Post on 28-Nov-2014
rrrade, cfipfomacy and state formation
in the earfy modern :Jvlecfiterranean:
paRlir af-(Dïn II, tlie Su6Cime (Porte and tlie court ofrruscany
Alessandro Olsaretti
Institue ofIslamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal
October 2005
A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts.
©Alessandro Olsaretti, 2005
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
RÉSUMÉ
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERA TlON AND PLACE NAMES
INTRODUCTION
THE EVOLUTION OF FLORENTINE TRADE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN (1350-1650)
4
5
6
7
9
19
The Medieval Legacy: the Importance and Peculiarities of Florence's Mediterranean Trade 23
The Fifteenth Century: the Florentine Republic and the Rise of Ottoman Power 34
The Sixteenth Century: the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Zenith of Ottoman Power 50
FAKHR AL-DIN AND THE CONSOLIDA TION OF OTTOMAN POWER IN THE SYRIAN PROVINCES
(1516-1633)
The Mamluk Legacy and the Beginnings of Ottoman Rule in Syria
Fakhr al-Dln's Rise and his Escape to Tuscany: 1585-1614
The Zenith of Fakhr al-Dln's Power and his Demise: 1614-1632
CONCLUSION
BIBLlOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
74
81
98
118
135
140
140
141
2
FIGURES
Figure 1: Portrait of the Druze emir Fakhr al-Dln Ma 'n II
Figure 2: Routes of the Florentine Galleys
Figure 3: Trade Routes of Balkan Wooi
Figure 4:Syrian eyaJets and sanjaks in the 16th & 17th centuries
Figure 5: Mount Lebanon
Figure 6: Fortresses under Ma'nid control
TABLES
8
38
47
80
97
130
Table 1: Annual revenues as muqata'a from Sidon according to Tapu Defters (akçes) 92
Table 2: Estimate of Fakhr al-Dln revenues from 1614 (in piasters) 111
Table 3: Ottoman Treasury Revenues from Five Highest Paying Regions (in akçes) 124
3
ABSTRACT
Author: Alessandro Olsaretti
Title: Trade, diplomacy and state formation in the early modem Mediterranean: Fakhr al-DIn II, the Sublime Porte and the court ofTuscany
Department: Institute ofIslamic Studies, Mc Gill University
Degree: Master of Arts
This thesis explores the relations between the Druze emir Fakhr al-Dln II Ma'n and three successive Medici Grand Dukes between 1605 and 1633. Eschewing traditional historiographie al concems with the origins of Lebanese nationalism and the cultural encounter between East and West, 1 have sought first and above aIl to locate relations between this powerful emir and the Court of Tuscany within the broader context of Mediterranean history.
1 suggest that the actions of Fakhr al-Dln and of the Medici Grand Dukes have to be understood in relation to broad, long-term trends in the economic and social history of the Medit errane an. 1 explore two of these trends in detail: the breakdown in commercial and diplomatie relations between Florence (and then Tuscany) and the Ottoman empire during the course of the sixteenth cent ury; the bargaining between the Porte and provincial power-holders in the Syrian provinces in the century following the Ottoman conquest.
4
RÉSUMÉ
Auteur: Alessandro Olsaretti
Titre: La commerce, la diplomatie, et la formation de l'état dans la Méditerranée du début de l'époque moderne: Fakhr al-Din II, le Sublime Porte et la cour de Toscane
Faculté: Institut d'Études Islamique, Université McGill
Grade : Maîtrise es Arts
Ce mémoire étudie les relations entre l'émir druze Fakhr al-Din II Ma'n et trois grandsducs de Médicis qui se sont succédé entre 1605 et 1633. Afin d'éviter les préoccupations historiographiques traditionnelles des origines du nationalisme libanais et de la rencontre culturelle entre l'Est et l'Ouest, j'ai cherché tout d'abord et avant tout à situer les relations entre ce puissant émir et la cour de Toscane dans le contexte plus large de l'histoire de la Méditerranée.
Je suggère que les agissements de Fakhr al-Din et des grands-ducs de Médicis sont à comprendre dans le cadre des tendances générales de l'histoire économique et sociale de la Méditerranée, qui se sont manifestées sur une plus longue période. J'explore deux de ces tendances en détail: l'échec des relations commerciales et diplomatiques entre Florence (puis par la suite la Toscane) et l'Empire ottoman dans le courant du 16ème siècle; et le marchandage qui a eu lieu durant les siècles suivant la conquête ottomane entre le Sublime Porte et les hommes détenant le pouvoir dans les provinces syriennes.
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1 wish to thank Prof essor Üner Turgay for his kind and generous support throughout my stay at McGill, as well as for his careful readings ofthis thesis.
1 also wish to thank Salwa Ferahian, who has been instrumental in obtaining many ofthe less common works cited in this thesis and has also been enthusiastic and encouraging about my project.
Michelle Hartman, as always ungrudgingly support ive, has given me invaluable feedback on countless points, including the style, legibility and coherence of the overall argument. She has also helped me with sorne of the most obscure points in the Arabic passages, sometime unmarked, that 1 cite.
6
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND PLACE NAMES
1 have transliterated from the Arabic according to the conventions of the Institute of Islamic Studies. For a number of words, however, when there is an option, 1 have used the simpler spelling. In partieular, if a word is eommonly used in English and has an English eounterpart, 1 have preferred the latter. AIso, for Ottoman terms and names, 1 have followed the eommon spelling from modem Turkish prevalent in the literature.
For city names, for example, 1 have used Damaseus, Tripoli, Beirut and Safed instead of Dimashq, Trablus, Bayrut and Safad. For loealities or villages sueh as 'Abayh, whieh do not have a (eommon) English name, 1 have transliterated from the Arabie.
