Post on 05-Jan-2016
description
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Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science
How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates
Stephen StichDept. of Philosophy
& Center for Cognitive ScienceRutgers University
sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu
Jean Nicod
Lectures
2007
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Lecture 2
The Persistence of Moral Disagreement
Jean Nicod
Lectures
2007
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Philosophical Background
Fundamental Moral DisagreementFundamental Moral Disagreement
No one doubts that moral views differ both withinwithin cultural groups
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Philosophical Background
Fundamental Moral DisagreementFundamental Moral Disagreement
No one doubts that moral views differ both withinwithin cultural groups and acrossacross cultural groups
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Philosophical Background
Fundamental Moral DisagreementFundamental Moral Disagreement
But whether that diversity of views would persist under idealizedidealized circumstance is a hotly debated question
How to characterize the relevant sort of relevant sort of idealized circumstancesidealized circumstances is a difficult and contentious question
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Philosophical Background
It is widely agreed that in to be “ideally situated” people must be
rational rational impartialimpartial agree on all relevant non-moral issuesagree on all relevant non-moral issues
There is much debate on how these notions are to be understood
But I’ll assume we all have a rough understanding which is good enough for present purposes
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Philosophical Background
If a moral disagreement would persist persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is
FundamentalFundamental
If it would not persistnot persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is
SuperficialSuperficial
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Philosophical Background
There are many reasons why it’s philosoph-philosoph-ically importantically important to know whether moral disagreement is fundamental or superficial
I’ll focus on two
Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude TheoriesTheories
Moral RealismMoral Realism
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Philosophical Background
Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude TheoriesIdeal Observer & Qualified Attitude Theories
(arguably) defended by Adam Smith, Hume & Hutcheson
and by Firth, Brandt, Lewis, Harman & other leading moral theorists in the 20th century
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Philosophical Background
Semantic Version:
‘x is morally right (wrong)’x is morally right (wrong)’ means anyone who is ideally situated (= rational, impartial, fully informed, etc.) would have a (un)favorable attitude toward x
If ideally situated people disagree about x, then x is neither right nor wrong
Semantic version + fundamental disagreement
Moral SkepticismMoral Skepticism
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Philosophical Background
Justification Version: a moral claim is justified justified iff the person making
the claim would have the appropriate attitude toward the matter at hand, after going thru an appropriate idealizing process (= a process that corrects relevant false beliefs & removes partiality, irrationality, etc).
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Philosophical Background
If two ideally situated people have different attitudes about x, then
‘x is wrong’is justified for one while
‘x is not wrong’is justified for the other
This version of the Ideal Observer Theory + fundamental disagreement
Moral RelativismMoral Relativism
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Philosophical Background
Moral RealismMoral Realism
defended by Boyd, Brink, Railton, Michael Smith, Sturgeon & many others
there are lots of important differences between these theorists
but for most of them, the persistence of moral moral disagreement that does not depend on non-moral disagreement that does not depend on non-moral disagreementdisagreement (or other distorting factors, like self-interest or irrationality) would pose a significant significant problem problem
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Philosophical Background
Richard Boyd:
"careful philosophical exam- ination will reveal …that agreement on nonmoral issues agreement on nonmoral issues would eliminate almost all would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of disagreement about the sorts of issues which arise in ordinary issues which arise in ordinary moral practicemoral practice.” "(1988)
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David Brink:
“It is incumbent on the moral realist . . . To claim that most moral disputes are resolvableresolvable at least in principle.” (1984)
Philosophical Background
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Philosophical Background
The notion of objectivity “signifies the possibility of a convergenceconvergence in moral views” (1994: 6)
Michael Smith:
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Philosophical Background
Many Moral Realists and many Moral Anti-Realists would agreeagree that
Fundamental moral disagreementFundamental moral disagreement (i.e. persisting diversity under idealized conditions) entails, or at least strongly suggests, that
Moral Realism is FalseMoral Realism is False*
*“Non-Convergentists” disagree
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Philosophical Background
For these reasons (and others) it is clearly
philosophically importantphilosophically important
to determine whether (and to what extent) moral disagreement is
fundamentalfundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Arguably the first “experimental philosopher” of the modern period was
Richard Brandt1910 - 1997
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There is a large anthropological literature (going back to Westermark 1906) documenting radically divergent moral outlooksradically divergent moral outlooks in different cultures.
