Internet of Terrible: Can you hear me meow?

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Transcript of Internet of Terrible: Can you hear me meow?

Internet of Terrible

Can you hear me meow?

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

• Name: Brandon McCrillis

• Company: Rendition InfoSec

• Email: brandon@renditioninfosec.com

• URL: RSEC.US

• Twitter: @13M4C

• Model: DA243A-ABA 6415cl NA910 • TotalPhysicalMemory: 804765696

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Objectives:

Discuss case studies of conducting network

enumeration using VoIP infrastructure and other

embedded devices

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Objectives:

Highlight attack methodologies that can be

used for credential harvesting, enumeration,

denial of service, and persistence

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Objectives:

Practical Defensive techniques and real-world attacker mitigations via monitoring and secure

configuration

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Objectives:

Therapeutically work through some *minor* cat issues

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Times have changed…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

The Internet of Terrible

1983: CYBER

CSI++

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

IoT: All the things!

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis©2016 RSEC.US

Spy-on-you Barbie!

Embedded Devices…Doing things with stuff

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Embedded Devices

In-flight Entertainment

Much Services, Many Lulz

Y’know, living off the land…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Real-world Assessments…

Voice over IP…Teh VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

What is VoIP?

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

What is Asterisk?

Where it’s at..Two turn-tables and a Polycom phone

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

What’s in the box…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Reduce, Reuse, Recycle

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Can you hear me meow?

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Factory Reset Devices pls!

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Meh?

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

I have wut u need…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Default SoundPoint 501 Creds

• Default TFTP || FTP:username: PlcmSpIppassword: PlcmSpIp

• DEFAULT HTTP:username: Polycompassword: 456

Default User Pass: 123Default Admin Pass: 456

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Ye Old Web GUI

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Sure, I’ll bite…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Sure, I’ll bite…

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Base64 Decode

Polycom : 456

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

AsteriskNOW

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

AsteriskNOW

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

AsteriskNOW

Attacking VoIP…Calling your mother

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

• Information Gathering / Enumeration• Monitoring and Eavesdropping • Attacking Authentication• VLAN Hopping• Denial of Service / Flooding• Spoofing Caller ID

Common Attack Vectors

VoIP WeaponizedI shouldn’t be able to do this!

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Oh so sexy….

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

CHECK-SYNC

Many vendors allow for a remote reboot of phones to facilitate SIP configuration

updates.

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

CHECK-SYNC

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

CHECK-SYNC

Using this for pure evil, an attacker can force consumption of a tampered

configuration to the phone… unauthenticated.

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

CHECK-SYNC

Check-sync DoS

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

• Python-based SIP Packet Forging Tool by Pietro Bertera (bertera.it)

https://github.com/pbertera/SIPPing

Also, wrote a blog post regarding SIP packet filtering using iptables

SIPPing …FTW!

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Crafted check-sync packet

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

SPECIAL EXTENSIONS

Configuration of a “special extension” with auto-answer can force the phone to

answer a call (without ringing) and immediately force the speakerphone mic

to listen. …a real time audio feed… without user interaction or knowledge.

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

SPECIAL EXTENSIONS

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

SPECIAL EXTENSIONS

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

VLAN Hopping

Often times VoIP VLANs are not monitored (read: trusted) -- “Plug and

Play” hopping…

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

VLAN Hopping

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

VLAN Hopping

When an attacker 0wn yer VoIP

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

More phun with VoIP

auxillary/voipauxillary/scanner/sip

SIPvicious / SIPdump / SIPCrack

Kali/Metasploit

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Future Development

• SIP Tunneling

• Exploit and Exfiltration Framework

• Enumeration of trusted devices within the information system

• Flashing Custom Firmware

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Trusted can’t be trusted

Wrapping it up…

©2016 RSEC.US

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Secure configuration and Monitoring FTW!

Wrapping it up…

©2016 RSEC.US

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

Know your network better than I will

Wrapping it up…

©2016 RSEC.US

©2016 RSEC.US -=- Brandon McCrillis

The Last Meow…

QUESTIONS?

Brandon McCrillis

brandon@renditioninfosec.com

@13M4C