Post on 02-Apr-2018
ForewordtotheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
“The water started to rise, and it did not stop…the water was already so high and strong that I could not hold on to one of my children and the water swept her away.
Luckily someone was there to grab her.”
Gonaïves,OgèLéandre,Haiti2008
ThepeopleoftheUnitedKingdomknowwhywerespond,individuallyandasasociety,tohumanitarianemergenciesaroundtheworld.Theyunderstandthatwhenweareconfrontedbytheimageofachildtrappedintherubbleofanearthquake,orofafamilyclingingtotheroofofafloodedhome,wedon’tsomuchcommittohelp,asfeelcommittedtodoso;committedbyoursharedhumanity.
Itisbecausetheimpulsetorelievesufferingisrootedinmoralitythat our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us.
Whatiscrucialisthatwhenwedecidetoact,wedosoeffectively.Thefactthat,acrossthecountry,householdbudgetsareunderparticularstrainatthemoment,onlyunderlinesthepoint.Peoplewanttoknowthateverypoundtheygivewillbeapoundspentsavinglivesandlivelihoods.
InlookingatthewaytheUKgovernmentrespondstohumanitarianemergencies,thisReviewhasidentifiedmuchinwhichtheBritishpeoplecantakepride.TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,asapolicymaker,afunderandadelivererofaid,hasbeenwidelypraisedforitsleadingrolewithintheinternationalhumanitariancommunity.
Butbeinggoodisnotgoingtobegoodenoughgiventhechallengesahead.Thescale,frequencyandseverityofrapidonsethumanitariandisasterswillcontinuetogrowinthecomingyears,andatanacceleratingpace.Expertspredictthatclimaterelateddisasterscouldaffect375millionpeopleeveryyearby2015,upfrom263millionin2010.
Thereasonsforthisaremany.Rapidpopulationgrowth,especiallyindisasterproneareas,isakeyfactor,especiallywhencombinedwithcontinuedmassurbanisation,muchofitunplannedandunsafe.Sotooarethechangesalreadyunderwayinsealevels,andinglobalrainfallandstormpatterns–changesthatwillcontributetosignificantadditionalpressureforfoodandwaterintheyearsahead.
Wearecaughtinaracebetweenthegrowingsizeofthehumanitarianchallenge,andourabilitytocope;betweenhumanityandcatastrophe.And,atpresent,thisisnotaracewearewinning.
Somerecentlyaffectedcountries,likeChinaandChilehavedemonstratedremarkableresilienceinthefaceofnaturaldisasters.EvenJapan,wherethetriplecatastrophehasledtotremendoussuffering,thingsmighthavebeenfarworsewithoutpreparation.Butothers,likeHaitiorPakistan,haveneededlargescaleoutsidehelpandwillcontinuetodoso.
Theabilityoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunitytoprovidethishelpisthreatenedbyanumberofproblems,somenew,somefamiliar.
HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
Thefirstistheglobaleconomiccrisis,whichcouldmakethealreadyslowergrowingcountriesoftheWestlessableorwillingtoprovideresourcesfordisasterrelief.Thisgapcouldbefilledbythefastergrowing‘emerging’worldeconomies,butthisisfarfromguaranteed.Thesecountriescurrentlycontributefarlesstodisasterrelief,andinanycasearelikelytoremainpreoccupiedwiththerelativelyhighlevelsofpovertywithintheirownborders.
Thesecondistherisingsecuritythreatfacedbyhumanitarianworkersontheground,andtheincreasingdifficultiestheyfaceinaccessingaffectedpopulations.Thetaskofprovidinghumanitarianassistanceimpartiallyandonthebasisofneedishugelycomplicatedbyconflict.Theneed,onoccasion,toworkalongsideorwithhostile–evenproscribed–groupsalreadypresentshumanitarianworkerswithanumberofmoralandpracticalproblems.Thesetooarelikelytogrowinnumberandcomplexity.
Regrettably,theleadership,managementandcoordinationoftheinternationalcommunity’seffortshavenotriseneventothechallengeswecurrentlyface.Unlessweradicallyimprovethequalityoftheleadershipoftheinternationaleffortinhumanitariancrises,wewillnotsucceedindealingwithwhatisahead.
Forallthesereasons,wehaveconcludedthatmerelyimprovinguponwhatwehavedoneinthepast–enhancingthestatusquo–willnotbesufficient.Wemustdevisenewwaystomeetthenewchallenges.
Thereareseventhreadstothisnewapproach.Theseformthestructureofthisdocument.
First,weneedtodevelopamoreanticipatoryapproach,usingsciencetohelpusbothpredict,andprepareforfuturedisastersandconflict.
Second,weneedtoplacethecreationofresilienceattheheartofourapproachbothtolonger-termdevelopmentandtoemergencyresponse.ThiswillrequireDFIDtomakehumanitarianresponseapartofitscoredevelopmentwork,engagingmorecloselywithlocalpeopleandinstitutionssoastostrengthenlocalcapacity.
Third,weneedsubstantiallytoimprovethestrategic,politicalandoperationalleadershipoftheinternationalhumanitariansystem.
Fourth,weneedtoinnovatetobecomemoreefficientandeffective.
Fifth,weneedtoincreasetransparencyandaccountabilitytowardsbothdonorandhostcountrypopulations.Farfrombeingburdensome,thisisinfactapreconditionfortheimprovementswewanttoseeintermsofvalueformoneyandimpact.
Sixth,weneedtocreatenewhumanitarianpartnershipstoallowDFIDbettertoinfluenceandworkwithinanincreasinglycomplexhumanitariansystem.Infuture,theeffectivenessofDFIDwilldependmoreonwhatitcandowithothers,thanonwhatitcandoalone.DFIDwillneedtoworkmorecloselywiththeemergingworldpowersandwiththeprivatesector,aswellaswiththemilitary.Inaddition,itwillneedtonurtureitsexistingpartnershipswiththeEU,theUS,otherdonors,theRedCrossandtheinternationalNGOs.
Finally,asemergenciesbecomebiggerandmorecomplex,soweneedtodefendandstrengthenthehumanitarian space.Thisreferstotheneedforhumanitarianworkerstobegrantedaccessandprotectionastheyseektoprovidehumanitarianassistanceinconflictaffectedareas.Thisinturnwillrequireustoreassertthecorehumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality;thepromisetoassistpeopleonthebasisofneed,regardlessoftheirgender,religion,ethnicityorpoliticalallegiance.
AsDFIDseekstomeetthesechallenges,itwillneed,ineverythingitdoes,tobecomeevenmoreinnovative,evenmoreofalearningorganisationthatisalwaysopenandwelcomingtonewideas.
ForewordtotheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
IhavebeenprivilegedtochairthisindependentreviewandamgratefultoSecretaryofStateAndrewMitchell,notonlyforaskingmetodothis,butforenablingmetoworkwithaSeniorAdvisoryBoardwhosetalent,experienceandwisdomhascontributedsomuchtothiswork;withagiftedandcommittedteamofDFIDofficialswhohavesupportedusoutstandingly;andwithmyfriendoffortyyears,RossMountain,who,astheReview’sDirector,hasdrivenandsteeredusthroughoutthesevenmonthsofthereviewprocess.
DFIDenjoysapositionofrespectandleadershipintheinternationalcommunityfortheworkthatithasdoneinthepastandstilldoestoday.ItisourhopethatthisreportwillassistDFIDtomaintainthatpositionofinternationalleadershipinthefaceofthechallengesthatlieahead.
Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, Chair HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
Director:RossMountainSeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;CarolynMiller;DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;GordonConway;JodaSilva;MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg;SueWardell;YaseminAysan.
ExecutiveSummary
ExecutiveSummaryThereviewcomesatatimewhenthehumanitariancommunityfacesanumberofdauntingchallenges.Disastersareincreasing,asarethenumbersofpeopleaffectedbythem.ThesearesetoutstarklyintheChair’sforewordandinthereportitself.
TheUKisamajorcontributorinhumanitariancrises,andishighlyrespectedforitsrole.SomeofthebestknownhumanitarianorganisationsareUKbased,andtheBritishpublicgivesgenerouslyinappeals.TheUKgovernmenthasbeenthesecondlargestbilateraldonorforhumanitarianreliefinrecentyears,aftertheUS.
ThisreviewhasfoundthattheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),themainconduitthroughwhichthegovernmentresponds,isalsowellrespectedandwellregarded.Ithasexcellenthumanitarianstaff,andhasplayedapositiveroleinimprovinginternationalresponse.Nevertheless,thereviewhasalsoconcludedthatinlightofthepotentialneedinyearstocome,therewillhavetobeastepchangeinthewayDFIDresponds.Thereviewmakesaseriesofhighlevelpolicy,andsomedowntoearthpractical,recommendationsintendedtobringthischangeabout.
Anticipation
If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be “ahead of the curve” rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them.
Itisinthenatureofdisastersandconflictthattheycannotbepreciselypredicted.Butwecanbemoreanticipatoryinourapproach.Hurricaneseasonsarewellknown,asareearthquakefaultlines.Droughtscanbequicklyidentified.Climatescienceisimprovingallthetime.Politicalinstabilityandtheconflictitcanleadtoarereportedearly.Buttheseearlywarningsandpredictableeventsareoftennotactedoninadvance,orquicklyenoughwhentheyarehappening.Partoftheanswerisbetterpresentationofthescienceforbetterdecisionmaking.Partoftheanswerisfordecisionmakerstoactonthisinformation.Devolvingdecisionmakingtothoseclosesttoeventsisanotherpart,includingequippingatriskgovernmentsandcivilsocietywiththemeanstoact.
Resilience
The more resilient a nation, the less lasting damage disasters cause and the quicker they can recover.Resilienceisaboutbeingpreparedfordisasters,andhavinggoodsystemsforrespondingtothem.Itisaboutinvestingininfrastructure,likebuildinghousesandhospitalsthatcanwithstandearthquakes,orschoolsthatdoubleupascycloneshelters.Butitisalsoaboutinvestinginhumancapacity;strengtheningagovernment’scapacitytorespond;creatingdisastermanagementstructuresandplans;givingpeoplesupportbeforedroughtforcesthemtosellalltheirpossessions.Itisabouteconomicplanningthatrecognisesdisasterscanhappenandmakesprovisionforthem.
Wheregovernmentsarecapableofbuildingresilience,thentheUK,throughDFIDshouldhelpthemtodoso.ThisshouldbeacorepartofDFIDdevelopmentworkincountriesthatareatrisk,whichisthemajorityofthe27inwhichDFIDnowworksbilaterally.Investinginresiliencewillsavelivesandmoneyinthefuture.Mozambiqueaskedtheinternationalcommunityfor£2millionin2006tohelpprepareforthefloods,anamountitcouldnotsecure.Afterthefloodstheinternationalsystemspent£60millionresponding.
HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
Leadership
Wheregovernmentsarenotabletorespondtodisastersorinconflictsituationstheyneedastronginternationalsystemtohelpout.Buttoooftentheinternationalsystemfailsthem.CasestudiesforthisreviewinHaitiandPakistanmakethisdepressinglyclear.TheUNistheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcanleadbutisoftentooweakandslowtodoso.
Changeisneededatthestrategicandtheoperationallevels.The UN needs to invest in a leadership cadre and ensure its best people are deployed quickly to the biggest and most complex disasters.Theseleadersneedthesupportoftheirheadquartersandtheagenciesthatdothemajorityofthework.Thesameistrueoftechnicalleadership–the‘clusters’.Theseneeddedicatedleadershipinthebiggestemergenciesandtheyneedtobestrategic,decision-makingbodieswithnationalandlocalgroupsfullyintegrated.Linesofauthorityneedtobeclearer,andwherenecessary,institutionalchangesshouldbemadetomakethemso.Overallthelevelofprofessionalisminthehumanitariansectorneedstoberaisedthroughbetterinvestmentinskillsandtraining.
TheUKhasbeenastrongproponentofchangeintheinternationalsystemtodate,andcanhelppushthisnewagenda.AlreadytheheadsofthemajorUNagencies,ledbytheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinator(ERC),arepushingtheseideas.DFID should encourage and support further reform, and work with others to deliver the change needed to face future challenges.
Innovation
Whenitcomestosavinglivesinanemergencyweneedtobeasefficientandeffectiveaswecan.Oneofthewaysthiscanbeachievedisthroughgreateruseofnewtechnologiesandnewpractices,harnessingthebestofnewscience,newprocessesandthenewideasfromthoseaffected.
Thehumanitariansectorhasbeenslowtochange.Newapproachessuchasgivingpeoplecash(insteadofbuyingthemblanketstheymaynotneed)havetakenyearstogotoscale.InPakistan,satelliteimagerywasavailabletostrategicplanners,butnottothoserespondingontheground.Intractableproblemssuchasthetimelyprovisionofshelterremainachallenge.Whilsttherehavebeenafewsuccesses,suchasinnutritionwherenewfoodproductshaveprovenrevolutionary,thesehavebeendrivenbycommittedindividualsusuallywithoutsupport.
DFIDhasagoodtrackrecordinsupportinginnovation.Ithasprovidedstartupfundingformanynewinitiatives,andcontinuestoseeksolutionstoproblemslikeshelter.Ithelpedsetupanewinnovationsfund,withotherdonorsandNGOs.Thisworkneedstobeaccelerated,andnewinnovationsneedtobetakentoscalefaster.Crucially, there is a need for more investment in research and evidence, as well as new ways of working.
Accountability
Humanitarianaidhelpsmillionsofpeoplearoundtheworldeachyear.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewalonemakesclearthattensofthousandsofchildrenweresavedfromstarvationthroughpromptaction,withDFIDfundingplayingameaningfulpart.Butthereisanaccountabilitydeficit.Thepeoplewhoareonthereceivingendofourassistancearerarelyifeverconsultedonwhattheyneed,orabletochoosewhohelpsthemorhow.This means that gender based issues and the needs of the vulnerable are too often overlooked.Whilstthishaslongbeenrecognisedasanissue,toolittlehasbeendoneaboutit.
ExecutiveSummary
Understandingtheimpactofhumanitarianassistanceisanotherareawheremuchworkisneeded.Thisisconnectedtotheaccountabilityissue;thosewhodeliverhumanitarianaidcanonlyunderstandtheirimpactiftheyunderstandwhatpeopleneed.DFIDcanhelpwithmeasuringimpactandmakingthosewhodeliverhumanitarianaidmoreaccountable. Linking impact measurement and accountability better to the funds agencies receive is a key recommendation of this review.
Humanitarian agencies should also be more accountable to donors, be they governments or the public.Donorshavearighttoknowhow–andhowwell–theirmoneyisspent.
Partnership
TheUKisnotalargedirectproviderofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadtoworkwithandthroughpartners.The review endorses this approach; partnership will become even more important as the world becomes more interconnected, as power shifts towards the newly emerging economies, and as greater challenges require more capacity.
The UK should remain a committed multilateralist in its approach.Workingwithpartnersinothernations,withtheUnitedNationsandwithcivilsocietyorganisationsmakessense.Itcombinesscarceresourcesforthebesteffect.
ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-classorganisations.Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenbymanyasa‘closedshop’withahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstthiscanbeexplained(partlybytheneedfororganisationstobeseenasneutralandimpartial)thesystemdoesneedtochange.This review concludes that DFID needs to become more of a ‘network enabler’, working with existing partners but also developing new and dynamic partnerships with emerging nations, NGOs, the private sector, faith groups and the diasporas.
Humanitarian space
Inconflictzonesorfailedstates,DFIDoftencannotworkdirectlythroughtheauthorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile‘space’intowhichhumanitarianagenciesareadmittedtohelpthosemostinneed.Theyareonly‘allowed’in,however,whentheyareviewedasgenuinelyimpartial.Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoals,accesscanbedeniedandthesecurityofstaffcompromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthosemostinneed.Hencetheimportanceofthekeyhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutralityandimpartiality.
The review concludes that DFID humanitarian policy should be to support, defend and where possible enlarge this fragile space; to work with agencies that can access and help those in dire need, and not to politicise humanitarian aid.Thereviewalsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andinsituationswheretheauthorityofthestatehasbrokendowntherewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN,willbeneededtoprotectciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.Insuchcases,creatingasecureenvironmentbothfortheciviliansandfortheconductofhumanitarianworkcanoftenbeafirstpriority.
Delivering transformational change in DFID
Todeliverastepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddelivered,DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.ThemostradicalchangewillinvolveseeinghumanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthansomethingthat
HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
needstoberespondedtowhenithappens.There should be a closer, more integrated relationship between DFID’s core development work and the way DFID responds to meet rapid onset emergencies.SuchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcerntoDFID’sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN.
DFIDshouldactivelysupporttheUNinitseffortstoreformitshumanitarianleadership.FundingformultilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothattheycaninvestintheskillsandstructurestheyneedtobebetterprepared.Thereisaneedforfastandflexiblefundingforthe‘criticalperiod’immediatelyafterahumanitarianemergencyhashappened.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlytogovernmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingandtransparent.
To introduce a new dynamism into the humanitarian sector DFID needs to reach out to new partners. It needs to work better with new donors and the private sector. It needs to promote innovation and bring new innovations and processes to scale faster. It needs to put the measurement of impact at the heart of its work, and demand accountability and transparency of itself and its partners. It needs to seek value for money, not crudely through comparing costs but through focusing on achieving the best outcomes for affected people and improving the quality of future decision making. It needs to drive radical change, for instance in the supply chain. It needs to improve the way it provides leadership and coordination across the UK government when responding to humanitarian emergencies. Finally, it must become better at communicating what it does, both to those who provide the money, and to those who are the beneficiaries of it.
TableofContents
TableofContents
1. Introduction 1
Howthereportisorganised 1
Howthereviewwasconducted 2
2. The international humanitarian system 3
DFID:Aleadingactorinhumanitarianresponse 5
3. Challenges 9
Increasingdisasterrisk:themajortrends,threats,andprobabilities 9
Respondingtoincreasedneed 12
4. Findings 13
4.1 Anticipation 13
4.2 Resilience 15
Embeddingresiliencewithindevelopmentprogrammes 16
Regional,nationalandlocalcapacities 18
Innovativefundingmodelsforrisktransfer 18
4.3 Leadership 19
Strategicleadership 20
Operationalleadership 20
Humanresourcecapacities 21
4.4 Innovation 23
Cashbasedapproaches 24
Shelter 25
Technology 25
4.5 Accountability 26
Impact 27
Addressingtheneedsofthemostvulnerable 29
Gender 29
4.6 Partnership 30
WorkingwiththeUnitedNationsanditsagencies 30
WorkingwiththeEuropeanUnion 31
Workingwithbi-lateraldonors 32
Workingwithnewdonorpartners 32
WorkingwithNGOs 33
WorkingwiththeRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement 35
Workingwiththeprivatesector 36
Workingwiththemilitary 38
4.7 Humanitarian space 40
Protectionofcivilians 40
Securityofhumanitarianworkers 41
HumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
5. Delivering transformational change in DFID 42
5.1 Changing the policy 42
5.2 Delivering differently 43
ShapingtheInternationalSystem 43
Changingthefundingmodel 44
Fastmobilisationfundingandpre-crisisarrangements 45
Fundingrecoveryfromdayone 46
Deliveringsmarterdirectaid 46
WorkingstrategicallyacrosstheUKgovernment 47
5.3 Changing the structure, shifting resources 49
Managingtheresponse 50
Managingrisk 50
5.4 Driving results and value for money 51
Outcomesandeffectiveness 53
Outputsandefficiency 53
Inputsandeconomy 54
Theglobalsupplychain 54
5.5 Getting the message across 55
6. Recommendations 58
1
Introduction
1. IntroductionThisindependentreviewintohowtheUKrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswascommissionedbytheSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentandledbyLordPaddyAshdown.ItwasaskedtoconsiderhowtheUKshouldbestrespondtohumanitarianemergenciesoverseas,andtheroletheUKshouldplayintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.
TheUKisconsideredoneoftheleadingnationsinhumanitarianresponse.Inrecentyearsithasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonorglobally,andiswidelyregardedinternationally.TheUKisastrongsupporterofthemultilateralsystem,providessignificantfundingandconsistentlyprovidesexperiencedstaffandreliefitemstosupporttheresponseinmajoremergencies.
TheBritishpublicexpectstheUKtobeamajorhumanitarianresponder.TheBritishpublicitselfgivesgenerouslytoemergencyappeals.InJanuary2010,theDisastersEmergencyCommittee(DEC)AppealforHaitiraised£101millionfromthepublic.Theresponsewasespeciallynotableatatimeofglobaleconomiccrisis.
ThisreviewofhowtheUKcarriesoutitshumanitarianresponseworkcomesatamomentofreflectionfortheinternationalsystem.AsthehorrendouseventsunfoldinJapanandoverayearaftertheHaitiearthquakeandsixmonthsafterdevastatingfloodsinPakistan,manyofthoseinchargeofmajoraidagenciesarewonderinghowtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.Italsocomesatatimeofchange forDFID,whichhasrecentlypublishedthefindingsofitsBilateralandMultilateralAidReviews.
Thereviewisforwardlooking.ItisnotanevaluationofDFID’sworkinemergenciestodate.Rather,thereviewnoteswherepastresponsehasbeenmosteffectiveandlooksforwaystoenhancewhathasbeendonewell.ItaimstobuildontheUK’sstrengths.Thescopeofthereviewdoesnotcoverlong-termchronichumanitariancrises.Itfocusesonsuddenonsetdisastersor‘spikes’inconflictsituations,butmanyoftherecommendationswillalsoapplytochronicsituations.
CreatingthebestUKresponsewillonlygopartofthewaytowardsimprovingthewholesystem.ThereviewlooksatthewaytheUKcanworkwithotherinternationalbodiesandUNagenciesinemergencysituationstoensurethattheglobalresponsetodisastersimproves.TheUKmustworktoinfluencetheglobalsystemifrealimprovementsaretohappen.
TheUKworksthroughandwithpartners.Workinginpartnershipisabigpartofthereviewandtheproposedfutureapproach.ThereviewsetsoutwhereDFIDcandeepenthesepartnershipsandhow.ItalsolookstonewpartnershipsandhowDFIDcanworkbestwithintheUKgovernment.
How the report is organised
Thereportislaidoutinsixsections.Thisintroductionisfollowedbysectiontwo,whichbrieflydescribestheinternationalhumanitariansystemandDFID’sroleinit.Thethirdsectionlooksatpotentialfuturehumanitarianchallengesandthecapacitiestherearetocopewiththese.Sectionfoursetsoutthefindingsofthereview.Thereview’sconclusionsonhowDFIDshouldpositionitselfinordertomeetthefuturechallengesareoutlinedinsectionfive.Sectionsixliststherecommendations.
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How the review was conducted
ThereviewwaschairedbyLordPaddyAshdownandwasentirelyindependentinnature.ASeniorAdvisoryBoard(SAB)of15metonamonthlybasisthroughoutthereviewperiodtosteerthedirectionofthereview,examinematerialandsetoutthemainthemesandrecommendations.Theadvisoryboardservedinapersonalcapacity,butrepresentedthroughtheirexperiencethemajorinstitutionsandtraditionsinvolvedinhumanitarianresponse.
Asmallreviewteamcarriedoutconsultations,literaturereviewandpreparedmaterialfortheboard.Anindependentdirectorwasappointedtoheadtheteam.
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Theinternationalhumanitariansystem
2. TheinternationalhumanitariansystemD
ON
OR
SD
ELIV
ERY
AG
ENC
IES
Affected population
Local NGOs
$*
International militaryorganisations
$*
NationalPrivate Sector
$*
International Private Sector
$*
International NGOs
$5.7bn
UN agencies funds and organisations
$7.8bnAffected countrygovernments
$*
Local communitiesand organisations
$*
Red Cross [ICRC, IFRC, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies]
$1.536bn
Governments
$4.1bn
Privatecontributions$12.8bn
Figure1: The international humanitarian system. Data included from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2010. (*Amountsunknown)
Theformalinternationalhumanitariansystemismadeupofproviders(donorgovernments,foundationsandindividualgivers)andtheimplementers(RedCrossandRedCrescentMovement,NGOs,UNAgenciesandIOMandnationalandregionalNGOsandcivilsociety).Anumberofkeyactorsalsoofimportancearestillseentobeoutsidetheformalsystem,namelyaffectedgovernments,themilitary,andbusinesses.Remittanceflowsarealsonotcapturedbytheformalsystem.Thechartaboveshowsthemaincomponentsofthesystem.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswherethereisanappealforinternationalassistance,orinextremecaseswheredirectedbytheUN.ThelegalframeworkforaninternationalhumanitarianemergencyresponseissetoutinInternationalHumanitarianLaw,HumanRightsLaw,RefugeeLawandUNResolutions.
