Post on 16-Nov-2021
Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns
Kimberly Cornaggia1 John Hund2 Giang Nguyen1
1Penn State University
2University of Georgia
Seventh Annual Brookings Municipal Finance Conference
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 1 / 28
The Big Picture
Question: how informationally efficient is the municipal bond market?Revised Question: do investors in municipal bond markets use readilyavailable information from other financial markets?
Answer: No. The market updates slowly and remains segmented fromother linked markets.
Method: A simple event study, complicated greatly by illiquidity andheterogeneity.More Detailed Method: When bond insurers become distressed and/ordowngraded, we examine when and if returns on Aaa-rated uninsuredbonds diverge from lower-rated insured bonds.
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 2 / 28
Our Contributions
1 Clean and rigorous analysis of whether muni investors respond toshocks (and which type) affecting the value of their investments.
Both retail and institutional municipal investors seem to ignoreinformation in equity and CDS markets.Changes in ratings for insurers prompt some selling by institutions.Overall, the municipal market remains highly segmented from othermarkets.
2 Novel analysis of whether insurance is valuable. Returns of low-ratedinsured bonds are identical to Aaa-rated uninsured bonds wheninsured by Aaa-rated insurer.
3 Robust methodology for computing indices and abnormal returns inilliquid and heterogeneous markets for use in event study analysis(with statistical inference).
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 3 / 28
We need an event date (x2)
1 Financial Distress revealed in equity market in Oct/Nov 20072 Loss of Aaa credit rating in June 2008
Importantly, the financial distress of the insurers is almost exclusively due to bad
decisions to insure sub-prime CDO structures, and not due to credit deterioration in the
municipal market.
01/06 04/06 07/06 10/06 01/07 04/07 07/07 10/07 01/08 04/08 07/08 10/08 01/09-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
Cu
mu
lative
Re
turn
(%
)
MBIA
AMBAC
The distress-downgrade period is valuable for research design:fundamental creditworthiness has changed but the “label” hasn’t changed.Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 4 / 28
Signs of Distress Clear and Well-Publicized in 2007
From ”How to Save The Bond Insurers,” a 145pg PowerPoint presentation by BillAckman, 11/28/17 (reported in NYT, FT and Reuters, 12/1/17)
From Creal, Gramacy, & Tsay, 2014
CDSGraph
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 5 / 28
Data (A Contribution by Itself)
1 Mergent Municipal Bond Securities database:3,555,964 bonds issued by 53,045 municipal issuersFinal sample: 763,070 G.O. bonds issued between 1960 - June 2016
2 Mergent insurer’s data unreliable: have only the most recent insurer(original insurer overwritten)
Hand collect insurer portfolio novation data from insurance companies,track down transfered CUSIPs, and re-instate original insurer data
3 Comprehensive ratings histories directly from Moodys and S&Pwebsites (provided by Ryan Israelsen MSU)
4 MSRB Municipal Bond Trade database:After merging with our GO bond sample and cleaning: 4,456,041 tradepairs spanning 2005-2016/06
5 Other data pieces: CRSP, Bloomberg, CRAs’ websites, insurers’websites and financial reports
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 6 / 28
Key Research Challenges
1 We need: daily returns on insured bond portfolios and oncorresponding benchmark (non-insured Aaa bonds)
2 How to compute daily returns (of insured bond portfolios and ofbenchmark) when munis are so illiquid? (The average bond in sampletrades about 30 times during 12-year sample period 2005-2016/07)