AIso, note that 1 have referred to the city on the Golden Hom as Istanbul, not Constatinople, for the most part, exeept when referenees are to the city from before the Ottoman eonquest. Similarly, 1 have referred to Jubayl, not Biblos and to SUr, not Tyre, when talking about the modem city. (Contemporary Tuscan documents refer to it as "Sur").
For personal names, 1 have followed the Arabie spelling and transliterated from the Arabie for the most part. Thus all personal names whieh appear in the Arabie sources that 1 have eonsulted are transliterated below, whether they have an Arabie origin or otherwise. Thus 1 write Fakhr al-Dln Ma'n and Altmad al-Khalidi al-Safadi, but 1 have also used Murad, Na~ult and Janbulad, because these are the spellings used in the sources. The names of famous sultans, however, follow the Turkish spelling whieh is most eommon in the literature, sueh as Mehmet II, Selim or Djem Sultan, as well as the Mamluk sultan Qaytbay.
1 have likewise used the simpler spelling whieh is prevalent in the literature for common Ottoman administrative terms, suitably italicized. Thus 1 refer to sanjak and sanjakbey, nahiye and sekban. Vizier and pasha, having entered English usage, 1 have left as is.
7
Figure 1: Portrait of the Druze emir Fakhr al-DIn Ma'n nI
1 Engraving probably based upon a contemporary portrait. Hafez Chehab, "Reconstructing the Medici Portrait of Fakhr AI-Din AI-Ma'ani," Muqarnas 11 (1994): 121-122.
8
INTRODUCTION
Cosimo II was on his way to the theatre on the 4th of November 1613 when news
reached him that the night before a Dutch vessel carrying the Druze emir Fakhr al-Dln II
had moored at Livomo.2 The Grand Duke would have known the emir through
diplomatie correspondence. A few years before, his father Ferdinand 1 had started
negotiations to establish an alliance against the Ottoman Sultan and had granted the
emir a safe-conduct to come to Tuscany should he need to do SO.3 But the arrivaI, several
years later, of Fakhr al-Dln and part of his retinue in Tuscany must have seemed like a
boit from the blue. The Grand Duchess immediately despatched secretary Lorenzo
Usimbardi to escort the emir to the Medici palace. For several days he would anxiously
wait in Livomo, however, for the arrivaI of two other ships carrying the rest of his
retinue and his favourite wife.4 Over the next few weeks it transpired that relations
between the Druze and the Ottomans had deteriorated and that the Grand Vizier had
moved against Fakhr al-Dln with vast forces. Hemmed between an Ottoman army
occupying the key roads around Mount Lebanon and Ottoman naval forces cruising the
sea just in front of it, the emir had bribed the commander of the naval squadron which
blockaded Sidon and hired merchant vessels to take him to safety. He apparently
announced that he was sailing for Istanbul to obtain the pardon of the Sultan, but
changed course as soon as the opportunity presented itself.5 The trip took two months.
Endless diplomatie wrangling would keep him in Tuscany, and then in the Kingdom of
Naples, for the next four years. It was not untillate in 1617 (at the earliest) that he was
finally free to retum to Sidon and resume his rule.
Fakhr al-Dln's stay in Tuscany and in southem Italy has been the subject of two
recent article-Iength studies.6 Both have focused on cultural aspects of the trip, whether
2 Documents XIX andXXI, Paolo Carali, Fakhr Ad-D"in II Principe dei Libano e la Corte di Toscana, 1605-1635,2 vols. (Roma: Reale Accademia d'Italia, 1936),166, 169. 3 Document IX, section 5, Ibid., 150. 4 Documents XXII and XXVI, Ibid., 170, 181. S Document XXIV, section 4, Ibid., 176. 6 Cf. Richard van Leeuwen, "The Origin of an Image: Fakhr AI-Din Ma'n's Exile in Tuscany (1613-1618)," in The Power of Imagery: Essays on Rome, ltaly and Imagination, ed. Peter van Kessel (Rome: Apeiron Editori, 1992). Albrecht Fuess, "An Instructive Experience: Fakhr Al-Din's Joumey to Italy, 1613-18," in
9
the cultural encounter that can be gleaned from a surviving account by a member of
Fakhr al-Dln's retinue, or the place that the episode acquired in the imagery and
mythology of modem Lebanese nationalism.7 l will focus, by contrast, on the
implications of the episode for broad trends in trade, diplomacy and state formation
between the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. The historical impact of the
episode itself, l will argue, was neither great nor lasting. However, its unfolding and the
context surrounding it reveal much about sorne important dynamics shaping the
economic and diplomatie landscape of the early modem Mediterranean. It is especially
useful for the light it shines on adynamie first pointed out by Fernand Braudel. The
early sixteenth century had witnessed the unchecked rise of the Habsburgs and the
Ottomans to the status ofworldempires, vast formations that at this point in time seem
to have been "the political enterprise of optimum dimensions.,,8 Yet by the end of the
sixteenth century it seemed as if the wheel had tumed. These great leviathans did not
dominate Mediterranean waters as comfortably as they had done in previous decades.
