How much Security for Switching a Light Bulb –The SOA Way

Sebastian Unger,Stefan Pfeiffer, Dirk Timmermann

University of Rostock, Germany

Institute of Applied Microelectronics and Computer Engineering

Motivation

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Q: What will you get from this presentation (or from reading the paper)?

Motivation

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Motivation

Q: What will you get from this presentation (or from reading the paper)?

A: Introduction to problems with security for distributed embedded devices

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Agenda

• Introductive scenario and derived key

features

• State of the art and problem statements

• Outlook

• Conclusion

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Scenario: Light Bulbs – The classical approach

light bulbs

switches

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Scenario: Security Key Features

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Scenario: Security Key Features

Authenticity

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Scenario: Security Key Features

Authenticity

Integrity

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Scenario: Security Key Features

Authenticity

Integrity

Confidentiality

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Scenario: Security Key Features

Authenticity

Integrity

Confidentiality

Authorization

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Scenario: Security Key Features

Authenticity

Integrity

Confidentiality

Authorization

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Scenario: Light Bulbs – The IoT approach

light bulbs

switches

SOA engine

digitalSTROM-module

SOA engine

PLC-module

Internet /LAN

SOA engine

smart-phone

SOA engine

PC

SOA engine

IoT wall-switch

ZigBEE

digitalSTROMIEEE 802.15.4

PLC

WiFi

Ethernet

6LoWPAN-module

SOA engine

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication

Securely remove devices from network

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication

Securely remove devices from network

Let participants gather security information about each other

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication

Securely remove devices from network

Let participants gather security information about each other

Plus: all this across different trust domains

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Scenario: Security Key Features IoT

Seemless integration of new devices, includes negotiation of suitable authentication

Securely remove devices from network

Let participants gather security information about each other

Plus: all this across different trust domains

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Problem Statement

Development of (new) security concepts is cumbersome and expensive

Technology designers tend to fall back on existing security techniques (even, if they are not ideal)

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Terminology

What are those techniques and why are the not ideal?

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MAC Layer Security

subnet subnet

Same key for everyone

- or -

Different key for everyone

MACLayer

Security ≙router

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IP Sec

Transport ModeTunnel Mode

subnet subnet

routernode IPSec Gateway

IPSec is complex!

Vendor A Vendor B

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Transport Layer Security (TLS aka. SSL)

TLS

PHYMAC

Internet

TransportApplication

TCP!

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Conclusion Network Stack Security

• Existing basic security mechanisms not ideal for embedded

devices

• Solve single aspects only and are not suitable for embedded

devices

Security should be covered on application layer

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Cooltown[1] Amigo[2]

Hydra/Linksmart[3]

PEIS[4]

SM4ALL[5]

ubiSOAP(PLASTIC)[6]

PECES[7]

MundoCore[9]

GREEN[8]

Gaia[10]

MobiPADS[11]

iCOCOA[12]PACE[13]

Cooltown[1]

PEIS[4]

SM4ALL[5]MundoCore[9]

GREEN[8]MobiPADS[11]

iCOCOA[12]PACE[13]

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Application Layer Security: Academic Reserach Projects

Conclusion Application Layer Security

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• Security often not considered at all

• If considered, then…

… employed technologies not suitable for embedded devices

… only single issues solved

No interoperability between approaches

Web Services

WS-Security Suite

Do not reinvent the wheel

Instead:

• Find existing solution from different domain

• isolate core concepts

• develop methodology to transport core

concepts to domain of embedded devices

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Outlook: Future Work

Web ServicesDevices Profile for

WS-Security SuiteDevices Profile for

Do not reinvent the wheel

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Outlook: Future Work

• Communication technology for distributed systems

• Base technology (Web Services) already adapted to embedded

devices (DPWS)

• WS Security suite offers all requested core features (message and

connection level security, trust and authorization brokering, …)

• Abstract Web Services to create security concept for any service-

oriented communication technology

• Open technology fosters interoperability

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Future Work in Detail

• Although often employed, existing basic technologies

(IPSec, TLS, …) not ideal

• Many approaches on application layer security exist but

• they often solve single aspects only

• are not interoperable

Future WS Compact Security has the potential to form a basis for an

interoperable security concept for distributed embedded devices

(disregarding the base technology)

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Conclusion

Bibliography (1)

[1] Barton, John; Kindberg, Tim: The Cooltown User Experience / Hewlett Packard Laboratories Palo Alto. 2001. Technical

Report

[2] IST Amigo Project: Ambient Intelligence for the networked home environment (Project Description). September 2004

[3] Eisenhauer, M.; Rosengren, P.; Antolin, P.: A Development Platform for Integrating Wireless Devices and Sensors into

Ambient Intelligence Systems. SECON Workshops 2009

[4] Saffiotti, A. et al.: The PEIS-Ecology Project: vision and results. In: IEEE/RSJ Int. Conf. on Intelligent Robots and

Systems (IROS). 2008

[5] Baldoni, R.: An Embedded Middleware Platform for Pervasive and Immersive Environments for-All. SECON

Workshops 2009

[6] PLASTIC Consortium: A B3G Service Platform: The IST PLASTIC Projects. Technical Report

[7] Handte, M. et al.: D4.1 Secure Middleware Specification - Version 1.4 / Peces - Pervasive computing in embedded

systems. 2010. Technical Report

08/30/2012 Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock – sebastian.unger@uni-rostock.de 32

Bibliography (2)

[8] Sivaharan, T et al.: GREEN: A Configurable and Re-Configurable Publish-Subscribe Middleware for Pervasive

Computing. In: Building 3760 LNCS (2005)

[9] Aitenbichler, M. et al.: MundoCore: A Light-weight Infrastructure for Pervasive Computing. In: Pervasive and Mobile

Computing (2007)

[10] Román, M. et al.: Gaia: a middleware platform for active spaces. In: SIG-MOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev. 6

(2002)

[11] Chan, A.; Chuang, S.-N.: MobiPADS: A Reflective Middleware for Context-Aware Mobile Computing. In: IEEE Trans.

Softw. Eng. 29 (2003)

[12] Ben Mokhtar, S et al.: COCOA: COnversation-based service COmposition in pervAsive computing environments with

QoS support. In: Journal of Systems and Software 80 (2007)

[13] Henricksen, K. et al.: Middleware for Distributed Context-Aware Systems. In: On the Move to Meaningful Internet

Systems 2005: CoopIS, DOA, and ODBASE

[14] Ellison, C.: UPnP Security Ceremonies Design Document.

08/30/2012 Sebastian Unger – University of Rostock – sebastian.unger@uni-rostock.de 33

Thank you!

Any questions?

Thank you very much for your attention!

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