Post on 18-Jul-2018
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IO Center Workshop
Online Barrier and Risk monitoring November 25th 2014, Stavanger
Center for Integrated Operations In the Petroleum Industry
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Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
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Workshop Introduction Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manager IO Center Workshop, Online Barrier and Risk monitoring, November 25th 2014, Stavanger
Center for Integrated Operations In the Petroleum Industry
Objectives of workshop
• Share insights and experiences concerning online barrier and risk monitoring.
• Present and get feedback on the handbook "Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and associated risk in the operational phase"
We intend to upload brief summary of the workshop on the IO center webpage, with the presentations by the project group and a few highlights from the discussion in an anonymised and generalised form.
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Program 08:30 Welcome, presentation of the participants 08:45 Introduction
• Risk barometer demonstrator for process event case, Nathaniel Edwin,/Stein Hauge, SINTEF
• General introduction of the handbook " Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and associated risk in the operational phase", Stein Hauge, SINTEF
• Discussion 09:50 Break 10:00 Barrier monitoring – industry status
• Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips
Skandinavia • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
11:00 Break 11:10 Concluding reflections 11:30 Lunch
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CENTER FOR INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
PHASE I AND II ACTIVITIES (2007-14)
Copyright: Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry
IO Center partners
Collaborating research institutions
Industry partners
Research partners
Center for Research Based Innovation
The Research Council of Norway
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IO3: Proactive management of safety and environment
Center for Integrated Operations In the Petroleum Industry
• How can better access to real-time data lead to improved safety? • How can IO solutions provide improved support to onshore/offshore decision-
making processes?
IO3 Deliverables 2014
SW demonstrator for anomaly detection in drilling
Risk barometer handbook/ demonstrator
Robust work practice handbook
Develop and demonstrate a concept for online monitoring of risk level
Risk barometer
Guideline
Demon-strator
Overall risk and barrier model
Process Collision Drilling
Activity 2014 Activity 2012/13
Deliverables 2014
Sand erosion
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Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
Technology for a better society 1
IO3 workshop:
"Online Barrier and Risk Monitoring"
Eni Norge, November 25th - 2014
Technology for a better society 2
Program 08:30 Welcome, presentation of the participants 08:45 Introduction
• Risk barometer demonstrator for process event case, Nathaniel Edwin / Stein Hauge, SINTEF • General introduction of the handbook " Guidelines for monitoring of barrier status and
associated risk in the operational phase", Stein Hauge, SINTEF • Discussion
09:50 Break 10:00 Barrier monitoring – industry status
• Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips Skandinavia • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
11:00 Break 11:10 Concluding reflections 11:30 Lunch
Technology for a better society 3
"Online barrier and risk monitoring" – background
• We have tools to monitor the status of the barriers (e.g. barrier panels/dashboards) - at least for the technical barrier elements
• We do not have good tools for monitoring the risk and for identifying important risk contributors in real time
The purpose of the risk barometer is to provide the operators with a tool that relates the status of the safety barriers to the risk level on the installation.
Information box 1
Technology for a better society
The risk barometer approach has been develop with basis in four industry cases: • "Process risk case" for COPSAS (2012-2014) + demonstrator
• "Sand erosion case" for BP (2013-2014) + demonstrator
• "Ship impact case" for COPSAS (2013-2014)
• "Drilling risk case" for COPSAS (2014)
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Risk barometer cases in IO3
Technology for a better society
PSA: "The methods which have been developed to describe, measure and communicate risk have provided important decision support, particularly in the design phase. In light of the frequent change processes, it is important that the
risk analyses are further developed for the operational phase as well."
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Main premises for developing the risk barometer
The risk barometer approach combines real time information about the safety barriers with knowledge from risk related analyses to make predictions about how the current risk picture may vary over time.
Information box 2
Technology for a better society
• Personnel participating in the planning process, e.g. Work-Permit (WP) meetings, planning-meetings and SJA meetings to aid decisions concerning ongoing and up-coming work.
• Maintenance supervisors to get an overview of the current risk level and the most critical barrier breaches/deviations to support decisions concerning prioritising of PM and CM tasks
• Other installation lead personnel to get an overview of barrier status and the risk level on the installation including technical integrity and technical safety functions.