3 CAN’T just use data on the bonds that actually trade on each day tocompute a day’s average:
4 Important to measure portfolio returns employing all observations forall bonds in the portfolio... but how???
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 7 / 28
Key Research Challenges: Addressed with Insights fromReal Estate Literature
Muni bonds are like houses: highly heterogeneous and very illiquid
Modify tools from real estate economists who use Repeat SalesRegressions (RSR) to calculate house price appreciation indices all thetime (similar to Spiegel & Starks (2016) for corporate bonds)
Apply GRSR (Peng (2010)) to estimate common return index for allbonds with the same insurer, as well as separate loadings for differentunderlying credit rating classes:
∆yi,b,s,l =
s∑t=b+1
τl,tRm,t +
s∑t=b+1
εi,t
Rm,t = common return of all bonds with same insurance wrap, and l indexes the
underlying rating class of bond i
τl,t indicates the time-varying sensitivity of bonds in rating class l tothe overall return pattern of all bonds with the same insurer
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 8 / 28
Result 1: When Do Insured Returns Diverge from Aaa?
Divergence from true-Aaa returns starts in late 2008 (afterdowngrade)
But not earlier (around time of financial distress in late 2007)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Cum
ula
tive R
etu
rn S
ince 1
/1/2
006 (
%)
Aaa Uninsured
MBIA
AMBAC
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 9 / 28
Formal Test of Divergence from true-Aaa Return
MBIA AMBAC
F-stat χ2 c.v. F-stat χ2 c.v.
Sub-sample 1: Prior to Distress Date 341.26 507.84 397.83 513.11Sub-sample 2: From Distress to Downgrade Date 147.83 192.70 42.76 187.24Sub-sample 3: After Downgrade Date 2889.16∗ 421.15 928.89∗ 421.15
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 10 / 28
Result 2: CARs of MBIA- and AMBAC-insured BondsVertical lines from left to right mark: 1) distress date, 2) downgrade date
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-6
-4
-2
0
2
CA
R(%
)
MBIA
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-6
-4
-2
0
2
CA
R(%
)
AMBAC
CAR Table Distress CAR Table Downgrade
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 11 / 28
Result 3: Attention of Institutional vs. Retail InvestorsGranger causality test based on VAR of institutional vs. retail daily net order flow
Sub-sample 1: Prior to Distress Date
Sub-sample 2: From Distress to Downgrade Date
Sub-sample 3: After Downgrade Date
Causality Direction Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 Sub-sample 3
Institutional → Retail 8.162∗∗∗ 6.350∗∗∗ 2.181 7.891∗∗∗
Retail → Institutional 4.617∗∗∗ 5.598∗∗∗ 1.500 2.228
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 12 / 28
Test of Information Transmission Across Linked MarketsExpanded VAR with both insurers
Granger-causality Test (row variable → column variable?)
ABK-Bond ABK-Stock ABK-CDS MBI-Bond MBI-Stock MBI-CDS
ABK-Bond 0.838 2.234 10.257∗∗∗ 1.124 0.655ABK-Stock 0.827 4.333∗∗ 1.129 0.674 0.447ABK-CDS 0.271 0.567 0.463 1.235 1.637MBI-Bond 36.394∗∗∗ 0.451 1.715 1.131 1.566MBI-Stock 1.013 2.226 2.134 2.212 11.828∗∗∗
MBI-CDS 1.766 4.789∗∗∗ 21.232∗∗∗ 0.616 0.659
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 13 / 28
One Explanation: Maybe Insurance Has No Value?
Then someone should tell the municipalities...
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
US Municipal Insurance Premiums Collected (millions)(MBIA/AMBAC actual; Estimated Total)
MBIA Premiums AMBAC Premiums Total Estimated Premiums
Total Premiums CollectedAMBAC (actual): 4.688 BillionMBIA (actual): 5.205 BillionTotal (est.): 17.127 Billion
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 14 / 28
Other Alternative Explanations
1 Maybe there isn’t any default risk?Then it doesn’t make much sense to buy insurance...However, we’ve replicated the analysis with revenue bonds, (whichhave much higher default risk) and they show similar patterns
RevenueReturns RevenueRatings
2 Lehman Brothers, bailouts, and crisisSignificantly negative CARs precede Lehman bankruptcyTrading activities in muni market around Lehman bankrupcy show“business as usual” Detail
Delayed reaction due to expectation of bailout? no such expectationevident in equity and CDS markets on insurers
3 Limits to arbitrageDifficulty in short-selling munis? Negative CARs following downgradeindicate short sale contraints cannot be the entire storyWhat prevents “smart money” from taking advantage of informationalinefficiency? High transaction costs?