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Theselegalnormsestablishthathumanitarianaidshouldbeguidedbytheprinciplesof:
i. Humanity–thecentralityofsavinglivesandalleviatingsufferingwhereveritisfound.
ii. Impartiality–humanitarianaidshouldbeimplementedsolelyonthebasisofneed,withoutdiscriminationbetweenorwithinaffectedpopulations.
iii. Neutrality–humanitarianactionmustnotfavouranysideinanarmedconflictorotherdispute.
iv. Independence–humanitarianobjectivesareautonomousfrompolitical,economic,militaryobjectivesorotherinterestsrelatedtothelocationwhereassistanceisprovided.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemhasgrownrapidlyoverrecentyearsandthereisoftenalackofclarityastowhatthetermactuallyreferstoandwhereitsboundarieslie.Themaindeliveryactorsfallintothree‘pillars’:theUNanditsspecialisedagencies;theRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement;andNon-GovernmentOrganisations(NGOs).Governments,nationalandlocalinstitutionsinaffectednationstypicallyleadtheresponseandprovidemuchoftheassistance,withtheinternationalsysteminsupport.Inrecentyears,internationalmilitaryforcesandlargeprivatecorporationshaveincreasinglybecomeaidproviders,asthisreportexplores.
Theinternationalsystemisfinancedbygovernmentdonors(ofwhichtheUKisasignificantone)andprivatecontributions.Figuresfortotalinternationalhumanitarianresourcesvarydependingonthesource.Althoughfundingtotheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasincreasedfasterthantherateofofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)inrecentyears,thelatestGlobalHumanitarianAssistance(GHA)reportclaimsthathumanitarianaidfellby11%from2008($16.9billion)to2009($15.1billion).
Therangeofactivitiesundertakenbytheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasalsoexpanded.Thecorehumanitarianactivitiesremain:healthservices;waterandsanitation;foodsecurity;nutritionandfoodaidandshelter.However,manyhumanitarianoperationsnowincludeawiderangeofotheractivities,including:protection;education;agriculture;mentalhealthsupport;incomegeneration;infrastructurerehabilitation;humanrightsadvocacyandsupporttothere-establishmentoftheruleoflaw1.
Thetotalnumberofstaffworkingfortheinternationalhumanitariansystemisestimatedat210,800(mostlynationalsintheirowncountry).ItismadeupofUNagenciesandtheIOM(49,500),theRedCross/CrescentMovement(48,400)andNGOs(112,900).Aidworkerpopulationhasincreasedby6%yearonyearoverthelast10years2.
Inconflictsituationsthereistypicallyapeaceandsecuritydimensiontohumanitarianemergencies.InsuchcasesothermultilateralmechanismsandinstitutionsarealsoinvolvedsuchastheUNSecurityCouncil,whichdetermineswhenandwhereaUNPeacekeeping(DPKO)operationshouldbedeployed.
1 Stoddard(2008).2 ALNAP,(2010).TheStateoftheHumanitarianSystem.
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Theinternationalhumanitariansystem
DFID: A leading actor in humanitarian response
TheUK,throughitsDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentisthesecondlargestbilateralglobalhumanitariandonor.The2002InternationalDevelopmentActprovidesthelegalbasisforDFID’sresponsetohumanitarianemergencies.ItgivestheSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentpowerstoprovidehumanitarianassistance,withthesolepurposeto“alleviatetheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorotheremergency”outsidetheUK.Latterly,theUKhasalsosignedtheEUconsensusonhumanitarianaidthatenshrinestheprinciplesoutlinedabove.Asadonor,theUKhasalsosigneduptothePrinciplesandPracticeofGoodHumanitarianDonorship.DFIDdelivershumanitarianassistanceinfourdistinctways:
1. DFID shapes the humanitarian system
AsasignificantUNmemberstateandalargedonortotheinternationalsystem,theUK(throughDFID)workswithUNagenciestodelivereffectivelyandimproveperformance.DFIDcontributescorefundingtotheUN,aswellasadditionalfundinginbigemergencies.Institutionalstrategicpartnershipshavebeenformedaroundthiscorefunding,allowingDFIDandtheUNtosetlong-termgoals.
In2009/10totalDFIDhumanitarianspendwassplitasshowninthefigurebelow.3Inseveralsuddenonsetemergenciesresearchedaspartofthisreview,theUNcomponentwassignificantlysmaller,closerto40%withlargerpercentagesgoingdirectlytoNGOsandtheRedCross/CrescentMovement.Exceptionally,inthecaseoftheHaitiearthquake,morethan50%wentondirectexpenditure.
UN 53.2%
ECHO 18.9%
Humanitarian Consultancy 0.9%
Red Cross 13.5%
NGO 11.1%
DFID Direct Contribution 1.9%
Government 0.6%
Figure2: Percentage of DFID’s humanitarian spend by agency type 2009/10.
3 AdaptedfromDFID,“DFID’sExpenditureonHumanitarianAssistance2009/10”.AccordingtotheGHAReport201014donorsspentover60%oftheirhumanitarianaidthroughmultilateralagencies.
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In2005DFIDsupporteda‘humanitarianreform’processthatsoughtmorepredictableresponse.Thereformscalledformajorchangesinfunding,leadershipandcoordinationofhumanitarianemergencies.Asaresult,DFIDhasworkedtoenlargetheCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)andcreatecountrypooledfunds,whichhelpUNagenciesrespondrapidlytoemergencies.TheUKhasbeenthelargestdonortotheCERF–morethan$420milliontodate–andtocountrypooledfundingmechanisms.Aswellasleadingbyexample,DFIDworkstoinfluenceothermemberstatestoincreasecontributionstotheCERF.In2006therewere52countrydonorstotheCERF.By2010thatfigurehadrisento82countries.
DFIDalsosupportedtheestablishmentofthe‘cluster’approach4,anewcoordinationmechanismthatmadeagenciesresponsibleforparticularareaslikeshelterorhealth.DFIDfundedglobalclusterappealstosetthesystemupandhascontinuedtopushagenciestodeploypeopletoleadthese.Throughitsfunding,DFIDcontinuestoplayaninfluencingroleencouragingclusterleadagenciestoviewhumanitarianleadershipandco-ordinationactivitiesaspartoftheircorework.
2. DFID funds humanitarian aid agencies and is the second largest bilateral donor after the US Government
In2009/10DFIDspentabout£528milliononhumanitarianassistance.About£100millionofthiswentthroughtheEuropeanCommunityHumanitarianOffice(ECHO),theEU’sfundforemergencies.ECHOthenspentthismoneythroughUNagencies,theRedCrossandNGOs.AlargeproportionofthefundsspentthroughtheUNwerechannelledtoimplementingNGOs.
11%wentonrapidonsetfundingforhumanitarianemergencies.TheremainderonprotractedcrisessuchasDRCongoorSudan.TheoneoffamountsthatDFIDspendsonrapidonsetemergencies,however,changesignificantlydependingonthecontext.In2010/11DFIDspent£134milliononrespondingtothefloodsinPakistanalone.
SeveralmillionpoundseachofcorefundingwenttoallofthebigUNagenciesinvolvedinemergenciesandtheRedCross/RedCrescent.TheannualcontributiontotheCERFconstitutedabout10%ofDFID’snon-ECHOhumanitarianspend.
ECHOwasthebiggestrecipientofUKaidatabout£100millionin2009/10,followedbytheICRCat£66million,andthenOCHA(includingCERF),WFP,UNDPandUNICEF(seefigure3onpage75).
4 Seewww.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=53forafulllistofclusters.
5 AdaptedfromDFID:“DFID’sexpenditureonhumanitarianassistance2009/10”.
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Theinternationalhumanitariansystem
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Inabsoluteterms,theUKhasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonoraftertheUS.Asapercentageofnationalincome(GNI)however,theUKcomesafterSaudiArabia,Kuwait,Denmark,Ireland,Sweden,Luxembourgandsomeothers.
3. DFID is also on a small scale a direct deliverer of aid, providing goods in kind, Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities, and supporting secondments where appropriate
HavingadirectresponsecapabilityallowsDFIDtostrengthenandinfluencetheinternationalhumanitariansystem.In2009/10DFID’sin-kindgoodsorpersonnelsupportamountedto£7million.DFIDhasastandbyarrangementwiththeUKfireservicetodeploysearchandrescueteamsaftermajorearthquakes.Italsohasitsownstanding‘operationsteam’(CHASEOT)thatcandeployrapidlytoemergenciesandrunsalldirectdeliveryfromLondon.Theoperationsteamisonstandby24/7andisacontractedoutfacility,currentlymanagedbyCrownAgents.Ithasstandbyarrangementswithairfreightcontractorsandcandeployrapidlynichecapabilitieslikeairporthandling.ItprovidesexpertpersonneltotheUnitedNationsonrequestandassemblesteamsspeedilyforDFID.
InthecaseoftheHaitiearthquakeresponseover50%oftheexpenditurewasspentdirectly,asoutlinedbyfigure4onpage8.
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CHASE OTGovernment advisor
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Figure4: Percentage allocations of DFID’s direct spend on the Haiti earthquake response.
4. DFID leads the HMG response to humanitarian emergencies
DFIDworkswithotherWhitehalldepartments,principallytheFCO,MODandCabinetOfficetocoordinatetheUKresponsetoahumanitarianemergency.DFIDleadsonmakingthehumanitariancase.DecisionsonwhethertodeployUKmilitarycapabilitiesaretakenonacase-by-casebasis.
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Challenges
3. Challenges
Increasing disaster risk: the major trends, threats, and probabilities
Allcurrenttrendssuggestthatmorepeople–particularlyindevelopingcountries–willbeaffectedbyhumanitarianemergenciesinthecomingdecades.Notonlywilltheybecomemorefrequent,theywillalsobeincreasinglyunpredictableandcomplex.
Lastyear,263millionpeoplewereaffectedbydisasters–110millionmorethanin2004,theyearoftheTsunami.By2015,climate-relateddisasters,suchasfloods,faminesanddroughts,arepredictedtoaffectanaverageofover375millionpeopleeveryyear6.Otherdisasters(suchasearthquakes),andman-madeconflicts,willaffectmanymore.
In2009UNHCRreportedits‘totalpopulationofconcern’at36.5million,includingrefugees,statelesspersonsandthosedisplacedwithintheirowncountry.Bydefinitionthesearepeoplefleeingconflictorpersecution.Anestimated27.1millionoftheseweredisplacedwithintheirowncountriesasaresultofarmedconflict,generalisedviolenceorhumanrightsviolations7.Thisfigurerepresentedanincreaseofoveramillioninthenumberofinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)comparedwiththe26millioninternallydisplacedin2008andalsoin2007.Whilstthetrendforrefugees(fleeingtheircountry)hasgonedowninrecentyears,thoseinternallydisplacedhasconsistentlyrisen.The27.1millionreportedin2009weredisplacedin54countries.
Therisingworldpopulationandgrowthinurbanareas(demographicstress)willalmostcertainlyincreasethehumanitariancaseload,particularlyinlessdevelopedcountries.Alreadyanaverageof1,052peopledieinanygivendisasterinlessdevelopedcountries,comparedto23indevelopedcountries8.Theworld’spopulationispredictedtoreach9.1billionby2050,withvirtuallyallpopulationgrowthoccurringinlow-incomecountries,includingPakistan,Nigeria,Bangladesh,EthiopiaandtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.
By2030,over61%oftheworld’spopulation(5billionpeople)willliveinurbanareas,mostlyinlowandmiddleincomenations9.Theconcentrationofpopulationsinurbanareaswillchangethenatureofmanyhumanitariandisasters.Morepeoplewillbelivingonmarginalland,inovercrowdedandpoorlyplannedhousing,lackingaccesstoadequatewaterandsanitation,healthcareandeducation.Whilstavailabilityofservicesandinfrastructureshouldmeanfewerfatalities,damagemayhavefarreachingconsequencesmakingrebuildingcostlier.Theimpactofdisastersonurbancentreswillhaveeconomicconsequencespotentiallygreaterthaninthepast,atlocal,nationalandregionallevel.
6 Oxfam,(2009).TheRighttoSurvive.7 InternalDisplacement(2010).GlobalOverviewofTrendsandDevelopmentsin2009.IDMC/NRC.8 Oxfam,(2009).TheRighttoSurvive.9 UNHABITAT.
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Challenges
Growingfoodinsecurityislikelytocreatenewhumanitarianemergencies,withincountriesandregionsandalsoglobally.Theexistenceofnearlyabillionchronicallyhungrypeople,primarilyinAsiaandAfrica,alreadyexacerbatestheconsequencesofemergencies.Thereispotentialforrepeatedfoodpricespikessimilartothoseofrecentyears,whichhaveespeciallydamagingeffectsondevelopingcountries.Underlyingthesechallenges,theworldasawholefacesthetaskofincreasingfoodproductionby70to100%by2050inordertocopewithagrowingpopulationwithagreaterlivestockbaseddiet.Thereisagrowingdemandforbio-fuelsandincreasingconstraintsareposedbythepriceoffertilisersandfuels,theshortageoflandandwaterandtheirincreaseddegradation.Climatechangewillreduceyields,sometimescatastrophically,necessitatingtheproductionofstoredsurplusesinsomeregionstocompensateforlosseselsewhere.
Globalisationandtheincreasinglyinterconnectedworldinwhichwelive,meansthatdisastersoftenhaveaglobalimpact.Pandemicsspreadrapidlythroughairtravel.Economicshocksinoneregionspreadthroughcommoditypriceincreaseandlossofremittanceflows.Conflictdoesnotrespectborders,andspilloverfromconflict-affectedareascontributetoregionaldestabilisationandrefugeeflows.Migrationandchangingemploymentpatternswillcontributetovulnerabilityinunexpectedways,withthepotentialtocreatenewsecuritythreats.
Futurecrisescoulddifferfundamentallyfrompastexperienceandtheprospectof‘synchronousfailures’isagrowingconcern,aswiththenuclearthreatinJapancausedbytsunami.Newsourcesofdisplacementorconflictarealsopossible,forinstanceaswaterresourcesbecomescarce10.
TheDiasporacommunityisplayinganincreasinglysignificantroleinhumanitarianresponses.Remittanceflowsarealreadythesecondlargestsourceofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)fordevelopingcountriesandincreasesignificantlyafteranemergency.TheDiasporacommunitycanalsoinfluencethesizeandtypeofdonorresponse,dependingonitssizeandvociferousness.
AseconomiesinChina,India,BrazilandtheGulfStatescontinuetogrow,theyareplayinganincreasinglyimportantroleglobally.Theyarebecomingmoreinvolvedinhumanitarianemergencyresponses,particularlyintheirneighbouringregions.ChinawasanimportantactorintheresponsetothePakistanfloodsattheendof2010.Theinternationalhumanitariansystemneedstoworkmorewiththesepartners,particularlyasitispossiblethattraditionalDACdonorswillbeabletoprovidefewerresourcesfordisasterreliefinthecomingyears.TheUSCongressisconsideringwhethertocutAmerica’shumanitarianassistancebudgetin2011,reducingU.S.foodaidprogrammesby41%($687million)andOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistancefundingby67%($875million).
Timelyandunimpededaccesstoaffectedpopulationsisbecomingmoredifficultduetotheincreasinglycomplexnatureofemergencies.Therehasbeenanunprecedentedgrowthinviolentattacksonhumanitarianworkers(177%increasefrom1997to200811)andthereisagrowingneedforincreasedprotectionandsecurityaspartofthehumanitarianresponse.Governmentsandnon-stateactorsinconflicthavebecomeincreasinglysophisticatedintheirattemptstomanageinternationalhumanitarianism,makingtraditionalwaysofinterveningmoredifficult.
Mediareportingofhumanitarianresponseshasgrownoverthelastyearsandwillcontinuetohaveanimpactonthepoliticalandpublicreactiontodisasters.Donorswill
10 HumanitarianFuturesProgramme,(2010)TheWatersoftheThirdPole:sourcesofthreats;sourcesofsurvival.
11 JohnBorton,(2009).FutureoftheHumanitarianSystem:ImpactsofInternalChanges.
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havetomakedifficultdecisionsonhowtorespondtoadisasterinthefullglareof24/7mediaattention.
Increasedmediacoverageandnewwaysofcommunicatingthroughsocialmediatools,suchasTwitterandFacebook,willallowclosercontactbetweenrecipientsofaidandthosedonatingthemoney.Togethertheywilldemandgreateraccountabilityofthedeliverersandtheofficialdonoragencies.
Responding to increased need
Theincreaseintheinternationalhumanitariancaseloadandchallenges,havethepotentialtobreakanalreadystretchedinternationalhumanitariansystem,whichisstrugglingtocopewithcurrentlevelsofneed.Thereweretwomajorhumanitariandisastersin2010,whichrequiredinternationalhumanitarianassistance–theearthquakeinHaitiandfloodsinPakistan.Inbothcases,theinternationalhumanitariansystemshoweditselftobelessthanthesumofitspartsandtheresponseswerecharacterisedbyweakleadership,poorcoordinationandaslowresponse.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemevolvedover150years,itwasnotplannedordesigned.Asaresult,therearegaps,overlapsandnumerousinefficienciesinthewayitworks.Thefuturechallengesoutlinedabovewillneedamoresophisticatedoperation.Newandinnovativewaysofworkingneedtobewidelyintroducedtoimprovetheefficiencyandspeedofdisasterresponse.Strongerlinksbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentwork;betterleadershipandcoordination;accesstonewresourcesthroughimprovedpartnerships,andengagementwithnewactors;betteruseoftechnologyandinnovations;andincreasedaccountability,willallbevitalpartsofahighperforminginternationalhumanitariansystem,whichisgreaterthanthesumofitsparts.
Fortoolong,theperformanceoftheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasbeeninconsistent,failingthosemostinneed.NumerousreportshavebeenwrittenbytheUN,NGOsandotherinternationalactors,inresponsetosuchconcerns.Seriousissueshavebeenidentified,butnotaddressed.Nowisthetimeforastepchangeintheapproachtohumanitarianreform.Merelyimprovinguponwhathasbeendoneinthepastwillnotbeenoughtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.
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Findings
4. FindingsThefirstpeopletorespondtodisastersandconflictaretheonesaffectedbythem.Friendsandneighbourssearchthroughtherubbleforlovedonesafterearthquakes;localhospitalsworkthroughthenighttocarefortheinjured.
Inmanycountriesgovernmentsroutinelyaffectedbydisastershavebecomeadeptatresponseandprevention.CasestudiesforthisreviewshowdramaticgainsinplacessuchasBangladeshandIndonesia12.Butalltoooftentheinternationalresponsearrivesasthoughthiswerenotthecase,sweepingasidelocalrespondersandaddingtothechaosratherthanalleviatingit.
Inconflictsituationstheinternationalsystemoftenbecomesthelasthopeforpeoplelivingintheworstcircumstances.Whereitisslow,orgetsthingswrong,itisthesepeoplewhosuffer.
Iftheworldisgoingtogetbetteratthechallengessetoutintheprecedingchapter,thenthishastochange.DonoragencieslikeDFIDhavetoworkwithgovernments,andwithaffectedpeople,aswellaswithaidagencies.Theyhavetosupportlocalinstitutionsratherthanweakenthem,especiallywherethereisconflict.
Wherenationalgovernmentsarecapable,theyinvariablyleadtheresponsetodisasterevenwhenitisonaninternationalscale.Whengovernmentsareoverwhelmedtheyeitherstruggletoassertthemselves,orfindtheyarecompletelyunabletocoordinate.Insomeinstancesgovernmentsareactivelybelligerent,orhostiletointernationalresponse(ortoaparticulargroupintheirpopulationbeinghelped).Thissuggestsfourbroadcategories:
• Strongandcapablegovernmentswhotakethelead(e.g.India).
• Capablebutunderresourcedgovernmentswhoneedhelptolead(e.g.Mozambique).
• Governmentswhoareunabletolead,andneedtheinternationalcommunitytodothisontheirbehalfforatime(e.g.Haiti).
• Governmentswhoareunableorunwillingtoleadandareobstructive(e.g.Nigerin2009).
Inthesefourbroadcategoriestheinternationalcommunityhastoresponddifferently,buttheapproachhasnotalwaysreflectedthisreality.
DFIDtoohastendedtorespondasifalldisasters,andallgovernments,werethesame.Thisreviewsuggestsadifferentapproachisneeded.Suchanapproachwouldrequiremuchmoreworkontheanalysisofrisksandcapacitiesinadvance,incorporatingdisasterresilienceintodevelopmentprocesses.Italsorequiresmoreworkonbringingadisparateinternationalresponsetogethersothatitperformsmorereliably.Mostofall,itrequiresbeingapartner,abuilderofcoalitionsandawillingparticipantinthem.Thisreviewhascalledthisbeinga‘networkenabler’.
4.1 Anticipation
Disastersareoftenviewedinthepublicimaginationas‘actsofGod’.Inrealitymanyarepredictable.A2005WorldBankreport‘globalhotspots’13identifiescountriesexposedtomultiplenaturalhazards(earthquakes,droughtsandstorms),andthereareplentyofcredibledataavailableidentifyingcountriesmostaffectedbydisasters.
12 TsunamiEvaluationCoalition(2006).ALNAP.13 Dilley,Metal.(2005).NaturalDisasterHotspots:AGlobalRiskAnalysis.WorldBank.
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TheUKDefenceConceptsandDoctrineCentre(DCDC)goesfurtherinits‘horizonscanning’reportof200714.Itidentifiesareasof‘multiplestress’,factoringindemography,economyandconflict.Climatechangeisanotherobviouselementofstress,orvulnerability,witharecentreport15identifyingsub-SaharanAfricaasoneofthemostatriskareas.
Whatisclearisthatprediction,althoughfarfromperfect,ispossibleforsomehigh-risknations.HurricaneseasonsintheCaribbeanandtheBayofBengalarewellknownandmonitored.ElNinoandLaNinaoceaneffectslastforsomeyearsandchangeweatherpatternsinwaysthatarepartlyunderstood.Rainfalldataforregionsandcountriesinaridzonessuggestsdroughtcyclescanbeidentifiedearly.
Whatisalsoclearisthatasclimaterelateddisastersincrease,thebetterwewillneedtobecomeatpredictionifwearetohaveanyhopeofcopingwiththese.Butdisastermanagersdonotmakeenoughuseofsuchscience,andscientistsdonotroutinelyproduceinformationforthisaudience16.TherainfallthatproducedPakistan’sterriblefloodsof2010happenedamonthbeforethefloodwatercauseditsgreatestdevastation.Theeffectswerepredictedbutnotactedon.
Thiscanalsobethecasewith‘foodsecurity’crises(famines).Thereareprovenearlywarningsystemsthatmonitorpotentialcrises,notablytheUSAIDsupportedFEWSNET.Despitethis,andproofthatpriorinterventionnotonlysaveslivesbutischeaper,these‘slowonset’disastersareregularlymissed.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewshowshowclearevidencedoesnotalwaystriggeraresponse(theblockageinNigerwasdomesticpolitics),andhowtimelyinterventioncansavetensofthousandsoflives.
ManyagencieswereabletoactinNiger,despitetheintransigenceofgovernmentandthetardinessoftheUnitedNations.PartlythiswasduetopromptactionbytheEuropeanUnionhumanitarianorganisationECHO;itwasalsobecauseDFIDhasaninnovativeregionalfundinWestAfricaforcrisisresponse.Thisregionalfundallowsagenciestogetmoneyquicklyforunexpectedandunnoticeddisasters–itallowsforearlyaction.Thousandsofchildrenweresavedasaresultoftheseearlyactions.
Earlyactionisatleastasimportantasearlywarning,andisamatterofpoliticalwill.TheexpansionoftheCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)wasinpartawayofmakingsuchdecisionsmoretechnicalandlesspolitical.Supportingresilienceinatrisknationswillfurtherincreasethelikelihoodthatearlyactionwillbetaken.Buttherewillalwaysbeanelementofrisk,howevergoodthescience.Beingabletotoleratefailure–gettingitwrongoccasionally–isimportant.Thecostbenefitofninetimelyinterventionseasilyoutweighsonewrongjudgementcall.
Oneareawherepredictionisimproving,butstillhasawaytogo,iswithearthquakesandvolcanoes.Thesegeo-physicalhazardsaredifferenttothehydro-meteorologicalonestouchedonabove(floods,droughtsandstorms).Theytendtohappenlessfrequentlybutcauseseveredamage.
