Post on 06-Oct-2020
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party
Identification?∗
Alexandra Feddersen† Simon Lanz‡
University of Geneva
August 17, 2015
Abstract
This article investigates the sources of individual perceptions of party competence.Classical issue ownership theory states that individual party competence evaluationstems from a party’s history of attention on a given issue (e.g. Petrocik 1996).Critics argue that party competence evaluation is little more than a product ofparty identification. Against the backdrop of this academic dispute, we investigatethe factors influencing individuals’ perception of issue ownership. Drawing on datafrom post-electoral studies and on the Manifesto Project Database, we look at howpartisanship and parties’ attention to issues influence voters’ competence evaluations.Adopting a comparative research design, we test our model for 20 OECD countries.The results show that issue ownership perceptions derive from both individual partyidentification as well as parties’ issue emphasis. Thus, viewing party competence as amere expression of party ties is too simplistic.
Keywords: issue ownership, competence, manifesto, issue, partisanship
∗ Paper to be presented at the ECPR general conference, University of Montreal, 26–29 August 2015.† Corresponding author: 40 bd du Pont-d’Arve, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland, phone: +41 (0) 22 379 83 73,
email: Alexandra.Feddersen@unige.ch‡ Email: Simon.Lanz@unige.ch
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 2
Introduction
Issue ownership theory is a fast-growing field in political research. Since the founding of salience
theory by Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik’s ground-breaking article (Petrocik 1996),
numerous studies look at how issue ownership influences the vote choice at the individual level or
party behaviour and success at the party level. Despite their many different approaches to issue
ownership, scholars working in this field agree with the idea that issues play a central role for
voters and parties. Walgrave et al. (2015: p.778; see also p.780) suggest that a broadly accepted
conceptualisation of issue ownership could roughly refer to “[. . . ] the link between specific parties
and issues in the minds of voters”.
However, the specificity of this link is challenged in literature. While the classic conception of
issue ownership theory foresees that a party’s enphasis of a given issue determines if voters deem
it competent on this issue, critics argue that party identification explains which party a voter
thinks is competent. Bypassing the importance of issues, these critics consider competence to be a
mere reflection of partisanship: “Competence is likely to be strongly affected by party preference
and therefore a tricky predictor of voting behaviour” (Walgrave et al. 2015). Parallel to the
flourishing literature on issue ownership, where competence ownership is widely used (e.g. Meyer
and Mueller 2013; Wagner and Zeglovits 2014), most post-election surveys nowadays contain
questions on parties’ issue competence (Wagner and Zeglovits 2014). From an issue ownership
perspective, therefore, the fact that issue ownership perceptions could be solely influenced by
partisanship is very problematic: does the attention, which parties pay to certain issues, not
influence the perception of their competence on these issues at all? And even if individual
competence perception was influenced by party identification, how could you explain that voters
without any party identification still attribute issue ownership to a certain party? We think that
it is more important than ever to get a better understanding of the sources of issue ownership in
order to be able to continue to estimate and predict its effects.
Our aim in this paper is therefore to assess how much of a voter’s competence ownership
perception can be explained by partisanship, and how much by a party’s attention to a specific
issue. Thus far, the great majority of publications on issue ownership are interested in issue
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 3
ownership voting, i.e. how issue ownership perceptions influence the vote choice. In contrast, the
origins of issue ownership perception at the individual level have not been analyzed extensively
(Walgrave et al. 2015: p.790), with the exception of Stubager and Slothuus (2013), who analyze
the case of Denmark. Comparing 20 OECD countries, we combine CSES data on voters and
CMP data on parties’ issue emphasis. Our results show that competence evaluations are, more
often than not, more than just a reflection of partisanship.
Sources of competence ownership
In the following sections, we will briefly define the key concepts and explain the basic mechanisms,
which are at work for individual competence evaluations.
What is competence ownership?