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 15 / 28
Conclusions
Muni market remains informationally inefficient and segmented
Natural experiment designed around collapse of muni insuranceindustry shows:
1 investors ignore insurers’ insolvency widely revealed in other markets,but...
2 do respond to insurers’ loss of Aaa rating
Institutional investors appear to respond ahead of retail investors, butthe market is generally slow in updating
Our paper also offers data and methodology contributions:improved methodology to compute bond returns for illiquid munimarket, overcoming major problems affecting earlier studiescomprehensive database related to municipal bond market, combiningvarious data sources with credit rating history collected from CRAs andhand-collected data on contemporaneous insurer information
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 16 / 28
Appendix
Additional Results
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 17 / 28
CARs Around Distress Date (Event 1)No significant CARs before, and lack of evidence of negative CARs after financial distressof insurers is well publicized
Pre-event window
[-20:-1] [-40:-1] [-60:-1]
CAR s.e. CAR s.e. CAR s.e.
MBIA −0.15 0.20 −0.20 0.20 −0.06 0.20AMBAC −0.47∗ 0.31 −0.07 0.31 0.02 0.32
Post-event window
[0:20] [0:40] [0:60]
CAR s.e. CAR s.e. CAR s.e.
MBIA 0.85∗∗∗ 0.36 −0.03 0.23 −0.23 0.39AMBAC −0.15 0.31 −0.68∗∗ 0.40 −0.37 0.57
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 18 / 28
CARs Around Downgrade Date (Event 2)No significant CARs before, significantly negative CARs after loss of Aaa insurance rating
Pre-event window
[-20:-1] [-40:-1] [-60:-1]
CAR s.e. CAR s.e. CAR s.e.
MBIA −0.07 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.26AMBAC −0.33 0.39 −0.27 0.39 −0.07 0.40
Post-event window
[0:20] [0:40] [0:60]
CAR s.e. CAR s.e. CAR s.e.
MBIA −0.48∗∗ 0.27 −0.41∗ 0.28 −0.87∗∗∗ 0.29AMBAC −0.74∗∗ 0.40 −0.79∗∗ 0.43 −0.15 0.47
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 19 / 28
Result 4: Information Transmission Across Linked MarketsVAR of equity returns, changes in CDS spreads, and insured bond portfolio returns
Granger-causality Test (row variable → column variable?)
Insured Bond Stock Return CDS Change
Panel A: MBIA
Insured Bond 1.687 1.665Stock Return 0.075 55.352∗∗∗
CDS Change 0.031 0.052
Panel B: AMBAC
Insured Bond 0.047 0.000Stock Return 0.002 44.400∗∗∗
CDS Change 0.982 3.123∗
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 20 / 28
Institutional Investors Selling Ahead of Retail InvestorsDaily ratio of institutional sell volume to retail sell volume
Jan 2006 Jul 2006 Jan 2007 Jul 2007 Jan 2008 Jul 2008 Jan 2009 Jul 2009 Jan 20100
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Distress Downgrade
More charts
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 21 / 28
MBIA and AMBAC CDS and Implied Rating
01/06 04/06 07/06 10/06 01/07 04/07 07/07 10/07 01/08 04/08 07/08 10/08 01/090
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
5-y
ea
r C
DS
Pre
miu
m (
bp
s) MBIA
AMBAC
Implied Rating: Ba
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 22 / 28
Cumulative Returns for Revenue Bond Indices
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Cu
mu
lative
Re
turn
Sin
ce
1/1
/20
06
(%
)
NON-INS AAA
MBIA
AMBAC
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 23 / 28
Cumulative Returns for Revenue Bond Indices by Rating
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Cu
mu
lative
Re
turn
Sin
ce
1/1
/20
06