But traditional ethnography gives little guidance about what people’s moral attitudes would be under idealizedidealized circumstances.
In the 1950s, Brandt’s began a study of the HopisHopis aimed at providing the sort of ethno-graphy that would be useful to philosophers
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
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Brandt found a number of examples of moral moral differencesdifferences between Hopis & white Americans that he could not trace to non-moral disagreementcould not trace to non-moral disagreement
Hopi have no moral qualms about allowing children to “play” with small animals“play” with small animals in a way which causes them great pain, breaks their bones and ultimately kills them
Brandt looked for evidence that the disagreement between the Hopis’ moral view and the view of contemporary white Americans was superficialsuperficial
But he found none
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
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Hopi do not believe that these animals lack the capacity to feel painpain
nor do they believe (e.g.) that animals are rewarded for martyrdommartyrdom in the afterlife
nor could Brandt find any otherany other nonmoral belief or failure of imagination that could account for the disagreement
Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Brandt concluded that these moral disagreements are fundamental
they reflect a “basic difference of attitude”“basic difference of attitude” which would not disappear not disappear under idealized conditions under idealized conditions like those that his own “qualified attitude theory” specified
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
He went on to argue that the “Qualified Attitude Theory” (his own justification-based version of the Ideal Observer Theory) led to relativism
and that some semantic versions of the Ideal Observer Theory led to skepticism
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Richard Nisbett’sRichard Nisbett’s studies of attitudes toward honor & violence in “Cultures of “Cultures of Honor”Honor” is a rich source of rich source of evidenceevidence suggesting that some very important examples of moral disagreement are fundamentalfundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Richard Nisbett’sRichard Nisbett’s studies of attitudes toward honor & violence in “Cultures of “Cultures of Honor”Honor” is a rich source of rich source of evidenceevidence suggesting that some very important examples of moral disagreement are fundamentalfundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
“A key aspect of the culture of honor is the importance placed on the insult and the necessity to respond to it. An insult implies that the target is weak enough to be bullied. Since a reputation for strength is of the essence in the culture of honor, the individual who insults someone must be forced to retract; if the instigator refuses, he must be punished – with violence or even death.” (Nisbett and Cohen 1996: 5)
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Cultures of honor tend to arise in situations where resources are liable to theftresources are liable to theft and where the state’s coercive apparatus cannot be relied on to prevent or punish theft
These conditions often occur in relatively remote areas where herdingherding is the main viable form of agriculture; the "portability" of herd animals makes them prone to theft
They also occur in many urban, inner city areasurban, inner city areas where police protection for minorities is unreliable
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Cultures of honor exhibit considerable cultural inertiacultural inertia, persisting for many generations after the conditions that gave rise to them disappeared
Parts of the American SouthAmerican South were originally settled by Scotch-Irish herders with a long culture of honor tradition
Nisbett & Cohen argue that a culture of honor a culture of honor persists among white southerners in the USApersists among white southerners in the USA
They support this claim with data of various sorts, including
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Demographic dataDemographic data indicating that among southern whites homicideshomicides are more
common in regions where herding once was common
white males in the South are much more likely than white males in other regions to be involved in homicideshomicides resulting from resulting from argumentsarguments they are notnot more likely to be involved in
homicides that occur in the course of a robbery or other felony
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Survey dataSurvey data indicating that white southerners are more likely to believe
that violence is “extremely justified”violence is “extremely justified” in response to a variety of affronts
that if a man fails to respond violently, he is “not “not much of a man”much of a man”
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Legal scholarshipLegal scholarship indicating that southern states “give citizens more freedom to use more freedom to use violenceviolence in defending themselves, their homes, and their property"
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Particularly compelling were a field studyfield study of moral responses to culture of honor violence and a series of laboratory experimentsof laboratory experiments
In the field studyfield study letters were sent to hundreds of employers in the North & South.