Despite the variety of approaches, scholars working on issue ownership voting understand it
as voting based on perceptions about a party’s competence to handle important issues.1 The
basic idea behind issue ownership voting is a three-step mechanism. First, it foresees that a
voter is worried about a certain issue more than about others. In a second step, the voter
assesses how competently parties can handle the further in order to choose the party best able to
handle her most important issue. Competence ownership therefore refers to voters’ perception
regarding a party’s competence to deal with an issue. The third and final step consists of the
vote choice based on this evaluation. Recent studies oppose competence ownership to associative
ownership, which is the link voters spontaneously make between an issue and a specific party,
whithout necessarily believing that this party offers the best solutions to the problem (Bellucci
2006; Walgrave et al. 2012; Tresch et al. 2015; Walgrave et al. 2014; Lachat 2014; Kleinnijenhuis
and Walter 2014). For Walgrave et al. (2015), competence and association are two different
dimensions of issue ownership, which often are not seperated clearly enough. Associative and
competence ownership have different incidents on vote choice. While associative ownership does
not have a direct effect on the vote (Walgrave et al. 2015, 2014; Lachat 2014), party choice is1Party competence voting is therefore used as a synonym to issue ownership voting.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 4
influenced by competence ownership (e.g. Nadeau et al. 2001; Bellucci 2006; Green and Hobolt
2008; Belanger and Meguid 2008; Lachat 2011, 2014; Lanz 2012; Meyer and Mueller 2013).
In this article, we are interested in the causes of a voter’s perception of competence own-
ership. From a theoretical perspective, competence ownership is more prone to be influenced
by partisanship than associative ownership. It is indeed likely that a voter would choose the
party she identifies with as best able to handle her most important problem. However, she
could still spontaneously think of another party which deals with the same issue. In this sense,
choosing competence over association is a harder test for our hypothesis predicting that other
factors than partisanship influence ownership perceptions. From a methodological point of view,
survey questions measuring competence ownership are more broadly available and more easily
comparable than questions measuring associative ownership.
The classic conception: competence as issue emphasis
In his seminal work on issue-ownership voting, Petrocik (1996) claims that competence ownership
comes from a party’s or candidate’s reputation of handling certain issues. According to Green
and Hobolt (2008: p.462) this notion of handling is at the very core of issue ownership theory. A
reputation of handling issues is “[. . . ] produced by a history of attention, initiative, and innovation
toward these problems [. . . ]” (Petrocik 1996: p.826). A party’s history of attention is largely
shaped by the link between the party and its constituency, as well as by its performances while
in office (Petrocik 1996: p.827). Firstly, constituency based ownership heavily leans on cleavage
literature (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The basic claim is that “parties have sociologically distinctive
constituencies and the linkage between a party’s issue agenda and the social characteristics of
its supporters is quite strong” (Petrocik 1996: p.828). A party therefore owns certain issues for
ideological and historical reasons, which are not dependent on competence evaluations primarily.
In their comparison of four possible sources of competence ownership, Stubager and Slothuus
(2013) look at constituency-linked issue ownership. Based on a case study of the two majors
parties on two issues in Denmark, they find a considerable impact of the constituency on issue
ownership. However, these results may depend on their measure of constituency. Instead of
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 5
measuring the impact of socio-democraphic characteristics on competence ownership, they ask
voters which party best represents a certain socio-economic segment of society (Stubager and
Slothuus 2013). In our opinion, this measure captures the perception of the links between the
parties and their constituencies rather than preference for a party based on an individual’s
belonging to a specific constituency. The second factor shaping a party’s history of attention
is the record of the incumbent. This record can lead to an advantage of the challenger party
if the incumbent does not match up to voters’ expectations.2 In their analysis, Stubager and
Slothuus (2013) find that the perception of real-world party performances influence the ownership
evaluation of governement. However, since the study only includes one election, it is difficult to
say whether the observed effect is more than a mere assessment of governement performance. In
short, performance evaluations contribute to issue ownership attribution. Specifically, parties’
performance on certain issues may be under more public scrutiny than their conduct of other
affairs. For Petrocik et al. (2003), issues such as the economy, the conduct of foreign relations
and the functioning of governement are tipical performance issues. This clearly resonates with
the literature on economic voting, which states that voters evaluate parties according to their
performance on economic issues (Anderson 2007; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2007; Powell and Whitten 1993).