(%
)
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 24 / 28
Trading Activity Around MBIA Distress and Downgrade
Institutional Trade Volume around Distress Date
10/18/2007
10/19/2007
10/22/2007
10/23/2007
10/24/2007
10/25/2007
10/26/2007
10/29/2007
10/30/2007
10/31/2007
11/01/20070
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Retail Trade Volume around Distress Date
10/18/2007
10/19/2007
10/22/2007
10/23/2007
10/24/2007
10/25/2007
10/26/2007
10/29/2007
10/30/2007
10/31/2007
11/01/20070
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Institutional Trade Volume around Downgrade Date
06/12/2008
06/13/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008
06/18/2008
06/19/2008
06/20/2008
06/23/2008
06/24/2008
06/25/2008
06/26/20080
10
20
30
40
50
60
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Retail Trade Volume around Downgrade Date
06/12/2008
06/13/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008
06/18/2008
06/19/2008
06/20/2008
06/23/2008
06/24/2008
06/25/2008
06/26/20080
2
4
6
8
10
12
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 25 / 28
Trading Activity Around AMBAC Distress and Downgrade
Institutional Trade Volume around Distress Date
10/25/2007
10/26/2007
10/29/2007
10/30/2007
10/31/2007
11/01/2007
11/02/2007
11/05/2007
11/06/2007
11/07/2007
11/08/20070
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Retail Trade Volume around Distress Date
10/25/2007
10/26/2007
10/29/2007
10/30/2007
10/31/2007
11/01/2007
11/02/2007
11/05/2007
11/06/2007
11/07/2007
11/08/20070
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Institutional Trade Volume around Downgrade Date
06/12/2008
06/13/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008
06/18/2008
06/19/2008
06/20/2008
06/23/2008
06/24/2008
06/25/2008
06/26/20080
10
20
30
40
50
60
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Retail Trade Volume around Downgrade Date
06/12/2008
06/13/2008
06/16/2008
06/17/2008
06/18/2008
06/19/2008
06/20/2008
06/23/2008
06/24/2008
06/25/2008
06/26/20080
2
4
6
8
10
12
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Go backCornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 26 / 28
Trading Activity Around Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
Institutional Trade Volume
09/1
0/20
08
09/1
1/20
08
09/1
2/20
08
09/1
5/20
08
09/1
6/20
08
09/1
7/20
08
09/1
8/20
08
09/1
9/20
08
09/2
2/20
08
09/2
3/20
08
09/2
4/20
08
09/2
5/20
08
09/2
6/20
08
09/2
9/20
08
09/3
0/20
08
10/0
1/20
08
10/0
2/20
08
10/0
3/20
08
10/0
6/20
08
10/0
7/20
08
10/0
8/20
08
10/0
9/20
08
10/1
0/20
080
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Retail Trade Volume
09/1
0/20
08
09/1
1/20
08
09/1
2/20
08
09/1
5/20
08
09/1
6/20
08
09/1
7/20
08
09/1
8/20
08
09/1
9/20
08
09/2
2/20
08
09/2
3/20
08
09/2
4/20
08
09/2
5/20
08
09/2
6/20
08
09/2
9/20
08
09/3
0/20
08
10/0
1/20
08
10/0
2/20
08
10/0
3/20
08
10/0
6/20
08
10/0
7/20
08
10/0
8/20
08
10/0
9/20
08
10/1
0/20
080
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
$ m
illio
n p
ar
Buy
Sell
Go backCornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 27 / 28
Demise of Monoline Insurance Industry
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Issue Year
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0
10
20
30
40
Num
ber
of
GO
Bo
nds
('00
0)
Number of GO Bonds (Right Scale)Volume Share of Bonds with InsuranceFraction of Bonds with Insurance
Go back
Cornaggia, Hund, and Nguyen Investor Attention and Municipal Bond Returns July 16, 2018 28 / 28