• Onshore support personnel and management to get an overview of the barrier status, current risk level and trends.
• CCR / field operators to get an overview of the barrier status and the risk level and the main contributors in the areas.
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Potential risk barometer users and user groups
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Approaches for monitoring and aggregating barrier status information
1. Individual status of all barrier elements – no aggregation beyond element level
2: Define simple rules for aggregating element status up to some system, function, area and installation level (no underlying risk models)
3: Develop a limited set of indicators for selected barrier systems/functions, and based on indicator status and an underlying simplified
risk model estimate current risk and trend in risk
4: Develop more detailed probabilistic models (FTA, etc.) for each barrier system / barrier function where all elements are included and link these models together.
Incr
easi
ngly
risk
bas
ed Risk barometer approach
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Main steps when establishing a risk barometer
Technology for a better society
The selection of accident scenario(s) to be represented by the risk barometer should mainly be based on:
i. their estimated contribution towards major accident risk ii. the availability of relevant real time data to support the continuous update of
the barrier system indicators.
Process risk is generally the most obvious candidate; High risk contribution, quite
detailed QRA and often good availability of data
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Step1: Definition of major accident scenarios 1. Define major accident scenarios
Technology for a better society
Main sources of information typically include: • QRA of the installation(s) under consideration • Qualitative and semi-quantitative barrier analyses • Investigation and event reports • Various qualitative safety analyses • Selected system documentation and relevant procedures • Interviews, discussions and workshops with experts / operational personnel
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Step2: Relevant information sources 2. Identify and review relevant information
sources
No single source of information will provide all the required information to implement the risk barometer. Rather, information from various written sources must be obtained and combined with information from discussions with operational personnel and subject matter experts.
Information box 20
Technology for a better society
• PSAN requires that the operators shall define critical safety barriers, describe their function and have a system for the continuous follow-up of the condition of these barriers (ref. § 5 in the Management Regulations).
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Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems
The extent to which barrier functions and barrier systems are well defined varies significantly between installations and also between hazard types. Normally, the barriers to prevent and mitigate process events are well defined, whereas for other hazards, such as ship collisions and well leaks / blowouts, the barriers are not specified in such detail.
3. Identify barrier functions and associated
barrier systems
Information box 21
Technology for a better society 12
Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems 3. Identify barrier functions and associated
barrier systems
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Step3: Barrier functions and barrier systems 3. Identify barrier functions and associated
barrier systemsLimit topside leak”Limit the feed of
hydrocarbon on deck / additional well control”
Prevent influx”Well integrity”
Detect influx”Early kick
detection and response”
Stop influx”Primary well
control by mud column”
Prevent topside leak”Secondary well
control, BOP”
Diverter system
Mud gas separator
Manual operation of well control
equipment(BOP equip.)
Top drive(safety valve)
BOP control system
Manual shut-in of well
Mud circulation (regain well
control)
Choke and kill mud system
Pit gain (volumetric control
Flow-in/out(rate control)
Driller / mud logger surveillance
interpretation
Drilling supervisor /
toolpusher / ODC surveillance
interpretation
Mud delivery systems (piping,
valves and pumps)
System interfaces utilities and
controls
Manual mud weight control (derick man)
Casing / liner
Casing cement
Well testing and integrity approval
Cement plug inside tubing
(Sidetrack drilling)
Trip tank (exact volemetric control for tripping, etc.)
Real time monitoring of well
parameters
Mud mixing and bulk capacity (on
rig / standby vessel)
BOP stack, RAMS and preventors
Choke and kill valves on BOP
Bottom hole pressure (MWD)
Density of drill mud return
WR – Influenced by Well planning and Risk assessment
WR
WR
WR
WR
WR
Technology for a better society
Main sources:
• QRA sensitivities • Review of investigation reports • Barriers and safety analyses reports • Expert opinions and judgements
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Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers 4. Evaluate relative
importance of the barrier systems
A risk related ranking of the barrier systems is performed to facilitate a more targeted selection of barrier system indicators. The ease of performing such a criticality ranking varies between hazards and is easiest for process risk due to the detailed QRA for this particular hazard.