In his recently published critical review of over 50 years of salience theory, Budge (2015: p.770)
summarizes the classical conception of the origins of issue ownership as follows: “Parties are thus
tied to certain issues by their origin and record.” In Petrocik’s view, competence ownership is
rather long-lasting and has a tendency to be reinforced when a party further highlights its issue
during campaigns (Petrocik 1996: p. 826). In other words, a party maintains and increases its
reputation to handle a certain issue by emphasizing it. Selective emphasis not only reinforces
the link between the party and its issue, it is also an attempt to dominate the public agenda
during election campaigns. Scholars studying problem emphasis find that candidates and parties
strategically underline issues that are beneficial to them and their party and hurt their political
opponents (Sellers 1998; Simon 2002; Petrocik et al. 2003; Hayes 2005; Green-Pedersen 2007).
2See Martinsson (2009) on this matter.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 6
For political parties, issue salience combined with strong competence perceptions, may lead to
electoral success (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996).
In the literature on issue ownership, emphasis is retained as the single most important
determinant of issue ownership (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Meguid 2005; Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen 2014). As Budge (2015: p.771) states, “ownership’ implies establishing a reputation
for greater competence and concern for certain issues by emphasising3 them more.” The more a
party communicates on an issue, the more likely it is to become and stay issue owner of this
problem.
Critique: a reflection of party identification
Apart from a party’s reputation of handling a certain issue, competence perception might
simply stem from a voter’s party identification. Following Campbell et al. (1960: p.121), party
identification is usually understood as “[. . . ] the individual’s affective orientation [. . . ]” to a
party. Developed during childhood socialization, party identification is imperatively prior to
competence evaluations,4 and can influence the latter. Voters having an affective tie to a party
are expected to be biased in their competence evaluations in at least two ways. On the one hand,
voters with a strong identification for a party may automatically attribute competence ownership
to that party. Indeed, many studies show that voters identifying with a party have a tendency
to name their own preferred party as competent on their most important problem (Belanger
and Meguid 2008). In their assessment of survey questions about party competence, Wagner
and Zeglovits (2014) find that respondents would adapt their anwers to questions regarding
competence ownership according to their party identificaiton. The lack of information and
opinions on issue-specific questions leads voters to use their partisan heuristic to determine which
party they deem most competent (Wagner and Zeglovits 2014). On the other hand, the issue
considered most important by these voters is probably the one owned by the party they identify
with. Petrocik (1996) is already concerned by the fact that issue ownership might be a reflection
of partisanship. He concedes that, in general, Republican identifiers have other issue priorities3Emphasis added.4For a different conception of party identification see Fiorina (1981).
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 7
than Democratic identifiers (Petrocik 1996: p.844). Competence ownership, therefore, is strongly
influenced by partisanship (Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Belanger and Meguid 2008; Kuechler
1991). However, partisanship can impossibly explain issue agendas and competence evaluations
of voters who do not have any party identification. In times where partisanship is on the decline
(e.g. Dalton 2002; Franklin 1985), it is more than ever pivotal to investigate how voters without
party identification assign issue ownership.5 Party identification is thus unlikely to be the only
determinant of competence ownership perceptions.
Furthermore, certain authors have claimed that competence evaluations are dependent on
voters’ values (Stubager and Slothuus 2013). However, the results are rather confusing, with
attitudes on different issues influencing competence ownership perceptions to different extents.
Stubager and Slothuus claim that attitudes and partisanship influence ownership perceptions
through an emotional mechanism (Stubager and Slothuus 2013: p.569). In line with Kuechler
(1991), they consider attitudes and party identification to be “affective bonds” and “ideological
beliefs” causing an emotional preference for a party. Asked about which party they consider
to be most competent to solve their most pressing problem, voters choose the party they feel
closest to (Stubager and Slothuus 2013: p.569). While we agree with the claim that partisanship
translates into an affective bond to a party, we consider attitude preferences to resonate with the
premises of proximity voting (Merril and Grofman 1999). The closer a voter’s opinions are to a
party’s position on a certain issue, the higher the chances that she will vote for this party. In
this sense, the fact that a voter holds certain preconveived attitudes is not contrary to the logic
of issue ownership attribution.
Hypotheses
Leaning on the extant literature cited above, we hypothesize that partisanship is a strong
determinant of competence ownership perceptions.
