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ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 1 of 48
ATTACHMENT E
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation of Individual Facilities
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
ORDINANCE
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 2 of 48
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 3 of 48
ATTACHMENT E
156
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 15, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1) Name and address of Stationary Source: Air Products
Tract 1, Tesoro Refi nery (Golden Eagle - Avon), Solano Way, Martinez, CA 94553
2) Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): Michael Cabral, (925) 372-9302
3) Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)): The Stationary
Source’s Safety Plan is complete per CCHS requirements and submitted to CCHS for review. The Program has
been implemented, as required.
4) Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
Date: 10 June 2005
Summary: Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Submittal
Update: Complete update and resubmission of Safety Plan and Human Factors Program to include Annual
Accident History Update.
5) List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Boulevard, Martinez; Bay Point Library (library closest to the stationary source); Air Products - See contact in
#2, above.
6) Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section
450-8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report
submittal (January 15) and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): None
7) Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the
status of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)): No events
triggered this requirement
8) Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)): APCI submitted
proposed remedies to the audit fi ndings to Contra Costa County before 16 August 2004. All outstanding actions
of this audit will be completed by 16 August 2005.
9) Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)):
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 4 of 48157
(1) Plant uses aqueous ammonia rather than anhydrous ammonia in its emission control system. This helps reduce
the off-site consequence of an ammonia release.
(2) Plant is designed without a liquid hydrogen backup system. This reduces the inventory of hazardous chemicals
on-site.
10) Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)): No enforcement actions were taken during
this time period.
11) Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)): No penalities have
been assessed against any facility.
12) Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
13) Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)): 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk
Management Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14) Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)): None
15) Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)): Air
Products is committed to the safe operation of our facilities and has implemented most of the requirements
outlined in the ISO, as well as the CalARP regulation. The Human Factors program is implemented, and should
have a positive impact on the safety of the facility. This Chapter has helped reinforce the need to maintain and
follow a structured safety program to help ensure the safety of our employees and the communities in which we
operate.
16) List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases Air Products has developed and implemented a Human Factors Program as
required by the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
17) Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in
response to major chemical accidents or releases: There were no emergency response activities to this site.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 5 of 48158
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 15, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1) Name and address of Stationary Source: Air Products
Shell Martinez Refi nery, 110 Waterfront Road, Martinez, CA 94553
2) Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): Michael Cabral, (925) 372-9302
3) Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)): The Stationary
Source’s Safety Plan is complete per CCHS requirements and submitted to CCHS for review. The Program has
been implemented, as required.
4) Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
Date: 10 June 2005
Summary: Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Submittal
Update: Complete update and resubmission of Safety Plan and Human Factors Program to include Annual
Accident History Update.
5) List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Boulevard, Martinez; Martinez Library (library closest to the stationary source); Air Products - See contact in
#2, above.
6) Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section
450-8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report
submittal (January 15) and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): None
7) Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the
status of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)): No events
triggered this requirement this year
8) Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)): APCI submitted
proposed remedies to the audit fi ndings to Contra Costa County before 16 August 2004. All outstanding actions
of this audit will be completed by 16 August 2005.
9) Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)):
1) Plant uses aqueous ammonia rather than anhydrous ammonia in its emission control system. This helps
reduce the off-site consequence of an ammonia release.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 6 of 48
2) Plant is designed without a liquid hydrogen backup system. This reduces the inventory of hazardous
chemicals on-site.
3) Plant switched from 99% monoethanolamine to 85% monoethanolamine in order to eliminate the need for
insulation around the water treatment tanks. This reduces the potential for a fi re.
10) Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)): No enforcement actions were taken during
this time period.
11) Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)): No penalities
have been assessed against any facility.
12) Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
13) Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)): 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk
Management Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14) Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)): None
15) Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)): Air
Products is committed to the safe operation of our facilities and has implemented most of the requirements
outlined in the ISO, as well as the CalARP regulation. The Human Factors program is implemented, and should
have a positive impact on the safety of the facility. This Chapter has helped reinforce the need to maintain and
follow a structured safety program to help ensure the safety of our employees and the communities in which we
operate.
16) List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases Air Products has developed and implemented a Human Factors Program as
required by the Industrial Safety Ordinance. The site clarifi ed issues associated with the Management of Change
for Organizational Changes at the site.
17) Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in
response to major chemical accidents or releases: There were no emergency response activities to this site.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 7 of 48
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 28, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source: ConocoPhillips
Rodeo Refi nery, 1380 San Pablo Avenue, Rodeo, CA 94572
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): John Driscoll at 510-245-4466 or Chris
Bowman at 510-245-4669
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)): The original
Safety plan and updates have been submitted (see item #4). All safety programs required by the ISO have been
implemented. CCHS has completed a review of the RMP. Public meetings for our plans were held on June 22,
2004 in Rodeo and July 8, 2004 in Crockett.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
The original Safety Plan for this facility was fi led with Contra Costa Health Services on January 14, 2000. A
revised plan was fi led on April 7, 2000 with the updated recommendations requested by CCHS. A Human
Factors Amendment was submitted on January 15, 2001. In conjunction with CCHSs required 2nd public
meeting on our plan and audit fi ndings, we submitted a complete revision of the plan to refl ect the change in
ownership of our facility and to update where needed. We took this opportunity to include Human Factors
within the plan instead of having it as an amendment. On August 9, 2002 the plan was resubmitted. The Plan is
scheduled for a full update this year.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Blvd., Martinez, CA. and the Crocket & Rodeo libraries.
6. Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section
450-8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report
submittal (January 15) and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): October 31,
2004 “Odor Incident”
Process gas was inadvertenly released from a piping system in Plant 19 (Refi nery Flare and Blowdown system).
The gas contained odorous compounds that migrated off site. This resulted in a Community Warning System
Level 3 response, which asks the community to shelter in place. The accidential opening occurred during
preparation for maintenance work when the wrong pipe fl ange was opened to install a pipe blind.
There were no injuries reported. The 72 hour and 30 day reports were submitted. A investigation team completed a
root cause analysis and corrective actions have been implelmented.
7. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the status
of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)): October 31, 2004
“Odor Incident”
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 8 of 48
A root cause analysis was performed using the Reason RC Software. Two root causes were identifi ed:
• COP policies did not require the fl ange, where a blind is to be installed, to be tagged specifi cally as a blind
installation location. The current Policy allowed the blind locations to be shown to the mechanics as part of the
jobwalk.
• The mechanics did not follow the Company Lock Tag Try Policy for executing maintenance for all the work.
The mechanics followed the Lock Tag Try Policy for the fi rst four fl anges they worked on. However, they did
not follow the Policy when they inadverently worked on the incorrect system and opened the fl ange on a system
that was in service.The mechanics should have double checked the isolations points before attempting to open
the last fl ange.
Recommendations/Preventive Measures
• Work Stand Down meetings were held to review the preliminary fi ndings of the incident and to reinforce that
the Lock Tay Try Policy principals must be followed. COMPLETED 10/31/04
• Counseled the Maintenance Supervosors and mechanics involved to always follow the Lock Tag Try Policy and
to double check the insolation to ensure that they are working on the correct system. COMPLETED 11/1/04
• Modify practices and procedures to require blind installation locations be marked with a distinctive tag to reduce
the chances of worker’s opening the incorrect system. Practices changed to require that each fl ange be tagged
prior to blinding COMPLETED 10/31/04. Formal change of policy for fl ange tagging before blinding -
COMPLETED 2/01/05
8. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)): See Question 7
above for implementation of the root cause analysis for the October 31, 2004 incident. Two action items from
the ISO/ CalARP remain open and have established target completion dates.
9. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)): A number of inherently safer systems have
been implemented since the last submittal. The attached list shows those that meet the criteria for inherent or
passive.
10. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)): There have been no enforcement actions
against the facility.
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)): No penalities have
been assessed against any facility.
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 9 of 48
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)): 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk
Management Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)): Comments received at the
public meetings were addressed by COP and CCHS. No other written comments have been received.