Exhausted by warfare, inflation and internaI crises produced by demographic pressure,
both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans saw themselves surpassed by smaller states which
had weathered the crisis more swiftly. Their "massive hulls were not refloated as quickly
as their lighter rivaIs by the rising tide.,,9 This is indeed the period which saw the
ascendant fortunes of France, ofEngland and of the Dutch Republic, but Braudel pointed
also to the revival experienced by Morocco, by the Regency of Algiers, by Venice and by
Tuscany under Grand Duke Ferdinand LlO
l propose that the history of the Ma 'nid emirate be considered alongside that of
polities such as Tuscany and Algiers in the late sixteenth cent ury and that Fakhr al-Dln
Les Européens Vus par les Libanais à l'Époque Ottomane, ed. Bernard Heyberger and Carsten-Michael Walbiner (Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 2002). 7 Fuess reviews arguments that the account may be (at least in part) by the Druze emir himself. Fuess seems to accept the myth of Fakhr al-Dïn's '"Europeanism''' and the notion that the Druze emir's interest in commerce, agriculture and development more in general was spurred by what he saw during his exile. Fuess, "An Instructive Experience," 27-28, 31-32, 39,41. Van Leeuwen, by contrast, suggests that common economic interests were the driving force behind contacts between Tuscany and the Druze emirate, while the cultural "impact" of the trip was part and parcel of later nationalist (and colonialist) imagery. van Leeuwen, "The Origin ofan Image," 60-61. 8 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip Il, 2 vols., vol. 2 (1973), 702. 9 Ibid., 703. 10 Ibid., 702-703.
10
II's fortunes and his relations with the Grand Dukes Ferdinand l, Cosimo II (and later
with Ferdinand II too) should be studied as an example of the rising fortunes of smaIl
political entities at the turn of the cent ury. In developing this interpretation of the
Ma'nid emirate and of its relations with Tuscany, 1 will specificaIly address and nuance
two major contributions to the history of Tuscan-Levantine relations and of the Ma'nid
emirate itself. Halil lnalcik has written on Ottoman-Florentine relations, beginning to
fiIl a gap in an historiography which has focused so much on Venice and Genoa, then on
England and the Dutch Republic, neglecting the peculiar paths and experiences of even
smaIler players in Mediterranean trade and diplomacy such as Florence. Il The first
section below, on the evolution of Florentine involvement in the eastern Mediterranean,
addresses and seeks to complete lnalcik's portrait of Ottoman-Florentine relations by
showing how they changed over time. 1 will suggest that the dealings between Fakhr al
DIn and the Grand Dukes of Tuscany hold a peculiar place as a closing chapter in a long
history. The second contribution 1 wish to address is more localized. Abdul-Rahim Abu
Husayn has written on Fakhr al-Dln within the context of the Ottoman conquest ofSyria
and the relationship between the Porte and the provincial leadership in this strategic
area. 12 The second section below addresses chiefly his interpretation of Fakhr al-Dln's
rise, as weIl as sorne remarks on this made by lnalcik. 1 focus especiaIly on economic
developments which the region shared with many other are as in the Mediterranean to
explain the accumulation of power in the hands of the Druze emir.
Having established that the framework of state formation and the dynamics
affecting the rise and fortunes of small polities are applicable to the Ma'nid emirate, as
weIl as to Tuscany, 1 hope to contribute to a broader debate about the early modem
Mediterranean. The manoeuvring by the Grand Dukes of Tuscany and by the Druze emir
represent, in my view, the attempt by small political entities/local power centres to
carve out a role for themselves in a changing international arena which was actually
Il Cf. Halil inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. Volume 1: 1300-1600,2 vols., vol. 1 (1994). Halil inalcik, "Ottoman Galata, 1453-1553," in Essays in Ottoman History (Beyoglu, istanbul: Eren, 1998). 12 Cf. Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650 (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985). Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria During the 16th and 17th Centuries: the Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, no. iv (1992). .
11
increasingly hostile to their endeavours. In their very different ways, Tuscany and the
Ma'nid emirate illustrate sorne of the difficulties experienced by smaUer political
entities at this point in history. In the long run, it was territorial states (the precursors of
modem nation-states), that emerged as the political enterprise of optimum dimensions. 13
Out of the bewildering mosaic of city-states, regional states, kingdoms and empires
which dotted the lands aU around the Mediterranean (and beyond) for most of the
Middle Ages and the Early Modem period, it was entities such as the Dutch Republic
and especiaUy the kingdoms of France and England which gave rise to the most
successful state forms. 14 Venice, Tuscany, Aigiers and the Druze emirate were as much
casualties of ongoing changes in the world system as were the Habsburg and the
Ottoman empires. Their brief apparent success between the end of the sixteenth and the
beginning of the seventeenth cent ury, for a few decades, was ephemeral. As l will argue
below for Tuscany and the Druze emirate, the difficulties that these polities faced in the
long run were as striking as the limited room for manoeuvre that they enjoyed at a
specifie conj unct ure. The prosperity of Florentine trade in the eastern Mediterranean
was dependent upon the pax Ottomanica which sheltered it against Venetian
interference in the west and maintained Central Asian caravan routes open in the east (at
least until the early sixteenth cent ury). Similarly, the political viability of the Druze
emirate is unthinkable outside the framework of Ottoman provincial politics and the
pattern of bargaining with central authority which saw the rise and faU of the Ma 'ns.
Theoretical Perspective, Sources and Originality
The originality of this paper rests in part upon the integration of sources from ltalian
archives with the main Arabie and Ottoman sources. It also rests upon the theoretical
perspective brought to bear upon these disparate sources. My reference to Braudel and to
the history of the Mediterranean should have already made clear that my approach is
13 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 657-658. Braudel used the term "territorial state" and deliberately avoided "nation-state" (see his footnote 2). Indeed, it would be anachronistic to describe these political entities as nation-states. What was most distinctive about them, as implied by Braudel's chosen term, was that they covered a contiguous and relatively compact territory including several cities. 14 Cf. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Cambridge MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1992).