Althoughearthquakescannotbepredictedwithanycertaintyinshorttimeframes,thelocationofmajorfaultlinesiswellknown.ThequestionofearthquakesinKathmanduorTehraniswhenratherthanwhether.Therehavebeensignificantadvancesinunderstandingearthquakeriskandwhentheymightoccurthroughmonitoringgroundmotion.Likewise,understandingthereasonsforbuildingdamageandcollapsesothatcodesandstandardscanbedevelopedtoensuresafeconstructioninthefuture.Science
14 TheDCDCGlobalStrategicTrendsProgramme2007–2036.See:www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/AgenciesOrganisations/DCDC/
15 DARA(2010).Climatevulnerabilitymonitor2010:thestateofclimatecrisis.16 Seeforinstancethe1MarchSelectCommitteeonScienceandTechnologyfindingsthatthere
isinadequateuseofscienceforanticipatingemergencies.
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Findings
inthisareahasproventohaveverysignificantlyreducedfatalitiesanddamageinmanycountriesandiscritical,butresearchandinvestmentisneededelsewheretopromotesafeconstruction.
Anticipatingandpredictingconflictisanotherareathathasimprovedinrecentyears.RegularcrisesindicesfromtheInternationalCrisisGrouportheFundforPeacearebeingusedbygovernmentstoinformdecisionsonearlyaction.Theseareimportant,asincontrasttoearlywarningfornaturaldisasters,therehasneverbeenashortageofwarningaboutpendingconflictsinahostofplaces.
Whilstpredictingsinglehazardsispossiblebutoftenneglected,anticipatingunexpectedhazards,orcombinationsofhazardsisafactorofmagnitudemoredifficult.Thepossibilityofalarge-scalefloodcausinganuclearspillforinstance(asJapanhasproved),ordroughtsinRussiaandfloodsinAustralialeadingtofoodpriceriotsinWestAfricaisdifficulttoseeinadvance.Nevertheless,inaninter-connectedworldtheseeventsareevermorelikelyandpolicymakersneednewtoolstohelpthemanticipate.
Recommendations
DFID should:
1 Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.
2 MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.
3 Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.
4.2 Resilience
Theimpactofadisasterdependsonhowwellpreparedacountryistocopewithit.Somearebetterabletobouncebackthanothers.TheHaitiearthquakeatthebeginningof2010killed230,000people.AmuchlargerearthquakeinChilelaterintheyearkilled3,000people,almostonehundredtimesfewer.
Butthisisnotonlyaboutrichnations;a1970cycloneinEastPakistan(nowBangladesh)killednearlyhalfamillionpeoplewhereasasimilarstrengthcyclonein2008killed3,000.ThedifferencewasthatintheinterveningthirtyyearsBangladeshhadbecomebetterprepared.
TheearthquakeinHaitihassetbackthedevelopmentofthatnationmanyyears.BandaAcehinIndonesiawasdevastatedbythe2005tsunami,butmanagedtorebuild100,000housesinthreeyears.BringingtheresourcesoftherestofIndonesiatobearenabledthisrapidrecovery.Beingabletochannelinternationalresourceseffectivelywasanotherkeyaspect.ThiswassimilarlytrueforKhyberPakhtunkhwaprovinceinPakistanwhichwasbetterpreparedasaresultofitsresponsetothe2005earthquake.
Beingprepared,andbeingabletorecoveriswhatmakesnationsresilient.Conversely,wherenationsarefragiletheyaremuchlessabletocope.Beingabletoanticipatedisasters,havingshockresistantinfrastructure,socialprotectionmechanisms,financialandhumanresourcesareallpartofbeingresilient,asistheabilitytoadapt.
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Embedding resilience within development programmesDisasterscanhavesignificantimpactoncountries’development.Between2000and2009MunichReestimateseconomiclossesfromdisasterswere$670billion17.SomesmallcountrieshavesustainedlossesthroughdisasterofseveraltimestheirGDP,settingthembackyears.Vietnamlosesover1%ofitsGDPannuallydealingwithdisasters.Floodsanddroughtscanhaveknockoneffectsintermsoffoodproductionandinternationaltrade.
AseminalWorldBankstudyin2004foundthatdisasterssloweconomicgrowthinthelongtermaswellasshortterm18.Thisisespeciallytrueincountriesthatdependonagriculture.Thismeanspoorercountriesaredoublyaffected,astheyhavelessabilitytocopefinanciallywiththecostofdisasters,andtheireconomiesareworseaffectedoverall.Disastersalsoaffecttheeconomiesofmiddle-incomecountrieshowever,astheytendtohavemanufacturingsectors(forexample)connectedtoagriculture.DroughtsinsouthernAfricainthe1990sledtobigswingsinGDPgrowthacrosstheregion.
Theseriskslooksettoincreasewithpopulationgrowth,climatechangeandresourcescarcity.InthefragilecountrieswhereDFIDisincreasinglyworking,achievingpovertyreductionwillgetharder.Reducingmaternalmortalityandothermillenniumdevelopmentgoalswilldependonnationsbeingresilient.
Ultimatelydevelopmentistheanswertobeingabletocopewithdisasters–theexampleatthebeginningofthischapterillustratesthat–butgettingtodevelopmentcandependonbeingabletobouncebackfromdisasters.Bangladeshismoreresilienttodisasterseconomicallybecauseofstructuralchangesinitsagriculturalsector(thederegulationofagriculturalinvestmentledtomoredisasterresistantirrigation).TheearlywarningandactionsystemsinBangladeshhavealsopreventedhighdeathrates.
Thisanalysishasimplicationsfordevelopment,andespeciallyfortheoverallgoalwithinDFIDofreducingpoverty.Disastersoftenhitthepooresthardest.Evenwhenacountrycopesquitewelloverallwithadisaster,thepoorestandmostvulnerablecanbedisproportionatelyaffected.
TheWorldBankrecognisesthisinitsguidelinesforpovertyreductionstrategies(PRS).Oneofthefourdimensionsofpovertyis,“exposuretoriskandincomeshock”,atahouseholdlevel,acommunitylevelandanationallevel.Despitethis,littleisroutinelydoneaboutdisastersindevelopmentstrategies,noraretheymentionedintheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Conventionalthinkinghasbeenthatscarceresourcesshouldbeusedtopromotegrowth,andthatthisisultimatelytheansweranyway.
Thisapproachisnolongerdefensible.Thebodyofacademicevidencethatdisastersandshocksmustbetakenseriouslyisgrowing,asistheevidencethatinvestmentinreducingdisasterriskshowsgoodreturns.FlooddefenceandretrofittingbuildingsforearthquakesintheUSfoundanaveragecostbenefitofonetofour19.Thesameistrueindevelopingcountries.Incorporatingdisastercostsintolongertermeconomicplanningisnecessaryifvaluabledevelopmentresourcesarenottobedivertedtorecovery.
Anewresilienceapproachwillincludeworkingatregional,national,communityandhouseholdlevel.Atnationallevelthereneedstobemoreworkondisastermanagement.Workonlegalframeworks,workonplanning,andworkonbolsteringthedepartmentsthatrespondafterdisasters,suchasnationaldisastermanagementagencies.Civilsocietyorganisationsthatrespondtodisastersshouldbesupportedtoplaytheirroletoo.
17 QuotedbyKunreutherin,“Encouraginginvestmentinadaptationmeasuresthroughmulti-yearcontracts”.Apaperforthe2010WorldEconomicForumHumanitarianCouncil.
18 BensonandClay(2004).Theeconomicimpactsofdisasters.WorldBank.19 Somecostbenefitanalysiscitefactorsashighas1:24.SeeTearfundforinstanceat
http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Tilz/Research/Investing%20in%20Communities%20web.pdf
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Findings
Atcommunityandhouseholdlevelthereneedstobeworkonmechanismsandinstitutionstorespond(suchascivilcontingencycommittees),andoninfrastructurethatcanwithstanddisasters,orplayadualrolelikeschoolsthatareusedascycloneshelters.
Governmentsandcivilsocietyorganisationsalsoneedhelptoprovidesocialprotectionmechanisms.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewdemonstratesthattargetedcashdistributionsattherighttimecanstophouseholdsslippingintostarvation,sellingassetsandincurringdebtalongtheway.Relativelysmallinputsattherighttimecansaveyearsofmiseryanddisease.Crucially,thecombinationofsuchmeasurescanprovidethebasisforeconomicdevelopment.Peoplelivingontheperilousedgeofextremepovertycannotaffordtotaketherisksneededtoescapethissituationotherwise.
Thiskindofworkistakingplaceindifferentsectors.Disasterriskreduction(DRR)workseekstobuildlocalresponsesystemsandsmallmitigationinfrastructure.TheHyogoFrameworkforActionsetsoutfivebuildingblocksforeffectivedisasterriskreduction;governance,riskassessment,knowledgeandeducation,riskmanagementandvulnerabilityreduction,anddisasterpreparednessandresponse.Butasthemoneyisusuallyhumanitarianitisonlyavailableafteradisasterhasstruck.DFIDhadastandingpledgetospend10%ofitsresponsebudgetonDRR,butthesemeasuresareneededbefore,notaftertheevent.Climatechangeadaptationworkisoftenaboutmitigationworktoo–fromplantingmoremangrovestonewseedvarietiesforwarmersummers.DevelopmentinplaceslikeEthiopiaisfocusingmoreonsocialsafetynetsandisexploringexcitingnewideassuchasmicroinsurance.Allofthisneedstobebroughttogetherformaximumeffectiveness.
Intheaftermathofthe9/11atrocitiesintheUS,theUKputinplacea‘nationalresilienceplan’,recognisingthatitdidnothavethewherewithaltodealwithsuchadisaster.Thisplansetsoutprotocolsforincidentcontrol,establishesthecapacitiesneededforresponseandensurestraining,equippingandregularpractising.Manycountrieshavenationaldisasterprotocols,buttheyarenotresourcedorplannedindetail.
Thisreportwasnotmandatedtolookatprotractedconflicts.Itisclearthough,thatinfragilestates,orstatesinconflict,theinternationalhumanitariansystemisoftentheprovideroflastresorttotheverypoorest.ThecasestudyinDRCongoforthisreporthighlightedthevulnerabilityofstatesandsocietiestoeventhesmallestshockswhentheyareveryfragile.Alackofinstitutionsandcapacitiesmeansthataccidentsleadtomuchhigherlossoflife,smallconflictscannotberesolvedandgrowtobigonesandcommunitiesarenotabletoprotectthemselves.InDRCongothereareemergenciesalmostconstantly;boataccidentsthatkillhundreds,petroltankerexplosionsthatdothesame.Afishingconflictin2009thatledtotheexodusofthousandsofpeopleacrosstheborderwhenitturnedviolent.Massrapesandrobberyarecommittedintheeastbyrovinggroupsofbandits.
Allofthisisavoidablewithworkinginstitutions.Alicensingauthoritythatdoesnotallowferriestorunwithoutcheckingthemforsafety;afireservicethatcanattendaccidentsbeforetankersexplode;ajudicialprocessthatallowsdisputestoberesolvedbeforetheybecomeviolent;apoliceorsecurityservicethatarrestsbandits.
Inthisvacuum,muchofwhatistodaycalled‘humanitarian’inDRCongoissimplysubstitutionservicedelivery.Healthcareisnotprovidedbythestateandpeoplearetoopoortopayforit.Sohumanitarianagenciesprovidebasichealthcareandrespondwhenmajorkillerslikecholeraormeaslesbreakout.Resilienceisanimportantwaytounderstandthiswork,andwillbeimportantasDFIDworkstobuildinstitutions,makingstateslessfragile.Ensuringhumanitariananddevelopmentworkcloselytogetherwillbevitallyimportant.
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Regional, national and local capacities DFIDhasnottraditionallyfundedgovernmentsdirectlyinhumanitariancrises(lessthan1%inthelasttwoyears),althoughithasfundedmulti-donorreconstructionfundsthroughtheUNandtheWorldBank.Similarly,whilstDFIDhasbuiltupconsiderableexpertiseinrapidprocurement,itusuallydonatesitsinkindassistancethroughaidagencies,ratherthangovernment.Therehasbeenfundingfornationaldisasterpreparedness,typicallythroughtheUN,incountrieslikeBangladesh.Thisisnotroutinelylinkedwithsubsequentresponsehowever.InMozambiquethegovernmentaskedfor£2milliontohelpthemprepareaheadofanticipatedfloodingin2006.Thiswasnotforthcoming;whentherewasfloodinglaterthatyeartheinternationalresponsecostover£60million.
NeitherdoesDFIDroutinelyfundlocalNGOsorlocalorganisationsinrapidonsetemergencies,althoughitfundsthemindirectly,asmanygrantstointernationalpartnersarepassedontonationalandlocalorganisations.InBangladeshUNDPhasalistofmorethan30pre-approvedlocalNGOsthatitgaveDFIDmoneytoafterthe2008cyclone.ManyoftheinternationalNGOs(andespeciallyfaithbasedorganisationslikeChristianAidandCAFOD),routinelyworkthroughlocalpartners.TheRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementalwaysworkthroughitsnationalsocieties.Despitethis,thefundingofnationalandlocalNGOsbyDFIDremainshitandmiss.Itisnotaconsciousstrategy,butmoreofaby-product.
Anapproachtailoredtogovernmentcapacitywouldofferseveraladvantages.GovernmentslikethePhilippinesandIndonesiacanalreadyrespondtoquitelargedisasterswithoutinternationalhelp.Preservinginternationalcapacityforthosedisastersthataretrulyoverwhelmingmakesmuchmoresensethanhavingtodeployexpensiveinternationalworkerstofloodssimplybecausethelocalsystemwassounderresourced.NationalDisasterManagementAgenciesexistinmostcountriesthatsufferregulardisasters,butoftenlackequipmentandtraining.Withanestablishedrelationship,itwouldalsobepossibletogivemoneyandgoodsdirectlytothegovernmentafteradisasterknowinghowsuchresourceswouldbeused.Specialfundingchannelscouldbesetupinadvance,makingtransparencyandreportingeasier.
Thesameistrueofcivilsocietyorganisations;organisationssuchastheRedCrossandRedCrescentNationalSocietiesoftenhaveformalresponsibilitiesinthenationaldisasterplan.Withproperresourcestheycanpreparejointlywithgovernmentandotherprivateorvoluntaryagencies,leadingtopromptresponseintheeventofdisaster.
Anincreasedfocusonnationalandlocalcapacitiescouldalsoincluderegionalbodies.TheAssociationofSouthEastAsianNations(ASEAN)playedapivotalroleinfacilitatingtheresponsetocycloneNargisinBurmainMay,2008.Thisregionalcooperationarounddisasterresponsehascontinued,withjointprotocolsondeploymentofmilitaryassetsoneofthelatestdevelopments.Increasinglygovernmentsatriskfromdisastersaresharingexpertisethroughsuchregionalforums,spreadinggoodpracticeanddevelopingjointearlywarningsystems.
Innovative funding models for risk transferAsthecostofdamagecausedbyextremeweatherconditionsissoaring,moresustainablewaystotackleweatherriskareneeded.Public-privatepartnershipsinriskfinancinghavebecomemorepopular,inparticularparametricinsurance.Catastrophebondsarealsoissuedmorecommonlynow,e.g.byMexicotoprovideresourcesintheeventofsevereearthquakeorhurricanedamage.
Insurancecanplayaroleinguaranteeingpredictableandreliablepayouts,allowingforlong-termplanning,increasinggovernments’self-determinationandownership,protectinglivelihoodsanddiminishingnegativeeffectsofreliefinterventionsonlocal
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Findings
markets20.Thelimitationsarethatpremiumscanbetoohighwithhighopportunitycosts,andthatitisnoteasytotelliftheinsurancegivesvalueformoney.Thereisalsothedangerofmoralhazard–governmentsnotfocussingenoughonriskreductionandpreventionbecausetheyfeelinsured.
TheCaribbeanCatastropheRiskInsuranceFacility(CCRIF)isthemostprominentexampleofapublicprivateinsurancemechanismthatDFIDhasfunded.Thereviewwelcomesthisgroundbreakingwork.DFIDisnowalsoinvestinginthedesignoftheAfricaRiskCapacity,leadingtotheestablishmentofanAfrican-ownedriskpoolingentityforweatherrisk.
Recommendations
DFID should:
4 Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.
5 Promote national response capacities of governments and civil society in at risk countries including:
• Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies.
• Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms.
• Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue.
• ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties.
• Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountryleveltosupportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceandimprovedisasterresponse.
4.3 Leadership
Insituationswherethegovernmentofanaffectedcountryisunabletoleadhumanitarianresponse,theUNremainstheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcandoso.Overtheyearsacomplexsystemhasbeenputinplacetodothis,withadedicatedglobalEmergencyReliefCoordinatorsupportedbythebigspecialisedUNagencies.
AlthoughtheUNhasthemandatetolead,itsperformancehasbeenverydisappointingoverall.InallbutoneofthecasestudiesforthisreviewUNleadershipwaspoor.Thiswasespeciallytrueinthelargerdisasters.Itistrueatastrategiclevelandatanoperationallevel.Itistrueacrosstheinternationalsystem,andinindividualcrises.Thereisrarelyavisionbeyondfundraising,andrarelyanorganisingnarrativethatdrawstogetherthedisparatecapacities.
WhatisneededisacompleteoverhaulofstrategicandoperationalleadershipintheUN.Thisreviewfindsthatthereisappetiteforthiswithinthesystem,andthatitisintheinterestoftheUKtochampionit.Theissueisattheheartofensuringaffectedpeoplereceivewhattheyneedandachievingvalueformoney.Onthestrengthofthesefindingsthereviewconcludesthatthereisaneedforfurtherhumanitarianreforms.
20 ChristianAid,“DoesDisasterInsuranceHaveaRoleinClimateChangeAdaptation”,TimeforClimateJustice,June2010.
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Strategic leadershipFirstandforemost,thereisaneedforvision.ThereisaneedfortheUNatthehighestleveltosetoutthechallengesaheadandhowitplanstodealwiththem.Thereisaneedforthisvisiontobebackedpolitically,andforthispoliticalbackingtoextendintoresponseswhentheyoccur.Leadersonthegroundmustbeconfidenttheyhavethebackingoftheirseniors,andofthememberstatesoftheUN.
Secondlythereisaneedfortherightpeople.DuringthereviewsconsultationsinNewYorktheideaofa‘standaside’mechanismwherebythebesthumanitarianleaderscouldbedeployedintomegacriseswasdeveloped.ThisideahassubsequentlybeentakenupintheIASCandthereviewstronglysupportsthisprocess.
TheUNneedstodevelopacadreofcapablehumanitarianresponseleaders.Itneedstherightapproachtotalentmanagementandtherighttermsandconditionstounderpinthis.Itneedstolookoutsideitsownnarrowbasetosecurethebesttalent.
Finally,thereisaneedfortherightsupportsystemsandstructuretoenableleaders.Someofthesestructuresareinplaceandworkwell;forinstancefinancingwhichhasimprovedasaresultofthelastroundofreform.Butplanningandprioritisationremainweakandpoliticised.LeadersofthevariousUNhumanitariancoordinationmechanismshavenoformalauthorityandreportinglinesbetweenclustersandcoordinatorsareunclear.Therearefewstandingsupportstaffanddeploymentoftherightteamcantakeweeks.Thesehavebeenseenasintractableissues,butwillhavetochangeifperformanceistoimprove.
FortheUKasastrongUNsupporter,andalargedonortothesystemitisimportanttoworkontheseissues,asoutlinedabove.TheUKisalsooneofthebestplaced.Itdrovethelastroundofreformsandwillreceivemuchsupportforinitiatinganewround.Todosoitwillneedtobuildcoalitionsofsupportandworkcleverlywithitspartners.Thisisexpandedinfurthersectionsofthisreport.
Operational leadershipOneofthefundamentaldrawbackstoachievingamorereliableresponsefromtheUNisthatitismorealoosecollectionofstrongandseparateagenciesthanawellfunctioningsystem.WFPistheworld’spremierfoodagency,withlogisticsthatrivalmanymulti-nationalcompanies.UNICEFistheworld’slargestchildren’sagencyprovidingeverythingfromcleanwatertotemporaryeducation.TherefugeeagencyUNHCRcansetupcampsforhundredsofthousandsofdisplacedpeoplefleeingwarorpersecution.Eachhasseparatemandates,boards,missionsandhistoriesandallaresuspiciousoftoomuchcentraldirection.Allthreeneedtofundraiseinbigemergencies,asdotheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO)andtheFoodandAgriculturalOrganisation(FAO)whoarealsoinvolvedinhumanitarianemergencies.Thiscreatescompetition,makingprioritisationespeciallydifficultasitcanhavefundingimplications.
Theclusterapproachwasdevelopedasthelatestattempttosolvethecoordinationproblem.Itsoughttofillgapsinhumanitarianservicedelivery.Improvedcoordinationofallplayersbyanamedleadagencywasexpectedtoeliminategapareasandavoidoverlaps.Keyagenciesweregivenresponsibilityforleadershipandcoordinationforeachsector;forexampleWFPleadsthelogisticscluster,WHOleadsthehealthcluster.TheclusterleadisusuallyaUNagencyalthoughIFRCleadstheshelterclusterandSavetheChildrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF.
Butperformanceofclustershasbeendisappointing.Clustercoordinatorsoftenlackexperienceandthetrainingrequiredtoprovidestrongleadership.Toooftenclustermeetingsareinformationsharinggatheringsinsteadofthestrategicdecisionmakingforumstheyshouldbe.Andthesystemhasmerelyreplicatedagencydivisionsmeaningprioritisationremainsjustasdifficult.
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Findings
Theclustersystemneedstoberevisedtoaddressthesefailings.Theroleoftheinternationalsystemistosupportnationalgovernmentintimesofdisaster,nottotakeover.Agreateremphasisthereforeshouldbeputonclusterleadershipbynationalgovernmentwhereappropriate.NGOsshouldplayagreaterroleinco-chairingclusters.Wherethishappens,theclusteroftenhasabetterunderstandingofthesituationontheground.
Inmegacrises,thereisaneedfordedicatedandexperiencedclusterleadership.Wherethisisnotthecaseexperiencedcoordinatorsshouldbedeployed,securedbypredictabledonorfunding.Inlargeremergenciesclustersshouldbecometwo-tier,consistingofa‘strategicbody’groupandan‘informationsharing’group.Thisallowsallpartnerstobeincludedbutalsoallowsforacoregrouptosetstrategicdirection.
Somedisastershaveseenanoverproliferationofclustersandsub-clusters.Thiscanleadtoless,ratherthanmoreeffectivecoordination.Infact,notallclustersareneededineveryemergency.Thetypeofdisasterandtheeffectivenessofexistingcoordinationmechanismsshoulddictatehowmanyandwhichclustersneedtobeactivated.InnaturaldisastersthisshouldbeanationalgovernmentleddecisioninconsultationwiththeUNHumanitarianCoordinator(HC).
TobefullyeffectiveclustersneednationalNGOsandlocalgroups.Butthesearetheverypartnersthatgetexcludedfirstduetosecurityreasons,languagebarriersorsizeofcluster.Thiscouldberectifiedifdonorsmadelocalparticipationaprerequisiteforclusterfundingineachemergency.Clustersalsoneed‘nontraditionalactors’suchastheprivatesectoriftheyaretobeeffectiveincoordinatingthefullresponse.
UNagencyautonomymeansthatclusterleadsoftenreportthroughtheiragencyratherthanthroughtheHCandOCHAcanbeexcludedaltogether.ClearreportinglinesshouldbeestablishedbetweenHC,clusterlead,agencyandOCHA.
Human resource capacitiesTheunevenqualityofpersonnelisamajorlimitingfactorinhumanitarianresponse.Thisisparticularlytrueattheleadershiplevel,butalsowithclusterleadership,technicalexpertsandmid-levelmanagers.Onemajorissueisthatthereisnostraightforwardprofessionalrouteintohumanitarianwork.Aidagencieswanttohireexperiencedpeoplebuthowdopeoplegetexperienceunlesstheyareofferedajob?Gettingstartedinhumanitarianworkbecomesachickenandeggconundrum.
Thereisaneedtogrowthepoolofcompetentprofessionalsinvolvedinhumanitarianwork.Thisrequiresinvestment,andacommitmentfromhumanitarianagenciestocreatecareerpathsforhumanitarianprofessionals.Manyaidagenciesgrewupwithoutacultureoftraining,insteadvaluingrapidactionandon-the-joblearning.Thisapproachhasstrengths:aidagenciesremainnimbleandkeeptheircostslow.Butitalsomeansthat,toooften,managersandstaffdonothavealltheskillstheyneed.
Therehasbeenprogressonstaffskillsinthepastdecade,andanumberofworthwhileinitiatives.Butineverymajoremergencytherearestillsignificantnumbersofaidpersonnelwholacksomeoftheskillsessentialtotheirjobs.Theconsequencesarehardtomeasurebutareboundtoincludelostlivesandwastedfunds.
ThegulfisstarkestwhenoneconsiderstheinvestmenttheUKmilitarymakeintheirpreparedness.Typicallyprofessionalmilitaryforcesspend95%oftheirtimetrainingand5%oftheirtimeinaction.Forhumanitariansthisfigureisreversed;95%oftheirtimeisspentinactionand5%ofthetimetrainingwouldbeahighfigure.