The letters purported to be from a 27 year old Michigan man who had one blemish on his otherwise solid record.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
One letter explained:
“I have been convicted of manslaughter… I got into a fight with someone who was having an affair with my fiancée…. He confronted me in front of my friends at a bar,… told everyone that he and my fiancée were sleeping together, …laughed at me to my face, and asked me to step outside if I was man enough.”
The other letter explained that the “applicant” had “stolen a couple of expensive cars” at a time when he needed money to support his family.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Southern employers were more likely to be more likely to be sympatheticsympathetic in response to the manslaughter incident than the car theft.
There was no such difference in responses from northernnorthern employers.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
One southern employer wrote back:
“As for your problems of the past, anyone could probably be in the situation you were in. It was just It was just an unfortunate incident that should not be held an unfortunate incident that should not be held against youagainst you. Your honesty shows that you are sincere…. I wish you the best of luck for your future. You have a positive attitude and a willingness to work. These are qualities that businesses look for in employees.”
No northern employers were comparably No northern employers were comparably sympatheticsympathetic.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The laboratory experimentslaboratory experiments were conducted on white, male (mostly upper middle class) University of Michigan undergraduates from the North & the South
Subjects were told saliva samples would be collected to measure blood sugar as they performed various tasks
After a sample was collected, Ss walked down a narrow corridor where they were bumped by a confederate who called the S an “asshole”
A 2nd saliva sample was collected & both samples tested for cortisolcortisol (associated with stress) & testosteronetestosterone (associated with dominance behavior & aggression)
% C
hange in Cortisol Level
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
0 Control Insult
% C
hange in Testosterone Level
15
10
5
0Control Insult
Culture of Honor SubjectsNon-Culture of Honor Subjects
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
These findings suggest that moral attitudes about the appropriateness of violence in response to insults will not convergenot converge even under idealized circumstances, and thus that these disagreements are fundamentalthese disagreements are fundamental
To see why, consider the standard examples of “defusing explanations”“defusing explanations” used by Moral Realists to argue that disagreement is not fundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The disagreement is caused or sustained by disagreement about relevant non-moral factsdisagreement about relevant non-moral facts
It is hard to see what these non-moral facts might be
We know (for example) that there are no systematic religious religious differences between the Northern & Southern students in Nisbett’s experiment
Nor is there any reason to think that Northerners did not believe that calling someone an “asshole” is an insultinsult
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Of course, it is always possible that there is an unsuspected systematic difference in beliefunsuspected systematic difference in belief
But it seems clear that the burden of argumentburden of argument falls squarely on those who deny that the moral disagreements between culture of honor subjects and non-culture of honor subjects are fundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The disagreement is caused by one group or the other failing to be impartialfailing to be impartial
There is no “reason to think that southerners’ economic interests are served by being quick on the draw, while northerners’ economic interests are served by turning the other cheek”. (Doris & Plakias, p. 30)
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The disagreement is caused by one group or the other being significantly more irrationalirrational
On thin thin interpretations of rationality, this is singularly implausiblesingularly implausible
It is perhaps more plausible on “thick” “thick” interpretations of rationality because …
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Southerners voted for Bush!
Southerners voted for Bush!
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
So they are OBVIOUSLY IRRATIONALOBVIOUSLY IRRATIONAL
But, of course, thick interpretations of rationality are typically normatively loadednormatively loaded, and thus question beggingquestion begging
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The Geography of Morals ProjectThe Geography of Morals Project (Doris, Peng, Uskul, Nichols & Stich)
Inspired by Nisbett’s findings EAs are more collectivist; Ws are more individualist
The EA conception of the personEA conception of the person emphasizes social rolessocial roles (mother, teacher) and de-emphasizes “context independent attributescontext independent attributes”(honest, gregarious)
This suggests EAs would take a harsher view of transgressions destructive of group tiesdestructive of group ties & a more lenient view of transgressions that benefit the benefit the groupgroup
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Note that if these psychological differences have a significant impact on moral judgment, it is plausible that the resulting disagreement is fundamentalfundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Experiment I Subjects were Asian & non–Asian undergrads at U.C.