12
driven by the framework ofworld history. 1 see the encounter between Fakhr al-Dln and
the Tusean Grand Dukes as one of countless instances in which the histories of diverse
political agents crossed paths in the early modem Mediterranean. It is one piece of a
puzzle representing the history of a sea and its peoples in an era which preceded nation
states and in which even the divisions of civilization (Christianity/Islam) were more
porous than official propaganda suggested. The world of smaller states like Venice was
characterized by adaptation and symbiosis, caught as they were between the Ottomans
and western Europe. 15 The world of pirates and renegadoes presents an unwieldy
phenomenon which straddles this allegedly dichotomous division into two camps. Fakhr
al-Dln's temporary exile and his subsequent return to Sidon offers yet another ex ample
of the crossing of the religious/civilizational divide. His was only one of many, as we
will see, for the Druze emir had been preceded by Djem Sultan and, closer to his own
time, by Yal}.ya Sultan; just as, conversely, Florentine exiles had sought refuge in
Ottoman domains.
Most importantly, the criss-crossing of lives and histories in the early modem
Mediterranean took place against a single backdrop of trade and diplomacy which tied
together aIl the merchants who sailed this sea and aIl the states touched by it. The two
sections below, as already mentioned, each address one historiographie al question in the
current scholarship on Tuscan-Ottoman relations. They also each portray the two
distinct historical trajectories followed by Florence and then Tuscany and by the
province of Damascus and the Levantine coast within the system of exehange which tied
together the early modem Mediterranean. These two trajectories were always related
through direct mutual ties as weIl as by participation in the greater system, but they
happened to beeome especially entangled at one moment in time. My approach to this
system of exchange is informed by world systems theory.16 Therefore, 1 focus on the
interaction of trade and diplomacy in creating a system which helped shape the
economies and politics of disparate states or political agents. This is addressed chiefly in
15 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),137-164. 16 1 draw particularly from Janet Abu-Lughod, whose work 1 discuss in the tirst section below and from Eric Wolf. Cf. Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califomia Press, 1997).
13
the first section, in which 1 have relied on several important collections of documents, as
weIl as on the vast body of secondary literature available, in order to chart the evolution
of commercial and diplomatie relations between Florence and the Ottoman empire. 17
1 have drawn from a variety of different sources (Arabie, Ottoman and Italian), in
order to reconstruct the history of relations between Fakhr al-Dln and the Sublime Porte,
which is the central focus of the second section. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
have bequeathed us a number of Arabie chronicles for the history of the province of
Damascus. 18 The area of Mount Lebanon, in particular, has had a strong tradition of
local historical writing. This was thanks both to Maronite and to Druze and other
chroniclers. 19 For the purposes ofthis thesis 1 have drawn exc1usively from the two most
important local chronicles for the history of the Ma'nid emirate and of Fakhr al-Dln in
particular.2o Altmad al-Khalidi al-$afadi was an 'iilim from Safed, which Fakhr al-Dln
17 Cf. Michele Amari, 1 Diplomi Arabi deI R. Archivio Fiorentino (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1863). Giuseppe Müller, Documenti sulle Relazioni delle Città Toscane coll 'Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi jino all'Anno MDXXXI ([Roma]: Società multigrafica editrice, 1966). Wansbrough's documents on FlorentineMamluk relations have also proven useful: cf. John Wansbrough, "A Mamliik Commercial Treaty Concluded with the Republic of Florence 894/1489," in Documents from Islamic Chanceries, ed. S. M. Stem (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1965). John Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence in the Mamluk Commercial Privileges," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 28, no. 3 (1965). For a comprehensive list, see the primary sources section in the bibliography. 18 An overview of the chronieles and biographical dietionaries for a history of the province of Damascus after the Ottoman conque st is provided by: Astrid Meier, "Perceptions of a New Era? Historical Writing in Early Ottoman Damascus," Arabica 51, no. 4 (2004). Meier also touches upon the contentious issue of Arab historians' feelings towards the Ottoman conquest, suggesting that especially in later centuries there might have been a sense of detachment akin to nostalgia and melancholia among Damascene intellectual groups. Rafeq, by contrast, has proposed a far more sanguine view of the role of the 'ulama' in maintaining a local identity vis-à-vis the Ottomans. See partieularly his article: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Relations between the Syrian 'Ulama' and the Ottoman State in the Eighteenth Century," Oriente Moderno 18, no. 1 (1999). 19 An overview of early Maronite historiography covering the sixteenth century and beyond can be found in: Kamal S. Salibi, "The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites," in Historians of the Middle East, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). Salibi also used Druze chronicles extensively in his work on the Bu4turids, which 1 cite below. 20 Abu-Husayn's comprehensive work, by contrast, is an exhaustive and unsurpassable study of al! Arabie sources for the history of the province of Damascus during the period under consideration. For a review of the sources he used, from chronicles to biographical dietionaries, see: Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 3-5. The court registers of Damascus are particularly important to reconstruct the economic and social history of the province. Cf. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Law-Court Registers and Their Importance for a Socio-Economie and Urban Study of Ottoman Syria," in L'Espace Social de la Ville Arabe, ed. Dominique Chevallier (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1979). Rafeq himselfhas used them to describe landholding after the Ottoman conquest. Cf. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Aspects of Land Tenure in Syria in the Early 1580s," in Actes du Vie Congrès du C.l.E.P.o. Tenu à Cambridge sur: Les Provinces Arabes à l'Époque Ottomane. Etudes Réunies et Présentées par Abdeijelil Temimi, ed. Comité international d'études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes (Zaghouan: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes et Morisco-Andalouses, 1987). The
14
controlled from the year 1602.21 His Tiirikh al-AmIr Fakhr al-DIn al-Ma'nlwas probably
commissioned by the emir himself when, at the height of his power in the 1620s, he felt
the need both to celebrate his own achievements and, most importantly, to justify his
actions to Ottoman authorities.22 It is essentially an apology for the Druze emir,
reviewing the political and military events in which he took part between 1612 (when he
first fell fouI of the Ottomans), until 1624 (when al-Khiïlidi died). It is nevertheless a
reliable account, since many important details that he provided can be verified against
other sources, proving the author to be accurate and scrupulous.23 Several different
manuscripts have survived and have been published in a recent edition?4 The second
Arabic source that 1 consulted is from IstiIan al-Duwayhl, a Maronite patriarch from a
distinguished clan in the town oflhdin, in northern Lebanon. He was close to the Ma'ns,
being a friend of AJ:}.mad Ma'n's, Fakhr al-Dln's grand-nephew, who still ruled over the
region?5 His TiirIkh al-Azminah was completed in 1699 and has also been re-printed in a
more recent edition.26 ln spite of its focus on ecclesiastical affairs, it is particularly
important both because it provides a long-term view of local history (including the
whole of the sixteenth cent ury) and because it offers a comprehensive sweep of the
. fD 't 27 provmce 0 amascus as a UnI .