Trainingisnottheonlymethodoflearningandshouldcomplement,notreplace,learningonthejob.Itneednotbeexpensiveorlengthy.Itshouldbebasedonanassessmentoftheskillsneededforthejob,takingaccountofskillsthatarealreadythere.Ideallyitshouldbecombinedwitharangeofcareerdevelopmentmeasures,which,overtime,resultinstrongindividualswithinwell-managedteams.
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Intheprivatesectorthislessoniswellknownevenifnotalwaysfollowed.Themostsuccessfulcompaniestakecaretoinvestintheirstaff,andfasttrackthemwhentheyprovecapable.Andindeed,someofthebestaidagencieshavebeendoingsoforyears.
Someaidagenciesmaybereluctanttoinvestintrainingforfearofincreasingthepercentageoftheirfundsspentonadministration.Theyknowthepublicarerightlysensitiveaboutthis.Iftheyincreasedtheiradministrationbudgetsfrom,say,anaverageof10pinthepound,to12pinordertopayfortraining,theymightworrythatitwouldappearwasteful.Butifthe2pspentontrainingincreasestheimpactoftheremaining88p,everyoneshouldbepleased.Aidagenciesshouldexplaintodonorsandthepublicthattheirbeneficiarieswillbebetterservedifthereisamodestinvestmentinstaffdevelopment.Skilledstaffwillmakebetteruseofthefundstheyhavebeenentrustedwith.
Professionalisationoftheaidindustrywillcomethroughbetterpreparationandtrainingofstaff.DFID’scommitmenttothiscouldbedemonstratedbyinvestinginagencyskillsdevelopmentandbybettertrainingofitsownstaffworkinginhumanitariansituations.DFIDshouldinvestigateandsupportthedevelopmentofprofessionalstandardsthatitcanuseitselfandwillbeofusetoothers.
Recommendations
DFID should:
6 Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including;
• Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea‘stepaside’systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicandoperationallevel.
• EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingtheinternationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.
• WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternationalsystem,includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.
• WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalentmanagementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.
• WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesinmanagement,recruitment,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaffavailableforrapiddeployment.
• WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipoftheclustersystem.
7 DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.Thisshouldinclude;
• Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership.
• TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterpronecountries.
• Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskillsdevelopment(seesection5.2).
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Findings
4.4 Innovation
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemisfacinggreaterandmorecomplexchallenges.Newsocial,demographic,environmentalandpoliticalproblemsincreasinglydemandinnovativeproducts,organisationalprocessesandwaysofthinking.SynchronousfailuressuchasthoseseeninJapan;simultaneousdisasterstaxingglobalcapacitywillneednewapproaches.Itisnowwidelyacknowledgedthathumanitarianactorscannotsimplydomoreofwhattheyhavealwaysdone.
Buthumanitarianpractitionersandanalystsbemoantheslowpaceofchange.Relativelystraightforwardideaslikecashtransfershavetakenalongtimetobecomeaccepted.Thebarrierstoinnovationareoftenmoretodowithpoliticsandinstitutionalinterests.
Recentresearch21hasidentifiedanumberofsuccessfulhumanitarianinnovations.Andmajororganisationsarebeginningtounderstanditsimportance.USAIDhasmadeinnovationacentralpillarofitsongoingstrategicrenewalinbothpolicyandoperations22.TheWorldFoodProgrammeisinnovatingthewayitdeliversfoodaid23.
Thiscontextofgrowinginterestandcommitmentpresentsclearopportunities.DFIDhasareputationforbeing‘outaheadofthedonorpack’intermsofflexibilityandresponsiveness.IthassupportedspecificinnovationsprocessesbothatpolicylevelsuchastheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipinitiative;andinoperationalcontextssuchascommunity-basedfeedingtherapy.Thisexperienceandreputationareassetsthatcouldbeleveraged,establishingtheUKasaninnovativeleaderinglobalhumanitarianefforts.
Evidenceshows24thatsuccessfulinnovationshaveanumberofcommonenablingfactors,includingeffectivesupportfromdonors,headoffices,seniormanagersandlike-mindedpeersinotherimplementingorganisations.Alsoimportantaregoodpartnershipswithactorsoutsidethetraditionalhumanitariansector.Anydonorseekingtoimprovethesystemmustworkonthebasisthatitisnotpossibletosinglehandedlyreformacomplexsystemwithmultipleactorsandfactors.Coalitionbuildingisvital.
Giventhelimitedresourcesthatwillbeavailablerelativetoothersectors(e.g.theprivatesector),itisessentialfordonorstotakean‘openinnovation’approachfromtheoutset.Collectively,DFIDanditspartnersneedtoinvestinrobustinnovationprocessesfocusingonbothlongstandingunresolvedproblemsandnewemergingchallenges.DFIDneedstobecomemoreconsistentinusingevidenceandsystematicanalysistodecidewheretoinvestandhow.Resourcesforstrengtheningtheinnovationscapacitiesofhighvaluepartnerswhichwillalsobeessentialtocreatethetimeandspaceneededforreflectionandgenerationofnewideas.
Amoreinnovativeinternationalresponsetodisastersneedstobefirmlygroundedinhumanitarianprinciplesandvalues.Theyneedtobuildontheprincipleofbetterlearningfromandwith,andgreateraccountabilityto,affectedcommunities.Manyofthemostimportantinnovationsofthepast30years–fromcashtocommunityfeedingtherapy–havecomefromrethinkingthiscentralrelationship.
Thereisanurgentneedtoleverageappropriateformsofscience,research,technologyandprivatesectorknowledgetosupporthumanitarianinnovation.WhileDFIDhasplacedconsiderableimportanceonresearchfordevelopment,withsignificantinvestmentinresearchcapacityNorthandSouth,therehasbeenrelativelylessattentionpaidtoresearchforhumanitarianaction,andnoneofithasfocusedon
21 www.alnap.org/pool/files/8rhach3.pdf22 www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2010/sp101008.html23 www.wfp.org/content/revolution-food-aid-food-assistance-innovations-overcoming-hunger24 www.alnap.org/pool/files/8rhach3.pdf
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Southerncapacities.Asnotedpreviouslyinrelationtoinsuranceandnationalresilience,thereisscopefortransformativedevelopmentsinthislastarea.
InnovationalsopresentsanumberofinternalopportunitiesandchallengesforDFID.OneofthekeyfindingsofthisreviewisthatthereareopportunitiestobenefitfromfreshideasthroughoutDFID’shumanitarianpolicyandoperationalwork.Moreworkisneededtosystematicallyidentifywheretheneedforinnovationismostpressing.DFIDstaffmembersareavitalassetfortheorganisation,withawealthofexperienceandknowledgefromarangeofdisastersettings.Butstaffarenotencouragedtoinnovate,noraretheyconsistentlyrewardedforit.Thereisnotimetodevotetodevelopingideas,andthereisoftenahardbattletogetnewwaysofworkingaccepted.
Anyefforttoenhancehumanitarianinnovationsneedstobuildonandenhancetheentrepreneurialandcreativecapabilitieswithintheorganisation.Thereisaneedtoprovideappropriatetraining,secondmentsandreflectionspaceforDFIDstaff.Effectiveinnovatorsandinnovationfacilitatorsshouldberewarded,andthisshouldbebuiltintoappraisalsystemsandultimatelycareerdevelopment.Leadersneedtofosteranatmosphereofenquiry,feedbackandchallenge,wherethereistoleranceofrisk.
DFIDalsoneedstoworktojointhedotsbetweenthesuccessfulinnovationsitfundsandtheproposalsitsubsequentlyapproves.Forinstance,DFIDprovidedsomeofthefirstfundstotrialthe‘plumpynut’ideainnutrition,sincehailedasoneofthemostexcitinginnovationsofthelastdecade.Butitdidnotpushthisnewwayofworkingthroughitsfundingdecisions.ThisurgentlyneedstochangesothatDFID’sresearchfundscansupportthedevelopmentofsuccessfulinnovationthataretakentoscalethroughoperationalfunding.
Twoapproachesarehighlightedherefortheirimportanceforaneffectivehumanitarianresponse,andalsoforhighlightingtherangeofwaysDFIDcansupportinnovations.
Cash based approachesOneoftheexcitingadvancesinrecentyearshasbeentheuseofcashforreliefandrecovery.Traditionally,humanitarianagencieswouldsupplygoods,butawealthofacademicworkhasprovencashtobemoreflexible,moreefficientandmoreeffectiveincertainsituations.
Whilstthebenefitofusingcashiswidelyacknowledged,itsadoptionatscalehasbeenfrustratinglyslow.Themajorityofreliefoperationsstillsupplystrickenpopulationswithblankets,potsandpans,soapandsoon.DFID,despitebeingafunderofresearchintocash,andasupporterofitasanapproachatapolicylevel,doesnotroutinelyrequireitspartnerstoworkwithcash.Thishastochange.
IntheNigercasestudyforthisreview,twoaspectsoftheresponsestoodout.ECHOinsistedthatitspartnersusedcash,requiringthemtoargueagainstitsuseratherthanforit.ConcernWorldwide,anNGO,demonstratedthatcashdistributionscouldpreventmalnutrition.Concerndidhalfoftheircashdistributionsusingmobilephones–theydistributedthephonesandthenusedatransfersystemcalled‘zap’toallowrecipientstobuygoodsinlocalshops.Withanestablishedinfrastructurefortransfer,costscanbemarginal.Itispossibletoenvisageasystemwherebyinleanyearstargetedcashdistributionsforseveralmonthswouldpreventmalnutrition,andfarcostliermedicalinterventions.
ThisreviewhasconcludedthatDFIDshouldfollowtheleadofECHOandmakecashbasedresponsestheusualreliefandrecoverypositionforitspartners.Partnersshouldberequiredtoexplainwhy they are not using cash,ratherthantheconverse.
Inevitablytherewillbetimeswhencashisnotappropriate.Wheremarketsdonotfunctionefficiently,largevolumesofcashmightpushpricesup.Wherethereare
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Findings
extremesecurityconcernsthismightalsobeanissue.Twoofthecasestudiesfromthisreviewsuggestthatthesecircumstancesmaybelessfrequentthanimaginedhowever.InNigerthecashdistributionsbyConcern,SavetheChildrenandotherstookplaceinremoteareasatatimeofabsolutefoodshortages.Despitethispricesdidnotriseinthemarkets,astradersefficientlydrewinsurplusfromneighbouringNigeria.SimilarlyinDRCongo,‘voucherfairs’demonstratedthatlocaltraderscouldbringgoodstoneedypopulationsfarfasterandmoreefficientlythanaidagencies.
Onefearthathasconsistentlydoggedthescalingofcashisthatofcorruption.Theextensiveliteratureoncashhasfoundnoincreasedriskofthiscomparedtootherreliefgoodshowever,andwithsystemssuchasmobilephonetransferandmicrobankaccountsitmayinfactbeless.
ShelterProvidingadequateshelterisoneofthemostintractableproblemsininternationalhumanitarianresponse.Tentsaretoocostlyanddonotlastlongenough.Plasticsheetingcanbegoodbutmostoftenislowqualityandfallsapartimmediately.Rebuildinghousestakesyears,evenwhenlandissuesarenotmajorobstacles.
Tosolvethisissue,agencieshaveincreasinglyused‘transitionalshelter’,awiderangeofalternativesolutionsincludingcash,communalbuildingsandtemporaryshelters.Typicallyacompromisebetweenatentandafullhouse,transitionalsheltercanlastforthreeyearsuntilproperreconstructionisachieved.Atbestituseslowcostlocalmaterialsandisbasedonasimpledesign.Materialscanbeusedafterwardstoo,whenpeoplemovetotheirnewhome.
Whilstthisapproachshowspromise,therearealsochallenges.Transitionalshelterscostmorethanafewbitsofplasticsheeting,andinemergenciesthatarenotwellfunded‘transitional’canquicklybecome‘permanent’.Argumentsbetweenexpertsoverdesign,qualityandcostcanslowtheprocess,andweakcoordinationinthesectoroftenleadstoawidevarianceinwhatisprovided.Thatcanmeanaffectedcommunitiesgettingdifferentlevelsofprovisiondependingontheagencyallocatedtobuildtheirshelter.
Theissueofweakcoordinationwasattheheartoftheestablishmentoftheclustersystem.Assection4.3ofthisreviewsetsout,insomeareasthishasworkedwell.Logistics,foodandwaterhaveallimproved.Otherareashaveimprovedinparts.Inshelter,theInternationalFederationoftheRedCross(IFRC)wasnominatedastheclusterleadagency,andthishasnotworkedwell.Partlythisisbecauseshelterisdifficult.PartlyitisbecausethereisanartificialsplitwherebyIFRCisresponsibleintheimmediateaftermathofadisaster,butnotbeyondtheemergencyphaseofdisplacement.
DFIDhasbeenheavilyengagedinsheltersincetheIndianOceantsunamiin2004.Ithasfundedresearchandpushedqualitystandardsandcoordination.ThisreviewconcludesthatDFIDmustcontinueandintensifyitseffortstofindbettersolutionstoprovidingshelterafterdisaster.Shelteriscriticaltohealth,employment,familyandsafety.Withoutadequateshelter,inallbutthemostbenignclimatespeopleareterriblyvulnerable.Partlythismayinvolveresolvingtheclusterissuestouchedonabove.Partlyitwillinvolvemoreresearch.Partlyitmayinvolvebringinginnewactors,suchastheprivatesectorconsortiumrecentlyfoundedthroughtheWorldEconomicForum.Continuingtofundandresourceshelterduringresponsewillalsobeimportant.
TechnologyTechnology,althoughnotasilverbullettotheproblemsofhumanitarianaid,alsoneedsmoreconcertedsupport.
Someexistingtechnologiesofferconsiderablepotential.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewhighlightedtheuseofmobilephonesforcashtransfers(alsosuccessfullyusedin
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Kenya).Thisrapidlydevelopingtechnologycouldbecomethestandardinafewyears,revolutionisingthebankingandremittancesectoralongtheway.Satellitesarealreadywidelyusedintrackingstormsandinprovidingimageryforhumanitarianoperations.“Crowdsourcing”,suchasthatusedinKenyaandHaitimayprovetobeanimportantnewwayofdoingneedsassessment.Socialmediaisdrivingnewaccountabilitytouchedoninthesectionbelow.GooglehaspilotedseveralsoftwareapplicationsforhumanitarianoperationsincludingthroughitsGoogleEarthmapanditspeoplefindersoftwarenowbeingusedinJapan.
Thereareemergingtechnologiesthatalsohaveconsiderablepotential(andrisks).Foremostamongtheseisnanotechnology,whichiswidelyseenashavingthepotentialtotransformmedicine,watersafetyandfoodstuffswithinthenext5-10years.Anotherisagentbasedmodelling,increasinglyusedineconomics,whichmayhaveapplicationsinunderstandingthespreadofepidemicsorevenpopulationmovement.
Recommendations
DFID should:
8 Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.
9 Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.
10 Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagementanddisplay.
11 Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology,andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.
12 Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationandwhereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted.
4.5 Accountability
Accountabilityinsuddenonsethumanitarianemergencieshasparticularcharacteristics:thepresenceofacuteneeds,lackofchoice,lackofvoiceandaccesstoformalprocedures,disconnectbetweendonorsandsurvivors,andtheprevalenceoflifeanddeathdecisions.Allofthesemakeaccountabilitymorechallengingbutalsomoreimportant.
TheparadigmisstillviewingtheaffectedpopulationtoomuchaswhateconomistJulianLeGrandhascalled“pawns”(passiveindividuals)andtheinternationalcommunityas“knights”(extremealtruists).Thisapproachcosts.Localcapacitiesarenotutilised,thebeneficiaryisnotinvolvedenoughandthequalityofdeliveryislowerthanitshouldbe.
Sincethelate1990sthehumanitariancommunityhasinitiatedanumberofinter-agencyinitiativestoimproveaccountability,qualityandperformance.DFIDhasbeenfundingthemostwidelyknownones:theActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction(ALNAP),HumanitarianAccountabilityPartnership(HAP),PeopleInAidandtheSphereProject.
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Findings
Theseinitiativesandothershaveimprovedstandards,quality,learningandtransparencyinthesectorbutnotenoughprogresshasbeenmade.Itistimenowtoputtheseapproachesattheheartofhowthesystemworks.
Thecasestudiesforthisreviewshowthatinvolvementofaffectedcommunitiesandprovisionofinformationaboutprogrammestorecipientsofaidwaspatchyeverywhere.Ingeneral,performancewasworstduringthereliefphase,andimprovingduringrecoveryandreconstruction.Theveryfactthatthemostinnovativepracticeshighlightedearlierarethosewhichfocusonrecipientcapacitiesandneedshighlightshowfarthesystemhastogo.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemneedstoputaccountability,learningandtransparencyintothecentreofitsresponse.Withthetechnologyandmethodsnowavailable,thereisnoexcusenotto.Assistancehastobeinaccordancewithwhataffectedpeoplehavemadecleartheyneed,ratherthanwhatthesystemispreparedtooffer.Andtheinternationalsystemhastobeheldtoaccountforthat,andforlearninghowtodeliverimprovedservices.Thiscanbedonethroughbetterfeedbackloopswiththeaffectedpopulation,througharangeofmechanismssuchasListeningProject-styleassessments,HAPcomplaintsmechanismsandperceptionsurveys.
DFIDisbeingaskedtobemoreaccountablethaneverbeforetoUKtaxpayersinaperiodofheightenedgovernmentbudgetaryconstraints.DFIDhastakenimportantstepsontransparencyasasteptowardsgreateraccountabilityandisattheforefrontamongstdonorsonthis.UndertheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteeDFIDhasstartedpublishingdetailedinformationaboutallnewprojectsandprogrammesonthewebsince1January2011.DFIDrecognisesthattransparencycreatesbetterfeedbackfrombeneficiariestodonorsandtaxpayers.Ithelpstobetterunderstandwhatworksandwhatdoesnot.Italsohelpsreducewasteandtheopportunitiesforfraudandcorruption.
DFIDisalsocommittedtopushforfulltransparencyacrosstheinternationalaidsystembyaskingpartnersandotherdonorstoadheretosimilarstandardsoftransparency.
Andtosquarethecirclefromtransparencytoaccountability,DFIDhascommittedtoprovidingopportunitiesforthosedirectlyaffectedbyDFIDprojectstoprovidefeedbackontheirperformance.Thiscommitmentneedstoapplytoallhumanitarianemergencyworkaswell.Evenifputtingthemintopracticewillbemorechallengingthaninotherareas.
Improvingaccountabilityisintimatelytieduptotheworkonimpactassessments–forcredibleimpactassessmentsthereisaneedtoputdisaster-affectedpeopleatthecentreoftheanalysis.
Thiscanbesupportedthroughinnovativeuseofappropriatetechnologythatimprovescommunicationstoandfromaffectedpopulations.Hi-techwasseeninHaitiwiththeUshahidi“crowdsourcing”platform,low-tech–menonbicycleswithmegaphonesinBangladeshandBurmaforearlywarning.Mobilephonesandradioarebothimportanttoreachpeople.
Impact Theemergencyresponsesectordoesnotroutinelyassessimpact.Whatthismeansisthatforsomeoperationsitisalmostimpossibletosayhowtheassistancehelpedpeople,orevenwhetherithelpedthem.
Therearegoodreasonsforthissometimes.Inemergencies,thereislittletimetomeasureintheearlyhoursanddaysofaresponse,inwhatthereviewseesas“theCriticalPeriod”.Inconflictitcanbedangerous.Andsavinglivesisthepriority.Itisalsomoredifficulttomeasureavertingnegativechange(e.g.topreventfamine)thanbringingaboutapositivechange(asindevelopment)becauseofthelackofdecent
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counterfactuals.Deliveringinsomeofthemostimportantsectorsofhumanitarianaid,suchasprotectionanddignity,isdifficulttoassess.Aidisonlyoneofanumberofinputsintothelivesofdisaster-affectedpeople.Anyattempttoassessevenatasystem-widelevelisplaguedwithattributionissues,neverminddowntothelevelofindividualdonors’contributionstoaparticularproject.
Otherreasonsfornotdoingimpactassessmentscannotbesoeasilyjustified:itisconvenientnottohavetodoit;theneedforhighvisibilityaction,shapedbydonorsandthemedia;thecompetitionbetweenagenciesandthelackofseriousconsultationwiththepeopleinneed;thefailuresinleadership.Perhapsmostimportant,impactassessmentsrequiretimeandresourcesthatarenottrivial,andtodatefewdonorshavebeenwillingtosupporttheseeffortsonthehumanitariansideofthesystem.
Thisisnolongeracceptable.Thesectormustincreaseitseffortstodemonstrateimpact,anditmustuseevidenceonwhatworksandwhatdoesnotandwhytoimproveitsperformance.Lessonsneedtobelearnedandapplied.DonorslikeDFIDneedtochangetheincentivesinthefinancingsystemtoensurethatimpactisroutinelymeasured,ratherthanfitfullyifatall.Perfectionisnotpossibleforthevalidreasonsoutlinedabovebutalotmorecanbedone.
Thisreviewfoundthattoolsexistorarebeingdevelopedtoovercomethemethodologicalchallenges.CasestudieshavebeencollatedbyALNAPandothers.AframeworkformonitoringandevaluatingresultsandimpactisbeingdesignedforDRCongo’sHumanitarianActionPlan.Thiswillprovidefurtherinsightintowhatcanandcannotbedone.Whatisnecessaryistomoveawayfromasystemwheremanyagenciesstillcontinuetomeasuresuccessinvolumeoffood,goodsorvaccinesdeliveredratherthantheimpactontheaffectedpopulation.Aparticularlyimportantandnecessaryareaforimpactassessmentswillbeininnovation,testingtherelativeimpactofoneapproachcomparedtoanother.
Tomeasureanddemonstrateimpact,actionneedstobetakenatvariousstagesofanemergencyresponseaswellasinresiliencebuildingprogrammes.Itcannotbedoneasanadd-onalone.Andthroughoutallstages,participatoryapproachesshouldbetakenwherepossible.
Intheory,needsassessmentsshouldprovidebaselinesagainstwhichimpactcanlaterbemeasured.Needsassessmentsshouldalsobedesignedandcarriedouthavingtheviewsofaffectedpeoplecentrestage.However,therealitylooksdifferent.Needsassessmentsroutinelylackbaselinedata.Theyaremoreaboutgatheringinformationforplanningandfundraisingbyspecificagenciesthanbuildingacomprehensivepictureofneedandprioritisation.Thereiscompetitionbetweenorganisationsandsectors,theprocessisnottransparentandsharinginformationissometimesdiscouragedasitmightposearisktoaninstitution’sroleintheresponse.Needsassessmentsarequiteoftentoolatetoinformfundingdecisions.
Thelackofbaselinesisnottheonlyproblem.Withoutacommonstrategyandagreeddefinitionsofhumanitarianoutcomes,impactassessmentsaredifficulttocarryout.Forthat,leadershipandstrongpartnershipsareessential(seesections4.3and4.6).
Monitoringhasalsobeenfoundtobeweakandsuffersfrompatchy,inconsistentefforts.Incomplexemergencieswheresecurityandaccessaremajorconstraints,monitoringisanevengreaterchallenge.Remoteprogrammingisincreasinglyused,especiallyincountrieslikeSomalia.
Ex-postevaluationstendtoevaluateactivitiesratherthanimpactanddonotoftenenoughincludeaparticipatoryelementsothatdisastersurvivorscanholdagenciestoaccount.Becauseofalackofresourcesandnarrowagendas,mostevaluationsfocusonaparticularprojectorprogramme;system-wideassessmentsarestillrare.Thequalityof
29
Findings
evaluations,asassessedbyALNAPfrom2000to2008hasbeenconsistentlydisappointing.Impactassessments,whetheragency-specific,sector-wideorsystem-wide,arenotusuallycarriedout.
Technologicaladvancessuchassatelliteimageryarestillnotusedenoughtocollectdataacrosstheprogrammingcycle,includingforneedsassessments,monitoringandimpactassessments.Neitherarenationalcapacitiesusedenoughinmonitoringandevaluativeefforts–whetheroperationalagenciesorthinktanksandacademics.
Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable Thehumanitariansystemispoorlyequippedtoensureanequitableresponseforthemostvulnerable.Whilstissuesspecifictochildren,age,oldpeople,womenandthosewithdisabilityarewidelywrittenabout,therearefewmechanismstodealwiththem.