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)): The ISO
improves safety by expanding safety programs to cover all operating units, emphasising human factors, requiring
Root Cause analysis for major chemical accidents and releases, and requiring inherently safer systems as part of
implementing PHA recommendations.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases The project to revamp/reformat the operating procedures continues
on schedule. Alarm system management continues to be addressed. Improvements have been made to the
management of change system. The Lock Tag Try Policy and associated practices have been improved.
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in response
to major chemical accidents or releases: October 31, 2004 “ Odor Incident “ A CWS Level 2 condition was
initiated when odors were apparent in the Plant 19 area ( Refi nery Flare and Blowdown System) as a result of
gas inadvertently released from a piping system. When the conditions was identifi ed as an uncontrolled release
of gas from an active fl are line fl ange that could not be quickly mitigated a CWS “Pushbutton” Level 3 was
activated resulting in a Shelter-In -Place. The Facility Responders developed a plan to mitigate the release.
Facility Hazmat Specialists, under the cover of hose lines, fi re-fi ghting foam and in full fi re-fi ghting turnouts
with SCBAs, were able to replace and take-up fl ange bolts, pulling the fl ange pair together and stopping the
release. Monitoring took place both on and off-site by facility safety specialists during the incident. Agencies
were notifi ed and those responding included CCHS, Contra Costa Sheriff, BAAQMD and Rodeo/Hercules Fire
Department.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 10 of 48
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 15, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source: General Chemical Bay Point Works, 501 Nichols Road, Bay Point,
California_94565
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): Jeff Luengo; (925) 458-7365
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)): The Safety Plan
was originally completed in November 2000 and was updated in December 2003.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
The Safety Plan was most recently updated in December 2003 to refl ect a change in ownership.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Boulevard, Martinez; Bay Point Library (library closest to the stationary source); General Chemical Bay Point
Works - See contact in #2, above.
6. Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section
450-8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report
submittal (January 15) and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): There have been
no major chemical accidents or releases during this time period.
7. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the status
of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)): There were no
RCAs conducted during this time period.
8. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)): An audit
was conducted by the Department in June 2003 and resulted in 114 fi ndings. To date, 31 fi ndings have been
completed and the remainder of the fi ndings will be closed by August 26, 2005.
9. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)): Several PHAs have been completed during
this evaluation period. Inherently safer systems were considered during this process and were either already
addressed or will be addressed within one year of conducting the PHA, as required by the ISO.
10. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)): No enforcement actions were taken during
this time period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 11 of 48
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)): No penalities have
been assessed against any facility.
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)): 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk
Management Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)): The facility has not
received any comments regarding the effectiveness of the local program that raises public safety issues.
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)): This chapter
helps minimize potential risk and exposure to employees, the community and the environment.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases Several PHAs were conducted for processes that are not subject to CalARP
regulations. Many recommendations from these PHAs have been completed or are in the process of being
addressed.
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in response
to major chemical accidents or releases: There have been no emergency response activities associated with this
facility during this time period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 12 of 48
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 23, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source: Shell Oil Products U.S. Martinez Refi nery
3485 Pacheco Blvd., Martinez, CA 94553
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): Mike Beck; 925-313-3199
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)): SMR’s Safety Plan
is complete, and the Safety Program has been implemented at SMR. Documentation of the Human Factors
Program is described in this document. SMR’s Human Factors program has been developed and implemented.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
SMR’s initial Safety Plan was submitted in January 2000. An update to the Accident History section of the
Safety Plan was submitted on April 12th, 2000 and againin June 2002. A revised Safety Plan describing SMR’s
Human Factors Program was submitted in January 2001. An additional revision was submitted in June 2003.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Boulevard, Martinez; Martinez Public Library (library closest to the stationary source).
6. Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section
450-8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report
submittal and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): The Accident History section
of the Safety Plan describes the MCARs that have occurred at SMR since June 1, 1992. In 2003, the Safety Plan
was updated to include all MCARs that have occurred to that date. SMR has not had any additional MCARs
since the 2003 submittal of the Safety Plan.
7. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the status
of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)): The Accident
History section of the SMR’s Safety Plan includes Root Cause Analysis (RCA) fi ndings where available. The
status for all recommendations resulting from RCAs perfomed on MCARs are included.
8. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections,
Root Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)): All
recommendations are complete following the CCHS on-site audit of SMR during the fall of 2000. All
recommendations are complete following CCHS’s unannounced inspection that occurred in January 2002.
All recommendations are complete following CCHS’s audit of SMR’s Human Factors and Inherently Safer
Systems. There has been no RCA or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department at SMR. 13 of
43 recommendations remain open from CCHS’s November 2003 RMP/PSM/ISO Audit. The county has
conducted no RCAs or Incident Investigations.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 13 of 48
9. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)): The major implemented ISS items can be
found in Attachment I.
10. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)): None
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)): No penalities have
been assessed against any facility.
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)): 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk
Management Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)): None received.
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)): Industrial
safety is improved by requiring Process Safety Management application to all processes. In addition, the
potential impact on industrial safety has been improved by the application of MOOC to several organizational
changes in the past year. ISS reviews have also identifi ed opportunities to improve industrial safety. Procedure
PHAs are another area that has contributed to the improvement of industrial safety at our facility.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Indusrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases As noted above, the Industrial Safety Ordinance has assured application of
Process Safety Management to all processes at SMR. The application of Human Factors review and Latent
Conditions Checklist has been applied to the development of operating procedures as well as incident
investigation and Process Hazard Analyses. Review for Inherently Safer Systems has also been applied at SMR.
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in response
to major chemical accidents or releases: SMR has not experienced an MCAR in this reporting period, and thus
have not had any CWS Level 3 activations of the siren system, nor the CAN system. SMR continues to use the
CWS system for communication of all events classifi ed with a Level under the warning system, and has reported
several Level 0 and Level 1 events this reporting period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 14 of 48
Attachment I - Major Implemented ISS Items
Name ISS Type Basis Description
Flexsorb Unit Inherent New Process Substitution: The Stretford Unit, which
used a solution containing vanadium,
was replaced with the Flexsorb unit
that uses an inherently safer amine
solution.
Vents To DCU Passive Existing Process Simplifi cation: During project design,
ISS review drove towards an inher-
ently safer design that required only piping
versus some of the other options that includ
ed higher operating pressures and additional
mechanical equipment. This project was
Name ISS Type Basis Description
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 15 of 48
implemented in 2005.
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 30, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source:
Tesoro Golden Eagle Refi nery
150 Solano Way
Martinez, CA 94553
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions):
Rich Leland at (925) 370-3264 or Sabiha Gokcen at (925) 370-3620.
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (450-8.030(B)(2)(i)):
The original Safety Plan and two Safety Plan updates have been submitted (see below). Contra Costa Health
Services has completed four audits of the safety programs. The fi rst audit was in September, 2000 on the safety
programs. The second audit was in December, 2001 and focused on Inherently Safer Systems and Human Factors.
An unannounced inspection occurred in March, 2003. The fi nal audit was in August, 2003. All safety program
elements required by the ISO have been developed and are being implemented.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)):
The original Safety Plan for this facility was fi led with Contra Costa Health Services on January 14, 2000. An
amended plan, updated to refl ect CCHS recommendations and ownership change, was fi led on November 30, 2000.
A Human Factors Amendment was submitted on January 15, 2001. A Power Disruption Plan was submitted, per
Board of Supervisor request, on June 1, 2001. An amended Safety Plan, updated to refl ect ownership change was
submitted on June 17, 2002.
The Safety Plan for this facility will be updated whenever changes at the facility warrant an update or every three
years from June 17, 2002. An updated Safety Plan will be submitted this year along with an updated RMP. In
addition, the accident history along with other information is updated every year on June 30. This submittal serves
as the 2005 update.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (450-8.030(B)(2)(ii)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333 Pacheco
Boulevard, Martinez; local library closest to the stationary source.
Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to Section 450-
8.016(E)(2) of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(iii)) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in Section 450-
8.016(E)(1) for all major chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report submittal
(January 15) and the annual performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)):
The accident history was updated in the 2004 update. Since that update, there have been fi ve incidents that meet the
Major Chemical Accident or Release criteria in the last year.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 16 of 48
July 4, 2004
On Sunday, July 4, 2004, at approximately 1:42 PM, the #5 Boiler developed an internal water leak suffi cient to
compromise good boiler water level control. Per refi nery safety procedures, Coker fl ue gas was then diverted
directly to the stack, and #5 Boiler was shutdown. To reduce stack emissions water sprays were activated, and
Coker rate was brought to a minimum. Crude rate was also cutback. IH performed monitoring. OS&E monitored
for odors in the community on July 4th and 5th and did not detect any offsite odors. The Ground Level Monitors
(GLM) did not detect any Hydrogen Sulfi de nor Sulfur Dioxide during the event. The following agencies were
immediately notifi ed: Contra Costa Health Services (CCHS) via the CWS, the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (BAAQMD), and the Contra Costa County Offi ce of Emergency Services. Agencies responding with
personnel to the site include the Contra Costa County Sheriff and the BAAQMD. Refi nery personnel immediately
responded to the situation by shutting down the boiler and activating water sprays to minimize the amount of coke
dust leaving the stack. Actions were also taken to transfer the material leaving the stack to #6 Boiler. In addition, the
Coker rate was reduced and crude rate was cutback. Materials released include Petroleum Coke fi nes and fl ue gas. It
is estimated that approximately 1200 pounds of coke was released during the incident. An estimated 1600 pounds
of Hydrogen Sulfi de was released during the incident as well. The weather was overcast with the wind coming out
of the Northwest. The average wind speed was approximately 7-13 MPH. The temperature was 80 degrees. There
were no injuries reported on or offsite.
Root Cause # 1: Sodium Sulfate deposits contributed to external corrosion of the #5 Boiler furnace tubes.
Root Cause # 2: The Sodium Sulfate originates from treated spent caustic that is eventually used as makeup
water for some units.
Root Cause #3: The combustion of the CO Gas/Coke fi nes from the Coker in the #5 Boiler furnace causes
Vanadium to deposit on the exterior furnace tubes, which contributes to external corrosion
of the tubes.
Root Cause #4: The line to transfer fl ue gas between #5 and #6 Boiler is not kept hot.
Root Cause #5: There is external corrosion on the furnace tubes.
Corrective Actions for July 4, 2004 Anticipated Date of Completion1 Zeolite water will be used to quench the elutriator
at the Coker unit (addresses Root Cause #1 and #2). Complete
2 Evaluate alternative methods for spent caustic neutralization
(addresses Root Cause #1 and #2). (Spent caustic is now
being sent offsite.) Complete
3 Optimize dosage of and continue to add anti-vanadium
deposit chemical Baker KI-85 to the #5 Boiler furnace
(addresses Root Cause #3). Complete
4 Conduct an engineering review to determine the feasibility of
keeping the line between #5 and #6 Boiler hot (addresses Root Cause #4). 7/1/06
5 Install new tubes in furnace. (addresses Root Cause #5). 12/31/04
September 16, 2004
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 17 of 48
On Wednesday September 15, 2004, at approximately 23:59:48, there was an explosion and fi re at Tank 745. (Note:
based on analysis of process data, a new estimate of the time of the explosion and fi re has been determined. The
original incident time was reported as Thursday, September 16, 2004, at about 12:03 A.M.) The tank involved in
the incident contained spent sulfuric acid. Emergency response personnel immediately responded to the area. The
Sulfuric Acid Recycling Unit was shut down by Operations personnel. A CWS level 1 notifi cation was made at 12:11
A.M. The CWS level was raised to a Level 2 at 12:22 A.M. The specifi c circumstances of this fi re precluded the use
of water or fi refi ghting foam to extinguish it. A plan was developed and implemented to apply carbon dioxide as
the extinguishing agent. Odor Science and Engineering (OS&E) was dispatched to monitor for odors off site. They
detected no odors offsite during their patrol of North Concord, Clyde and Bay Point. Refi nery personnel were also
dispatched to monitor the community for odors and conduct industrial hygiene (IH) sampling. The IH sampling
detected no chemicals of concern offsite. There was no activity detected by the Ground Level Monitors (GLMs).
There were no injuries associated with this incident. The all clear was declared at 8:25 on September 16th. The
following agencies were immediately notifi ed: Contra Costa Health Services (CCHS) via the CWS, the Bay Area Air
Quality Management District (BAAQMD), and the Contra Costa County Offi ce of Emergency Services. Agencies
responding with personnel to the site included CCHS, Contra Costa County Sheriff, Contra Costa Fire Protection
District, and the BAAQMD. Tesoro emergency response personnel were notifi ed and responded immediately.
Contra Costa County Fire Protection District also responded to the site. The Sulfuric Acid recycling unit was
shutdown by operations personnel. The specifi c circumstances of this fi re precluded the use of fi refi ghting foam
to extinguish it. A plan was developed and implemented to apply Carbon Dioxide as the extinguishing agent. The
plan was formulated after discussions with Contra Costa Fire and Williams Fire and Hazard Control. The burning
material was gasoline range hydrocarbon. Smoke from the fi re is a material released by this type of incident. Sulfur
Dioxide (SO2) is also a potential emission for this type of incident. No SO2 was detected by the GLM monitors
or by IH monitoring performed offsite. An estimated 115,000 pounds of hydrocarbon material was consumed by
the fi re. The weather was clear on 9/16/04, with wind direction varying from 180 to 280 degrees. The wind speed
varied from 3 to 8 MPH. The temperature at the time of the incident was about 65 to 70 degrees F. No injuries
were reported on or offsite.
Root causes #1-6 relate primarily to the duration of the event and not to its occurrence, while root causes #7-12 are
more directly related to the probable cause of the incident.
Root Cause #1: Refi nery emergency response studies did not identify the need for specialized fi refi ghting
equipment at spent sulfuric acid Tanks 745 and 746.
Root Cause #2: Acid Plant PHA did not identify fi re as a consequence for low pressure in the spent acid Tanks
745 and 746.
Root Cause #3: The spent acid Tank 714 at the LHP unit does not have a permanent, engineered skim system for
alkylate removal.
Root Cause #4: There is no real time acid/alkylate interface indication on Tank 714 at the LHP unit.
Root Cause #5: The level bridle and associated instrumentation on Tank 745 for detecting the acid/alkylate
interface was out of service as it was diffi cult to keep maintained.
Root Cause #6: The design for the alternate alkylate draw from Tank 745 did not meet operations needs for
removing alkylate from the spent sulfuric acid tank during a single tank operation.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 18 of 48
Root Cause #7: There are no means to verify online operability and historical performance of the pressure
regulators on spent acid Tanks 745 and 746 to confi rm control within desired limits.
Root Cause #8: The capacity of the gas blanketing system for spent acid Tanks 745 and 746 was inadequate to
meet the maximum tank draw down rate during use of railcar transfer pump (may have allowed
for air entry into tank).
Root Cause #9: The pressure regulators may have been set to maintain a negative pressure (may have allowed for
routine air leakage into tank).
Root Cause #10: The fl ame arrestor on the vent lines from spent acid Tanks 745 and 746 may not have been
specifi ed for the range of gas compositions possible in these two tanks (may have allowed passage
of fl ame through fl ame arrestor due to presence of hydrogen).
Root Cause #11: The fl ame arrestor system for the vent lines from spent acid Tanks 745 and 746 has no means to
detect the presence of a sustained burn (may allow passage of fl ame through fl ame arrestor).
Root Cause #12: The thermal check valve of the fl ame arrestor system from the vent lines of spent acid Tanks
745 and 746 did not seat properly, which may have allowed a sustained burn at the fl ame arrestor.
The valve may have malfunctioned during the incident, which prevented seating and there are no
means to verify the integrity of this valve prior to the incident due to lack of maintenance and
inspection records.