Both Khiïlidi and Duwayhl were close to the Ma'ns, and hence their accounts
sought to portray the latter in a positive light. Their chronicles are signally silent on the
shortcomings and insubordination of Fakhr al-Dln and his predecessors towards
Ottoman authorities. As Abu-Husayn has pointed out, it is necessary to consult Ottoman
work of both Abu-Husayn and Rafeq has provided the indispensable broader background to this paper, which is necessarily far more restricted. 21 Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Khalidi on Fakhr AI-Din: Apology as History," Al-Abhath, no. 41 (1993): 5-6. 22 Ibid.: 8-13. 23 Ibid.: 14. This does not mean, however, that Khiilidi would not have willingly omitted things that put the emir in a very bad light with the Ottomans. His crusading plans are one example.
24 Al)mad ibn Mul)ammad Khâlidï, Lubnan FI 'Ahd AI-Amïr Fakhr AI-Dïn A/-Ma'nï AI-ThSnï: Wa-Huwa Kitab
Tarikh AI-Amïr Fakhr A/-Dïn AI-Ma'nï, Qism AI-Dirasat A/-Tarikhïyah; 16 (Beirut: Manshürat al-Jami'ah al
Lubnanïyah, 1969). 25 Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Duwayhi as a Historian of Ottoman Syria," Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies l, no. i (1999): 2-3, Il.
26 Istifan Duwayhï, Tan"kh A/-Azminah, A/-Khizanah AI-Tan"khïyah. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-I:fadd Khatir, 1900). 27 Abu-Husayn, "Duwayhi," 5.
15
sources in order to get a better picture of Ottoman-Druze relations in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. 1 have relied heavily on his recently published collection of
Ottoman documents on this very subject, supplementing it with other similar collections
of Ottoman documents.28 Most importantly, 1 have integrated the sources which Abu
Husayn used (and made available) with documents preserved in the Tuscan and Vatican
archives. The published collection 1 relied upon was assembled by a Maronite priest,
Bulus Qar'afi (or Paolo Carali) in the 1930s, at the height of Lebanese nation-building.29
While Carali's own bias has to be taken into account and the collection itself is
necessarily only a partial selection from Tuscan and Vatican archives, we have here an
ideal complement to Ottoman documents in order to paint a fuller picture of Fakhr al
Dln's schemes and insubordination.30 ln the first place, it contains full reproductions of
letters sent to Fakhr al-Dln by the Porte and by his aides while he was himself in
Tuscany, as weIl as letters that he later exchanged with the Medicis. Secondly, it
contains numerous letters and despatches by Tuscan administrators and diplomats which
shed light on Medicean plans in their contacts with the Druze emir. Finally, it inc1udes
full reports on the economic potential and revenues of Druze-controlled areas, written by
Tuscan agents who had been sent to Lebanon especially for this purpose. Most
significantly, these reports also offer assessments of the emir's forces and fortifications
28 Cf. Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul: Lebanon and the Druze Emirate in the Ottoman Chancery Documents, 1546-1711 (London and New Nork: Centre for Lebanese Studies and l.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004). Heyd's old collection of Ottoman documents is also useful, both for the light it shines on developments in the province of Damascus at large, and because it covers Safed, one of Fakhr al-Dïn's Sa/yaks. Cf. Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman According to the Mühimme Defier; (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1960). For other Ottoman documents see the bibliography. 29 Cf. Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din. For Carali's place in the historiography ofthis period and for his commitment to a specific nationalist view, see: Albert H. Hourani, "Historians of Lebanon," in Historians of the Middle East, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 234, 236. Carali viewed Fakhr al-Dïn as the founding-father of an independent Lebanon and also insisted on his "Europeanism"-an idea that gave weight to a specific view of Lebanese particularism. In this sense, his own portrait of the Druze emir is as anachronistic as the portraits of ail mythological founding fathers of nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalisms. 30 Abu-Husayn himself regretted not having integrated Tuscan and Vatican documents in his work: "The present study, in full awareness of their possible value, does not take them into consideration." AbuHusayn, Provincial Leaderships, 10. See footnote 19 on this page for Abu-Husayn's critique of the shortcomings ofCarali's collection (chiefly, its incompleteness). 1 concur with this critique, but as will be cIear, the documents in the collection are still extremely valuable and Carali's own bias is not necessarily a hindrance to using his work.
16
by military agents of foreign powers interested in an alliance with the emir, who were
thus particularly keen to evaluate his military potential.