Berkeley
All experimental material was in English
Experiment 2 Subjects were Chinese students in Beijing & non-Asian
undergrads at U.C. Santa Cruz
Experimental material was translated into Chinese for Chinese subjects
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Case I: The Magistrate & the MobThe Magistrate & the Mob
An unidentified member of an ethnic group is known to be responsible for a murder that occurred in a town. This causes many of the townspeople to become extremely hostile towards the ethnic group. Because the town has a history of severe ethnic conflict and rioting, the town's Police Chief and Judge know that if they do not immediately identify and punish a culprit, the townspeople will start anti-ethnic rioting that will cause great damage to property owned by members of the ethnic group, and a considerable number of serious injuries and deaths in the ethnic population. But nobody in the community knows who the murderer is, or where to find him.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The Police Chief and Judge are faced with a dilemma. They can falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, an innocent member of the ethnic group, in order to prevent the riots. Or they can continue hunting for the guilty man, thereby allowing the anti-ethnic riots to occur, and do the best they can to combat the riots until the guilty man is apprehended. After discussing and debating their options at length, the Police Chief and Judge decide to falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, the innocent member of the ethnic group, in order to prevent the riots. They do so, thereby preventing the riots and preventing a considerable number of ethnic group deaths and serious injuries.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The (Western!) philosophical consensus(Western!) philosophical consensus on cases like this is clear. “Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to
prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)
“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to argue with him;
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
The (Western!) philosophical consensus(Western!) philosophical consensus on cases like this is clear. “Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to
prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)
“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mindhe shows a corrupt mind.” (Anscombe 1958)
Compare (even!) Smart (1973)
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
However, in both Experiment I (with Asian-Americans) & Experiment II (with Chinese students) the Asians the Asians were less inclined to make these judgmentswere less inclined to make these judgments
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Here are some of the moralmoral questions subjects were asked:
4. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally right thing
5. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally wrong thing
6. The Police Chief and Judge should be punished for what they did
8. The Police Chief and Judge should feel guilty for what they did
12. The Police Chief and Judge are responsible for Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted and imprisoned
13. The townspeople are responsible for Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted and imprisoned
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
… and here are some of the factual questions subjects were asked:
1. Being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned caused Mr. Smith to suffer
2. Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned caused Mr. Smith’s friends, family, and loved ones to suffer
3. If the riots occurred, they would have caused members of the ethnic group to suffer
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
ResultsResults Chinese subjects were significantly less likelyless likely to think
that the Police Chief & the Judge did was morally wrongmorally wrong
They were significantly more likelymore likely to think that what they did was morally rightmorally right
They were significantly less likelyless likely to say that the Police Chief & the Judge should be punished punished
Chinese subjects were significantly more likelymore likely to hold the potential rioters responsiblepotential rioters responsible for the scapegoating
Suggesting that they attributed more responsibility at the level of the collective than did their more individualist counterparts
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Case II: PromiscuityPromiscuity
Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years. Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with an emergency. “Casey, old friend,” Jack says, “I’m sorry I won’t be here to see you off. But I want you to enjoy our fullest hospitality.”
