ a7Dayijk � Aft05to29ijk þ eijk
Leader Follower
Coefficient Coefficient sum Coefficient Coefficient sum
Intercept 0.016***
(9.83)
0.015***
(9.38)
Bef30to16 0.000
(0.19)
0.001
(0.58)
Aft00to04 0.004***
(3.48)
0.004***
(4.78)
Aft05to29 -0.003**
(-2.27)
-0.004***
(-4.53)
Day -0.033***
(-3.37)
-0.022***
(-4.28)
Day 9 Bef30to16 0.026*
(1.71)
-0.007
(-0.65)
0.018*
(1.87)
-0.004
(-0.49)
Day 9 Aft00to04 -0.236***
(-8.21)
-0.269***
(-9.84)
-0.217***
(-10.65)
-0.239***
(-10.70)
Day 9 Aft05to29 0.050***
(4.68)
0.017***
(3.28)
0.039***
(5.34)
0.017***
(5.74)
Adjusted R2 1 % 1 %
|Return| is the absolute stock return in the 2 h after an analyst forecast or in the first two trading hours on
the next trading day if the forecast is made after the stock market closes. The variable is set to be missing
if the forecast is issued within 2 h of an earnings announcement. Day is the number of trading days
relative to the closest earnings announcement date, and its value is negative for observations before the
earnings announcement, 0 for the announcement date, and positive for observations after the
announcement date. The late information discovery period (days -15 to -1) is the baseline period. We
use the indicator variables Bef30to16 for the early information discovery period, Aft00to04 for the
information analysis phase, and Aft05to29 for the post-analysis phase. The slope coefficient for the early
information discovery phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Bef30to16. The slope coef-
ficient for the information analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft00to04. The
slope coefficient for the post-analysis phase is the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft05to29. The
coefficients on Day and its interaction terms are multiplied by 100. We identify leader and follower
analysts using the procedures in Shroff et al. (2013). The leader (follower) estimation uses 66,261
(373,242) observations with standard errors clustered by analyst and year. We report t statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively
The timing of annual earnings forecasts
123
measured by forecast accuracy improvements, forecast boldness, and the price
impact of forecasts) than later forecasts in that phase. In addition, forecast timing
within distinct analyst information production phases is incrementally informative
Table 7 Absolute stock returns and forecast timing in week 2 after the earnings announcement
jReturnijkj ¼ a0 þ a1Bef30to16ijk þ a2Aft00to04ijk þ a3Aft05to09ijk þ a4Aft10to29ijk þ a5Dayijk
þ a6Dayijk � Bef30to16ijk þ a7Dayijk � Aft00to04ijk þ a8Dayijk � Aft05to09ijk
þ a9Dayijk � Aft10to29þ eijk
Coefficient Coefficient sum
Intercept 0.015***
(9.97)
Bef30to16 0.002
(0.98)
Aft00to04 0.005***
(5.81)
Aft05to09 -0.002**
(-2.04)
Aft10to29 -0.004***
(-3.98)
Day -0.026***
(-6.03)
Day 9 Bef30to16 0.024**
(2.48)
-0.002
(-0.30)
Day 9 Aft00to04 -0.243***
(-11.60)
-0.269***
(-12.13)
Day 9 Aft05to09 0.015
(1.25)
-0.011
(-0.90)
Day 9 Aft10to29 0.045***
(6.89)
0.019***
(5.32)
Adjusted R2 1 %
|Return| is the absolute stock return in the 2 h after an analyst forecast or in the first two trading hours on
the next trading day if the forecast is made after the stock market closes. The variable is set to be missing
if the forecast is issued within 2 h of an earnings announcement. Day is the number of trading days
relative to the closest earnings announcement date, and its value is negative for observations before the
earnings announcement, 0 for the announcement date, and positive for observations after the
announcement date. The late information discovery phase (days -15 to -1) is the baseline period in the
estimation. We use the indicator variables Bef30to16 for the early information discovery period,
Aft00to04 for the information analysis phase, Aft05to09 for week 2, days 5–9, and Aft10to29 for the
remaining post-analysis phase. The slope coefficient for the early information discovery phase is the sum
of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Bef30to16. The slope coefficient for the information analysis phase is
the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft00to04. The slope coefficient for week 2 is the sum of
coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft05to09. The slope coefficient for the remaining post-analysis phase is
the sum of coefficients on Day and Day 9 Aft10to29. The coefficients on Day and its interaction terms
are multiplied by 100 for presentation. The estimations use 558,725 observations with standard errors
clustered by analyst and year. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively
S. Keskek et al.
123
about forecast quality beyond an analyst’s leader/follower status. These finding
enrich the understanding of how individual analysts contribute to price discovery in
the capital markets.
Acknowledgments We thank Anwer Ahmed, Shuping Chen, Xia Chen, Michael Clement, Gus De
Franco, Matt Hart, Joost Impink, Marcus Kirk, Paul Madsen, Tom Omer, David Reppenhagen, Kathy
Rupar, Jim Vincent, Greg Waymire, David Weber, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the
2011 AAA Annual Conference and the accounting workshops at the University of Connecticut,
University of Florida, Peking University, University of Toronto, and Zhongshan University.
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