The shortcomings of Carali's collection can be partially addressed by taking
recourse to other publications. A short collection of Tuscan documents has made
available sorne important papers missing from Carali's?! Most of all, 1 have
supplemented Tuscan with Venetian documents-more specifically, reports written by
Venetian ambassadors and consuls in Istanbul and Syria (Aleppo or Tripoli).32 Venetian
diplomats had long been required to present to the Senate an account of their activities
abroad soon after they returned to their city. These accounts developed a specific, yet
flexible, format during the sixteenth century which included distinctive tropes of
Renaissance humanism, such as literary portraits of the ruler.33 Their main purpose,
however, was to provide an informed and up-to-date overview of matters of state or of
the conditions of trade.34 Many of these reports have survived and provide a wealth of
information about disparate facets of life in Istanbul and in the Syrian provinces,
including, of course, trade and diplomacy between the Ottoman and other states?5
Venetian ambassadors and consuls rarely addressed specific issues such as the
insubordination of a single provincial govemor like Fakhr al-Dln. Yet, they are still
useful to a history of Florentine-Ottoman relations and do shed sorne light on the Fakhr
al-Dln affair. In the first place, precisely because they assessed matters of state and
31 Cf. Martiniano Roncaglia, "Fabr Ad-Din AI-Ma'nï e la Corte di Toscana, Nuovi Documenti," AI-Machriq 57,
no. 4,5 (1963).
32 Cf. Luigi Firpo, Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, vol. XIII, Costantinopoli (1590-1793) (Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1984). A number of previously unpublished reports have recently been made available in: Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, vol. XIV, Costantinopoli, Relazioni Inedite (1512-1789) (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1996). For reports from Syria 1 have used the old and widely quoted collection: Guglielmo Berchet, Relazioni dei Consoli Veneti ne/la Siria (Turin: Paravia, 1866). 33 Donald E. Queller, "The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni," in Renaissance Venice, ed. J. R. Hale (London: FaberandFaber, 1973), 177-178, 180-181, 187-188. 34 Ibid., 176. The reports of Consuls who had been stationed in Syria had a similar purpose and also delved into the state of the provinces, Ottoman revenues from each eyalet etc. They naturally focused more on the state oftrade, describing the competition brought to Venetians in Aleppo by other trading nations. 35 Cf. Paolo Preto, "Le Relazioni dei Baili Veneziani a Costantinopoli," Il Veltro 23, no. 2-4 (1979). Pedani has recently pointed both to the previously unsuspected number of reports which have survived and to the usefulness ofthese well-known documents as historical sources for topics litt le explored so far. The history of women at the Ottoman court and its portrayal by Venetians, for example. Cf. Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, "Satiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy," Turcica, no. 32 (2000). For a brief overview of available collections and their history, see the tirst two pages ofthis article and the lengthy tirst footnote.
17
prospects for trade, they provide broad vistas which help put the Fakhr al-Dln affair and
Tuscan meddling in the Levant into perspective.36 Secondly, when thoroughly combed
for specifie references to Fakhr al-Din, they do provide interesting pieces of information.
Finally, Venetian reports and especially reports from consuls stationed in Syria, are
essential in order to assess the role of the region in international trade. Venice was, after
aU, the dominant trading partner first of the Mamluks and then of the Ottomans in Syria
until the second decade of the seventeenth century. In this role it was unrivalled by any
other ltalian city and was only displaced by the rising star of the Atlantic economies.
36 The importance of Tuscan meddling in Levantine affairs, which underpins Carali's approach, is much reduced by these reports.
18
THE EVOLUTION OF FLORENTINE TRADE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (1350-1650)
The diplomatie and commercial contacts between the Grand Dukes of Tuscany and
Fakhr al-Dln were embroiled in plans for a new crusade. Therefore, one of the main
historiographical perspectives applied to the contacts between Fakhr al-Dln and the
court of Tuscany has been that of ChristianlMuslim confrontation in the early modem
Mediterranean. Indeed, the Druze emir on several occasions discussed schemes to
capture the coast of SyrialPalestine from the Ottomans with the Medicis, the Papacy and
the Habsburgs.37 Thus, it is only natural that historians should have been tempted to
view Fakhr al-Dln's contacts with the Court of Tuscany in the light of the crusading zeal
and rhetoric fostered by the Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation of the sixteenth cent ury,
particularly after the Christian victory at Lepanto in 1571.38 The alliance between unruly
Ottoman subjects and expansionist Christian powers, Tuscany included, has also been
presented as the out come of an age-long, almost "natural" enmity. Sorne contemporaries
certainly tried to portray it in this light, not only by invoking the crusades, but by
floating the myth that the Druze were the descendants of those Franks who had settled
in the region at that time.39 Yet, if we do take a long-term approach and look beyond
Lepanto, Tuscan involvement in such schemes is far from obvious and caUs for an
explanation. This different perspective reveals that at one point Florentine-Ottoman
relations were buttressed by solid common interests. As Inalcik suggested, "political and
economic circumstances created a natural alliance between the Sultan and Florence
37 See, for example, documents XVII (letter of the bishop of Cyprus, 1611), XXVII (Usimbardi report of conversation with the emir in November 1613), XCII (letter by Monsignor Maronio, 1627) in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:163, 1:187, 1:300. 38 Angelo Tamborra is one such scholar who belonged to the generation ofhistorians for whom the battle of Lepanto marked a decisive tuming point. He studied Tuscan involvement in Syria, including contacts with Fakhr al-Dïn, in this context: Angelo Tamborra, Gli Stati Italiani, l'Europa e il Problema Turco Dopo Lepanto (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki - Editore, 1961),69-85. Braudel pointed out that the effects of the battle should not be dismissed too easily. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 1103-1106. The point has recently been taken up by Abu-Husayn. Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul,19. 39 This myth was presented, for example, by a Tuscan agent in the service of the Medicis in 1614. Document XLI (Santi's report), Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 212-213. It was also mentioned by the Venetian consul Alessandro Malipiero in 1596. Berchet, Relazioni, 90.