Information box 22
Technology for a better society 15
Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers 4. Evaluate relative
importance of the barrier systems
0
10
20
-10
-20
-30
-40-41.8
-16.8
-10.9
-5.2
-2.6 -3.0 -2.7
18.0
7.3 7.85.3
4.6 3.6 3.1 2.3
[%]
Leak frequency (x0.1)
Probability of leakage in neighbor module (x0.4)
Number of drillings and completions (0)
Number of workovers (x0.5)
Probability of hot work (x2)
Probability of ignition due to failure in electrical equipment (x2)
Probability of autoignition (x2)
Probability of ignition due to drive unit (x1.5)
Probability of ignition given leakage and hot work (x1.6)
Probability of ignition due to pumps/compr. (x2)
Probability of blowout (x0.75)
Reduction factor for electrical disconnection of ignition sources (x2)
(x1.75)(x1.7)
(x0.5)
Potential risk increase
Potential risk reduction
0
*0,ΔRR t
Technology for a better society 16
Step 4: Relative importance of the barriers
Ensure technical & operational integrity of
visiting vessel
Technical integrity of visiting vessel
Operational preparedness / base
activities
Limit consequences from an impact
Operational integrity of visiting vessel
Vessel / hull design
Contingency measures during loading/
offloading
Installation design / vulnerability
Emergency Bridging Document available, but not
updated and/or provided to vessel.
Procedure for familiarization and vessel specific training was not
followed
Required preparations prior to entering the safety zone not done
in accordance with procedures
The Captain left the steering position upon approaching the
installation
No reaction to the speed alarm when the vessel exceeded the speed limit
at entering the safety zone
The communication protocol including a PA announcement
at the vessel was not used
The Captain and 2nd Officer didnot demonstrate good bridge
resource management
Safeguarding of personnel / emergency
preparedness
Wrong alarm was activated
No general alarm was activated at the installation to muster
personnel and obtain head count
Prevent vessel on collision course
Technical navigation aids
Operational procedures and
restrictions inside safety zone
Operational navigation,
surveillance and communication
Position surveillance
Prevent contact/impact between vessel and
installation
DP & propulsion system
Normalisation of vessel operations
Operational awareness during vessel approach/departure and
loading/unloading
4. Evaluate relative importance of the barrier
systems
Technology for a better society
Main criteria for selecting indicators for each barrier system are: i. Relevance of indicator (correlation between indicator status and barrier
performance) ii. The possibility of obtaining an objective measure of the indicator iii. The availability of real time data to substantiate the indicator
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Step 5: Establishing barrier indicators 5. Establish barrier performance indicators
Technology for a better society 18
Step 5: Establishing barrier indicators 5. Establish barrier performance indicators
Hazard Barrier Function Examples of indicators and associated barrier system(s)
PRO
CE
SS L
EA
KS
BF1: Prevent release
"Design and condition of HC equipment"/ “Containment” Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP
"Work on / disassembling of HC systems" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of open work permits Number of work permits extended beyond one shift
BF2: Prevent ignition
"Ex Protection" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP
"Gas Detection" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of isolations present in the safety system
"Hot work" Number of open barrier breach notifications in SAP Number of open deviation notifications in SAP Number of open work permits – Hot work type A Number of open work permits – Hot work type B
SHIP
IM
PAC
TS
BF1: Ensure technical & operational integrity of
visiting vessel
"Technical integrity of visiting vessel" Fraction of days (during the last year) off-hire due to repair of a safety critical failure
"Operational integrity of visiting vessel" Vessel crew competency: Fraction of officers on bridge that has conducted a BRM course during the last two years
"Operational preparedness / base activities" Fraction of sailings that are regulated by long-term contracts Discrepancies between number of planned arrivals and number of experienced arrivals
BF1: Prevent vessel on collision course
"Technical navigation aids” Total amount of backlog on maintenance of technical-navigation equipment with overdue exceeding two weeks
"Operational procedures & restrictions inside safety zone" Deviations with respect to complying to speed criteria inside pre-safety and safety zone
Technology for a better society 19
Step 6: Establish a risk model 6. Establish risk model based on barrier indicators
Technology for a better society
About the chosen risk model: • A simple hierarchical model based on weighting of barrier systems and functions, and
weights allocated to the associated indicators.