Additional Finding #1: The implication of the lead pill melting in the thermal check valve in the past (indicating
that there was a fl ammable mixture in the vent from spent acid Tanks 745 and 746 to the
stack) was not recognized/understood by plant personnel.
Additional Finding #2: The MSDS for spent sulfuric acid did not contain information about the fl ammable
properties of the alkylate entrained in the spent sulfuric acid.
Additional Finding #3: Operating procedures do not exist for some tasks involving spent acid at the chemical
plant.
Additional Finding #4: There was incomplete design information available for spent sulfuric acid tanks 745 and
746.
Additional Finding #5: Nitrogen, an inert gas, is the preferred blanketing gas for current design of spent sulfuric
acid tanks.
Corrective Actions for September 16, 2004 Anticipated Date of Completion
1 Evaluate spent acid and spent caustic storage
(chemicals that react negatively with water and
fi refi ghting foam) to determine if specialized
fi refi ghting equipment is required. (addresses
root cause #1) 3/31/05
2 Review PHAs that include hydrocarbon gas
blanketed tanks to determine if scenarios
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 19 of 48
involving fl ammable mixtures due to oxygen
ingress are adequately addressed in
the PHA. (addresses root cause #2) 4/1/05
3 Review design of spent acid tank 714 at
the LHP unit for conformance with best
practice and design with respect to
instrumentation, control, skimming operations,
safety systems, etc. (addresses root causes #3 and #4) 1/1/06
4 Review design of spent acid tanks 745 and
746 at the Acid Plant for conformance with
best practice and design with respect to
instrumentation, control, skimming operations,
safety systems, etc. (addresses root causes #5, #6 and #9) 1/1/06
5 1) Review all gas blanketing regulators for
chemical storage tanks in fl ammable service to
ensure that all tank blanketing regulators are
assigned equipment ID numbers, have appropriate
documentation and that their maintenance is tracked.
(addresses root cause #7)
2) Ensure the standard tank turnaround work-list
for gas blanketed storage tanks in fl ammable service
requires a verifi cation that all tank blanketing regulators
have assigned equipment ID numbers, have appropriate
documentation and that their maintenance is tracked.
(addresses root cause #7) 1/1/06
6 Consider installation of remote and local pressure
indication with alarms on spent acid Tanks 745 and 746.
(addresses root cause #7) 1/1/06
7 Confi rm that the capacity of the new natural gas
blanketing system for Tank 746 is suffi cient to meet
the maximum expected tank draw down rate
(addresses root cause #8) Complete
Corrective Actions for September 16, 2004(con’t) Anticipated Date of Completion
8 Consider specifying positive tank pressure control
set point (at all times) for Tanks 745 and 746 to
prevent air from entering the tank. (addresses root
cause #9) 12/1/04
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 20 of 48
9 Revise operating procedures for Tanks 745 and 746
to include gas blanket system check for positive
pressure control. (addresses root cause #9) 1/31/05
10 Review design of spent acid vent line safety systems
for Tanks 745 and 746. (addresses root causes #10,
#11 and #12) 1/1/06
11 Develop inspection and maintenance procedures
that include the frequency of task performance for
the fl ame arrestor system at Tanks 745 and 746.
Develop a system for maintaining documentation
of the inspection. Train all personnel on new
procedures and document retention. (addresses root
cause #12) 9/1/05
12 Train Chemical Plant maintenance personnel on
consequences of fl ammable mixtures in vent gas
from Tanks 745 and 746 and how to recognize
its occurrence and communicate its occurrence to
operations. (addresses additional fi nding #1) 9/1/05
13 Revise MSDS for spent sulfuric acid to contain
information regarding fl ammability. (addresses
additional fi nding #2) Complete
14 Develop operating procedures for operation of a
single spent acid tank and for any other spent acid
tank related tasks at the Chemical Plant. (addresses
additional fi nding #3) 1/31/05
15 1) Ensure tank 746 design information is complete
after rebuild. 4/1/05
2) Develop tank 745 design information if tank is
replaced. (addresses additional fi nding #4) 1/1/06
16 Review blanketing gas alternatives including the use
of nitrogen (an inert gas) for spent acid Tanks 745
and 746. (addresses additional fi nding #5) 1/1/06
October 14, 2004
On Thursday, October 14, 2004, at about 2:45 A.M. there was a fi re at the naphtha transfer pump (P-0234).
Emergency response personnel immediately responded to the area. A CWS level 1 notifi cation was made at 2:54
A.M. The CWS level was raised to a Level 2 at 3:39 A.M due to the visibility of smoke offsite. The Petrochemical
Mutual Aid Organization (PMAO) was also activated and several PMAO member companies responded. Water
and fi refi ghting foam were used to fi ght the fi re. Fire response personnel were able to isolate the tank from the
pump and the fi re was extinguished. Odor Science and Engineering (OS&E) was dispatched to monitor for odors
off site. They detected no odors offsite during their odor patrols. Refi nery personnel were also dispatched to
monitor the community for odors and conduct industrial hygiene sampling. There was no activity detected by the
Ground Level Monitors (GLMs). The following agencies were immediately notifi ed: Contra Costa Health Services
(CCHS) via the CWS, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD), the Contra Costa County
Fire Protection District (CCCFPD), and the Contra Costa County Offi ce of Emergency Services (CCC OES).
Agencies responding with personnel to the site included CCHS, Contra Costa County Sheriff, and CCCFPD. Tesoro
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 21 of 48
emergency response personnel were notifi ed and responded immediately to the fi re. CCCFPD also responded to
the facility. The Petrochemical Mutual Aid Organization (PMAO) was also activated and several PMAO member
companies responded. Water and fi refi ghting foam were used to fi ght the fi re. Fire response personnel were able to
isolate the tank from the pump and the fi re was extinguished. The burning material was gasoline range hydrocarbon
and wooden walkways. Smoke from the fi re is a material released by this type of incident. The weather was clear
on 10/14/04, with wind direction varying from 150 to 200 degrees. The wind speed varied from 3 to 8 MPH. The
temperature at the time of the incident was about 58 degrees F. No injuries were reported on or offsite.
Root Cause #1: The pump had a gear coupling with a spacer design that allowed coupling hub travel.
Root Cause #2: Maintenance programs did not ensure gear couplings received lubrication per required frequency.
Root Cause #3: Although the naphtha pump sat “idle” for several years, no maintenance was conducted on the
pump to check for suitability for operation.
Root Cause #4: Small bore threaded piping sheared causing two naphtha leaks through ¾” holes.
Corrective Actions for October 14, 2004 Anticipated Date of Completion
1 Conduct refi nery audit to identify any other pump
with gear couplings. (addresses root cause #1) Complete
2 Initiate and complete coupling upgrade program to With spacers: 9/1/05
eliminate gear couplings. Pumps with spacer gear
coupling should be top priority. (addresses root cause #1) Without spacers:12/31/06
3 Consider creating a SAP Preventative Maintenance
plan for gear coupling which triggers lubrication at
recommended frequencies. (addresses root cause #2) 6/1/05
4 Consider installation of high vibration auto shutdown
on remote hydrocarbon systems. (addresses root causes
#1 and #2) 1/1/06
5 Develop refi nery wide procedure to startup idle pumps.
(addresses root cause #3) 1/1/06
6 Evaluate whether pump is really needed and should
be replaced. Review system and manifolds for opportunity
to simplify and eliminate equipment. (addresses root
cause #3) 1/1/06
7 Consider upgrading small bore threaded fi ttings in
hydrocarbon service to welded pipe. (addresses root
cause #4) 1/1/06
These corrective actions refer to availability of additional fuel for the fi re or for improvement of emergency
response.