Hypothesis 1 If a voter feels close to a specific party, she is likely to consider this party most
competent.
5In our dataset, 39 percent of the respondents do not feel close to any political party.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 8
However, competence ownership is not a mere reflection of partisanship. According to the classic
conception of issue ownership, we therefore hypothesize that issue emphasis of the party influences
competence ownership.
Hypothesis 2 A voter judges a party to be more competent than other parties to solve her most
important problem if the party in question emphasizes this issue more than other parties.
Issue emphasis might have a stronger impact on voters without any attachment to a party. For
identifiers, the fact that their preferred party raises their most important problem might not
further increase their probability to find this party competent.
Hypothesis 2.a For voters who identify with a party, the above-mentioned effect is less strong
than for non-identifiers.
Voters’ perception of competence might be influenced by issue emphasis for most issues, but for
economic issues emphasis might not be as important as peformance evaluations.
Hypothesis 2.b For economic issues, the above-mentioned effect is less strong than for other
issues.
Data, Case Selection and Method
Data and case selection
Data for this analysis comes from two different sources. First, we use the Comparative Study of
Electoral System (CSES).6 We build on the third module which includes election surveys from
2006 to 2011. In addition to standard sociodemographic questions, the CSES includes measures
for the most pressing problem (MIP) and party competence.7
Second, to assess the parties’ issue attention we use the Comparative Manifesto Project
Database (CMP) which is based on a content analysis of party programs.8 CMP data has been
criticized for a number of reasons, notably for not producing a reliable left-right measure of party6Data available at: http://www.cses.org/.7The more recent CSES module (2011-2016) does not include these indicators.8Data available at: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 9
positions (McDonald and Mendes 2001). However, it is commonly used to measure parties’ issue
emphasis (Ward et al. 2015) since it produces a rather reliable measure of “the relative emphasis
parties give to the different messages they wish to transmit to electors” (Klingemann et al. 2006).
Moreover, it allows a comparison of issue attention of different countries.
All countries included in this study are member states of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and are labelled full democracies on Freedom House
and Polity IV.9 20 countries fulfil these criteria and are included in the CSES and the CMP
projects.10
Our statistical models are fairly demanding with regard to the number of observations. We
hence exclude voters who indicate a small party as most competent. Small parties are those
which are considered competent by less than ten percent of the respondents in a country.
Operationalization
Our outcome variable is the individual evaluation of party competence. In the survey, respondents
first have to select the most important problem the country is facing. In a second step participants
indicate the most competent party for this problem: “which [party] do you think is best in
dealing with [MIP]”? While this variable is widely used in electoral research (e.g. Clarke et al.
2009; Lachat 2011; Pardos-Prado 2012), critics have proposed other measures for competence
ownership.11 However, none of these measures is available for several countries, which makes a
comparative approach impossible.
Party identification is measured with a standard question asking if the respondent feels close
to any particular party. In the empirical model we introduce a dummy for each party, which
was big enough not be excluded from the outcome variable. We add a dummy for the voters
who identify with another party. The reference group are voters who do not feel close to any
particular party.9We used the scores for the respective year of the election.
10Data on Greece and Slovenia is also available. We exclude these countries due to low numbers of observationson our dependent variable. Ireland is excluded because information on the respondents’ most pressing problemwas not available.
11For a full account of the disagreements on conceptualization and measurement in issue ownership literaturesee Walgrave et al. (2015).
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 10
The second input variable reflects party attention to a given issue. Each respondent is assigned
the share of attention the parties pay to the issue she considers most pressing. The variable
party attention is hence contingent of the respondent’s MIP. In order to match the CMP
attention scores with the respondent’s MIP, issues had to be recoded. We recoded the most
pressing issues into seven categories: Social policy, international relations, public services and
administration, economy, immigration, inner security, environment and other quality of live
issues. A residual category that we exclude from the analysis captures mostly country specific
issues. This systematic categorization enables us to compare the results across all countries in
the analysis. For the categorization of issues we follow Roller (1998) and Giger (2011).12 The
same categories are used to recode party attention in the CMP database. While the coding
is straight forward in most cases, the CMP is problematic when it comes to estimating party
positions on immigration. The available codes13 often confound immigration issues with other
political issues (Ruedin 2013).