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Looking meaningfully at Debbie, Jack says, “Debbie will be pleased to see to your every need, won’t you, Debbie?” The implication is clear: Jack is inviting Casey to have sex with his wife. After Jack leaves, Debbie and Casey have sex.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
2. What Jack did was morally wrong
3. What Jack did was morally right
4. Jack should be punished for what he did
5. Jack should have been prevented from doing what he did
6. If what Jack did was not customary in his culture, it would be morally wrong
7. If what Jack did was customary in his culture, it would be morally right
8. I would be bothered by what Jack did, even if it were customary in his culture
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
ResultsResults
Chinese subjects were more likelymore likely to agree that this behavior is morally wrongmorally wrong
They were less likelyless likely to agree that it was morally rightmorally right
They were more likelymore likely to think that Jack should be punishedpunished for doing what he did
They were more likelymore likely to think that Jack should have been prevented from doing what he did
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
These results indicate that Chinese subjects were more likely to think this kind of sexual behavior is appropriately morally condemnedmorally condemned, subject to punitive punitive responsesresponses, and legitimately interfered withlegitimately interfered with
These findings are predicted by the hypothesispredicted by the hypothesis that Chinese culture is more collectivistChinese culture is more collectivist
since this kind of sexual behavior is, intuitively, a threat to the family, among the most important forms of association in a collectivist culture
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Case III: HonorHonor
Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years. Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with an emergency.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
When he returns a few hours later, he finds Debbie and Casey lying on the couch, naked in each other’s arms. They have obviously been having sex. Jack is enraged; his best friend and wife have betrayed him. “Bastard,” he shouts at Casey. “How can you insult a man like this, when you are a guest in his home?” Casey tries to respond, but before he can do anything, Jack pulls a knife, stabbing and killing him.
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Subjects were asked many of the same questions they were asked about the promiscuity case. They were also asked some additional questions, including:
1. What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer
2. What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
ResultsResults
Chinese subjects were less likelyless likely to think the homicide committed by Jack was morally wrongmorally wrong
They were more likelymore likely to think it was morally rightmorally right
They were less likelyless likely to think Jack should be punishedpunished
They were more likelymore likely to assent to the statement, “If what Jack did was customarycustomary in his culture, it would be morally rightmorally right.”
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
Again, most of these results can be explained by the hypothesis that Chinese morality is more collectivistcollectivist
The Chinese subjects are more tolerant of violence in response to an anti-collective behavioranti-collective behavior – the individual pursuit of sexual gratification at the expense of a collective – the family
If that is right, then it is plausible that the disagreement is fundamentalfundamental
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
None of the standard “defusing explanations”“defusing explanations” look plausible
There were no differences between Chinese & Westerners on any of the non-moral questionsnon-moral questions, like:
What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer.
What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer.
It is hard to see how either group might be considered less impartialless impartial
And it is hard to take seriously the suggestion that one group or the other suffers from irrationalityirrationality
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Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data
or that 1.3 billion Chinese have …
corrupt minds!
Elizabeth Anscombe
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“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
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“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
We are under no illusions that this study (and others that point in the same direction) will convince convince those who think there is little or no fundamental moral disagreement
Those skeptical about fundamental moral disagreement might raise a variety of objections focusing on the detailsdetails of these studies
including possible sources of superficial sources of superficial disagreement that have not been ruled disagreement that have not been ruled outout
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To address these “Yes, but …”“Yes, but …” objections and move the debate forward, I believe that we need an empirically supportedempirically supported theory of the psychological psychological mechanisms mechanisms underlying the acquisition & utilization of moral norms and of how those mechanisms might have evolvedevolved.
Chandra Sripada & I have recently published a theory aimed at doing that
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
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“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Sripada & Stich, “A A Frame-work for the Frame-work for the Psychology of NormsPsychology of Norms,” in The Innate Mind: Culture & Cognition, ed. by Carruthers, Laurence & Stich, Oxford Univ. Press, 2006
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanismid
enti
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
r
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
Rule-related reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
norm data base r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanismid
enti
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
r
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
Rule-related reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
norm data base r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claimsthat Moral Judgments
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanismid
enti
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
r
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claimsthat Moral Judgments
Rule-related reasoning capacity
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
are largely determined by therules in the norm data base
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
rAcquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claimsthat Moral Judgments
Rule-related reasoning capacity
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
which are largely determined by theacquisition mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
rAcquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
ProximalCues in
EnvironmentEnvironment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
The Model Claimsthat Moral Judgments
Rule-related reasoning capacity
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
which is heavily influenced by the normsthat prevail in the social environment
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
rAcquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
ProximalCues in
EnvironmentEnvironment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
Rule-related reasoning capacity
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
So people who grow up in social environments inwhich different norms prevail will often make different
moral judgments… even in ideal conditionsideal conditions
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
rAcquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
compliance motivation
punitive motivation
emotion system
ProximalCues in
EnvironmentEnvironment
judgment
explicit reasoning
beliefs
post-hoc justification
other emotion triggers
causal links that are well supported by empirical findings
causal links for which there is currently little evidence
Rule-related reasoning capacity
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
So people who grow up in social environments inwhich different norms prevail will often make different
moral judgments… even in ideal conditionsideal conditions
85
Sripada & I survey a substantial body of evidence which, we maintain, is consistent with this model
But rather than review that evidence, I want to close by considering a prima facie disquieting featureprima facie disquieting feature of the S&S model, viz.