8 Consider establishing a maintenance standard for future
repairs of wooden walkways that provides fi re resistant
walkways rather than repair “like-and-kind.” Complete
9 Consider initiating a project to upgrade isolation
access points for existing tank systems. 1/1/06
10 Consider developing a refi nery policy defi ning the
acceptable locations and uses of wooden walkways
& platforms. 1/1/06
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 22 of 48
11 Consider conducting an emergency response
critique that includes most responders from
the incident. 4/1/05
October 30, 2004
On Saturday, October 30, 2004, at about 12:44 hours, there were visible emissions coming from the No. 5 Boiler
stack. The associated Coker Unit had an upset that resulted in visible emissions from the stack and, ultimately, a
shutdown of the No. 5 Boiler. During the incident, coke dust and steam were emitted from the stack, resulting
in a visible plume. When the boiler was shutdown, water sprays were activated and the Coker rate was reduced to
minimize the amount of coke dust leaving the stack. Odor Science and Engineering (OS&E) was dispatched to
monitor for odors off site. They detected no odors offsite during their patrol of North Concord, Clyde and Bay
Point. Refi nery personnel were also dispatched to monitor the community for odors and conduct industrial hygiene
(IH) sampling. The IH sampling detected no chemicals of concern offsite. There was no activity detected by the
Ground Level Monitors (GLMs). The following agencies were immediately notifi ed: Contra Costa Health Services
(CCHS) via the CWS, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) via the CWS, Contra Costa
Fire Protection District, and the Contra Costa County Offi ce of Emergency Services. Agencies responding with
personnel to the site include CCHS and BAAQMD. Operations personnel shut down the boiler and activated water
sprays to minimize the amount of coke dust leaving the stack. The boiler was restarted as quickly as possible to
stop the visible emissions from the stack. An estimated 2.2 tons of petroleum coke was released during this event.
The weather was partly cloudy on 10/30/04, with wind direction varying from 150 to 300 degrees. The wind speed
varied from 2 to 10 MPH. The temperature varied between 50 and 65 degrees F. No injuries were reported on or
offsite.
Root Cause # 1: There was a large increase of solids carried over into the cyclones.
Root Cause # 2: The cyclone effi ciency may not have been adequate.
Corrective Actions for October 30, 2004 Anticipated Date of Completion
1 Consider modifying the Coker start up procedure
to reduce the steam fl ow to the Cold Coke Riser
and Angle Bend to the minimum required to
fl uidize the coke during the coke loading, until
it is needed to establish the coke circulation from
the Reactor to the Burner. Evaluate if additional
steam connections to the Cold Coke Riser are
required to start the circulation from the Reactor
to the Burner. (addresses Root Cause #1). 12/31/05
Corrective Actions for October 30, 2004(con’t) Anticipated Date of Completion
2 Consider modifying the Coker start-up procedure to
initially load coke into the Reactor by back-fl owing
the coke through the cold coke riser, angle bend and
slide valve as was done in the 2004 start-up. Evaluate
if additional steam connections to the Cold Coke
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 23 of 48
Riser or angle bend are required to move the coke in
this direction. (addresses Root Cause #1) 12/31/05
3 Consider modifi cation to the Burner cyclone outlet
plenum to reduce the likelihood of accumulating
coke particles during the low velocity start up periods.
(addresses Root Cause #1). 12/31/05
4 Consider whether to operate at minimum air/steam
rates to the Burner during coke loading to minimize
coke carry over through the Burner cyclones, or to
operate at higher air/steam fl ows to minimize the
settling out of particles in the Burner overhead system.
Modify the Coker start up procedure to refl ect these
changes as necessary. (addresses Root Cause #2). 12/31/05
5 Retain outside engineering consultants to review the
four recommendations listed above and provide
additional recommendations to prevent recurrence
of coke carryover to the No. 5 boiler during a Coker
start-up. (addresses Root Causes #1 and #2). 12/31/05
January 12, 2005
On Wednesday, January 12, 2005, at about 14:09 hours, there were visible emissions coming from the #5 Boiler
stack. The #5 Boiler experienced a tube failure that resulted in visible emissions from the stack and the shutdown
of the #5 Boiler. During the incident, coke dust and steam were emitted from the stack, resulting in a visible
plume. When the boiler was shutdown, water sprays were activated and the Coker rate was reduced to minimize the
amount of coke dust leaving the stack. Odor patrols during the incident indicated that there were no odors in the
surrounding communities (Concord, Vine Hill, Benicia Bridge, and Martinez areas). Refi nery personnel were also
dispatched to monitor the community (Martinez and Pacheco areas) for odors and conduct industrial hygiene (IH)
sampling. The IH sampling detected no chemicals of concern offsite. There was no signifi cant activity detected
by the Ground Level Monitors (GLMs). The following agencies were immediately notifi ed: Contra Costa Health
Services (CCHS) via the CWS, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) via the CWS, Contra
Costa County Fire Protection District, and the Contra Costa County Offi ce of Emergency Services. Agencies
responding with personnel to the site included CCHS, BAAQMD and the Contra Costa Sheriff. Operations
personnel shut down the boiler and activated water sprays to minimize the amount of coke dust leaving the stack.
Materials released include Petroleum Coke fi nes and fl ue gas. It is estimated that approximately 4000 pounds of
coke was released during the incident. An estimated 1400 pounds of Hydrogen Sulfi de was released during the
incident as well. The weather was partly cloudy on 1/12/05, with wind direction varying from about 30 to 80
degrees. The wind speed varied from 4 to 9 MPH. The temperature was about 52 degrees F. No injuries were
reported on or offsite.
Root Cause # 1: #6 Boiler was not ready to process the CO gas from #5 Boiler (addresses coke dust plume).
Root Cause # 2: The boiler tube restriction may have come from contaminated attemperating water (addresses
tube failure).
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 24 of 48
Root Cause # 3: An Inappropriate Source Of Water Was Used For Attemperating Water (addresses tube failure).
Root Cause # 4: Attemperating water piping is made of carbon steel (addresses tube failure).
Root Cause # 5: High superheater temperatures on the boiler tubes were not understood or communicated
(addresses tube failure).
Root Cause # 6: The boiler tubes may have exceeded maximum operating temperature due to high fl ue gas
temperature associated with instrument error (addresses tube failure). [Note: the investigation
team concluded this root cause was not a likely contributor to the incident, but a corrective action
was still formulated to address this possibility.]
Root Cause # 7: The boiler tubes may have contained a foreign object (addresses tube failure).
Root Cause # 8: The boiler tubes may have had water blockage (addresses tube failure).
Root Cause # 9: The boiler tubes may have had deposits in them from carryover from the steam drum (addresses
tube failure). [Note: the investigation team concluded this root cause was not a likely contributor
to the incident, but a corrective action was still formulated to address this possibility.]
Additional Finding #1: Emissions were visible from the #6 Boiler stack.
Corrective Actions for January 12, 2005 Anticipated Date of Completion
1 Evaluate options to reduce the time required
to transfer CO gas from #5 Boiler to #6 Boiler.
(addresses root cause #1) 6/1/06
2 Develop program to review and store water
treatment results obtained from laboratory
analysis of attemperating water. (addresses root
cause #2) 10/1/05
3 Establish water targets in the shift supervisor
target sheets. (addresses root cause #2) 7/1/05
4 Train operators and shift supervisors on
importance of attemperating water quality.
(addresses root cause #2) 7/1/05
5 Install double block and bleed between
deaerator water and attemperating water to
prevent deaerator water from contaminating
attemperating water. (addresses root cause #2) Complete
6 Convert oxygen scavenger in use in deaerator
water to DEHA to eliminate a potential source
of solids. (addresses root cause #2) 6/1/05
7 Eliminate the cross connection from the economizer
inlet water to the attemperating water to prevent
economizer inlet water from contaminating attemperating
water. (addresses root cause #2) Complete
8 Establish surface condenser condensate as the primary
attemperating water source since attemperating water
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 25 of 48
Corrective Actions for January 12, 2005 (con’t) Anticipated Date of Completion
should be condensate or demineralized water only.
(addresses root cause #3) 8/1/05
9 Evaluate zeolite water cross connections and determine
an appropriate isolation plan to prevent zeolite water
from contaminating attemperating water. (addresses
root cause #2) 9/1/05
10 Conduct engineering review to evaluate attemperating
and boiler feed water system piping materials. (addresses
root cause #4) 1/1/08
11 Operation manual and procedures did not
properly identify superheater temperature targets
and implications of high temperature; revise
operating manual and applicable operating procedures.