Empirical model
To model our outcome, we rely on a multilevel analysis performed on a stacked data matrix
including all 20 countries (for a similar approach see Walgrave et al. 2012; Kroh 2009; van der
Eijk et al. 1996; Westholm 1997; MacDonald et al. 1991). In this matrix observations correspond
to respondents×party combinations. We are not interested in differential effects of issue attention
between parties. The transformation of the data is an ideal strategy to estimate models across all
parties in a given country. Our dependent variable is binary taking the value 1 if respondent j of
country k considered party i competent. For all other observations of j the outcome variable is
0. For observation (k, j, i) the party attention variable measures the attention party i dedicates
to j’s MIP. Party identification on observation (k, j, i) is 1 when the respondent identifies with
party i. If a respondent does not feel close to any party, she has the value 0 on all observations.
Our statistical model has to account for the multiplication of individuals by the number of
12Other than Giger (2011) who codes unemployment as social policy issue we label it as economic issue.13Multiculturalism: positive (per607); multiculturalism: negative (per608); underprivileged minority groups
(per705).
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 11
parties and the fact that we estimate effects across all countries (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
We thus estimate random intercept logistic regressions where observations are grouped in each
individual and individuals are grouped in the countries. The full empirical model can be specified
as follows:
Pr(yijk = 1) = logit−1(β0 + β1partisani + β2attentioni + β3−5Xi + µ0j + φ0k)
Where we estimate the probability that respondent j of country k chooses party i as the most
competent. β0 is a global average for a party to be considered competent. partisanshipi is a
dummy measuring party identification. attentioni measures the attention party i dedicates to
the MIP in the party manifesto. Xi is a vector for the control variables gender, age and education.
µ0j and φ0k cover respondent-dependent and country-dependent differences respectively.
Due to the non-linearity of the logistic curve, regression coefficients in logistic models are
difficult to grasp. In the empirical section we thus rely on predicted probabilities and first
differences (FD). In our case first differences show how much the probability of considering a
party competent changes as a function of a change in party identification or party attention (King
et al. 2000). This is done in four steps: First, we set our explanatory variables to their median.
The variable of interest “party identification” or “issue attention” is fixed on its minimum (e.g.
no party identification or low issue attention). With these initial settings (Zs) we calculate the
probability to consider a party competent (Pr(ys = 1)). In a second step we set the values of
the context variable on its maximum (Ze) and approximate Pr(ye = 1). Third, we estimate the
difference between the two predicted probabilities (Pr(ys = 1)) and (Pr(ye = 1)). By repeating
this algorithm 1’500 times we compute the first difference. Finally, we cut the lowest and highest
2,5 percent of the simulated values to approximate the 95 percent confidence interval.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 12
Tabl
e1:
Hie
rarc
hica
llog
istic
regr
essio
nm
odel
sO
utco
me
vari
able
:co
mpe
tenc
eA
llis
sues
Eco
nom
icis
sues
Soci
alis
sues
(0)
(1a
)(1
b)(2
a)
(2b)
(3a
)(3
b)P
arti
sans
hip
(no)
3.30
5∗∗∗
3.31
7∗∗∗
3.35
9∗∗∗
3.72
5∗∗∗
3.87
0∗∗∗
3.22
0∗∗∗
5.48
5∗∗∗
(0.0
33)
(0.0
33)
(0.0
65)
(0.0
52)
(0.1
82)
(0.0
73)
(0.2
10)
Issu
eat
tent
ion
0.01
5∗∗∗
0.01
5∗∗∗
0.00
50.
006
0.04
7∗∗∗
0.06
5∗∗∗
(0.0
01)
(0.0
01)
(0.0
03)
(0.0
03)
(0.0
04)
(0.0
04)
Sex
(mal
e)0.
024
0.02
90.
029
0.07
50.
074
−0.
012
0.00
1(0
.026
)(0
.026
)(0
.026
)(0
.041
)(0
.041
)(0
.059
)(0
.060
)
Age
−0.
003∗∗
∗−
0.00
3∗∗∗
−0.