19
against Venice.,,40 In fact, when we look back in time, instead of finding an age-old
enmity, we discover that a close relationship had existed between Florence and the Porte
which is aptly described as a natural alliance. Both this relationship and the state of
affairs which underpinned it had been particularly strong for several decades during the
fifteenth century, but they continued, at least in part, during later times. Their presence
can be clearly detected in the sixteenth cent ury, when they only slowly gave way to the
enmity which fuelled the crusading rhetoric.
This section will provide a survey of Florentine trade and diplomacy in the
Eastern Mediterranean that takes into account both of the perspectives that I have just
outlined. Its purpose is to chart shifts in Florence's diplomatic and commercial position
in the Levant and the Balkans, describing the way in which the natural alliance between
Florence and the Sultan came into being and subsequently unravelled. It deliberately
takes a long-term approach in order to encompass both the golden age of Florentine
Ottoman relations in the fifteenth century and the more troubled and antagonistic
dealings of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. A long-term approach is also
justified by the fact that these relations were part of an evolving system of exchange
which came into being during the Fourteenth Century Crisis and eventually unravelled at
the dawn of another momentous crisis in world trade, in the seventeenth century. The
date of 1350 is a convenient starting point, approximately coinciding with the arrivaI of
the Black Death to Europe and the beginnings of the Hundred Years War.41 Ultimately,
the disruption caused to French overland trade, together with the difficulties suffered by
Central Asian inland routes, paved the way for a profound restructuring of trade patterns
that was to last until the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 (which was to last
until 1648).42 As with its fourteenth century equivalent, the Seventeenth Century Crisis
40 Ïnalcik, "Ottoman Galata," 318. 41 Abu-Lughod pointed out that by the mid-fourteenth century many of the areas active in the trade across Asia and into Europe showed signs of economic difficulties and suggested that these difficulties were due in part to the strains that the entire system suffered. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Belore European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 37. Hence she chose 1350 as the closing date for her inquiry. 42 Herman van der Wee, "Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and Particularly in the ReExport Trade from South to North, 1350-1750," in The Rise olMerchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16-7,32.
20
in its turn coincided with a time of profound strains in the world system.43 It heralded
yet another restructuring of trade patterns from which the modern world economy
eventually emerged.
The Florentine-Ottoman trade was a specific part of this overarching exchange
system and it foIlowed a weIl-defined pattern so long as the overaIl system remained in
place. The guiding theme of this section, therefore, will be the interaction of trade and
diplomacy in creating and maintaining a specific pattern of trade between Florence and
the Ottoman empire. This pattern of trade was at the heart of the natural alliance
between described by lnalcik. When it feIl apart, the Florentine-Ottoman alliance
coIlapsed with it. But for this to happen, sorne very profound changes in trading patterns
and in the balance of power among aIl the states around the Mediterranean had to alter
Florence's position towards the Ottoman state and towards the eastern half of this
inland sea in genera1.44 The first chapter below considers the antiquity and importance of
Florentine involvement in Mediterranean trade, as weIl as its peculiarities compared to
the involvement of seafaring cities like Venice and Genoa. The strength of Florentine
trade consisted in its merchant networks and in its ability to use different carriers and to
redirect its trade as needed. As we will see, this ability helped Florence to weather the
Fourteenth Century Crisis, when the commercial importance of the Levant for the
Florentine economy increased. For Florence, in fact, the late fourteenth cent ury
coincided with a significant change in its involvement in Mediterranean markets
(including Levantine markets, particularly in Mamluk Egypt), which became especiaIly
important for its wool industry.
43 A brief overview of the different interpretations of the Seventeenth Century Cri sis was provided by Steensgaard. He emphasized that the crisis in trade with Asia was brief (1590-1600, followed by recovery and then stagnation in 1621-1650), but it coincided with the rise of state power and with what he described as a "circulation crisis." Niels Steensgaard, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis," in The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker and Leslie Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 35-36, 48. More recently, the interaction of state-formation (and rising state expenditures) with the rapid population expansion ofthe sixteenth century aIl across the Eurasian continent has been highlighted in: Jack A. Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, no. 1 (1988). 44 For the importance of Ottoman expansion and particularly the conquest of Mamluk domains in changing this balance of power and ultimately trade patterns: Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, Suny Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 6-8, 21, 144. The Ottoman state, Brummett emphasizes, was very interested and active in trade as much as in conquest and tribute-taking.
21
Strong commercial ties with the eastern Mediterranean contributed to the
successive recovery of Florentine manufacturing and Florence actively sought to
promote them in the early fifteenth century. The second chapter in this section considers
the growing competition between Florence and Venice in .Levantine markets and the
changes brought about by the rise of Ottoman power. Florence found a new prosperity
after the faH of Constantinople, with the development of close ties with the Porte. A
two-way trade then flourished which was based on the exchange of fini shed wool cloth
for Persian raw silk, tying the fortunes of the Florentine wool industry to eastern
Mediterranean markets even more.45 It was the golden age of Florentine-Ottoman
relations under Mehmet II, when Ottoman favour helped shield Florence from growing
competition with Venice in the Levantine trade.