(addresses root cause #5) 10/1/05
12 Maintenance was not aware of high superheater
temperature readings and the closure of the
maintenance notifi cations. Evaluate training and
internal communications to improve highlighting of
potential failures of critical instruments. (addresses
root cause #5) 7/1/06
13 Evaluate options to improve the precipitator
performance at #6 Boiler. (addresses additional
fi nding #1) 9/1/05
14 Evaluate chemical KI-75 inventory strategy. (addresses
additional fi nding #1) 8/1/05
15 Repair primary furnace fi rebox temperature indicators.
(addresses root cause #6) Complete
16 Ensure #6 Boiler turnaround work scope items are
properly ranked for processing Coker CO gas.
(addresses root cause #1) 12/1/05
17 Evaluate possible testing methods (blowing a ball
through, similar to a cyclone) for fi eld verifying that
new tubes do not contain a foreign object.
(addresses root cause #7) 1/1/07
18 Ensure that superheater dryout procedure is
followed on all restarts. 9/1/05
19 Prior to controls modernization of #5 Boiler,
develop a plan to monitor and record superheater
temperatures. (addresses root cause #5) Complete
20 Install a sodium analyzer on the steam drum to
detect any drum carryover, connect the analyzer
readings to the IA controls as part of the #5 Boiler
controls upgrade. (addresses root cause #9) 4/1/06
21 Consult with a boiler specialist to conduct a general
review of boiler procedures and practices, operating
conditions and water chemistry. 7/1/06
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 26 of 48
6. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis (Section 450-8.016(C)) including the status of the analysis and the status
of implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis (450-8.030(B)(2)(iv)):
Root Cause Analysis information is included in answers to #6.
7. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department (450-8.030(B)(2)(v)):
“CCHS Information”: CCHS completed an audit on September 15, 2000, December, 2001 and August, 2003. There
are no RCA or Incident Investigations that have been conducted by the Department.
8. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution (450-8.030(B)(2)(vi)):
Golden Eagle is submitting a list of the Inherently Safer Systems (ISS) that meet the criteria for Inherent or Passive
levels only and that were completed within the last year (see attached).
Item Level of Risk Reduc-tion Implementation Basis Description
A002-2001-0606 Inherent PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of piping.
A003-2001-0274 Inherent PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of piping.
A003-2001-0382 Inherent PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of piping.
A003-2001-1097 Inherent PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of piping.
A004-2003-163 Inherent PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of equipment.
A002-2001-0661 Inherent and Passive PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 27 of 48
Item Level of Risk Reduc-tion Implementation Basis Description
of piping.The passive level of risk
reduction was implemented by
increasing the piping/fl ange pressure
and temperature rating which
minimizes the hazard without the
active functioning of any device.
A003-2001-1159 Inherent and Passive PHA The inherent level of risk reduction
was implemented by reducing
inventory on site through elimination
of equipment and associated piping.
The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented through piping
modifi cations that eliminated the
potential for liquid accumulation in
low points.
A002-2001-0002 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented through piping
modifi cations that eliminated the
potential for liquid accumulation in
low points.
A002-2001-0286 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by rerouting piping
to a safer location which minimizes
personnel exposure to a hazard
without the active functioning of
any device.The passive level of risk
reduction was also implemented
through piping modifi cations that
eliminated the potential for liquid
accumulation in low points.
A002-2001-0613 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by increasing the
piping/fl ange pressure rating which
minimizes the hazard without the
active functioning of any device.
A002-2001-0714 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by increasing the
piping/fl anges temperature rating
which minimizes the hazard without
the active functioning of any device.
A002-2001-0923 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by replacing old
equipment with new equipment that
meets existing code requirements
which minimizes the hazard without
the active functioning of any device.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 28 of 48
Item Level of Risk Reduc-tion Implementation Basis Description
A002-2001-1035 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented through piping
modifi cations that eliminated vibration
stress on piping without the active
functioning of any device.
A003-2001-0923 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented by increasing equipment
pressure rating which minimizes the
hazard without the active functioning
of any device.
A003-2001-1076 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by rerouting piping
to a closed system which minimizes
personnel exposure to a hazard
without the active functioning of any
device.
A003-2001-1166 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented by increasing equipment
pressure rating which minimizes the
hazard without the active functioning
of any device.
A003-2001-1205 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by replacing old
equipment with new equipment that
meets existing code requirements
which minimizes the hazard without
the active functioning of any device.
A005-2003-441 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented through piping
modifi cations that eliminated the
potential for liquid accumulation in
low points.
A016-2001-162 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented through replacement of
old equipment with new equipment
that cannot exceed piping and
equipment design ratings which
minimizes the hazard without the
active functioning of any device.
A039-2003-057 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by upgrading vessel
design ratings and vessel containment
which minimizes the hazard without
the active functioning of any device.
A045-2002-353 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 29 of 48
Item Level of Risk Reduc-tion Implementation Basis Description
was implemented through piping
modifi cations that eliminate pressure
buildup without the active functioning
of any device.
A048-2001-169 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented through the installation
of blinds to eliminate the potential for
cross contamination.
A060-2002-027 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by replacing old
equipment with new equipment
with increased pressure rating which
minimizes the hazard without the use
of an active device.
A067-2004-225 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented by upgrading equipment
support system which reduces the
likelihood of equipment failure
without the use of an active device.
A067-2004-282 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction
was implemented by rerouting piping
to a safer location which minimizes
personnel exposure to a hazard
without the active functioning of any
device.
A068-1999-522 Passive PHA The passive level of risk reduction was
implemented through design features
that naturally restrict fl ow without the
active functioning of any device.
9. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to
Section 450-8.028 of County Ordinance 98-48 (450-8.030(B)(2)(vii)):
“CCHS Information”: CCHS issued a Preliminary Audit Findings on April 16, 2004 based on a CalARP/ISO audit/
inspection. Tesoro responded to the Preliminary fi ndings on May 3, 2004.
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter (450-8.030(3)):
“CCHS Information”: No penalties have been assessed against any facility.
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO (450-8.030(B)(4)):
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 30 of 48
“CCHS Information”: CalARP program fees for these nine facilities were $395,679. The Risk Management Chapter
of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees were $256,893.
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter (450-8.030(B)(5)):
“CCHS Information”: 4000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk Management Chapter
of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues(450-8.030(B)(6)):
This facility has not received any comments to date regarding the effectiveness of the local program.
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source (450-8.030(B)(7)):
Chapter 450-8 improves industrial safety by expanding the safety programs to all units in the refi nery. In addition,
the timeframe is shorter to implement recommendations generated from the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) safety
program than state or federal law. This has resulted in a faster implementation of these recommendations.
Chapter 450-8 also includes requirements for inherently safer systems as part of implementing PHA
recommendations and new construction. This facility has developed an aggressive approach to implementing
inherently safer systems in these areas.
Chapter 450-8 has requirements to perform root cause analyses on any major chemical accidents or releases
(MCAR). This facility has applied that rigorous methodology to investigate any MCARs that have occurred since
January, 1999.
Chapter 450-8 requires a human factors program. This facility has developed a comprehensive human factors
program and is in the process of implementing the program.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCAs) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases.
This question was broadly answered under question 15 above. Some examples of changes that have been made
due to implementation of the ordinance are as follows. There are some units that were not covered by RMP,
CalARP or PSM. Those units are now subject to the same safety programs as the units covered by RMP, CalARP
and PSM. They have had PHAs performed on them according to the timeline specifi ed in the ISO and the PHA
recommendations have been resolved on the timeline specifi ed in the ISO. A list of inherently safer systems as
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 31 of 48
required by the ISO for PHA recommendations and new construction is attached to this fi ling as mentioned in the
response to question 9. With respect to Compliance Audits, there was a compliance audit performed in June, 2003
in addition to the CCHS audits mentioned above. All audit fi ndings are being actively resolved. Root Cause Analysis
fi ndings and recommendations for MCARs are listed in the response under question 6.