003∗∗
∗−
0.00
6∗∗∗
−0.
006∗∗
∗−
0.00
3−
0.00
4∗
(0.0
01)
(0.0
01)
(0.0
01)
(0.0
01)
(0.0
01)
(0.0
02)
(0.0
02)
Edu
cati
on(l
ow)
−0.
048
−0.
056
−0.
056
−0.
089
−0.
089
−0.
045
−0.
049
(0.0
30)
(0.0
30)
(0.0
30)
(0.0
46)
(0.0
46)
(0.0
67)
(0.0
68)
Par
tisa
nshi
p×
atte
ntio
n−
0.00
2−
0.00
5−
0.09
0∗∗∗
(0.0
03)
(0.0
06)
(0.0
07)
Con
stan
t−
1.43
3∗∗∗
−1.
777∗∗
∗−
1.78
6∗∗∗
−1.
676∗∗
∗−
1.70
3∗∗∗
−2.
534∗∗
∗−
3.00
5∗∗∗
(0.0
70)
(0.0
76)
(0.0
77)
(0.1
20)
(0.1
24)
(0.1
53)
(0.1
60)
Obs
erva
tion
s42
,149
42,1
4942
,149
18,9
7518
,975
8,40
18,
401
Indi
vidu
als
14,4
9714
,497
14,4
977,
117
7,11
72,
698
2,69
8C
ount
ries
2020
2020
2020
20Lo
gLi
kelih
ood
-18,
959.
310
-18,
877.
610
-18,
877.
330
-8,0
60.3
46-8
,060
.002
-3,8
00.9
83-3
,728
.403
Aka
ike
Inf.
Cri
t.37
,932
.620
37,7
71.2
1037
,772
.660
16,1
36.6
9016
,138
.000
7,61
7.96
67,
474.
807
Bay
esia
nIn
f.C
rit.
37,9
93.1
6037
,840
.410
37,8
50.5
0016
,199
.500
16,2
08.6
607,
674.
254
7,53
8.13
2N
ote:
∗p<
0.05
;∗∗p<
0.01
;∗∗∗p<
0.00
1
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 13
Empirical results
In a first step we investigate to what extent partisanship influences issue ownership on the most
pressing problem. To this end we estimate a basic model with party identification as predictor
for competence (model 0, table 1). The positive effect of partisanship shows that partisans are
more likely to consider their party competent than voters who do not feel close to this party. In
the basic model, as well as in all other models estimated, the effect of partisanship is significant
on the 0.001-level. To assess the strength of the effect we estimate first differences. Partisans are
67 percentage points more likely to consider their party competent than non-partisans. This
result provides ample support for our first hypothesis. However, at the same time it should not
be overstated. Closeness to a party can only determine issue ownership if the voter feels close to
a party.
In a second step we introduce issue attention as an additional explanation of issue competence.
This additional estimate decreases the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) which indicates a better model fit. In other words, issue attention
contributes to the explanation of issue ownership. The coefficient in table 1 is positive and
significant which means that attention increases ownership. For the strength of the effect we
turn to graphical presentation. The right panel in figure 1 displays the probability of assigning
competence to a party across different levels of issue emphasis in the manifesto.
The first differences in the chart show a simulated change of attention from its minimum to its
maximum (∆mm). The curve in the chart shows that issue ownership is more likely the more a
party is concerned with an issue. If a party is not at all invested in an issue, chances are low that
it is regarded as competent on this topic. If the attention is maximal, the party is 19 percentage
points more likely to be considered competent. Since the range of attention across issues and
countries is large, we additionally report the FD when attention changes two standard deviations
(∆sd). If we consider this range, the change in probability is a more modest five percentage
points. This result supports our claim that issue attention affects issue ownership. However, the
strength of the effect is relatively modest. In order to gain only little more ownership, parties
would have to go through substantial changes in their issue attention.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 140.
00.
10.
20.
30.
40.
50.