• A simple model is more transparent and therefore easier to understand
• It is important to ensure that although information is aggregated in the model, insight on underlying conditions and causes is never lost. This is easiest obtainable in a simple model that is hierarchically structured.
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Step 6: Establish a risk model 6. Establish risk model based on barrier indicators
Technology for a better society
The risk model presents relative risk:
• Each indicator can have a max and a min score based on its current value (min score = 0, max score = weight).
• When all indicators are in best state: Total score is 0
• When all indicators are in worst stat: Total score is 100
• No absolute risk presented
An important feature of the risk model is the ability to identify the indicators that give the highest contribution towards the current risk on the installation
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Step 6: Establish a risk model 6. Establish risk model based on barrier indicators
Technology for a better society 22
Step 6: Establish a risk model 6. Establish risk model based on barrier indicators
Normal Risk Levels Increased Risk Levels High Risk Levels
<15 <30 >30
Calibration of the individual indicators and the risk barometer itself should be based on judgements made by operational personnel. It is highly desirable to supplement this calibration with historic operational data (if available).
Technology for a better society
Some main objectives of visualisation:
• Illustrate how the risk dynamically changes as a function of the monitored barrier performance (in terms of barrier functions and barrier systems).
• Provide information at different levels; installation, area, barrier function and barrier system (and also barrier element)
• Better understanding of contributing factors to increased risk levels.
• Provide decision support to planning and prioritizing
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Step 7: Visualisation of the risk 7. Visualize risk picture
Technology for a better society
Overview Display
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Technology for a better society
Detailed overview Display (at installation level)
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Technology for a better society
Drill down at area level – Process Deck
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Technology for a better society
Drill down at detailed area level
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Technology for a better society
Drill down to barrier function and system
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Technology for a better society
Visualization of additional guidance information
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Technology for a better society
Interfaces towards other systems
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Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
www.eninorge.com
Goliat Barrier Monitoring Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager
Barrier Management Project
Purpose The purpose of the project is to establish the safety and
barrier strategy and performance requirements to all barriers for the operation phase of Goliat based on the specific risk picture on the Goliat FPSO
Participants Eni Norge
Goliat Project Operations HSEQ Dept. D&T Dept.
Professional support: SINTEF Safetec ABB
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The objective of the “In Service Safety and Barrier Strategy” is to establish an overview of all barriers in place to prevent and/or mitigate risk on Goliat FPSO, and thus be able to control risk through barrier management in daily operations.
Barrier Management Project – activity break down
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B0 Review of Pilot Project
B1 Continuos Review and
Evaluation of Main Project
B2 Verification of Detailed Barrier Networks
B3 Concepts and Definitions Related to O&O Barrier Elements
and Performance Infl. Factors
B4 Operational Indicators to Monitor Safe Operational
Envelope
B5 Consistency in Analyses and Documents; Updating of Governing Documents
B6 Method to Determine
Importance of Change in Barrier
Status
B7 Programme for Follow-Up of SIL in
Operation
Special Tasks in Pilot Project(B2, B3, B4, B5)
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Identify barrier functions by «barrier grid» technique
Barrier grids developed for all main areas: • Shows the relationship between the hazards in a specific area (i.e.