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in
response to major chemical accidents or releases:
Please refer to #6 which has the CWS classifi cations for the major chemical accidents and releases as well as any
information regarding emergency responses by agency personnel.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 32 of 48
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJuly 7, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source: Chevron Corporation. Richmond Refi nery, 841 Chevron Way,
Richmond, California 94802
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): Matt Brennan, 510-242-1862
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (42-01 §6.43.160(b)(1)): The June
2004 Safety Plan refl ects the program elements within the Refi nery. Additionally, the Refi nery follows the
program requirements specifi ed by the requirements of the Richmond Industrial Safety Ordinance.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (42-01
§6.43.160(b)(2)): In June 2004, the Site Safety Plan was updated and issued to refl ect process improvements and
to address recommendations resulting from the November 2003 Cal/ARP & Richmond ISO Audits.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if the
source will provide individuals with copies of the document (42-01 §6.43.160(b)(2)): CCHS response
6. Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to §6.43.090(e)(2)
of City Ordinance 42-01 (§6.43.160(b)(3) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in §6.43.090(e)(1) for all major
chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report submittal (2004) and the annual
performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30, 2005): There have been no new major chemical accidents
or releases during the defi ned time frame. The June 2004 Site Safety plan includes the required updates to the
accident history section.
7. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis §6.43.090(c) including the status of the analysis and the status of
implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis §6.43.160(b)(4): All corrective actions
resulting from the previously reported events have been implemented with the exception of one item resulting
from the refi nery-wide power outage in October of 2002 (CWS Level 2 event). The project design for the item,
[Revise relay protection for RLOP feeder] which was initally scheduled for completion in November 2004, was
revised and enhanced. Work is in progress.
8. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department §6.43.160(b)(5): 100% of all audit and
inspection recommendations have been resolved. The County has not performed any Root Cause Analysises or
Incident Investigations during this reporting period.
9. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution §6.43.160(b)(6):
Strategy ISS Solution Employed
Minimize Removed a section of 2” Dead leg piping on the discharge of P605.
Minimize Removed unused ¾” nipples and bleeder valves from the V613 Fuel Gas piping.
Minimize Disconnected and demolished Hot Flush Piping from C650 that is no longer used.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 33 of 48
Strategy ISS Solution Employed
Minimize Replaced piping spool between E650 and V650, eliminating a Deadleg.
Minimize Dismantled Jet Additive Piping and Injection Equipment that is no longer used,
reducing the contents of hazardous materials in the Plant.
Minimize Reduced the amount of Fresh Sulfuric Acid used in the Alkylation Unit by
optimizing acid strength control.
Minimize Start-up of E-248 heat exchanger may result in piping fl ange leaks. Changed gasket
design from spiral wound to CMG which improves seal ability by 400%.
Minimize Minimize ignition sources on the Long Wharf. Primary source is unauthorized
vehicles driving out on the wharf. Installed security gate that only allows vehicles
with special transmitter access to the wharf.
Minimize C-1000 wash water column is not needed to wash feed stock to the C5 SHU.
Removed column from service and installed new piping to reduce storage quantity.
Minimize Pumps P-17 and P-21 hydrocarbon pumps are no longer needed. Removed pumps
from service thereby eliminating two VOC and Reg. 8 sources.
Substitute Replaced C711 and associated Reboiler with a new Column employing stripping
steam. The Reboiler was eliminated and replaced with stripping steam.
Substitute Changed catalyst in Reactors R-3550, R-3560 and R-3570 to a new type allowing the
reactors to operate at a lower temperature and pressure.
Moderate Upgraded P447/A Pump Seals to API Plan 23 which will reduce the potential of
loss of cooling in Seal Flush Cooler due to fouling caused by high temperature
seal fl ush exchanging heat with cooling water resulting in seal failure and release to
environment of fl ammable and hazardous material. This new design lowers the fl ush
supply temperature to below boiling eliminating the possibility of fouling.
Moderate High temperatures from relief drum V-705 may cause the fl are gas recovery
compressors to shutdown resulting in fl aring. Modifi ed compressors to operate at
higher inlet temperature.
Moderate Pipeline/Cargo hose at Long Wharf can rupture due to overpressure. High pressure
shutdown devices installed on all loading pumps.
Moderate Upgraded P1167 Pump Seal to API Plan 23 which will reduce the potential of
loss of cooling in Seal Flush Cooler due to fouling caused by high temperature
seal fl ush exchanging heat with cooling water resulting in seal failure and release to
environment of fl ammable and hazardous material. This new design lowers the fl ush
supply temperature to below boiling eliminating the possibility of fouling.
Moderate Potential corrosion of V-1431 caustic wash drum inlet distributor piping causing
leaks to environment. Reduced length of distributor piping which resulted in
eliminating the corrosion mechanism by not allowing the process fl ow to enter the
turbulent regime which could have made it corrosive.
Moderate Potential corrosion of V-1440 and V-1441 inlet distributor piping could cause leaks
to environment. Reduced length of distributor piping which resulted in eliminating
the corrosion mechanism by not allowing the process fl ow to enter the turbulent
regime which could have made it corrosive.
Strategy ISS Solution Employed
Moderate Sections of 1-1/2” and 3” C-660 bottoms piping are no longer in use and act as a
large dead leg with a potential for leaks to the environment. Demolished piping
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 34 of 48
Strategy ISS Solution Employed
thereby eliminating the potential for high corrosion and leaks.
Moderate Removed dead leg leading to DCMA #4 from service and eliminated a potential leak
source.
Moderate Vessel V-712 may overpressure if the 6” bypass valve is open around the pressure
controller overwhelming the pressure relief valves. Replaced the 6” valve with a 4’
bypass valve eliminating any potential to overpressure V-712.
Moderate Upgraded P1128 and P1128A Pump Seals to API Plan 23 which will reduce the
potential of loss of cooling in Seal Flush Cooler due to fouling caused by high
temperature seal fl ush exchanging heat with cooling water resulting in seal failure
and release to environment of fl ammable and hazardous material. This new design
lowers the fl ush supply temperature to below boiling eliminating the possibility of
fouling.
Moderate Upgraded P1129 and P1129A Pump Seals to API Plan 23 which will reduce the
potential of loss of cooling in Seal Flush Cooler due to fouling caused by high
temperature seal fl ush exchanging heat with cooling water resulting in seal failure
and release to environment of fl ammable and hazardous material. This new design
lowers the fl ush supply temperature to below boiling eliminating the possibility of
fouling.
Moderate The TKN reactors average at least two unplanned shutdowns every fi ve years due
to plugged beds caused by poor quench distribution. Modifi ed distribution piping in
reactors allowing for excellent fl ow distribution and reducing the potential for hot
areas in the catalyst beds.
Moderate The FCC pumps that use hot MCO as seal fl ush may cause the coolers to foul
resulting in seal failures and leaks to the environment. Installed new piping to bring
cool MCO to the pumps thereby eliminating the possibility of fouling the coolers.
Moderate Pumps P-472 and P-472A operate beyond the design rate resulting in seal failures
and leaks to the environment. Installed speed controllers and discharge restriction
orifi ces to prevent operation outside of design.
Simplify Replaced section of R1410G&H Carbon Steel Discharge Piping with Alloy 20 Piping
for increased reliability / greater corrosion resistance.
Simplify Replaced section of P1440/A Carbon Steel Piping with Alloy 20 Piping for increased
reliability / greater corrosion resistance.
Simplify Replaced unreliable V1410 Level S/D Switches with Level Transmitters with alarm
points. Gives Operators additional Level Indication that indicates when Level is near
trip point.
Simplify Replaced Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve with a more reliable Bellows Sealed
Pressure Relief Valve. Provided block valves so valves can be serviced more readily.
Simplify Installed a Flow Control Valve in the C400 Overhead to V400 to increase process
control reliability and reduce potential for Plant upset.