6
Emphasis in manifesto
P(c
ompe
tenc
e)
1A: all issues (based on 1a)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
∆mm 0.19*
∆sd 0.05*
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Emphasis in manifesto
P(c
ompe
tenc
e)
1B: economic issues (based on 2a)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
∆mm 0.1
∆sd 0.01
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Emphasis in manifesto
P(c
ompe
tenc
e)
1C: social issues (based on 3a)
10 20 30 40 50
∆mm 0.32*
∆sd 0.14*
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities across issue attention (basic models). First differences (∆)with * are significant on the 0.05 level. ∆mm show a change from the minimumissue emphasis to the maximum issue emphasis. ∆sd show a change of two standarddeviations.
So far we have analysed competence across all seven issues. This might however be too
simplistic. With regard to the economy, the literature suggests that issue ownership is rather
driven by performance than attention (e.g. Petrocik 1996). In order to test this we estimated
separate models for economic issues and the social issues. Across all 20 countries in our analysis
these were by far the most pressing issues.
Model 2a in the regression only includes voters who consider the economy to be the top
priority. The estimator for issue attention is positive but not significant on the 0.05 level. The
visualization in the middle panel of figure 1 confirms that for economy, attention has virtually no
impact on competence. Even a substantial change of attention does not yield higher chances to
be regarded as the competent party.
This is in sharp contrast to the findings of model 3a which only includes social issues. The effect
is positive and highly significant. The visualization of the effects (right panel in figure 1) shows
that emphasising social issues is highly rewarding. Chances are low to be regarded as competent
when a party does not deal with the issue. If a party’s attention to this issue is maximal, the
probability is a striking 32 percentage points higher. A change of two standard deviations in
attention (which equals 18 percentage points more attention) means that the probability to
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 15
be regarded as competent increases by 14 percentage points. Put differently, every additional
percentage point of emphasis in the manifesto increases the probability of ownership by almost a
percentage point.
These results indicate that issue ownership has multiple sources depending on the issue at
stake. Competence on economic issues is determined differently than competence on social issues.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Emphasis in manifesto
P(c
ompe
tenc
e)
2A: all issues (based on 1b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
∆mm 0.20*
∆sd 0.06*
∆mm 0.10*
∆sd 0.04*
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Emphasis in manifesto
P(c
ompe
tenc
e)2B: economic issues (based on 2b)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
∆mm 0.7
∆sd 0.01
∆mm 0.1
∆sd 0.1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Emphasis in manifestoP
(com
pete
nce)
2C: social issues (based on 3b)
10 20 30 40 50
∆mm 0.45*
∆sd 0.33*
∆mm −0.18*
∆sd −0.06
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities across issue attention (interaction models). The grey linerepresents partisans. First differences (∆) with * are significant on the 0.05 level. ∆mmshow a change from the minimum issue emphasis to the maximum issue emphasis. ∆sdshow a change of two standard deviations.
In a next step we investigate a possible trade-off between the two sources of competence
evaluation, i.e. partisanship and issue attention. Regression models are summarized in table 1
(models 1b, 2b, 3b). Let us first address the regression with the full sample. The interaction
term between partisanship and issue attention is negative which indicates that attention is less
important for partisans. Figure 2a shows that the effect of issue attention is only slightly more
pronounced for non-partisans than for partisans. However if we look at extreme changes of
issue emphasis, the effects are substantially larger among non-partisans (∆mm 0.1 vs. ∆mm 0.2).
Overall the results indicate slight support for the trade-off thesis. However, the effects are small
and, as indicated by the larger AIC and BIC in the interaction model, do not improve the model
fit.
Figure 2b underscores the finding that on economic issues, issue attention does not affect
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 16
perceived competence. This finding is true for partisans and non-partisans. Finally, we turn
to voters who are concerned with social issues. Here, issue attention has a striking effect for
non-partisans. If we consider the whole range of issue emphasis, the probability of being the
owner of the issue increases by 45 percentage points as we change from low issue attention to high
issue attention. For partisans, issue attention does not add to the effect of party identification.
We even observe a slight negative effect of issue emphasis. This impressive result is underscored
by the improvement of the model fit. The AIC as well as the BIC decreases with the introduction
of the interaction term between partisanship and issue attention.
Overall this confirms that issue ownership and partisanship are complementary sources at least
for issues where ownership can be gained through issue attention.