Thereisnoformalplatformforcollectiveengagementonspecificissues,andthereislittleifanydisaggregateddataonneedsandimpactonvulnerablegroups.Alotoftheevidencebaseisanecdotal,pickedupbysomeonewhowasawareoftheneedsofvulnerablegroupswhiledoingsomethingelse.Culturallyinsensitivepracticessuchasdeliveringreliefitemsinsinglelanesarestillroutinelypractised.DuringthePakistanearthquakethispreventedwidowswithoutmalecompanyfromaccessingaid.AstudybyHelpAge25showsthatadisproportionatelylowamountofhumanitarianassistancewasdedicatedtoensuringthattheneedsofaparticularvulnerablegroupindisaster-affectedpopulations–olderpeople–aremet.
Children,definedbythoseundertheageof18,makeupatleast50%ofaffectedpopulationsinmostoftheemergenciesaroundtheworld.Humanitarianassistancethatdoesnotassessandaddresstheneedsofchildrenmaybeignoringthemajority–andwouldthereforepotentiallybefailingtohavethegreatestimpact.
AmnestyInternationalreportedthatwomenandgirlslivinginthemakeshiftcampsinHaitioneyearafterthedevastating12January2010earthquakefacedanincreasingriskofrapeandsexualviolence.Thecampsprovidedshelterandaccesstobasicservicesintheimmediateaftermathbutnoadequateprotectionforwomenandgirls.
GenderAccountabilitycannotimprovewithoutthehumanitariansystembecomingmoregenderaware.Povertyexperiencedbywomenandmenisshapedbyinequalitiesthatdiscriminateagainstandmarginalisecertainsocialgroups.Themostpervasiveoneisgenderinequalityandthisismagnifiedbytheimpactsofclimatechangeanddisasters.26AstudybytheLondonSchoolofEconomicsshowsthatnaturaldisastersandtheirsubsequentimpactonaveragekillmorewomenthanmenorkillwomenatanearlierage.27
Anapproachthatdoesnotrecognisethatwomen,men,girlsandboysinanemergencysituationhavedifferentneedsandareexposedtodifferenttypesofriskwillinthebestcasebebadqualityprogramming,intheworstcaseitcancauseharm.Projectsthataregenderblindriskmissingoutonthemostvulnerableindividualsandmayalsoprovideaninappropriateresponseduetolackofanalysisandlimitedunderstandingofwhatthegenderspecificneedsare.
Atthesametime,theroleofwomeninprevention,reliefandrecoveryisnotrecognisedenough.Previousevaluationsshowthatwomendrivethemovefromimmediateconcerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingwaystogenerate
25 HelpAge(2010).Astudyofhumanitarianfinancingforolderpeople.London.26 Gender,DisasterRiskReductionandClimateChangeAdaptation:ALearningCompanion,
OxfamDisasterRiskReductionandClimateChangeAdaptationResources,2010.27 TheGenderedNatureofNaturalDisasters:theimpactofcatastrophiceventsonthegender
gapinlifeexpectancy1981–2002.LondonSchoolofEconomics.
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income.Andwomenhaverepeatedlyledinitiativestoadapttotheimpactsofclimatechange,andtheirknowledgeandresponsibilitiesrelatedtonaturalresourcemanagementhaveprovencriticaltocommunitysurvival.28Womenandgirlsneedtobeconsultedontheirneedsimmediately,appropriatelyandcomprehensivelythroughoutallstagesofassistance.
Recommendations
DFID should:
13 Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.
14 Promote the development of improved needs and robust impact assessments.
15 Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiaryaccountability.
16 Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.
17 Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfundingdecisions.
4.6 Partnership
TheUKisnotalargedirectgiverofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadtoworkwithandthroughpartners.Thisreviewendorsesthisapproach;partnershipwillbecomeevenmoreimportantasourinterconnectedworldgetsmoresoandaspowershiftstowardsthenewemergingeconomiessuchasBrazil,China,IndiaandtheGulfStates.TheUKcanachievemorethroughandwithpartners,usingitsresourcestobringtogetherorganisationswithdifferentskillstorespondtoacuteneed.Inthemodernworldthemostimportantpartofwhatanorganisationcandoiswhatitcandowithothers.
ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-classorganisations.Amultilateralaidreview,commissionedatthesametimeasthisreview,foundthat80%ofhumanitarianagencieswereeithergoodorverygood.
Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenbymanyasaclosedshopwithahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstsomeofthishasbeenforgoodreason–theneedtobeseenasneutralandimpartialinconflictandbeingabletoaccesspopulationsmostly–someofthisissimplynotworking.Thisreviewconcludesthataseachangeinthinkingisrequired,sothatDFIDrecognisesthatitisthequalityofitspartnershipsthatmatters,asmuchifnotmorethanitsownstandalonecapacity.Itsroleshouldbemore‘networkenabler’thanindividualdoer.
Working with the United Nations and its agenciesTheUnitedNationsasawholeisthelargestpartneroftheUKinhumanitarianemergencyresponse.AsapermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,andafoundermemberoftheUN,theUKhashistoricallybeenactiveinsupportingmultilateralism.Thisreviewhasconcludedthatthispositionshouldbemaintained,withmultilateralresponsethedefaultpositionoftheUKandDFID.
UNagenciesareamongstthelargestdeliverersofhumanitarianaid.TheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)delivered44billionmealsin2010,mostofitinresponsetoemergenciesorongoingcrises.UNagencieshavethereachandthepresencetodeliver
28 A.Araujoetal(2008),GenderEqualityandAdaptation,IUCN.
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Findings
aidatscale,andtheirinternationalstatusoftenmeanstheyhaveabetterrelationshipwithgovernment.ThereviewdocumentedsomeexcellentexamplesofUNagency-ledresponse;fromWFPrapidlydeliveringfoodto7millionpeopleinfloodhitPakistan,toUNICEFsupplyinginfantfoodnationallyforstarvingchildreninNiger.Therehavealsobeenfailures,notablytheinabilitytotreatandcontaincholerainHaiti.
Thesectionsonleadership,finance,accountabilityandimpactinthisreviewmakethepointthatthereisstillmuchworktobedonetoimprovetheperformanceoftheinternationalsystem.Clusterleadershipneedstobeimproved,theUNagenciesneedtobettersupportOCHAandtheERC,andneedtoworkmorecollegially.Agenciesneedtogetbetteratreportingresultsratherthanwhattheyhavepurchased.
DFIDneedstosupporttheseefforts.Asoneofthemajordonors,itneedstoprovidegreaterpredictabilityoffundingsothatthemainUNagenciescaninvestintheirhumanitarianresponsecapacities.Itisdifficulttokeepstaff,chartcareersandinvestinpeopleifyoudonotknowwhetheryouwillhavemoneynextyear.Agenciesneedmulti-yearfundingtomaketheseinvestments.ButDFIDcanalsolinkthismoreclearlytoresultsandperformance.Themultilateralaidreviewcanbeagoodbasistostartthisrebalancingoffunding.
ThisreviewconcludesthatalongsidemorepredictablecorefundingtheCERFisavaluablemechanismandshouldcontinuetobesupportedandexpanded.ItalsoconcludesthatNGOsneedsimilarsupport.PooledfundsliketheoneinDRCongohavegenerallyworkedwell.Astheyapplymostlytoprotractedcrisesthereviewhasnotstudiedtheseindepth,excepttogenerallyendorsethisapproach.
UNagenciesarethebackboneofmanyresponses,andtheUKisconsistentlyoneofthelargestcontributors.Thedefaultpositionofmultilateralismmeanstheseagenciesneedsupporting,asdoestheoverallinstitution.Butsupportcannot,andshouldnotbeuncritical.Agenciesmustcollaboratewitheachother,withgovernments,withNGOsandwithUNappointedleadership.Theclusterapproachisthecorrectvision–strategicnetworksbringingtogetherthemainactorsinvolvedinresponse.Butitsimplementationhasbeentooinflexible.Clustersneedtobegroupedaroundneedratherthanmandate,includingallkeyactors,notjustUNagenciesandinternationalNGOs.Theyneedtobestrategic,andoftentheyneedtoworkonseverallevels.Theyneedtobecreative,decisionmakingbodies,notuninspiringtalkshops.ResourcesfromDFIDshouldfollowsuccessonthesecriteria,andnotberoutinelyallocated.
Working with the European Union TheEuropeanUnioncollectivelyprovideshalfofallofficialhumanitarianaid.Italsohasitsownhumanitarianaidagency,ECHO,whichisthesecondlargestglobaldonorinitsownright.AndalthoughtheUKprovidesasixthofitsfunding,itdoesnotengagewithECHOstrategically.Thisneedstochange.
DFID’spolicylevelrelationshipwithECHOisweak.DFIDandECHOtoooftenworkinparallel,failingtocommunicateeffectively.Thisresultsinduplicationofworkandcostlyoverlaps.IndisastersituationsECHOisroutinelyunawareofwhatDFID’sresponsewillbe.Atpolicylevel,DFIDfocusespriorityattentiononthemajorUNhumanitarianpartnersratherthanotherdonors.ThelackofeffectivepartnershipwithECHOisawastedopportunity.TheUKholdsauniquepositionamongstEUmemberstates,withcapacitytoprovideeffectivehumanitarianaidwhenactingalone.Thisexperienceifbettershared,couldbebeneficialtobothagencies.
AtpresentDFID’srelationshipwithECHOappearstobedelegatedtojuniorstaff.Whatisneededisbetterengagementatpolicylevel,andbetteralignmentatdeliverylevel.DFIDneedstohaveamoreconsistentstrategicdialoguewithECHO.ItneedstobeawareofECHO’sstrategicplanningprocessesandengagewiththese.
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Mostimportantly,DFIDneedstogetsmarteratsharingresourceswithECHO.Nigerisagoodexampleofhowthiscanwork.ECHOhasstrongtechnicaladvisorypresencethroughitsspecialisedofficesandpermanentrepresentationthroughtheEUdelegation.DFIDreliedonECHOtoleadtheresponse.ButDFIDalsoperiodicallysenthumanitarianadvisorstoreinforceandcomplementECHOleadership.InothersituationsECHOmightfollowaDFIDlead.
Working with bilateral donorsTheUSgovernmentistheworld’slargestindividualhumanitariandonor.Itisveryinfluential,withtheheadsofWFP,UNICEFandtheWorldBanktraditionallycomingfromtheUS.TheUSgovernmentisalsothelargestdonortoUNHCRandtheICRC.
ThismeanstheUShasanopportunitytoinfluenceUNagenciesatahighlevel.ThisisoftennotusedcoherentlybecauseofthefragmentednatureoftheUSaidbureaucracy.Butevenso,DFIDdoesnothaveasustainedpolicydialoguewiththehumanitarianagenciesoftheUSgovernment,andisoftenperceivedbytheUSasaloner.
TheUSwasconsideringasignificantreductionintheamountofhumanitarianaiditgivesasthisreviewwenttopress(40%offoodaidanddisasterresponseby70%).Werethistohappen,forDFIDitwouldmeanthatconversationsaboutburdenshare–similartothosewithECHO–wouldbeevenmorevital.ItwillbeimportanttounderstandwheretheUSwillfocusitsefforts,andtoensurethatscarcehumanitarianresourcesarespreadmosteffectively.WheretheUSwillobviouslylead–Haitiwasagoodexample–thenDFIDshouldbeabletofitaroundthis.
TheGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)grouphasplayedaroleinachievingchangeinthehumanitariansystem.DonorssuchastheNetherlands,Sweden,NorwayandCanadahavebeenclosealliesforDFID.GHDhascreatedaspaceforcollectiveactionthatdidnotpreviouslyexist,andprovidedDFIDwithitsmostconsistentallies.Lately,ithaslostmomentum.DFIDshouldworktoreinvigoratethisgroup,bothgloballyandincountrieslikeDRCongowhereitplaysapivotalrole.
DFIDsharesthebasichumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutralityandimpartialityasastartingpointforpartnershipwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonors.TheprinciplesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)bindlike-mindeddonorstogetheraroundafurthersetofcoredonorprinciples.TheGHDgroupisastartinggroundformoreeffectivedonoraction.ButmoreneedstobedonebyDFIDtodemonstrateacollegialapproach.
WideningthegroupwhoadheretoGHDprincipleswouldbeapositivewayforward.DFIDisoneofthestrongergroupmemberswithcapacitytoinfluencehowtobringothersin.TheannualMontreuxmeetingmightbetheforumforthisandcouldpotentiallybewidenedinscopeandambition.
Working with new donor partnersTheworldischanging.Chinaisnowthesecondlargestglobaleconomy.NationssuchasIndia,SouthAfrica,Russia,Brazil,andSaudiArabiaareimportantregionalpowers.Theglobalpictureofwhorespondstohumanitarianneedischangingtoo.Increasingcontributionstodisasterresponsearebeingseenfromdonorsoutsidethe‘traditional’OECDDACgroup.
Allofthenationscitedabovesignificantlyrespondtodisastersintheirregions.China’scontributiontoWFPdoubledin2005andwasoneofthelargestdonorsinBurmaafterCycloneNargisin2008(andinPakistanduringthefloodsin2010).BrazilwasamajorresponderinHaiti.SaudiArabiawasthesinglelargestdonortoBangladeshfollowingcycloneSidr(andwasoneofthetopfiveglobaldonorsin2009).IndiagavethroughmultilateralchannelstoPakistanfloodrelief.
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Findings
Theemerginggroupofnon-traditionalpartnersisanopportunityforDFIDtoestablishnewrelationships.Todoso,DFIDmustlookforareasofcommongroundthatalreadyexist.Similarviewpointscanbeusedasstartingpoints.Forexample,Brazil’sviewonhumanitarianresponseis,likeDFIDtobuildownershipbyworkingwithlocalauthorities.
DFIDcancombineitsexpertisewiththatofnationsthatregularlyexperiencelargescalenaturaldisasters,andworkwiththemtosharelearningwithotheratrisknations.Russia’sEmergencyControlMinistry,EMERCOMhasvastcapacityandexperience.Indiahasacadreofexperienceddisastermanagersingovernment,followingdisastersinOrissa,GujuratandTamilNadu.China’shandlingoftheSichuanearthquakeresponsewasexemplary.China’scurrent5yearplan(2006–2011)includesdisasterrelief,highlightingtheimportanceofmultilateralcoordination.
Chinahasenormouscapacitytorespondanddeepexperienceofhumanitarianemergencieswithinitsownborders.AnydisastersintheregionoftheHinduKushwilllikelyseeChinarespondinginasignificantway.Toremainahumanitarianleaderintothe21stcentury,DFIDshouldreachouttoseektobuildnewrelationshipswithChinaalongthelinesoftheirrecentWhitePaper.
TheGulfStates,suchasQatar,theUAEandSaudiArabiaaresignificantdonorsinthehumanitarianassistanceandareincreasinglybecominginvolvedinotherways.TheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)hasanewhumanitarianmechanism.DFIDisalreadyworkingwiththeGCCandhumanitarianassistanceisagoodareaofcommoninterest.
Inforgingnewhumanitarianrelationships,DFIDshouldnotrisk‘goingitalone’.Alliancesmustbebuiltwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonorstowelcomenewpartnersonboard.SupportmustbecorralledfromwithintheDACgrouptocreateareceptiveforumfornewdonorstojoin.DFIDwillhavetolookwideracrossWhitehalltoinfluenceinthisaction.ClosecollaborationbetweenDFID,FCOandotherWhitehalldepartmentswillbevitaltodevelopopportunities.TheFCO’scapacitytobuildrapidconsensusthroughcablesinsupportofASEAN’sroleinresponsetoCycloneNargisin2008hasalreadybeendemonstrated.DFIDshouldmakemoreuseofthediplomaticnetworksandothergovernmentdepartmentsinordertobuildwidercoalitionsitneedstodrivethroughtheinternationalreformagenda.
DFID’scommitmenttohumanitarianprincipleswillbecomeincreasinglyimportantaspartnershipsaredeveloped.Demonstratingthevalueofthesewillbeanimportantpartofnewrulesforinternationalhumanitariancollaboration.
Working with NGOsTheUKhassomeofthemostrespectedandimportantinternationalnon-governmentorganisationsintheworld.OrganisationslikeOxfamandSavetheChildrenareknownworldwide.TheirworkhashelpedmillionsindisasterfromEthiopia,toBangladeshtoHaiti.Theirpioneeringtechnicalworkhasoftensetthestandardforotherhumanitarianagencies.TheyarehighlyregardedbytheUKpublicandreceivegeneroussupportwhenmassivedisastersstrike.
Non-governmentorganisations(NGOs)alsoprovidemuchoftheimplementationcapacityinhumanitarianemergencyresponse.IndigenousandfaithbasedNGOsareoftenthefirsttorespond,andunderstandbothcultureandcontext.InternationalNGOsareadeptatdeployingquickly,oftensettingupbigreliefoperationsweeksbeforetheUNcranksintogear.In2008NGOsspent$5.7billiononhumanitarianassistance29.NGOsoftenhavelargeprogrammesinaffectedcountriesbeforedisasterstrikes,haveexperienceinresiliencebuildingespeciallyincommunitybaseddisasterriskreductionandmanyworkwithnationalandlocalorganisations.
29 GHAreport2010.DevelopmentInitiatives.
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ThetermNGOcoversadiversityoforganisations.WorldVisionhadaturnoverof$2.1billionin200630,rivallingUNICEFat$2.7billioninthesameyear.In2006MedecinsSansFrontieres(MSF)spent$575milliononhumanitarianaid.Onlytwogovernments–theUKandtheUS–spentmoreonofficialbilateralhumanitarianassistancethatyear.TheCatholicChurchnetworkCaritas’svoluntaryspendwasequivalenttothebilateralhumanitarianassistanceofSweden,thesixthlargestdonorin2006.Insomecases,asinglememberofanNGOfamilymakesamoresignificantcontributionthanitshostgovernment.Forexample,MSFFrancespentanestimated$81millionoftheFrenchpublic’smoneyonrespondingtocrisesin2006,comparedwithbilateralspendingofonly$48millionbytheFrenchgovernment.
NGOsarealsorapidlygrowinginscaleandgeographicspread.IndiahasamillionindigenousorganisationsthatdescribethemselvesasNGOs.BRACinBangladeshclaimstobetheworld’slargestNGOifnumberofemployeesisconsideredratherthanfinancialturnover.MercyMalaysiahasbecomeawell-knowninternationalNGOrunningprogrammesasfarafieldasAfrica;AfricaHumanitarianActioninEthiopiarunsprogrammesacrosstheHorn.
WhatNGOsrepresentattheirbestiscitizens’action.OrganisationslikeMSFhaveverygenerouspublicsupportacrossEuropeandtheUS,receiving86%oftheirfundsfromprivatedonations.Theirglobalspreadistestimonytotheirenduringappeal.
Forofficialdonorsandtheinternationalsystemthiscreatesbothanopportunityandachallenge.Theincreasedcapacity,especiallyofnationalandlocalNGOsprovidesuntappedpotential.TheHaitiearthquakeprovidesanexamplethoughoftheheadachethattryingtocoordinatetheNGOsectorcanbe,withmorethan1,000internationalNGOsflyingintoPortauPrincereadytohelp.SomeNGOsareanintegralpartofthesystem.SavetheChildrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF;Oxfamprovidespeoplereadytogoforthewaterandsanitationcluster.ButotherNGOseitherdonotknow,ordonotacceptthissystem.Manyturnuplookingforguidance.Otherstrytopushapoliticalagenda.
FaithgroupsareanotherexampleofagrowingNGOsectorwithpotentialtoimproveresponsesthroughtheirstronglinkswithandaccesstolocalcommunities.TheyraiseconsiderabledonationsfromfaithandDiasporacommunitiesoutsidetheDECappeals.
TheinternationalNGOsectorhasgonealongwayintryingtoself-regulate.ThereisanindustrywideCodeofConduct,technicalstandardsforeachsectorofactivityandlotsofworkonaccountability.Unfortunatelythishasnotbeenenoughtostemthetideoffirsttime“wellwishers”,manyofwhomdonotknowaboutstandards,codesandtheideathattheirhelpmightdomoreharmthangood.NeitherhasitmadeanimpactonthecompetitionbetweeninternationalNGOs.AswithUNagenciesthiscompetitionmeansthatassessmentinformationisoftentreatedascommerciallysensitive,leadingtomultiplesurveysandorganisationsjostlingforfundingforparticulargeographicareasortechnicalsectors.
AsaresultofthehumanitarianreformeffortswiththeUN,DFIDhasratherneglectedtheNGOsectorinthelastfiveyears.Latterlythishasbeenchangingwiththeestablishmentofinnovativeconsortia,bothforimprovingrapidresponseandin-countryforlocalNGOs.TheConsortiumofBritishHumanitarianAgencies(CBHA)andtheWestAfricaRegionalHumanitarianFund(WARHF)offertwoprovenmodelsataglobalandregionallevel.Theseareeffectiveandshouldbeexpanded.
DFIDshouldalsoconsider,eitherthroughconsortiaorindividually,investinginNGOswithspecialistresponsecapabilitiestoensurethesecanbedeployedrobustly.Thiscould
30 DIreportfor2009Montreuxdonorsconference.
35
Findings
belinkedtoclusterneedsandresponsibilities(forinstancewithCAREwhosupportthesheltercluster,orMerlinwhohaveco-chairedcountryhealthclusters).
IncountrieswhereDFIDhasapresencethistypeofapproachcanbeextendedtonationalandlocalNGOsandapplytointernationalNGOswithsubstantialpresenceandexperience.ThecivilsocietyfundinDRCongocouldserveasamodel,wherebyoneNGOactsasthegrantholderonbehalfofthecollective.USAIDusesthesetypesof‘umbrellagrants’routinely.AnothermodelisUNDPinBangladesh;anotheristherecentlyformedCBHA.
WhilstthesetypesofapproacheshavethepotentialtoimprovetheeffectivenessofmanyofthebiggerinternationalNGOs,itwillnotsolvetheissueofeverincreasingproliferation.OnepotentialmeasurethathasbeendebatedwithintheNGOcommunityformanyyearsisfor‘accreditation’ofsomesort,allowingaccreditedNGOseasieraccesstocoordinationmeetingsandsoon.ThisideahasbeenresistedonthegroundsthatitwouldbealmostimpossibletoachieveandthatitmightunfairlyexcludeNGOswithrealcapacityorinsighttooffer–especiallynationalNGOs.However,thereviewfindsthatasystemisneededtohelpshortcutsomeofthechaosofcoordinationofNGOs,perhapslinkedtopre-crisisarrangementsandplanning.ThisworkcanonlybeconductedbytheNGOsectoritself.ButDFIDshouldencourage,helpandsupportthisprocess.Whateveritlookslike,ithastohelpaffectedgovernmentsandthosechargedwithcoordinationtounderstandwhereareputableorganisationhasprovencapabilityandhowitcouldbestbedeployed.
Working with the Red Cross and Red Crescent MovementTheInternationalRedCross/CrescentMovementistheworld’slargesthumanitariannetwork.Thereare186NationalSocietieswithaSecretariatinGenevaaswellastheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),aprivateSwissorganisationdedicatedtohelpingvictimsofconflict.TheICRCreceivesthelargestamountofDFIDhumanitarianfundingofanysingleagency,at£66millioninfinancialyear2009/2010.
TherelationshipbetweenDFIDandtheRedCross/RedCrescentMovementhastraditionallybeenmediatedbytheBritishRedCrossSociety(BRCS).TheBRCSisoneofthestrongerNationalSocieties(NS)intheMovement,alargecontributortootherNSinitsownright,andastrategicvoiceintheIFRCSecretariat.Forthepastdecade,DFIDfundsforboththeIFRCandICRCpassedthroughtheBRCSinwhatwascalleda‘tripartite’relationship.ThisrecentlychangedfortheICRC–DFIDfundsnowgodirecttoGeneva–butremainsthesamefortheIFRC.
Thedifferentarrangementsreflectthestrengthsandcharacterofthedifferentorganisations.TheICRCiswidelyadmiredforitsprofessionalismanditsadherencetomandate.ItscoreshighlyininternalDFIDanalysis,includingtherecentmultilateralaidreview,andwithcountryoffices.ThismakestheICRCapartnerofchoiceinconflictsituationsandthisreviewendorsesthatview.DFIDshouldcontinuetoworkwiththeICRCasitis,atrustedandprincipledpartnerinconflictsituations.
TheNationalSocietiesandtheIFRCSecretariataredifferent.Thenetworkhastremendouspotential,rootedasitisinitsnationalbase.NationalSocietiesarerequiredtohaveauxiliarystatustogovernmenttobeamember,andinmanycountriesthisisasignificantrole.TheChineseRedCrosshasaround20millionvolunteersandoftenrespondsalongsidethePeople’sLiberationArmyindisasters.TheIranianRedCrescentSocietyistheofficialresponsearmofgovernment,withhugereliefstocksandlogisticsassetsincludinghelicopters.TheAmericanRedCrossisresponsibleformasscareindomesticdisasters.