Simplify Minimized / Eliminated 20 Plant Shutdowns on loss of Instrument Air by increasing
the delay time in Pressure Switch 64PL2500 to 5 seconds.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 35 of 48
Strategy ISS Solution Employed
Simplify Installing a remotely operated Emergency Block Valve on P144A/B Suction to so
Pumps can be blocked in from a remote location.
Simplify Installed maximum set-point / output change limits in Honeywell DCS to avoid
major plant upsets due to typographical errors on set-point / output changes.
Simplify Replaced F651 Carbon Steel Convection Tubes with 1-1/4Cr-1/2Mo. for greater
corrosion / oxidation resistance.
Simplify Replaced Fresh Acid piping between P472/A and T1821 with Alloy 20 for increased
reliability / increased corrosion resistance.
Simplify Replaced Carbon Steel E632 inlet piping (caustic) with Monel for increased reliability
/ increased corrosion resistance.
Simplify Standardized 4 Cat and 5 Cat Control System GUS graphic buttons between
different Control Consoles to minimize confusion when Operators transition to
another Console.
Simplify Installed new type of Inert Topping Material in R1310 that has a greater capacity
for holding particulate that will keep particulate matter out of Catalyst. Particulate
matter in Catalyst causes high pressure drop and necessitates a shutdown to skim the
catalyst. This new material will allow longer run times, reduces the amount of non-
routine operations.
Simplify Installed new Catalyst in R900 in the C5 SHU that has been shown to increase run
life, decreasing the amount of non-routine operations.
Simplify V1900/V1901 High Level Shutdown: Removed two displacer type Alarm Switches
and replaced them with a single “guided wave radar” level transmitter, reducing
instrument complexity and increasing reliability.
Simplify Upgraded V470 Overhead Piping to Stainless Steel for increased reliability /
increased corrosion resistance.
Simplify Upgraded V717 Overhead Piping to Stainless Steel for increased reliability /
increased corrosion resistance.
Simplify Removed in-service valves and piping associated with Instruments PDI510 and
PDI511 which were also removed, eliminating 8 Valves in VOC service that were
potential leak points, and eliminating Dead-leg piping.
Simplify Upgraded metallurgy of C710 Bottoms to E712 Piping to Stainless Steel to increase
reliability and increase corrosion resistance.
Simplify Dismantled redundant Differential Pressure Switch PDSH 14644. Its function is
served by Pressure Differential Transmitter 84PDT644.
Simplify Different units used for fl ow measurement in relief system. Standardized relief fl ow
measurement in refi nery to one standard unit (MMSCFD).
Simplify Control valve PC-312 is too small and the bypass line operates in the open position
allowing for possible plant pressure upsets. Installed larger control valve with bypass
line closed thereby eliminating the overpressure potential.
Simplify LPG truck drivers are required to connect a separate bonding cable to prevent static
electricity discharge. This may be confusing to the drivers because other facilities
have self grounding loading hoses with no separate bonding cable. Replaced all
loading hoses with the self grounding type.
Simplify Continual entry errors for critical controllers made by board operators’ resulting in
major plant upsets. Developed a Honeywell setpoint/output entry error protection
program that eliminates the possibility of entering an incorrect value.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 36 of 48
10. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the City Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to City Ordinance 42-01
§6.43.160(b)(7): CCHS Response
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter §6.43.160(c): CCHS Response
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO §6.43.160(d): CCHS Response
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter §6.43.160(e): CCHS Response
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues§6.43.160(f): None
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source §6.43.160(g): The refi nery
perceives that it has had fewer incidents that did or could have reasonably resulted in a Major Chemical Accident
or Release. However this is not indicative of a trend since the Ordinance has only been in effect for a short
period of time. Chevron believes it will take 7 to 10 years to fully realize the positive effects of the current ISO.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases: Refer to the ISS Solutions implemented (noted in question 9)
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in
response to major chemical accidents or releases: There were no activations of the CWS during this reporting
period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 37 of 48
Annual Performance Review and Evaluation SubmittalJune 15, 2005
*Attach additional pages as necessary
1. Name and address of Stationary Source: General Chemical - Richmond Works,
525 Castro Street, Richmond, California__ 94801
2. Contact name and telephone number (should CCHS have questions): David Connolly; (510) 237-3869,
3. Summarize the status of the Stationary Source’s Safety Plan and Program (42-01 §6.43.160(b)(1)): The Safety
Plan and Program was submitted to the City of Richmond and the County on January 2003.
4. Summarize Safety Plan updates (i.e., brief explanation of update and corresponding date) (42-01
§6.43.160(b)(2)): The Safety Plan was most recently updated in June 2004.
5. List of locations where Safety Plans are/will be available for review, including contact telephone numbers if
the source will provide individuals with copies of the document (42-01 §6.43.160(b)(2)): CCHS Offi ce, 4333
Pacheco Boulevard, Martinez; Bay Point Library (library closest to the stationary source); General Chemical Bay
Point Works – See contact in #2, above.
6. Provide any additions to the annual accident history reports (i.e. updates) submitted pursuant to §6.43.090(e)(2)
of City Ordinance 42-01 (§6.43.160(b)(3) (i.e., provide information identifi ed in §6.43.090(e)(1) for all major
chemical accidents or releases occurring between the last accident history report submittal and the annual
performance review and evaluation submittal (June 30)): There have been no major accidental chemical releases
from January 2003 to the present.
7. Summary of each Root Cause Analysis §6.43.090(c) including the status of the analysis and the status of
implementation of recommendations formulated during the analysis §6.43.160(b)(4): There have been no root
cause analyses during this period.
8. Summary of the status of implementation of recommendations formulated during audits, inspections, Root
Cause Analyses, or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department §6.43.160(b)(5): The County
completed an Unannounced Inspection in October 2004 and submitted the report to General Chemical in
October 2004. Corrective actions were completed.
9. Summary of inherently safer systems implemented by the source including but not limited to inventory
reduction (i.e., intensifi cation) and substitution §6.43.160(b)(6): A PHA was conducted on the new DCS Control
System in November 2004. ISS was considered during this process and were either already addressed or will be
addressed within one year of conducting the PHA, as required by the ISO.
10. Summarize the enforcement actions (including Notice of Defi ciencies, Audit Reports, and any actions turned
over to the City Attorney’s Offi ce) taken with the Stationary Source pursuant to City Ordinance 42-01
§6.43.160(b)(7): No enforcement actions were taken during this time period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 38 of 48
11. Summarize total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this Chapter §6.43.160(c): No penalities have
been assessed against any facility.
12. Summarize the total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifi cally for the support of the
ISO §6.43.160(d): CalARP Program fees for these eight facilities are - $314,013, the Risk Management Chapter
of the Industrial Safety Ordinance fees are - $319,669.
13. Summarize total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer
this Chapter §6.43.160(e): 4,000 hours were used to audit/inspect and issue reports on the Risk Management
Chapter of the Industrial Safety Ordinance.
14. Copies of any comments received by the source (that may not have been received by the Department) regarding
the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues§6.43.160(f): The facility has not received
any comments regarding the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety.
15. Summarize how this Chapter improves industrial safety at your stationary source §6.43.160(g): This Chapter
helps minimize potential risk and exposure to employees, the community and the environment.
16. List examples of changes made at your stationary source due to implementation of the Industrial Safety
Ordinance (e.g., recommendations from PHA’s, Compliance Audits, and Incident Investigations in units
not subject to CalARP regulations; recommendations from RCA’s) that signifi cantly decrease the severity or
likelihood of accidental releases: Several PHAs were conducted for processes that are not subject to CalARP
regulations. Many recommendations from these PHAs have been completed or are in the process of being
addressed.
17. Summarize the emergency response activities conducted at the source (e.g., CWS or CAN activation) in
response to major chemical accidents or releases: There have been no emergency response activities conducted
at this site in response to major chemical accidental releases during this period.
ISO Annual Performance Review and Evaluation Report — November 15, 2005 39 of 48