it suggests that reasonreason can play only a peripheral roleperipheral role in our moral lives
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In a recent paper, Leland SaundersLeland Saunders has argued that this is mistaken and that the S&S modelS&S model actually supportssupports an
influential account of the use of reason in ethics, viz, a psychologized version of Rawlsian psychologized version of Rawlsian Reflective EquilibriumReflective Equilibrium
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
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In the 11stst step step in Saunders’ account, a deliberative moral agent generates lots of judgmentsgenerates lots of judgments about actual and hypothetical cases in a given moral domain
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
ng
behavio
r
infe
r co
nte
nts
of
norm
ati
ve r
ule
s
compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers J2J1
J3 J4J5 J6
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Next, the deliberative agent attempts to articulate a articulate a moral principlemoral principle (or set of principles) that will capture capture those cases those cases
That, as Rawls notes, will often require ignoring one ignoring one or more of the judgments or more of the judgments
The process is one that requires explicit, often explicit, often painstaking, reasoning painstaking, reasoning
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
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behavio
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infe
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nts
of
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ati
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compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers J2J1
J3 J4J5 J6
Pr
91
The deliberative agent then forms a commitmentcommitment to adhere to the principle – which may be thought of as a belief that one ought to do what the principle belief that one ought to do what the principle requiresrequires
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
ati
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behavio
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infe
r co
nte
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of
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ule
s
compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers
DO
Pr
93
Acting Acting on that belief will often require that the principle be explicitly rehearsedexplicitly rehearsed One says to oneself, “I ought (or ought not) to do A”
This repeated, linguistically explicit, rehearsal mimics mimics one of the principle environmental cues for norm environmental cues for norm acquisitionacquisition
And that (sometimes) will lead to the principle being internalized internalized by the norm system
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
plic
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behavio
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infe
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nte
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of
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ati
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s
compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers
DO
Pr
Explicit verbalrehearsal of Pr
Pr
95
Subsequent spontaneous judgments & behaviors will be the product of rationally generated norms
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
fy n
orm
im
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behavio
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infe
r co
nte
nts
of
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ati
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s
compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers
Pr
97
As Saunders notes, this process is probably relatively rarerelatively rare, since it is both complicatedcomplicated and arduousarduous
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
Acquisition Mechanism
Execution Mechanism
identi
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orm
im
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behavio
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infe
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of
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ati
ve r
ule
s
compliance
motivation
punitive motivati
on
emotion
systemRule-related
reasoning capacity
ProximalCues in
Environment
judgment
explicit reasonin
g
beliefs
post-hoc justificatio
n
norm data base
r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------
other emotion triggers J2J1
J3 J4J5 J6
Pr
Explicit verbalrehearsal of Pr
Pr
99
Also, as Saunders does not explicitly note, deliberative agents who start with quite different, start with quite different, socially acquired normssocially acquired norms are likely to end up with end up with different judgment-capturing principlesdifferent judgment-capturing principles and thus with different rationally generated normsdifferent rationally generated norms
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
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They will be Rawlsian Rational Agents
with
Fundamental Moral Fundamental Moral DisagreementsDisagreements
“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory
The End