the area-specific risk picture ) and the Barrier Functions (BF) needed to prevent or/and mitigate these risks
Barrier sub-functions and barrier elements identified and recorded in spread sheets
Ref. Sintef (K.Øien)
The performance requirements and verification activities are also recorded in the spread sheets
Barrier Panel - Visualisation tool
The Goliat Barrier Panel is currently being developed by ABB (integrated in ACE)
The Barrier Panel will show the status of the barrier functions
(and hence, the barrier elements) In the area they are meant to protect (protected area)
Only the technical barrier elements will be included in the first
phase Barrier Management Project Phase II (2015-2016) will identify
indicators for organisational and operational barrier elements and include these in the panel
The Barrier panel shall be a decision support tool To be use during activity planning
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Barrier Panel – showing barrier status
Barrier status (both for areas and for the FPSO as a whole) will visualised in the Barrier Panel – to be used for planning of operational activities Use of Barrier grids; showing where in the ‘sequence of events’
that barriers are not functioning or degraded Use of area risk charts (‘operationalization’ of QRA (and EPA))
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Barrier elements and data - general
The system should, in so far as is possible, automatically harvest and present updated data
The harvested data needs to have good data quality
The system should also accommodate for some kind of manual input as this may be required for measuring the condition of operational and organisational barrier elements
The selected indicators must reflect whether a specific barrier element is degraded or not functioning
6. Rules for aggregating barrier status information
1. Individual status of all barrier elements – no aggregation beyond element level
2: Implement simple rules of aggregation at system and barrier function level – no criticality evaluations performed
3: Include criticality evaluations of the barrier elements, and define rules for aggregating this information up to system and barrier function level – no normative evaluations.
4: Add normative evaluations of the acceptability of the aggregated status.
5: Perform additional detailed probabilistic risk modelling on system or barrier function level.
Incr
easi
ngly
risk
bas
ed
Ref. Sintef
Aggregation rule set
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Below, a rule set for allocating traffic lights on a barrier element/tag level is presented: On a barrier element/tag level at least one of these observations will give a red light:
• IF PM overdue > ½ PM interval, then red light 1) • IF CM notification open OR overdue, AND priority in SAP = high, then red light • IF condition monitoring alarm = Failure (> 750), then red light • IF safety fault alarm = failure, then red light • IF tag manually blocked (i.e. inhibited) or suppressed2), then red light
On a barrier element/tag level at least one of these observations will give a yellow light:
• IF PM overdue ≤ ½ PM interval, then yellow light 1) • IF CM notification overdue AND priority in SAP = medium, then yellow light • IF fault alarm = degraded, then yellow light
IF none of the above conditions are present, then barrier element/tag has a green light:
Note 1): PM also includes functional testing (FT) of the barrier elements/tags Note 2): Automatic suppression (e.g. of standby equipment) not to be included in barrier panel
www.eninorge.com
www.eninorge.com
www.eninorge.com
Barrier panel – lead to increased risk awareness
Use of the Barrier panel will lead to improved risk management and a joint risk awareness/understanding between the offshore and the onshore organisation: Used offshore in daily activity planning Used by the OSG (Onshore Support Group) in Hammerfest to prepare work
packages and to monitor risk and barrier status Used by TSG (Technical Support Group) and D&T (technical authorities) in
Stavanger to monitor and follow-up technical systems and performance standards
Used by onshore HSEQ to monitor and trend risk and barrier status Used by onshore management to monitor high level risk and barrier status
Training will be comprehensive. User groups identified and training packages are being developed: E-learning: Introduction Classroom; including use of scenarios On the job training, coaching
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Measuring safe operation (and lack of safety)
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Operational indicators for measuring safe operation can provide useful supplement to event indicators and barrier indicators. In addition, disabled, inhibited or otherwise non-functioning barriers may be viewed as unsafe operation.