Conclusion
In this article, we look at sources of individual competence ownership perceptions. Students of
issue ownership claim that parties’ emphasis of certain issues conferes them ownership on these
issues. Critics argue that voters simply consider the party they identify with to be most competent
as well. This critique, of course, is very problematic from an issue ownership perspective, since it
minimizes the importance of issues for an individual’s voting decision. Moreover, this perspective
fails to explain why voters without any party identification consider a party to be competent.
We therefore hypothesize that individual competence perceptions not only derive from party
identification, but from parties’ attention to issues as well. Adopting a comparative research
design, we test our hypotheses in 20 OECD countries. The empirical tests rely on two distinctive
datasets. The CSES data provide information about voters’ competence ownership perception,
MIP, party identification, as well as socio-demographic control variables. Parties’ issue emphases
are taken from the CMP data. We conduct multilevel analyses based on a stacked data matrix.
The models are estimated with random intercept logistic regressions, where the outcome variable
measures if an individual finds a party competent to solve her most pressing problem. The first
basic model estimates the influence of party identification on individual competence perception.
As expected, partisanship influences the attribution of issue ownership significantly. For the full
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 17
model, we add a predictor measuring parties’ emphasis of the voter’s MIP. We see that party
attention contributes to the explanation of an individual’s competence perceptions. Even though
this contribution is rather modest, the full model performs better than the basic one. Thus,
competence ownership perception is more than a mere reflection of partisanship. Moreover, we
find that the impact of parties’ attention to issues depends on the issue addressed. Looking
seperately at economic and social issues, we notice considerable differences. For economic issues,
parties’ attention has no impact on voters’ competence evaluations, whereas parties might greatly
benefit from emphasizing social issues. It must be concluded that competence evaluations are
determined in a different way for economic and social issues. Voters’ perceptions of a party’s
ability to handle the economy might indeed be based on the economic performance of that
party rather than on the party’s attention to this issue. The strength of the impact of party
attention is not only moderated by the nature of the issue addressed, but also which category
of voter we focus on. Issue attention has a stronger impact on non-partisans than on voters
who already identify with the party. Overall, however, we can conclude that issue attention
and party identification are complementary source of issue ownership. Parties might influence
perceptions by emphasizing certain issues in their communication. They do not solely have to
rely on voters’ long-term attachments. This conclusion should be reassuring for scholars working
on issue ownership voting. Clearly, competence evaluation and party identification are not one
and the same predictor of vote choice. While this is an important contribution to the literature
on the sources of issue ownership, some questions remain unsolved. The results clearly show
differences accross issues. While this might be partly due to the data used for measuring parties’
issue emphasis, these differences might be an interesting starting point for future research on the
origins of competence ownership perception. Only by assessing the sources of issue ownership
can reasearch on its consequences become more relevant.
Issue Ownership: More than Just Party Identification? 18
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Appendix
Table 2: Main variables
Survey code Variable Wording
CSES Q2a MIP What do you think is the most important political problem facing[COUNTRY] today?
CSES Q3a Competence Thinking of the most important political problem facing [COUNTRY]:which [party/presidential do you think is best in dealing with it?
CSES Q20 Party identification (PI) Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?
Table 3: Countries and elections included
Ntotal Ncomp. Nbig
Australia (2007) 1,873 1,705 1,663Austria (2008) 1,165 691 603Canada (2008) 4,495 1,768 1,486Czech Republic (2010) 1,857 790 486Denmark (2007) 1,442 1,007 826Estonia (2011) 1,000 601 461Finland (2011) 1,298 993 680France (2007) 2,000 1,546 1,312Germany (2009) 2,095 1,404 1,064Iceland (2007) 1,385 898 851Netherlands (2010) 2,153 1,610 1,189Norway (2009) 1,782 1,400 1,173New Zealand (2008) 1,149 792 694Poland (2007) 1,817 1,104 941Portugal (2009) 1,316 592 372Slovakia (2010) 1,203 699 438Spain (2008) 1,204 870 802Sweden (2006) 1,547 625 438Switzerland (2007) 3,164 1,833 1,585United States (2008) 2,102 1,685 1,631Total 36,257 22,613 18,695
Ntotal = total NNcomp. = N with competence preferenceNbig = N with comp. preference for big party