Butthenetworkdoesnotroutinelyachieveitspotential.Itislessthanthesumofitsparts,withmanyNationalSocietiesthatareunder-resourcedandunder-performing.
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Particularlyinsub-SaharanAfrica,manyoftheNationalSocietiesaremarginaltotheirnationallifeandincapableoflarge-scalemobilisation.Partlythisisaquestionofresources–whenahighachievingofficerfromtheIFRCSecretariatbecameSecretaryGeneralofaweakperformingNationalSociety,andwasremuneratedataninternationallevel,therewasastepchangeinperformance.Itisalsoaquestionofmanagementandgovernance.
InthenewdirectionrecommendedforDFIDinthisreview,focusingonnationalresilience,thereisamajorroleforRedCrossandRedCrescentNationalSocieties.WorkingthroughandwithNationalSocietiescanbeagoodwaytoengagewithNationalDisasterManagementAgencies,andwithnationaldisasterlegislation.NationalSocietiesareoftenclosetocommunities,throughtheirvolunteernetworksandtheFederationhaspioneeredworkoncommunitybaseddisasterpreparedness.
TheIFRCalsoremainsamassivenetworkfordisasterresponse,oftentheveryfirsttohelpthroughlocalvolunteersandmobilisingthenetworkofNationalSocietiesataregionalorgloballevel.Theirperformanceinresponsehasbeenmixedhowever.ThiscriticalrolecouldbeimprovedwithgreaterclarityoffocusonimprovingtheglobalRedCross/RedCrescentresponsesystemfromtheFederation,andstrengthenedbettercapacityattheNSlevel.
Butthiscanonlyworkifsomeofthefundamentalproblemscanberesolved.WorkingwithandthroughtheBritishRedCrossisasensiblehalfwayhouseforthetimebeing.TheBRCShasauxiliarystatustogovernmentintheUK,althoughinpracticethishasnotoftenbeeninvokedinrecentyears.DFIDshouldworkcloselywithBRCSandtheIFRCSecretariattoinvolvetheFederationinitsresiliencework.ItshouldalsocontinuetosupporttheglobalreadinessoftheFederation.TheBRCScanactasaninterlocutor,giventheotherwisetimeconsumingnatureofapotentialengagement.
TheroleoftheBRCSasanauxiliarycouldbere-invigoratedinotherways.TheBRCSalreadyprovidesadegreeoflegaladviceonthelawsofwartotheMOD;thiscouldbeextendedtoDFID.BRCSalsokeepsanumberofhighqualityemergencyteamsonpermanentstandbyfortheFederation.ThenationalsocietyhasofferedtoextendthistypeofsurgearrangementtoDFID,somethingthatshouldbeexplored.
Working with the private sectorTheprivatesectorrepresentsahugesourceofuntappedcapacityandexpertisetoreducesufferingandhelprebuildcommunitiesintheaftermathofadisaster.Itcanalsohelptomitigatedisasterriskthroughpreventionandpreparedness.Thispotentialmustbeunlockediffuturechallengesaregoingtobemet.
Theemphasisneedstoshiftfromseeingtheprivatesectorasadonortobeinga‘doer’,andasavaluedpartnernotacontractedentity.Newmodalitiesofengagementarerequiredinordertoenablethehumanitariansectortohaveaccesstoskillsandproductsasandwhenrequired.Examplesofthisincludepublic-privatepartnershipsthatenablethesharingofrisks,creditandinvestment(e.g.theCaribbeanCatastropheRiskInsuranceFacility,theBritishEarthquakeConsortiumforTurkey).
Butthereisstilldistrustfromthehumanitariansectorthatcharacterisesitselfas‘non-profit’towardsprivatesectororganisationswhoseprimemotivationisperceivedas‘profit’.Thisbarriertocollaborationneedstobeovercome,andDFIDshouldbeactiveinhelpingtoachievethis.Theprivatesector’smotivationforengagementisbasedonawiderbusinessinterest,includingbrand,newmarkets,corporatesocialresponsibility,andstaffmotivation.Andinviewofthisfirmsareoftenwillingtoengageonareducedrateor‘atcost’basis,asforexamplewithDigicellinHaiti.HumanitarianorganisationssuchasMapActionandRedRrelyontrainedpersonnelfromtheprivatesectorbeingavailablewhenneededforcriticalshort-termassignmentsintheimmediateaftermathofadisaster,oftenonavolunteerorpartialcostbasis.
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Companiesandgovernmentshaveoutsourcedservicesforyears,concentratingontheircoreadvantage.Thehumanitariansectoralsohasasetofquasi-commercialrelationshipsinitsgrant/recipient/sub-contractingmodel.Protectionistrhetoricneedstobereplacedwithafocusonwhocandowhat,mosteffectively.Again,DFIDshouldencourageandstimulatethisprocess.
Thecurrentmodelsofprivatesectorengagementinhumanitarianactiongenerallyfocusonlargemultinationalcompaniesandinvolvepro-bonocontributionsoftheirproducts,skillsandexpertisetoresponseoperations.Thisismostlyinthesectorsoflogistics,ITandcommunication,mapping,engineeringandmedicalsupplies.ThebestknownexampleinthesectoristhecollaborationofAgility,TNTandUPSinprovidinglogisticsandtransportationservicestoWFP.Therehavealsobeenproactiveeffortsbytheprivatesectortobetterunderstandhumanitarianaction,andvariousinitiatives,suchastheWorldEconomicForumDisasterRiskPartnershiptofacilitateaccesstoprivatesectorexpertiseinengineeringandconstruction.
Theprivatesectorcanbringprofessionalism,leadershipandmanagementbestpractice,toolsfordrivingefficiencyandmanagingrisk,andtheuseofcuttingedgetechnologyandinformation.Suchskillsneedtobecontextualizedtothechallengesofpost-disastersituationsthroughworkinginpartnershipwithhumanitarianorganisationsandbuildinglong-termcollaborativerelationshipsthatenableknowledgetransfer.
Recognitionofthevalueoftheinternationalprivatesectorneedstobematchedwithunderstandingoftheimportanceoflocalbusinessesandcompaniesinimmediateresponseandincatalysingeconomicrecovery.Thisimportanceislikelytochangesignificantlywhencashtransfersbecomemoreprominent.
Thelocalprivatesectorisusuallythefirstthatcanrespondwithreliefitemsandfood.Itcanprovideemploymentandcontributetonormalisation.HindustanConstructionCompanyinIndiahasbeenabletorespondtofloodsinOrissaandfloods/landslidesinLaddakhwheretheyhadconstructionsites.Notablyitisnationalcompanieslikethesewhohavethecapacitytorespondaswellastherelationshipswiththelocalgovernmentandcommunity.
InHaiti,theruralhinterlandwasnotmuchaffectedbytheearthquakeandmarketsresumedquickly.Large-scalefoodaidwasneverthelessimported,withapotentiallydetrimentaleffectontheagriculturaleconomy.
Thelocalprivatesectorcanalsoprofiteerfromdisasters.ThereisevidencethatNiger’scerealmarketisstrictlycontrolledbyarestrictedgroupoftraders.Thesetraderskeepcerealsoutofcirculationuntilthemaximumpriceisreached.
Alltheseexamplesshowthatpositiverelationshipswiththeprivatesectorneedtobeestablishedpre-disastersothattheycanbebestusedwhendisasterstrikes.InDFID’sresilienceandpreparednesswork,thelocalandnationalprivatesectorneedstobeakeypartner.
Disastersareincreasinglytakingplaceinurbanenvironments.Urbanenvironmentsarecharacterisedbyahighconcentrationofprivatesectorinterests(markets,labour,thesupplychain).Urbanareasarealsodependentoninfrastructureforthedeliveryofessentialservices(water,solidwastemanagement,sanitation,drainage,energy)Damagedinfrastructureneedstoberapidlyreinstatedandissueslikerubbleremovalarecriticaltomakinglandavailableforcamps,andintegratedurbanplanningisneededinordertoprovideabasisforrecoveryandreconstruction.ReinstatingtheseisoutsidetheskillssetofNGOsorUNagencies,andfundingandprocurementbarriersoftenpreventsuchskillsbeingaccessedinatimelyfashionfromtheprivatesector.
Local,nationalandinternationalcompaniesholdtheknowledgeandexpertisetorespondtourbandisasters.Theycouldbeofgreatvaluetohumanitarianorganisations
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operatingoutoftheirtraditionalareasofexpertise.Thereareexamplesofmunicipalgovernmentsturningdirectlytotheprivatesector,forinstancetheDujiangyanMunicipalGovernmentaftertheChineseearthquake,andapublic-privatepartnership(PRES)betweenArauco,theministryofhousingandlocalmunicipalityinSantiago,Chile.
DFIDhassetupanewPrivateSectorDepartmentinJanuary2011tohelpraisethelevel,extentandeffectivenessofDFID’sengagementwiththeprivatesector.Thisisanexcellentinitiative.Existingandnewprogrammescouldaddressmanyoftheissuesraisedabove.FacilitiessuchasthePrivateInfrastructureDevelopmentGrouportheBusinessInnovationFacilitycouldhavehumanitarianwindows.Knowledgegenerationanddisseminationactivitiescouldincluderelevanthumanitariancases.Andwhereappropriate,CHASEandthePrivateSectorDepartmentcouldworktogetherongalvanisingprivatesectorexpertisearoundspecificopportunitiesthatneedunblocking.Anexamplewouldbefastinfrastructurerehabilitationinurbanareas.Anothermightbeencouragingtheprivatesectortohelpstrengthenthehumancapacityoflocalgovernmentsandstructurestomanageemergencies.
Working with the militaryThemilitaryhaslongbeeninvolvedindisasterreliefoperations.Domesticmilitaryareoftenthefirstresponseofgovernment.Internationalmilitaryinvolvementindisasterreliefhasbeenmorecontentious,especiallywherethereareobviouspoliticalormilitaryobjectives.Buthumanitarianworkersneedtobeabletoacknowledgeareasofmilitarycomparativeadvantageandrecognisewheretheycanworktogether.Itisvitaltoupholdhumanitarianprinciples.Itisequallyvitaltousethemosteffectiveresourcesatourdisposaltomeettheneedsofthoseaffected,especiallyifpredictionsofincreasedneedmaterialise. ThereviewtakestheviewthattheBritishmilitarydoeshavearoletoplayinsupportoftheUKresponseledbyDFID.
Itisthenationalgovernment’sresponsibilitytodecidewhethertocallinmilitaryresourcesinsupportofahumanitarianresponse.Thismaybeadecisiontousethecountry’sownmilitaryortoaccepttheuseofforeignmilitary.Inmanycountries,callingintheirownmilitarytorespondtoalarge-scaledomesticdisasteristhemostobviousthingtodo.Aftertheearthquakeof2005,thePakistanarmywasthefirstresponder,savingthemostlivesbypullingpeopleoutoftherubbleandbyprovidingthefirstreliefitems.Whenbigdisastershit,oftenacountry’smilitaryistheonlyactorwithadequateresourcestorespondatspeedandscale.DFIDshouldrecogniseacountry’srighttouseitsownmilitaryindisasterresponseandbesupportive.
Anationalgovernmentmayrequestassistancefromforeignmilitary.FollowingthetsunamithathitBandaAceh,Indonesiain2004militaryhelicoptersfrominternationalforceswereneededtoreachcutoffpopulationsandmanynationsprovidedmilitaryassetstowardthisoperation.Asubsequentreviewfounditoneofthemosteffectivepartsoftheinitialinternationalresponse31.ChinaprovidedmilitaryhelicoptersandmedicalteamsafterthePakistanfloodsin2010.Theseexamplesdemonstratethebenefitofextramilitarysupportwhendisastersaresolargethatthecombinedresourcesofdomesticmilitaryandthoseoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunityareinsufficienttomeettheneedsoftheaffectedpopulation.
Inarmedconflict,orsensitivepoliticalsituations,usingmilitaryassetsassociatedwithpartiestotheconflictcancompromisetheperceivedneutrality–andthereforesafety–ofhumanitarianworkers.Thereisanobviousneedtobeabletodistinguishbetweenthesesituationsandmakesensiblepolicydecisionsbasedoncontext.Indisasterscausedbynaturalhazard,attherequestofgovernmentandwithclearcomparativeadvantage,
31 TECcoordinationstudy:www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/coordination.aspx
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Findings
militaryplanningandassetscanbehugelybeneficial.Inconflict,thisisnotusuallythecase,althoughUNmandatedforcescanhelpinsecuringhumanitarianaccess.
Twoinstrumentscurrentlyexisttoguidetheappropriateuseofmilitaryresourcesinhumanitariansituations,the‘Oslo’guidelinesfordisasters,andtheUNguidelines32forconflict.TheOsloguidelinesestablishtheprincipleof‘lastresort’.Thisisusefulasitmakesgovernmentsandpolicymakersthinktwicebeforedeployingmilitaryforces.ThisreviewhasconcludedthattheOsloguidelinesarestillrelevant.DFIDshouldinterpretandwherepossibledefinetheprincipleoflastresortas,‘onlyusingmilitaryassetswhennothingelsewilldo’.Thiswillopenthedoortotheuseofnichecapabilities,withoutopeningthe‘floodgates’tounwelcomedeploymentofmilitaryassetsforeverybigemergency.
NichecapabilitiesoftheBritishmilitarymayincludestrategicplanningandsurgedeployment.Itmayalsoincludeagreateruseofmilitaryassets.Thereisanassumptionthatthiskitistooexpensive.Therealissueiswhetherthereareessentialassetsforsavinglivesthatcannotbesecuredintimeanyotherway.
InconflictsituationsdeploymentofmilitaryassetsshouldbeinlinewiththeUNguidelines.Butthereisawiderpointabouthowhumanitariansengagewithmilitaryforces,andthedifferencebetweenthem.Whenmilitaryforcescontrolareasthereisaneedforahumanitariandialoguetoensurepopulationsinneedcanbeaccessed.ManyUNforcesareroutinelygivenmandatestoprotectcivilians,andinsuchsituationshumanitarianorganisationsneedtoworkwiththem.33
Recommendations
DFID should:
18 Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (including China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).
19 Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral33. In particular it should:
• EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityofco-financing.
• WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformofOCHAandthesystemmorewidely.
20 WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.
21 EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareaswhereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness,includingatthecountrylevel.
22 UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswhereareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffercapacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives.
23 WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.
32 MilitaryandCivilDefenceAssets(MCDA):http://www.coe-dmha.org/media/guidance/3mcdaguidelines.pdf
33 Seesection5.2forrecommendationonfunding.
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4.7 Humanitarian space
Whenthereisconflict,wherestateshavefailed,whengovernmentsarebelligerentorvenalDFIDcannotworkdirectlythroughtheauthorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile‘space’inwhichhumanitarianagenciesareacceptedandworktohelpthosemostinneed.DFIDneedstodowhatitcantonurtureandexpandthisspace;byobservingthekeyprinciplesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality,andbyleadingwhereithasinfluencetoensureothersdo.
Humanitarianprincipleshaveevolvedovertimetohelpagenciesaccessandprotectpopulationsmostatrisk.Wherethoseagenciesareseenasneutral,impartialandindependenttheycanbuildtrustwithcombatants,allowingthemtodeliveraid.Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoalsthesecurityofstaffcanbecompromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthosemostinneed.
ThisreviewconcludesthatDFIDhumanitarianpolicyshouldbetoprotectandwherepossibleenlargethisfragilespace;toworkwithagenciesthatcanaccessandhelpthoseindireneedandtocontinuetoresistthepoliticisationofhumanitarianaid.Thereviewalsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andthebreakdownofstateauthoritythattherewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN,willbeneededtoprotectciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.
Protection of civiliansInconflictsituationsandaftersomedisasters,particularlyinurbanareasciviliansneedprotectionfromviolence.Oftentheneedforsecuritycomesbeforeanythingelse.
Thisreviewwasnotmandatedtoconsiderthefullrangeofconflictsituations,focusingonlyonnaturaldisastersandspikesinconflict.Insituationsofconflict,itisclearthatprotectionofciviliansandhumanitarianaccessisparamount.
TheUKcanplayameaningfulroleinsuchsituations,evenwhereitisapartytotheconflict.Itmustobserveinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Itcanuseitsinfluencetoremindothersoftheirobligationsunderinternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightslaw.Itcanworkwithlegitimatehumanitarianagenciestoassistthemintheirrole.AnditcansupporttheworkoftheUnitedNationsinpeacekeeping,byensuringthatpeacekeepingmandatesincludetheprotectionofcivilians,andthatpeacekeepingforcesareresourcedforthis.
InthecasestudyforDRCongo,itwasclearthatUNpeacekeepinghasmadeprogressinitsprotectionwork.Whilsttherecontinuetobehorrificattacksagainstcivilians(massrapesbygovernmentaffiliatedforcestonameone),thepeacekeepingforceunderstandsithasadutytotryandpreventtheseandworkswithhumanitarianstothisend.Thisshouldbereinforced.Itishardforsoldiers,trainedinthetacticsoffightingbattles,tofindwaysofpreventingattacksoncivilians,especiallywhenresourcesarescarce.MobileoperationalbasesofthetypetrialledinDRCongohavemerit,especiallywhencoupledwithwaysforcommunitiestotriggerthem.
DFIDcanworkwithagenciesliketheICRC,theUNHCRandOHCHRtoenablethemtocarryouttheirprotectionwork(visitingprisoners,registeringrefugeesandpromotingrights).InparticularDFIDmustensurethatinconflicthumanitarianbudgetsfundneutralandimpartialagencies,andsubstitutionofbasicserviceswhereappropriate.
DFIDcanworkwiththeUN,includinginpeacekeepingassetoutabove.Thisistechnicalwork,andhasmerit.Thebiggerpictureisthatconflictispolitical.Humanitarianworkcannotbethestickingplasterforalackofpoliticalaction.
CasestudiesinDRCongo,GazaandBurmademonstratethelimitedinfluencetheUKworkingonitsownhasinsituationsofconflict.Thesamecasestudiesshow,however,thattherearethingsthatcanbeachieved,especiallyworkingwithothers.InBurma
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Findings
followingcycloneNargis,workingwiththeASEANgroupofnationsitwaspossibletogainaccessforhumanitarians.InDRCongo,thepatient,patchybuild-upofinternationalhumanitarian,militaryandlegalactiontriestocontainconflictandhelpthoseaffectedbyit.InGaza,DFIDsupportedtheUNincoordinatingaccessadvocacythroughaHumanitarianAssistanceFramework,praisedbyBanKi-Moon.
Aparticularissuerelatingtocounter-terrorismlegislationhasariseninseveralcomplexemergenciesrecently(Somalia,Colombia,SriLankaandGaza)andislikelytocomeupmoreofteninthefuture.DFID,onoccasion,hadtostopfundingthehumanitarianworkofinternationalNGOsandotherimplementingpartnersbecausetheycouldnot100%ensurethataterroristorganisationwouldnotindirectlyordirectlybenefit.Europeanlegallybindinginstrumentsoncounter-terrorismandUKlegislationstipulatethatanybodydirectlyorindirectlyfundingterroristorganisationswillbeprosecutedundercriminallaw.However,exemptionscanbemadebytheEuropeanCouncilonhumanitariangrounds.
Thisreviewfindsthatinthesecircumstances,andinallcasesofconflict,anessentialpriorityistonegotiatehumanitarianaccessonanunimpededbasis.AllpartiesarerequiredtograntsuchaccessunderInternationalHumanitarianLaw.Thisshouldbenegotiatedatthehighestnecessarylevel,andnotlefttofieldworkerstomanageontheirown.Inthecasesabove,thelegalproblemshouldbeovercomebyapplyingforexemptionsonhumanitariangrounds.Thehumanitarianimperativeshouldbeaprimaryconsideration.
Security of humanitarian workersHumanitarianworkisbecomingmoredangerous.Statisticsquotedinthechallengessectionofthisreviewoutlinehowmoreandmorehumanitarianworkersarebeingkilledandwoundedinthecourseoftheirwork.HavingUNinyourtitleandflyingaUNflagonyourvehiclenolongerprovidestheautomaticprotectionitusedto.Partlythisistheresultofamorecomplexandlesscertainworld;insomeplacesitisalsoaperceptionthathumanitarianworkerandeventheUNispartisan.
Theissuesaffectingthesafetyofhumanitarianworkersarebeyondthescopeofthisreview.Whatisclearisthattheyareinmoredanger,andthatprotectingthemisnecessaryiftheworkisgoingtogetdone.
Traditionallyhumanitarianagencieshaveworkedonthebasisofbeingacceptedbythelocalpopulation.Thishasmeantmoreinvestmentinexplainingwhattheyaredoing,andrelyingontheirgoodworkstospeakforthemselves.Thislargelyremainsthecase.Deterrence,asemployedbypartisanmilitaryforcesandforeigngovernmentsinconflicts,islargelycounter-productive.
DFIDneedstoensurethatthoseagencieswithwhichitworkstakesecurityseriously.WiththeUN,thismeanscontinuingtohaveacloserelationshipwithitssecuritydepartment(UNDSS),fundingwhennecessary.WithNGOs,thismeansputtingsecurityintoanyauditingprocessconnectedtopre-qualification,andinvestingininter-agencysecurityinitiativeswhenthesehaveprovenworth.
Recommendations
DFID should:
24 Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.
25 Ensurefundingismadeavailableforsecurityandriskmanagementforhumanitarianworkers.
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5. DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFIDTodeliverthestepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddeliveredoutlinedabove,DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.ThemostradicalchangewillinvolveseeinghumanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthansomethingthatneedstoberespondedtowhenithappens.WorkonanticipationandresilienceshouldbepartofDFID’severydayworkincountrieswhereithasapermanentpresence(seesections4.1and4.2).SuchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcerntoDFID’sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN.
ThestepchangesoughtbythisreviewwillalsohaveconsequencesforthewaythatDFIDprovidesfundingbeforeandduringhumanitarianemergencies.FundingformultilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothattheycaninvestintheskillsandstructurestheyneed.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlytogovernmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingandtransparent.
Asoutlinedintheintroduction,DFIDisashaper,afunderanda‘doer’.Thissectionsetsouthowitshouldengageintheseroles,andlooksattheresourcing,structureandaccountabilitymechanismsitneedsinplace,aswellassomecriticalareasforinvestmentsuchasresearchandinnovation.
5.1 Changing the policy
TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002isthekeypieceofUKlegislationthatframesoverseasassistance.Intheact,humanitarianassistanceisdefinedas,“assistanceforthepurposeofalleviatingtheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorotheremergencyonthepopulationofoneormorecountriesoutsidetheUnitedKingdom”.
Inadditiontoitsdomesticlegalobligations,theUKissignatorytoEUandinternationallaw.TheEUconsensusonhumanitarianaidinparticularcommitstheUKto,‘provideaneeds-basedemergencyresponseaimedatpreservinglife,preventingandalleviatinghumansufferingandmaintaininghumandignitywherevertheneedarisesifgovernmentsandlocalactorsareoverwhelmed,unableorunwillingtoact’.
Theconsensusalsosubscribestoanumberofotherprinciplesandcodes.Notablyit‘firmly’commitstothe‘fundamentalhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutrality,impartialityandindependence’.DFIDhasalsocommittedtotheseprinciplesinits2006humanitarianpolicy.
IftheinternationaldevelopmentactandthekeypiecesofEuropeanandInternationallawdeterminetheoverallframeworkforDFIDhumanitarianaction,thenthe2006humanitarianpolicyisthekeyinternaldocument.Ithadthreepolicygoals:
• Improvetheeffectivenessofhumanitarianresponses.
• Beabetterdonor.
• Reduceriskandextremevulnerability.
Thispolicyneedsupdating,notleastbecauseofthisreview.Anewpolicyshouldbegroupedaroundthemajorthemesidentifiedinthisreviewofanticipation,resilience,leadership,accountability,innovation,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.
Thepolicyshouldalsosetoutwhy,where,whenandhowDFIDresponds.Theconsensusofthisreviewisthatthedefaultpositionforthisresponseshouldbemultilateral,inthatDFIDwillworkwithandthroughitspartners.Wherethescaleoftheneedexceedsregularresources,thenDFIDshouldstandreadytomakeadditionalfundsavailableintothemultilateralsystem.OccasionallyDFIDwillalsoresponddirectly,basedoncomparativeadvantageincludingpresence.Thissuggeststheformulashouldbe:
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DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFID
• Why:becauseofinternationaldevelopmentact,EUconsensusandBritishpublicsupport.
• Where:onthebasisofneed.
• When:throughmultilateralpartnersinthefirstinstance.InmegadisastersUKtoroutinelyrespondwithadditionalfundinganddirectdelivery.