Control deviation Regain controlPrevent deviation Mitigate accidentMitigate hazard
Lack of control
Normal operation Accident sequence
Barriers(mitigate consequences)
HazardFault/loss of control
Barriers(regain control)
Barriers(mitigate development of DSHAs)
Controls(prevent loss of control)
Accident
Prevention Control Mitigation
Inherent safety
Regular control
Loss
Operational indicators
Outside operational envelopeOperational envelopeBarrier indicators
Non-functioning or impaired barriers
Indicators forimpaired barriers
Event indicators
Summary
The Barrier Management Project has focus on linking barriers to the risk picture on Goliat in order to have more control with majors accident risk
Barrier Panel: Planning & decision-making tool, but also a risk management tool; via monitoring the barrier status over time, we get an indication on how well protected we are against major accidents
Barrier Panel to include indicators on operational and organisational barrier elements (Phase II)
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Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
iSee – Visualization of risk related factors
D.E.Etterlid, ConocoPhillips
IO Conference 24.09.13
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Cautionary Statement
The following presentation includes forward-looking statements. These statements relate to future events, such as anticipated revenues, earnings, business strategies, competitive position or other aspects of our operations or operating results. Actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is expressed or forecast in such forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict such as oil and gas prices; refining and marketing margins; operational hazards and drilling risks; potential failure to achieve, and potential delays in achieving expected reserves or production levels from existing and future oil and gas development projects; unsuccessful exploratory activities; unexpected cost increases or technical difficulties in constructing, maintaining or modifying company facilities; international monetary conditions and exchange controls; potential liability for remedial actions under existing or future environmental regulations or from pending or future litigation; limited access to capital or significantly higher cost of capital related to illiquidity or uncertainty in the domestic or international financial markets; general domestic and international economic and political conditions, as well as changes in tax, environmental and other laws applicable to ConocoPhillips’ business and other economic, business, competitive and/or regulatory factors affecting ConocoPhillips’ business generally as set forth in ConocoPhillips’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Use of non-GAAP financial information - This presentation includes non-GAAP financial measures, which are included to help facilitate comparison of company operating performance across periods and with peer companies. A reconciliation of these non-GAAP measures to the nearest corresponding GAAP measure is included in the appendix.
Cautionary Note to U.S. Investors – The SEC permits oil and gas companies, in their filings with the SEC, to disclose only proved, probable and possible reserves. We use the term "resource" in this presentation that the SEC’s guidelines prohibit us from including in filings with the SEC. U.S. investors are urged to consider closely the oil and gas disclosures in our Form 10-K and other reports and filings with the SEC. Copies are available from the SEC and from the ConocoPhillips website.
What to cover …
About ConocoPhillips
Background
What we set out to do
What we developed
Use and experience
Ongoing work & Further development
Questions
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Greater Ekofisk Area
Norway UK
Teesside
Emden
Tananger
Tor
Eldfisk
Embla
Ekofisk
Germany
Ekofisk is the largest oil and gas field on the Norwegian shelf Operated by ConocoPhillips
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5
6
Ekofisk
Tor Embla Eldfisk
Greater Ekofisk Area Number of people offshore: 1100-1300 Four fields in production Production: approx. 210,000 barrels oil equivalent per day Water injection: 600,000 barrels per day
The Ekofisk licence (PL018): ConocoPhillips 35.112% TOTAL 39.896% Eni 12.388% Statoil 7.604% Petoro 5.000%
Background
Is it reasonable to expect that our personnel understand the overall risk picture?
Do we really understand?
Is there room for improvement?
Objective – create solution for visualization of risk related data to improve understanding and information sharing
enable safer and better operations
Original focus at Operational HSE environment (HSE IO Centre) – currently the development also includes other environments
7
Background
Fast-track internal project – October 2012-March 2013 HSE Norway Operation (vision & spec)
IT (tools & infrastructure)
Operational Excellence (data & data preparation)
iSee was rolled out to HSE Norway Operations in March 2013
Phase 2 of iSee will be rolled out within the next weeks
The solution has been given the name iSee because
the user can see the data in a graphical interface
“iSee” can be understood as “I see” – I understand
the low letter «i» refers to our intention of creating the «iSee» app for smartphones and tablets
The «iSee-eye» represents integrated information put together to see/understand
8
What we set out to do
Create: a Web-based visual graphical interface containing
risk analysis data ongoing and planned work permits overview of barrier and deviation status and development