• How:throughregularfundstomultilateralandNGOpartners.Whereneedexceedsthislevelofresources,additionalfundingtobeconsidered(basedonadvice).DFIDtoresponddirectlyonlywherethereiscomparativeadvantageoroverwhelmingUKpublicinterest.
Buttheimplicationsofthisreviewgofurther.ThereneedstobeapolicychangeinDFIDonthedevelopmentsidetoo.Thisneedstoplacethecreationofresilienceinatriskcountriesintheheartofdevelopmentprocesses,seennotasa‘humanitarian’activity,butasadevelopmentnecessity.
Recommendations
DFID should:
26 Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.
27 Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when and how. Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.
5.2 Delivering differently
Shaping the International SystemTheUKisamajorcontributortotheinternationalsystem,withthemajorityofitshumanitarianresourceschannelledthroughpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussections.ThismeansthatDFIDhasadirectinterestinmakingtheinternationalsystemwork.Aninternationalsystemthatworksprovidesthebestvalueformoney,andhelpsthemostpeople.
ThisreviewhighlightsinseveralsectionstheinfluencetheUK,throughDFID,exertswithintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.Butthishaswaned.DFIDhasbecometooshrill,andtooinconsistent.Internationalagencieshavecometorealisethatwhilehumanitarianstaffmightbehighlycriticalofanoperation,politicalandseniororganisationalleaderswillnotexpendpoliticalcapitaltofixit.Thesameistrueacrossgovernment.IntheUN,onbudgetarygroundstheUKhasdriventermsofservicechangesthathavemadeithardertorecruithumanitarians.Atthesametime,DFIDberatestheUNfornotdoingmoretorecruithumanitarians.DFID’sinfluenceinbringingaboutmuchneededchangeandreformswillbeincreasedifitspendsmoretimebuildingalliances,andlesstimeactingalone.
Sincethehumanitarianreformsof2005,DFIDhasbeenoneoftheleadingvoicesinpressingforreformsinfinancing,leadershipandcoordination.Thereviewhasconcludedthatthisefforthasbeenbeneficialandshouldcontinue,givingspecialemphasistothechangesinleadershipstructuresandcapacitythereviewrecommends,andwhichtheIASChasrecentlyendorsed.
AnewapproachisneededifDFIDwantstocontinuetoshapetheinternationalsystem.DFIDwillhavetolearntobemorestrategic.HumanitarianadvisorsneedtobesureoftopmanagementandpoliticalsupportbeforeengaginginnegotiationswiththeUNsystemonreform.
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TheUKmissionsinNewYorkandGenevaarevaluableassets,andwhenusedwellcandeliverimpact.ButDFIDdoesnotuseeithermissionsystematicallyforitshumanitarianlobbyingandalliancebuilding.Thisneedstochange.TheNewYorkmissionhasasizeableDFIDpresence,whichshouldbebetterusedtoplanadvocacy.GenevadoesnothaveaDFIDpresence.ButUKMISinGenevacanneverthelessalsobeusedmoreeffectivelytohelpbuilddiplomaticalliancesinthepursuitofDFID’sreformagenda.
DFIDalsoneedstoworkbetterwithitsdonorpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussectionsofthisreport.WherepolicymessagesarecommonbetweentheUK,ECHOandtheUS,theyarefarmorepowerful.TheGHDgrouphasbeenanengineforchange–theUKneedstoworkwiththisgrouptoseethishappenagain.
AboveallDFIDneedtobemorestrategicinitslobbyingwork.ManyintheUNseeDFIDasthesinglemostinfluentialdonor.TheabilitytoleverageitspositionasthethirdlargestdonortoachieverealchangegivestheUKuniqueopportunities.Theseneedtobecarefullymanaged,notsquanderedinfrustration.Maintainingapositionasatopdonorwillbeessentialifthisinfluenceistoberetained.ButbetteruseofpositionsonUNagencyboards,withinthevariousUNcommittees,andsharperadvocacybyleaderswithinDFIDisneeded.Betterallianceswithestablisheddonorpartnersandthenewemergingeconomieswillbeessential,aswillnewrelationshipswithregionalbodies.
Changing the funding modelThemajorityofwhattheUKgovernmentdoesinhumanitarianassistanceisfundingothers.DFIDhaslongbeenseenasafastandflexiblehumanitariandonor.Thispositionshouldbemaintained.ButDFIDalsoneedstouseitsfundstopromotechange–toensurethatagenciesareequippedtorespondfastanddeliverwhatpeoplereallyneed.
Donorsshapetheinternationalresponsesystembythewaytheyfund.Someofthisisintended,butmostisnot.DFID,asoneofthemostinfluentialdonors,hasapowerfuleffectonthesystem–aslaidoutabove.Butthesystemisnotservingtheneedsofaffectedpeopleaswellasitmight.Fundingisnotproportionatetoneeds,itisnotequitable,itisnotcoordinatedorharmonised,itdoesnotfocusenoughonpreventionanditdoesnotdemanddemonstrableperformanceoffundedagencies.
DFIDcanchangetheincentivesinthewayitfunds,bettershapingtheinternationalsystem.Indevelopmentaid,DFIDhasbeenastrongadvocateofgreateraideffectiveness,throughseveralinternationalinitiatives.ForDFIDtoachievebetterresultsandgreatervalueformoney,thesameprinciplesofaideffectivenessneedtoapplytothefundingofhumanitarianpartners.Astepchangeisneededongreaterpredictability(includingmulti-yearcommitments),coherence,transparency,accountability,focusonresultsandvalueformoney.ThemainpriorityshouldbetoequipDFID’spartnerstobuildtheircapacityandmanagehumanitarianresponse.
DFIDcurrentlyfundsthemultilateralhumanitariansystemthroughacombinationofcorefundingandadditionalnon-corefundingatthecountrylevelforemergencies.Thesplitoverthelastfewyearshasbeenstronglyinfavourofadditionalnon-corefundinginresponsetoUNFlashAppealsforsuddenonsetdisasters.TheBilateralandMultilateralAidReviewsarechangingthissplit.ThroughtheMAR,thebestperformingagenciesshouldreceivesignificantlymorecorefundinglinkedtoresults.TheHERRwelcomesthisandrecommendsthatDFIDtakesafurthersteptowardsmulti-yearcorefundinglinkedtoperformancesothatthemajoragenciesandtheRedCrossMovementgetpredictabilityforfinancialplanningandcapacitybuilding.34
34 Carefulconsiderationwillneedtobegivennottobreachtheruleonfundinginadvanceofneed.
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Forgreaterglobalequityinallocationsandcoherence,theHERRalsorecommendsahighercontributiontotheCERFlinkedtoresults,inlinewiththeMARfindingongoodperformance.TheCERFshouldbeenabledtofundpreparedness.
Keepingwiththesameprinciplesappliedabovetothemultilaterals,thebestperformingNGOsshouldgetmorepredictablelong-termfundinglinkedtoperformancethroughstrengthenedProgrammePartnershipArrangements.Andforgreaterequityinallocationsandcoherence,theCBHAandotherregional,nationalandlocalconsortia,astheCERF,shouldgetincreasedfundingonamulti-yearbasis.
Asaresultofmorecorefundingformajoragencies,theFlashAppealsandConsolidatedAppealsshouldbecomeproportionatelysmallerovertimeapartfrominexceptionalcircumstances.DFID’scontributiontothemwillalsogodown.However,DFIDneedstoretainitscommitmenttofundinghumanitarianneedsatthecountrylevel.Often,thisiswhereDFID’sseatatthetableprovidesgreatvaluebyimprovingoverallaideffectiveness,asdemonstratedforexamplebyitsinvolvementintheDRCongopooledfund.
Whatisrequiredisastepchangeinlinkingcountrylevelfundingtoperformance.ThisreviewrecommendsDFIDlinksdemonstratingresultsandimpactcloselytofuturecountry/emergencyfunding.Inreturnforanagreedenvelopeoffundingforanemergency,implementingpartnershavetobeabletodemonstrateresultsandreportaccordingly.
AsDFID’scontributiontoECHOisfixed,DFIDshouldlookforwaysofco-financingECHOresponseswherethiswouldaddvalue.
Fast mobilisation funding and pre-crisis arrangementsAparticularchallengeinfundingsuddenonsetdisastersisthefirstweekafterdisasterstrikes,inwhatwerefertointhisreportasthe‘criticalperiod’.DFID’sabilityandwillingnesstoprovidefastfundingtogetthewheelsrollingandenablingthewidersystemtostartprovidingreliefiswidelypraised.ItisoneofDFID’smostimportantandvaluablecontributionstoemergencyresponses.Itdoescomeatacosthowever.HavingtodecidequicklywhattofundandwhatnotanddealingwithmanydifferentfundingstreamscarrieshightransactioncostsforDFID.Butmoreimportantlythecurrentapproachdoesnotprovidetherightincentivesforagenciestodeliverhighqualityworkforthebestvalue.
Oncefundingisapproved,partnershavefewpressurestoprovideinformationonhowtheirprojectwillachievethedesiredimpact,howitwillbeaccountabletobeneficiariesorhowspecificissuessuchasgenderareaddressed.Importantareasofperformancejustgetbox-ticking.Programmeauditsarerarelycarriedout.
Generally,thewayhumanitarianfundingisallocatedactsasa‘complexincentivesystem’,promotingbothpositiveandnegativebehaviours.Oneoftheperverseincentivesitcreatesisforimplementingagenciestoproposethehighestbeneficiarynumberspossiblefromtheirprogrammes.Henceaboxofwaterpurificationtablets‘servesthousandsoffamilies’,wheninfactthisisonlytrueifeachfamilyreceivesahandful–somethingimpracticalinmostdistributionmodels.Inmanyemergenciesinfacttheseboxesusuallyrotinwarehouses.
Nevertheless,agenciesdoneedsubstantialfundingtomobilise–tohirepeople,transport,purchasegoods,useequipmentandsoon.Thesemobilisationfundsareconnectedtothe‘programmes’andsohighlyspeculative‘proposals’aremadesimplytoallowagenciestomobilise.Onceapprovedhowever,thislocksagenciesintoacourseofactionthatmayonreflection(i.e.whentheyactuallyhavetimetomakeaproperassessment),notbethemostjudiciousone.
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Similarly,whileDFIDasksforgreatercoordination,itoftenfundsimplementingorganisationsindividually,therebycreatingacompetitivedynamicwhichcanerodecollectiveactionandcompromisestheoutcomesfortheaffectedpopulated.
Thenumberofprojectgrantsinemergencieshasalsobecomeoverwhelming,52intheaftermathofCycloneNargisor27afterOperationCastLeadinGaza.Becauseinsuchcomplexemergenciesobjectivesandcontextschangefrequently,DFIDdoesneedvariedfundingmechanismsandaflexibleapproach.Butthesenumbersoffundingstreamsresultinhightransactioncostsofstafftimeandprovideastrainonhumanresourcestoadequatelymonitorandfollowupprojectsfunded.
Toincreaseitsflexibility,whilstsolvingsomeoftheissuesoutlinedabove,DFIDneedsafundingmodalitythatcanprovidefastmobilisationfundinginthefirstweek.Thisshouldbebasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.
Funding recovery from day oneInternationalfundingforemergenciesisusuallysplitintothreelevels.Theimmediatereliefphase,recoveryandreconstruction.The‘criticalperiod’iswheninternationalactorsandmoneypourintocountriesintheaftermathofanemergencytryingtosavelives.Afterthefirstmonth,recoveryneedsassessmentsarecarriedoutandlonger-termhumanitarianprogrammingbegins,targetedatsavinglivelihoods.Adonorpledgingconferenceisheld,typicallywithlessmoneypledgedthanrequired.Andthen,thereconstructionphasestartssometimeduringrecoverywithdifferentfundingcomingonstreamfromtheWorldBankandIMFoftentorepairpre-existinginfrastructure.
Whatthissplitfundingmodelhascausedisafalsedichotomyinseparatingrelieffromrecoveryandreconstruction.Thisreviewhasfoundthatwhataffectedpopulationswantandneedmostisanimmediatestarttolivelihoodsrecovery.Theneatdonorsplitdoesnotworkforthem.Evaluationsshowthatwomen,forexample,drivethemovefromimmediateconcerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingwaystogenerateincomeveryquickly.OrtheexamplefromCycloneNargisinBurmaoftheprivatesectorsellingthepotsandpansthatenabledthepreparationofcookedfoodandareturntonormallongbeforetheinternationalpotsandpansarrived.Bythen,beneficiarieshadincurreddebtunderminingtherecoveryoftheirlivelihoods.Thevalueformoneyofthereliefitemsdeliveredhasbecomequestionable.
Cash-basedapproachestoacceleraterecoveryareonewayoutofthisfalsedichotomyandeasethewayintodevelopmentprogramming,forexampleintocashbasedsocialprotectionschemesthatcanreducevulnerabilityandbuildresilienceforthenextcrisis.Evidenceisbuildingupontheeffectivenessofcashresponses.Itisimportantthattheirimpactisassessedinrelationtothesegoals.
Infrastructurerehabilitationisanotherexamplethereviewfounddoesnotgetenoughattentionintheimmediateaftermathofanemergency.Theun-clearedrubbleinHaitihighlightsthis.Theresultinghighercostsofrecoveringlostlivelihoodswillhavetobepickedupbydevelopmentprogrammes.DFIDneedstorecogniselivelihoodsfundingislegitimatefromdayone.
Delivering smarter direct aidInthebiggestemergencies,DFIDcandeliveraidrapidlythroughitsstandingemergencyteam.Itcanalsodeliverhighqualitypeopleintotheinternationalsystem.Bothofthesecapacitiesarehighlyappreciatedandhavebeenproventomakearealdifference.
Inadditiontotheinternalcapacity,DFIDhasacalldownarrangementwiththeUKfireserviceforSearchandRescue.ThisprovidesforoneUNclassified‘heavy’team(64people,dogsandequipment)tobedeployedwithinhoursofbeingcalled.Onoccasion,
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theUKalsoprovidesmilitaryassetssuchasships,aircraftandhelicopters.InHaiti,DFIDhelpeddeployateamofhighlyqualifiedsurgeonstoworkoncomplicatedtraumawounds.
Alloftheinterventionscitedabovehavevalue.TheSearchandRescueteamsarehighlyvisibleanddemonstratemuchvaluedsolidarity.Theseareespeciallyusefulinthe‘criticalperiod’,lesssoafterwards.FromaUKperspectivesuchdeploymentsofferuniqueopportunitiesforteamstoexperiencearealdisaster–invaluableshouldtherebesomethingsimilarintheUK.ButSearchandRescueunderthismodeliscostlywithover£250,000perlifesavedinHaiti.AndastherearenomajorearthquakefaultlinesclosetotheUK,theycanarrivetoolate.Thesurgicalteamscostaboutonehundredthofthesearchandrescueteams(littleover£2,500)perlifesavedinHaiti.InNigeragenciesspentlittleover£100perchildsavedinfeedingprogrammes.
WhatthismeansisthattheUKneedstobesmartaboutwhereandwhenitdeploystheseassets.Italsoneedstothinkaboutthefuture,asthisreviewmakesclear.TheUKhasotherassetsthatcouldbeharnessedfordisasterresponseas‘nichecapabilities’.Thesame‘resilience’teamsintheUKfireservicehavenuclear,chemicalandbiologicalcapabilities–thesecouldberapidlydeployedincircumstanceswheretheycouldmakearealdifference,ascouldothersciencebasedassets.
WhereUKdirectassistanceconsistentlymakesadifferenceiswiththedeploymentofpersonnel.ThisisoneofthemostcosteffectiveandinfluentialactionsDFIDundertakes.DFIDdeploymentsaretypically‘enablers’–aircrafthandlerstomakesureaidflowsswiftly,informationmanagerstosetupsystemsquickly.Thiscouldeasilybeextended–onoccasionswheretheUKhasdeployedclusterleadsquicklythistoohasmadeahugedifference.DFIDshouldworkwiththeUNtoensureithasthemostneededenablingstaffonstandby(andnotsimplytakerequestsforcheappeoplethroughtraditionalagencystandbyschemes).Itshouldworkwithotherstobetteralignthissurgecapacity(forinstanceNRCandtheBritishRedCross).
DFIDhasalsobuiltanicheexpertisein‘enablingequipment’.Thismightbemachinesforunloadingaircraft,orhighqualitysheltermaterials.Thistooisvaluable,andintheworkrecommendedaroundsupplychainbythisreport,thedirectdeliveryofDFIDshouldberetained.
Working strategically across the UK governmentTheUK’sresponsetointernationaldisastersneedstobecoordinatedacrossgovernmentdepartments.TheresponseisusuallyledbyDFID,andDFIDusuallyprovidesthemajorityofresources.Othergovernmentdepartmentsprovidesupportinwayswheretheyhavedistinctadvantage.ForexampletheFCOandCabinetOfficethroughtheirinformationnetworkscanproviderapidsituationupdatestocomplementthoseofDFID’sownstaffandagencycontacts.TheNHSprovidessurgeonsforresponseinthe‘criticalperiod’.However,evidencefromthereviewsuggestswecandobetteratintegratingtheseseparateinputs.
Thereisforexample,noformalmechanismforconveningallgovernmentdepartmentsinresponsetoaninternationalemergency.ArrangementsbyDFIDaread hocanddepartmentsarecalledinasandwhenDFIDconsidersthereisaneedforwidersupport.Theinformalityofthisarrangementmeansthattherightpeoplearenotalwaysavailableatshortnoticetoattendmeetings.Morejuniorstaffmayrepresenttheirdepartmentthanisideal.Thesepeoplemaynotbeofsufficientsenioritytotakedecisions,andcontinuityofstaffwhoattendmeetingsisnotmaintained.Thiscanleadtoalackofeffectivecommunicationbetweendifferentdepartmentsandafailuretoachieveresults.ForexampletheMODchainofcommandrequiressomeoneoftherightranktoapprovetheuseofanaircraftforreliefsupplies.Iftherightpersonisnotatthemeetingwhenitisrequested,thedecisioncannotbetakenandtimeislost.DFIDmaylookelsewherefortransport.
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ThereviewunderstandsthatothergovernmentdepartmentsarekeentoprovidesupportinemergenciesandconsidertheyhavemoretocontributethanDFIDisawareof.Thisisparticularlythecaseifotherdepartmentsaregivenenoughtimetoplanandpreparetheirresponse.Incaseswheremoreformalcoordinationarrangementshavebeenmade,crossgovernmentactionhasbeenmoreeffective.ForexampletheresponsetoCycloneNargisinBurma,2008includedthecreationofacross-Whitehallteamforplanningjointresponseoptions.Theresultwasaneffectivebodymadeupofpeopleoftherightsenioritywhowereabletomakedecisionsandactrapidly.
TheNationalSecurityCouncilisthenewmechanismunderwhichcross-governmentdepartmentsareconvenedundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister.AsimilarbodythatcoulddrawtogethergovernmentdepartmentsundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister,chairedbyDFIDandconstitutedunderstricthumanitarianprincipleswouldprovidethenecessarycoordination.AwayshouldbefoundthroughtheexistingNationalSecurityCouncilmechanismtoconveneastandingcommitteeonhumanitarianemergencyresponsetodothis.
Recommendations
DFID should:
28 Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:
• Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.
• Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooledfundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHAandWAHRF.
29 Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:
• ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.UsetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthisCriticalPeriod.
• EnsurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyaftertheCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.
• Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsbyprovidingitinstages.
30 Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformancethroughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodicprogrammeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.
31 Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way where they add value:
• OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.
• Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes.
• Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreatssuchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.
32 ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternationalsystem.
33 Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformegaemergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.
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5.3 Changing the structure, shifting resources
HumanitarianemergencyresponsehashistoricallybeenundersupportedwithinDFID.ThehumanitariancadrewasonlyrecentlyformedandisthesmallestofDFID’stechnicalnetworksbyamargin.Itcurrentlystandsat12peopleglobally,despitehumanitarianspendingconstituting8%ofoverseasdevelopmentaid(ODA)annually.TheConflict,HumanitarianandSecurityTeam(CHASE)managesallhumanitarianissues,includingresponse.Astheconflictportfolioofworkincreases,themanagerialloadhasbecomeincreasinglyuntenable.Despitealargeresearchbudget,DFIDdoesnotsupportsignificanthumanitarianresearch.
Theemergency(rapid)responsecapabilityhasbeenoutsourcedonathreeyearrollingcontractualbasis.Thecontractcurrentlyprovidesfor27staffsharedwiththeStabilisationUnit.Therearesixdedicatedhumanitarianstaffonthecontract.Italsopaysforasignificantlogisticalstandingcapacity–cars,communications,specialistdeploymentequipmentandsoon.ThiscapabilityiscalledtheOperationsTeam(OT)andisco-locatedwithCHASE,withOTstaffintegratedintotheDFIDmainoffice.WhilsttheinternationalreputationoftheOTisextremelyhigh(andmuchenvied),inrecentyearscorporateworkhasbeenincreasinglyundertakenbytheteamasaresultoflackofcapacitywithinDFID.
ThelackofcapacitywithinbothCHASEandOThasmeantclear,strategicdirectionhasbeenmissing,astheworkhasbeenalmostconstant‘fire-fighting’.Theimpactofsuccessivelarge-scaleemergencieshasbeentostretchresourcesstillfurther.ThislackofstrategyisnotconfinedtoCHASE.HumanitarianactionisspreadacrossDFIDinalargelyunconnectedandad hocfashion,andthereisnoseniorchampion.UntilrecentlytherewasaseparateAfricaConflictandHumanitarianUnit(ACHU)withinAfricadivision.ACHUoversawanAfricaemergencyreservefundandhadnoformalconnectionwithCHASE.Countryofficescanchoosewhethertohavehumanitarianadvisors,eveninhigh-risksituations(Pakistanhadaconflictadvisorwithresponsibilityforhumanitarianbutnoexperienceinthisarea).
Thedisparateandneglectedstructuredoesnotonlyhaveaneffectonoverallstrategy,ithasledtoaschismbetweenthepolicyfunctionandtheresponsemechanisms.ThesmallteamofhumanitarianpolicyadvisorscentrallyholdlongtermfundingrelationshipswithbigagencieslikeUNICEFandUNHCR,butitistheOTstaffthatseehowtheseagenciesperforminsuccessiveemergencies.Thishasledtomixedmessagesandlostopportunities.
PartnersremainhighlypositiveaboutDFIDandvalueboththequalityofthepersonnelanditsabilitytoreactquicklyandflexibly.ThereisdemandforDFIDtobepresentinlarge-scaleemergenciesasitsabilitytoinfluencetheoverallstrategyismuchvalued.Thereisalsodemandforacontinuedcapacitytodeploybothpeopleandgoodsintotheinternationalsystematshortnotice.
Inparalleltothisreview,DFIDalsoundertookabilateralaidreview(BAR)thataskedcountryofficestopredicttheirexpenditureforthenextfewyears.Inthisexercisehumanitarianspendwasforecasttofall,orrathercountryofficesdidnotmakeabidforhumanitarianresourcestorise.Thismightreflectanaturaloptimism–thatthingswillgetbetterorthatdevelopmentgainswillmeantheimpactofhumanitarianemergencieswillbediminished.However,itisoutofstepwithmostforecastsofneedandmayalsoreflectadesire‘nottobeinvolved’;anideathatDFID’scorebusinessisdevelopmentandthathumanitarianemergenciesareanunwelcomedistraction.ItmayalsoreflectanassumptionbycountryofficesthatCHASEwillrespondifthereisanemergencyandtheresourceswillbemadeavailablecentrally.
Tosomeextentthisassumptioniscorrect.Thisreviewconcludesthatforoverwhelminglylargeemergencies,‘megaemergencies’,responseshouldbeledfrom
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London.TheintenseinterestfromacrossgovernmentandfromthepublicmeansthatitisnecessaryforLondontoleadonstrategy.Wherethereisacountryofficetheyshouldleadondelivery,althoughDFIDshouldalsooperatea‘stepaside’policysimilartothatbeingadvocatedwiththeUN,wherebyitensuresthatdeliveryisledwiththerequisitelevelofexperience.Formediumandsmall-scaledisastersthecountryofficesarewellplacedtolead,perhapswithsometechnicalorlogisticalsupportfromCHASE.
ItalsomeansthatDFIDneedstomakebettersenseofitsinternalstructureandstrategy–reflectingtheimportanceofitshumanitarianworkinstructure,capacityandresourcesaswellasinrhetoric.IfbuildingresilienceistobecomeacorepartofDFID’sworkasthisreviewsuggests,thenbothseniormanagementandthecountryofficeswillneedtoreflectthisinthewaytheyworkandplan.IftheperformanceoftheinternationalsystemistrulytobeimprovedthenDFIDwillneedtomakebetteruseof(andincrease)itshumanitarianstaffanditsoperationsteam,andwillneedtoexpandthiscapability.IfDFIDisgoingtopromoteinnovation,buildnewpartnershipsandenablenewnetworksofhumanitarianpolicyandpractice,thenitwillneedtobebetterintegrateditself,usingitspolicydivisiontopromoteresearchandevidence,itscountryofficestoworkwithgovernmentsandUKmissionstoworkwithothernations.
Managing the responseHumanitarianemergenciesarechaoticandfastmoving.Theyneedexperiencedmanagerswithclearauthoritytobeincharge.
DFIDhasasystemof‘responsemanagement’butitisdiluted.ThisisduetotheseparationofthecontractedoutOperationsTeamfromthemanagementofCHASE.Partlyalsoitisbecausethisskillhasnotbeenprioritised.Thenewsystemmusthaveexperiencedresponsemanagerswithdelegatedauthority.
Aneffectiveresponserequiresclearlinesofauthorityandresponsibility,andaclearstrategy.Theproductionofawiderangingstrategyincludingfunding,lobbying,cross-Whitehallworkandanydirectassistance,shouldbeapriorityfortheresponsemanagement.Theownershipoftheresponsestrategyshouldbeatasufficientlyseniorlevel.InamegaemergencythiswouldbeatDirectororDirectorGenerallevel.
AcomparativeadvantagethatDFIDhaslongenjoyedisthequalityofitsadvisorycadre.ThereisaneedforDFIDhumanitarianadvisorstobedeployedtoemergencies.Theycanhelpshapetheresponse,andsafeguardUKtaxpayerinvestments.TheycanalsoprovidevaluableanalysisandinsighttoLondon.Thisisnottruejustinmega-emergenciesbutalsoinemergingcrisesandconflict.
Managing riskHumanitarianemergenciesarehigh-riskenvironments.Theyarechaoticanduncertainanddecision-makinghastoberapid.Thereismorechanceofgettingthingswrong.Theremustbeagreatertoleranceforriskinsuchsituation.
Butthereareoftengreaterriskswithdoingnothing,orrespondingtooslowly.Humanitarianemergenciesarehighriskbecausetheyinvolvelifeordeathsituations.Slowdecision-making,ornotreacting,canleadtolossofbothlivesandopportunities.Politicallythereislessriskinamessyresponse,oranaccusationofwaste,thanbeingaccusedoflettingpeopledie.
Theconsequencesofthisarethatproceduresneedtobestreamlinedforhumanitarianemergencies,anddecision-makingneedstobedelegated.Empoweringthosewiththeinformationtomakeadecision,andtoimplementitfastisessential.HistoricallythishasbeenacknowledgedwithinDFIDandprocedureshavebeenmodified.Thistraditionneedstocontinue.
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Thisreviewsetsoutseveralmeasuresforimprovingaccountabilityintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.Connectedtothisistherequirementforagenciestodemonstrateresults,andprovetheyaregoodvalueformoney.ButthiscannotcomeattheexpenseofrapidresponseorifDFIDhumanitarianstafffeelafraidtomakedecisions.
Recommendations
DFID should:
34 Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its move to being a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require:
• RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed.
• Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield.
• Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperiencedresponsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.
• Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.
35 Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedtosupportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.
5.4 Driving results and value for money
Thehumanitariansectorhastraditionallybeenreluctanttocollect,systematiseandshareevidenceonwhatworks,whatdoesnotandwhy.Therehasbeenalackofdemandforthiskindofinformation,andsometimesaninabilitytofindanswers.ThereasonsarelaidoutintheImpactsectionabove.
Fundingdecisionsarenotroutinelybasedonevidence.Andwhenfundingdecisionsarebasedonevidenceofresults,itisoutputsratherthanimpactthatarebeingconsidered.
Withoutgreaterclarityonresults(bothonwhatistheevidenceandwhatisthehumanitarianobjective),itisnoteasytodeterminethevalueformoneyofhumanitarianactions.Andithasrarelybeentried.
Valueformoneyisabouttheoptimaluseofresourcestoachievetheintendedoutcomes.Itisabouttheoptimumcombinationofcostsandqualityofthegoodsandservicestomeettheneedsofbeneficiaries.AsinallotherareasofHMGspending,itisnotjustaboutthelowestcost.
Inahumanitarianresponse,togetvalueformoney,speedisoftheessence.Thereisnovalueinaresponsethatcomestoolate.Liveswillbelost.Therisksoflateornon-interventionneedtobeconsidered.Therefore,timelinessorspeedneedstobeaddedintotheequationonvalueformoney.
ThefigurebelowfromtheNationalAuditOfficeshowstheresultschainthroughitsdarkbluearrows.Andthecostsattachedtotheresultsthroughitslightbluesquares.Valueformoneyanalysishastoincludethiswholechain.
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Value for money
Economy
Costs (£) Inputs Outputs Outcomes
Efficiency Value for money
Qualitative
Qualitative
Figure6: Value for Money: Costs and results, National Audit Office.
Duringaresponse,therelativeimportanceofthethreekeycomponents,cost,qualityandspeed,hastochangeifthehumanitarianimperativeofsavinglivesistheprinciple.IntheCriticalPeriod,itisspeedthatshouldcountthemost,because,inthisphasespeedsaveslives.Costandqualitythenincreaseinimportancewithtime.
SinceJanuary2011,allproposalsforDFIDfundingmustbeaccompaniedbyaBusinessCase,whichsetsouttheneed,justificationandaffordabilityofanintervention.35Ithasnotbeendevisedthoughforcompletingwithinhoursofadisasterhittingwheninformationisscarceandpeoplearedying.AsDFID’scomparativeadvantageisfastresponse,partnerslooktoDFIDimmediatelyforfunding.
Whilethereviewrecommendsmoreworkonevidenceofwhatworksandwhatdoesnotandcost-effectivenessinhumanitarianaction,thisworkislessrelevantintheCriticalPeriod.However,post-actionreviewsandevaluationscanhelpgreatlytoinformfuturedecisionmakingaboutdeliverypartnersandmechanismseveninthecriticalperiod,throughprequalificationofpartners(seeChangingthefundingmodelinsection5.2).
Valueformoneyinaresponsecanbestbeachievedthroughafocusonachievingresultswithallresources.Beitfromotherdonors,domesticresourcesortheprivatesector.DFID’sresourcesinaneffectivesystemcanachievemuchgreatervalueformoneythaninanineffectivesystem.DFID’simportantroleinmakingthesystemmoreeffective,aslaidoutthroughoutthisreport,isthereforelikelytohavethegreatestimpactonvalueformoney.
InnovationisanotherareawhereDFIDinvestmentcouldreapsubstantialgainsinvalueformoneyinthefuture.DFID’sinvestmentinCommunity-BasedTherapeuticcare(CTC)isagoodexamplewhichhasmadethetreatmentofmalnourishedpeopleinmajoremergenciesmorecost-effectivethantraditionaltherapies.Witharelativelyhighfixedinitialcost,CTCcantreatseveralthousandmalnourishedpeoplewithlittlemorethantheextracostsoffoodandmedicine.Othersubstantialcoststothecommunity(suchastravelcostsandopportunitycostsofbeinginfull-timecare)havealsoreducedsignificantly.
Itshouldnotbeforgottenthatbuildingresilienceisoftenthebestmeansofprovidingvalueformoney.Itisestimatedthat£1inpreventionsaves£4inresponse(seesection4.2).AstheIFRCAnnualreport2008says:‘thereisnoeconomicsenseinspendingmoneyonemergencyresponsealone.Yearsofinvestmentcandisappearinminutesif
35 ThisBusinessCasemodelisbasedonHMTreasuryguidanceandensuresconsistencyacrossUKgovernmentdepartments.
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riskreductionandpreventionareignored.’36ThisiswhyDFID’sapproachtohumanitarianworkneedstohavepreventionatitscore.
Outcomes and effectivenessThesectiononimpactsetsouttheimportanceofbeingcleareraboutdesiredoutcomesandimpactandmeasuringthem.ButassessingtheoutcomesofDFID’sfundingandinfluencingisfarmorecomplexthanmeasuringoutputs.Andquantitativeassessmentsareastepmoredifficultthanqualitativeones.
JudgingfromthequalitativeassessmentsmadeinevaluationsofDFID’sresponseefforts,DFIDoftengetsitright.Fundingisfast,flexible,goestothesectorswheretheneedisgreatestandenablesotherpartsofthesystemtobecomemoreeffective.Thisshouldleadtobetteroutcomesfortheaffectedpopulation.Howexactlyitdoesthat,atwhatcostandwhatwouldhappenwithoutDFID’ssupporthoweverisoftennotclear.Costandbenefitsarerarelyquantified.
DFIDismakingeffortsonvariousfrontstorectifythis.Internally,DFIDPakistan,forexample,hasstartedpilotinganapproachtobetteroutcomeassessmentandunitcostanalysis.DFIDKenyaandSomaliaarebuildingupadatabaseofhumanitarianindicatorsandcosts.Externally,DFIDhassetuptheIndependentCommissionforAidImpact,abodythatwillevaluateDFID’swork,includingindisasterresponse,withafocusinimpact.Thereviewwelcomesthisinitiative.
Outputs and efficiencyOutputsarethefirstresultsinthechain.Anyprojectorprogrammehastobeabletoshowwhattheintendedoutputsareandlaterwhattherealoutputswere.Therearehowever,twoproblemswithreportingoutputresults.First,outputscanonlybeproxiesforimpactandcangetitwrong.Second,outputs,ascurrentlyreportedinprojectdocuments,cannoteasilybecomparedoraggregated.HenceitisdifficulttojudgetheefficiencyofimplementingpartnersandDFID’sfunding.
ThefollowingareexamplesofoutputsfromthePakistanfloodsresponse:
• Wheatandvegetableseeds,fertiliser,animalstockfeed,andveterinaryservicestomorethan115,000ruralfamiliestoavoidfurtherlossofanimalsanddependencyonfoodaidforthenextyearormore.
• Toiletsandsanitationforalmost500,000people.
Thenumberssoundimpressive,buttheydonotsayiftheseedsandfertiliserscameintimefortheplantingseason.Ifthetimingwaswrong,theimpactwouldnothavebeenthedesiredoneofrecovery.Theyalsodonotshowifthetoiletswereplacedandlitinsuchawayastobegendersensitive.Qualityandspeed–twokeyparametersofhumanitarianeffectiveness–cannotbeassessedbyoutputmeasurement.Thereisadangerbyfocusingononeareaoftheresultschainofhittingthetargetbutmissingthepoint.
Comparisonsbetweencostsofoutputsandhencethecostefficiencyofimplementingpartners,arecurrentlyclosetoimpossible.
• Outputsarenotstandardised(evenwithinsectors)withtheresultthatcomparingisoftenlikeappleswithpears.
• Somebenefitsaredifficulttomeasure,e.g.inprotectionanddifferentinterventionshavedifferentbenefits–theydonotalladdressthesameneed,e.g.cash-for-workversuspsychosocialsupport.
36 IFRCannualreport2008,p14;HowardKunreuther,November2010;otherstudiesestimateevenhighercostbenefitratios.
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• Theinformationcurrentlyreceivedfromimplementingpartnerscangivearoughindicationofwhatthingscost.Itcannotgivemuchmorethough.
• Anycomparisonsofcostswouldbemisleadingwithoutknowingtheexactcircumstancesoftheactions,includingtargetingofdifferentpopulationgroups,levelofsecurityrisk,ortiming.
Onlywhenoutputsarethesame,isitpossibletocarryoutananalysistoseewhichinterventionisthemostcost-efficient.
Inputs and economyInputsareeasytoidentifyandquantify.Allbudgetsofimplementingpartnersshowwhatinputsareusedatwhatcost.Inputsrangefrommaterialsandlogistics,personnelandpersonnelsupport(includingsecurityforpersonnel)toindirectsupportcosts(theoverheads).
Comparingunitcostsofinputsbetweenimplementingpartnersoracrossemergenciesisrelativelyeasy.Butthecomparisonsdonotmakesenseifthecontextisnottakenintoaccountasexplainedintheoutputsection.Aprojectinacomplexemergencywithsecurityimplicationswillhavegreatersecuritycoststopersonnelattachedthananotheroneinanaturaldisasterzone.Aprojecttargetingdifficulttoreachpopulationswillhaveveryjustifiablygreaterlogisticscoststhanaprojectinanurbaneasy-to-reachenvironment.
LookingthroughbudgetsofDFIDimplementingpartners,itisobviousthatcostscandiffersignificantly,notalwaysforjustifiablereasons.AnagencyinthePakistanfloodresponseforexamplewantedtochargeDFID£1millionmoreforthesamenon-fooditemsdeliveredtothesameplacebutwithaonemonthtimedelaythanifDFIDhadprocuredtheitemsitself.Withthis£1million,shelterforanadditional10,000familiescouldhavebeenpurchasedanddeliveredamonthearlier.
The global supply chainAslogisticscanaccountforasmuchas80%37oftheeffortofhumanitarianorganisationsduringareliefoperation,theglobalsupplychainwarrantsspecialconsideration.
IfDFIDwantstoimproveitsabilitytorespondattherighttimefortherightpriceandwiththeappropriatequality,supplychainmanagementneedstoberecognisedasanintegralpartofpreparednessandresponse.
End-to-endsupplychainmanagementinahumanitarianresponseincludesprocurement,stockpilemanagement,qualityandcostcontrol,managingproductioncapacity,internationalmovement,coordinationwithotheragenciesanddeliverytothebeneficiaries.
ManyINGOshavelosttheirsupplychainmanagementcapabilitiesthroughthechangeintheirfocusfromdirectdeliverytoadvocacyoverthelastdecade.Thiscapabilitylossonthedevelopmentsideofoperationshastranslateddirectlyintoalossonthehumanitarianresponseside.EvaluationsofNGOresponseshaveshownthatmistakesareroutinelymadealongthesupplychain.
UNagenciesontheotherhandhavesignificantprocurementandlogisticsdepartmentsbuttheyareconstrainedbyantiquatedprocurementrules,differentdonorrequirementsandUNbureaucracy.
Keyconcernsthatimpactnegativelyontheaffectedpopulationare:
37 Trunick(2005).
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DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFID
• Qualityofnon-fooditemsbeingsubstandard.Itisestimatedthat70%ofthemillionplussheetsprovidedtoHaitiaftertheearthquakeneededreplacingafter9months.Atacost(withoutfreight)ofaround£10asheetthatmeans£7millionwasspentoncommodities,whichhaveatbestlasted9months.
• Reliefitemsarenotalwayswhatthebeneficiariesmostneedorarrivetoolate.AfterCycloneNargisinBurma,womengotintodebtbecausetheypurchasedreliefitemslongbeforetheinternationalresponsereachedthem.BlanketsprovidedintheaftermathoftheSamanganearthquakeinAfghanistanweretoothinfortheclimate.
• Lackofpreparednesscanleadtomultiplesoftransportcostsnecessary(especiallyairversusseatransport).
• Becauseoflimitedsupplysidecapacityinanemergency,pricesgoupandqualitydecreases.Thiscanbeovercomebybuildingupthesupplierbaseinadvanceandcollaboratingonqualitystandardsandspecifications,
Whilstdecreasingtheseinefficienciesshouldbeseenasaprioritynow,DFIDhastorecognisethattheglobalsupplychainislikelytochangesoonerorlater.Ifforexamplecashresponsesbecomeagame-changerinhumanitarianresponse,thiswillhaveimportantimplications.Internationalprocurementandtransportwilldecrease.Afocusonmorelocalprocurement,asincreasinglydonebyWFP,willalsochangethenatureofthetraditionalsupplychain.
Recommendations
DFID should:
36 Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.
37 EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeofhumanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.
38 Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID’sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupplychainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses.Basedonthefindings,workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementingpartnerstoalignsupplychainpractices.
5.5 Getting the message across
ThereisstrongpublicsupportfortheUKresponsetodisastersandemergenciesindevelopingcountries38.ButhistoricallyDFIDhasnotusedtheseopportunitiestotalkaboutitswork.WithanaidbudgetunderattackfromsomequartersandquestionsaboutfailureinHaiti,DFIDneedstogetbetteratcommunicatingthegenerallyexcellentworkitdoes.
Thecommunicationsenvironmentischanging.CommunitiesintheUKareoftenindependentlylinkedtoaffectedpopulations,throughdiasporas,faithbasedgroupsandpartnerships.Itisnolongerpossible,ordesirabletoadoptabroadcastapproachtocommunicationswork.Domesticmediacoverageisincreasinglyhostiletothe
38 93%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘WhereverpossibletheUKgovernmentshouldresponddirectlytodisastersandemergenciesindevelopingcountries’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.
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government’sringfencedaidbudget,andtherearegreaterexpectationsaroundthespeedandavailabilityofaccurateinformationaboutDFID’swork.
HumanitariandisastersnaturallyattracthighlevelsofmediaattentionintheUK,andthepublicarereadytobeengaged.TherelationshipbetweenthemediaandNGOsisacomplexone.ThemediaoftenreliesonNGOsforaccessandinformationatthesametimeasseeingitsroletoholdthemtoaccount.IfanNGOhelpsajournalistreachacommunitythatisreceivingsupportduringaresponse,thejournalistislikelytogofurthertofindacommunitythathasbeenoverlookedtopresentthestoryofaidnotgettingtothosewhoneedit39.
UsingitsrelativeindependencefromthisrelationshipDFIDcanmakegeneralcommentsonthecontextandnatureofthedisasterandtheplannedresponse.Itisabletoreferneutrallytotheworkofothers,tosecureauniquepositionincommunicatingtotheUKpublic.Butthispositioncanonlybeexploitedifitcanofferanauthoritativevoiceonthegroundfromtheoutsetofaresponse.
Thereisalsoaneedtoemployalongertermstrategicapproachtohelpshareabetterunderstandingabouthowanemergencyresponseworks–andwhyitisimportant.
ThisneedsastrongandconsistentnarrativetoenablethepublictounderstandthatdifferentdisastersandemergenciesneedadifferentresponsefromtheUK–includingexplanationofhumanitarianpolicy,howtheinternationalcommunityisrespondingandtherangeofresponsestomeetneeds.Intimethiswillhelpchallengetheperceptionthataid,developmentandhumanitarianresponseisoneandthesame.
TheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteewillputallnewspendingon-line.Thiswillmakedetailedinformationofeachemergencyresponseavailable.Aproactiveandstrategicapproachtopubliccommunicationswork(mediaandnon-media)willbeneededtoputthisinformationincontext.
Foranemergencyresponse,strategy,plansandexpectedresultsneedtobereadilyavailable.EarlystatementsonUK’splansandobjectivestoresponseshouldbepostedon-lineassoonaspossible.Thesecanbedevelopedastheresponseprogressesandshouldcomplementmediaannouncementsonfundingallocations.
ButwhereconcernsabouteffectivenessandcorruptionaregenerallyhighthereviewpublicsurveyshowedsupportforDFID’sresponsedidn’tcarrythesamelevelsofconcernaboutwasteandcorruptionthathavebeenreflectedinothersurveys40.ItalsoshowedthatthepublicfeelpleasedwhentheyhearabouttheUKgovernment’sresponse41alongwithadesiretoknowmore42.AndmorerecentresearchcommissionedbyPlanUKreportedthat90%ofrespondentsrecalledrecentdisastersinHaitiorPakistan,and36%werepromptedtodonate43.ThispresentsDFIDwithaclearopportunitytobringitsworktotheattentionofanalreadyengagedpublic–oneofitsbestchancestoreachabroadUKpublicisthroughcommunicationsarounditsresponsetorapidonsetdisasters.
39 PlanUK:Unnaturaldisasters:compassionversuscomplexityinthemedia’sreportingofhumanitarianemergencies.MediaSymposium:Feb2011.
40 60%ofrespondentsdisagreedorstronglydisagreedwiththestatement‘Emergencyaidiswastedthroughinefficiencyandcorruption,andthemoneyandsupportdoesn’tgettothepeolewhoreallyneedit’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.
41 98%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘IfeelpleasedwhenIhearthattheUKgovernmentishelpingplayapartinaninternationalresponsetoadisasterofemergency’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011.
42 94%ofrespondentsstronglyagreedoragreedwiththestatement‘TheUKgovernmentshoulddomoretoexplaintothepublichowitsworkishelpingtomeettheneedsofpeopleaffectedbyinternationaldisastersandemergencies’.HERRon-linepublicsurvey:Feb2011
43 PlanUK:Unnaturaldisasters:compassionversuscomplexityinthemedia’sreportingofhumanitarianemergencies.ComRes:Feb2011.
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DeliveringtransformationalchangeinDFID
Governmentrestrictionsonspendingmeansthatalongsidetraditionalbroadcastandprintmediaactivity,communicationsthroughDFID’sownwebsiteandonlinepresenceisvitaltothesuccessofitscommunicationstrategy.Thisworkhasbeendevelopingwell:e-bulletins,blogs,tweets,YouTube,FacebookandFlickrpagespresentDFID’sworktoanengagedpublic.CommunicationsactivityaroundtheUK’sresponsetomeethumanitarianneedsinGazafollowingOperationCastLead,andtheon-lineFloodMonitorshowingclearlywhereandhowUKAidishelpingpeopleaffectedbythefloodsinPakistan44,hasshownDFID’scommunicationsworkaroundanemergencyresponseatitsbest.
Thoseaffectedbydisasterareincreasinglyabletoprovideinformationandcontributetoassessmentofneedaswellascallingdonorsandtheinternationalcommunitydirectlytoaccountviaonlinechannelsmeansevengreaterneedforcontinuedbuildingofitsonlineprocess.
Recommendations
DFID should:
39 Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK’s emergency response, and resource it accordingly.
• Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningofaresponse.
• MakeDFID’shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymorevisiblethroughDFID’swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses.Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbesupportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID’sbehalf.
• Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.
• Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistentnarrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceofanemergencyresponse.
40 Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.
44 www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Pakistan/Pakistan-Floods-Monitor/
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6. RecommendationsAnticipation
1 Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.
2 MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.
3 Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.
Resilience
4 Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.
5 Promote national response capacities of both governments and civil society in at risk countries including:
•Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies.
•Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms.
•Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue.
•ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties.
•Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountryleveltosupportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceandimprovedisasterresponse.
Leadership
6 Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including;
•Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea‘stepaside’systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicandoperationallevel.
• EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingtheinternationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.
•WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternationalsystem,includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.
•WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalentmanagementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.
•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesinmanagement,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaffavailableforrapiddeployment.
•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipoftheclustersystem.
7 DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.Thisshouldinclude;
•Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership.
•TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterpronecountries.
• Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskillsdevelopment
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Recommendations
Innovation
8 Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.
9 Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.
10 Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagementanddisplay.
11 Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology,andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.
12 Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationandwhereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted.
Accountability
13 Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.
14 Promote the development of robust impact assessments.
15 Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiaryaccountability.
16 Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.
17 Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfundingdecisions.
Partnership
18 Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (in particular China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).
19 Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral. In particular it should:
• EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityofco-financing.
•WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformofOCHAandthesystemmorewidely.
20 WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.
21 EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareaswhereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness,includingatthecountrylevel.
22 UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswheretheyareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffercapacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives.
23 WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.
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Humanitarian space
24 Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.
25 Ensurefundingismadeavailableforsecurityandriskmanagementforhumanitarianworkers.
Changing the policy
26 Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.
27 Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when and how.Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.
Delivering differently
28 Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:
• Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.
• Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooledfundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHAandWAHRF.
29 Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:
•ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.UsetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthisCriticalPeriod.
• EnsurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyaftertheCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.
• Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsbyprovidingitinstages.
30 Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformancethroughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodicprogrammeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.
31 Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way concentrating on those areas where DFID or the UK are able to add value:
•OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.
• Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes.
• Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreatssuchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.
32 ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternationalsystem.
33 Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformegaemergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.
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Recommendations
Changing the structure, shifting resources
34 Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its importance as a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require
•RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed.
• Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield.
• Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperiencedresponsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.
• Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.
35 Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedtosupportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.
Driving results and value for money
36 Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.
37 EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeofhumanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.
38 Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID’sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupplychainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses.Workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementingpartnerstoalignsupplychainpractices.
Getting the message out
39 Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK’s emergency response, and resource it accordingly.
• Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningofaresponse.
•MakeDFID’shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymorevisiblethroughDFID’swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses.Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbesupportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID’sbehalf.
•Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.
•Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistentnarrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceofanemergencyresponse.
40 Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.
PublishedbytheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview
March2011
Chair:Lord(Paddy)Ashdown
Director:RossMountain
SeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;CarolynMiller;DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;GordonConway;JodaSilva;MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg;SueWardell;YaseminAysan.
HumanitarianReviewTeamSecretariat:MelindaSimmons;LewisSida;RachelKessler;SophiePongracz;LouisaBrewin;DavidPratt;MalcolmRidout;RosTendler.
Thisreportisavailableonline:www.dfid.gov.uk/emergency-response-review