a system reducing the efforts and knowledge required to gather data from
different sources
a system automatically harvesting and presenting updated data (from our work tools) graphics as basis for showing data
a system having risk indicators, smart agents and tools to follow
development
a system requiring minimum resources for operation/maintenance a system which is intuitive/easy to use a system using latest tools, technology and knowhow
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What we developed
A web based system: Harvesting data automatically
Locating data automatically on updated graphics
Converting «Current Version» plot plans and safety plot plans from dwg-/dgn- format to a format suitable for visualization automatically
Visualization of QRA data
Boat collisions data
Work Permits level 1 & 2 in real time
Barrier degradations/breaches
Deviations
Compensating measures
Manning
Development based on data shown graphically
Data shown as clickable icons
A hierarchic system where data can be aggregated
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iSee – Installation level
13
SAP
details
«Click»
«Click»
iSee – «QRA area» level
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“Fatal accident rate”
for QRA area A2
Other risk data also
available
Use and Experience
System rolled out to HSE IO Centre, safety advisors offshore and operational HSE personnel March 2013
Currently ~300 users – approximately 100 users every day
Used to Get overview on- and offshore
Support during assessments
Support during approval of Work Permits offshore
To be a success: A new tool needs to be better than the existing
tools/methods
Need to be easy to use and efficient
Need to have good data quality
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Further development
Ongoing work: Develop solution for visualization of barrier
functions/systems
Develop dynamic risk- and barrier performance indicators
Develop and include «Smart agents»
Include 360 degree HD panorama photos
Include real time safety system status
Show self imposed barrier degradations
Show small leaks (below criteria)
Develop solutions showing well integrity status
Future possibilities Include plan data (look ahead)
Include risk «heat maps» connected to plan data
Include maintenance, test, inspection data
Include real time process data
Develop the iSee App
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Thanks for your attention …
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1
Presentations • Lars Bodsberg, IO3 Area Manger, SINTEF • Stein Hauge, Senior Adviser, SINTEF • Ole Rekdal, Safety and Emergency Preparedness Manager, Eni Norge • Dag Eide Etterlid, HSE OC Supervisor Ekofisk Facility Team, ConocoPhillips • Erik Sælen, Consultant, Safety & Asset Risk Management, DNV GL
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL © 2014
Erik Sælen, DNV GL Safety and Asset Risk Management, Trondheim 25 Nov 2014
Dynamic risk and barrier monitoring in an operational risk management context
1
The vision and our road towards it
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014
2
Risiko vurdering
Etablere kontekst
Fare identifikasjon
Risiko analyse
Risiko evaluering
Risiko håndtering
Monit
orer
ing og
oppfø
lging
Komm
unika
sjon o
g kon
sulta
sjon
Risiko vurdering
Etablere kontekst
Fare identifikasjon
Risiko analyse
Risiko evaluering
Risiko håndtering
Monit
orer
ing og
oppfø
lging
Komm
unika
sjon o
g kon
sulta
sjon
Risiko vurdering
Etablere kontekst
Fare identifikasjon
Risiko analyse
Risiko evaluering
Risiko håndtering
Monit
orer
ing og
oppfø
lging
Komm
unika
sjon o
g kon
sulta
sjon
Risiko vurdering
Etablere kontekst
Fare identifikasjon
Risiko analyse
Risiko evaluering
Risiko håndtering
Monit
orer
ing og
oppfø
lging
Komm
unika
sjon o
g kon
sulta
sjon
Ledelse
Plan
Do
Check
Act
The vision
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014
The steps to get there
Systems and tools which allows for major accident evaluations
Clearly defined processes for managing major accident risk
Deep major accident risk understanding among crew
3
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014
Barrier Management and Operational Risk Management Manual
Project example: Barrier Management and Operational Risk Management
4
INPUT USE
Technical barriers
Overdue maintenance
Corrective jobs and compensating measures/
Non-conformances
Inhibited equipment
Incidents
Operational barriers
Formal competence and courses
Emergency preparedness drills
Well control drills
Op
erat
ion
al r
isk
man
agem
ent
Bar
rier
man
agem
ent
Task planning and execution
Specific tasks and PTW/SJA/TBT
Overall work planning
Work coordination - PTW meeting
Maintenance planning
Maintenance planning and optimization onshore
Status meetings
Internal HoD morning meeting
Status meeting with shore
Morning meeting with client
Handovers
Daily drilling instruction meetings
Strategic planning
• Input during senior management planning
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014
"Ok, we have the system in place, now what?" - A few things to have in mind
5
Biased indicators will give biased information
Aggregation of indicators without losing information
False feeling of safety
The focus may shift from safe operation to the indicators themselves
The main success criteria of a KPI system is that the process to monitor, follow and make decisions based on the data is sufficiently defined
DNV GL © 2014 25 Nov 2014
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
www.dnvgl.com
Thank you!
6
Erik Sælen erik.saelen@dnvgl.com 414 70 186