The final chapter in this section considers the unraveling of the diplomatic and
commercial links which had tied Florence and the Ottoman empire. The first half of the
sixteenth century saw the pattern of trade established in the previous century soldier on
in spite of diplomatic difficulties and of the rising price of raw silk. The first signs of its
demise were already there, however. Continued Ottoman expansion eventuaHy led to
conflict with Persia and to periodic interruptions of the caravan routes through Central
Asia. The rise of Valois and most of aH of Habsburg power engulfed the Italian
peninsula in conflict. EventuaHy, Florence was to faH squarely into the Habsburg camp.
This political realignment accompanied and compounded the undoing of the profitable
trade which had underpinned Florentine-Ottoman relations in previous times. The Fakhr
al-Dln affair belongs to this last period.46 It was a coda, one could justly say, to a
previously beneficial and then increasingly troubled relationship between Florence and
the Ottomans which by the end of the sixteenth century had been fundamentally altered
by changes in patterns oftrade and in the state system in which the two operated.47
45 This trade in many ways anticipated the two-way trade that the Levant company would carry out with the Ottoman empire. It is particularly interesting here because, as Abu-Lughod observed, many elements of a given world-economy often existed in previous ones. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 365-368. 46 Diaz completely dismissed Florence's involvement in the Levant at this stage. Furio Diaz, Il Grandueato di Toseana: 1 Medici (Torino: UTET, 1976),373. Tamborra saw it as the last of the crusading efforts (and a belated one, at that), with the Medicis acting only reluctantly. Tamborra, Gli Stati Italiani, 82. 47 By contrast, Ina\cik mentioned the decline of the Florentine-Ottoman trade under Selim 1 and tentatively attributed it to foreign competition and the discovery of the New World. ina\cik, Economie and Social
22
Tuscan involvement in various anti-Ottoman schemes in the Balkans and the
Levant also betrays signs of a weakening of the Tuscan economy and of Tuscan foreign
poHcy. If Tuscan agents schemed with local rulers like Fakhr al-Dln and Tuscan pirates
plied the eastern Mediterranean in search of booty, it was largely because they had lost
their lucrative position as one of the main trading partners of the Porte to others, chief
among whom were the Venetians (and the latter were about to lose it to the French, the
English and the Dutch). The Medicis' aggressive stance towards the Ottomans at this
specifie conjuncture, therefore, should not obscure the profound limitations of Tuscan
foreign policy at this stage. The very changes which enabled a less conciliatory attitude
on the part of Tuscan policy-makers also worked to undermine the prosperity of the
Tuscan economy and ultimately to deprive those same policy-makers of the wealth that
gave weight to their foreign policy. When looked at in the context of wider trade
patterns and diplomacy, the apparent daring of granducal policy shows itself rather more
clearly for what it really was: the foolish and forlorn gamble of a player largely excluded
from the ongoing game. The Eastern Mediterranean trade had been an integral part of a
web oftrade links that had made Florence rich during the fifteenth century. The relative
decline of the Florentine economy between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
complex though it was as an historical phenomenon, was inextricably linked to changes
in patterns of trade around the Mediterranean which included the demise of Florence's
economic interests in the Balkans and the Levant. Ultimately, Medicean scheming
against the Ottomans during the sixteenth century and especially after Lepanto, was
both a symptom and a secondary cause ofthe decline of Florence.
The Medieval Legacy: the Importance and Peculiarities of Florence 's Mediterranean Trade
Throughout the Middle Ages, Tuscany found itself at the centre of trading newtorks that
criss-crossed the Mediterranean. Pis a and then Florence had dealings with Catalonia and
Tunis, as weIl as the Levant. They thus actively participated in trade crossing the sea
from east to west, which for most of the Middle Ages outweighed trade occurring on the
His/ory, 233. The undoing of this trade, as we will see below, actually happened later (after Suleiman the Magnificent's reign) and was linked more to interstate rivalry and a changed balance of power.
23
north-south axis.48 Tuscan and especially Florentine merchants also became active in
parts of France, Flanders and in England, coming to play a key role in the movement of
goods and capital from the shores of the Mediterranean to northem Europe. This
involvement in far-flung trade networks left a lasting legacy to the Florentine economy.
In the first place, as we will see, Tuscany-and Florence within it-were deeply
involved in the exchange of goods which tied the economy of the medieval
Mediterranean to the Near and Far East. This can be seen clearly in the material culture
linked to the long-distance trade in luxury items. It is also evident, cruciaIly, in the
expanding trade in commodities and in the marketing of textiles of a manufacturing
centre such as Florence.
For aIl its importance, Florence's participation in this exchange of goods had
sorne marked peculiarities which will be addressed in the appropriate chapter section
below. Chief among these was the fact that it took place by proxy, through the navies
and consulates of other cities such as Pisa, Genoa or Venice. While at times this could
be a weakness, it was also an integral part of the characteristic strength of Florentine
trade, namely its ability to use different carriers and different trade routes, as needed.
Finally, with the Fourteenth Century Crisis, Florence's textile exports to the
Medit errane an, Levant included, grew in importance. However, many of the largest
Florentine companies disappeared at this stage, while Florence had not yet gained a
foothold of its own in the region beyond the diffuse merchant networks that it had
previously built.
Florence and the Exchange ofGoods in the Medieval Mediterranean
The trade in luxury goods had a centuries-long history in drawing together city-states
and principalities along routes which spanned the whole Eurasian continent.49 From
these beginnings, the increasing intensity of exchange among the cities and courts
48 Paolo Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the near East in the Late Middle Ages," Journal of European Economic History 16 (1987): 343. Malanima suggests that Pisan success in Mediterranean trade occurred precisely thanks to their involvement in the east-west trade routes. 49 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 327-330. The antiquity of the pattern of exchange taken over by the Mongols, as weIl as the importance of textiles within it, is discussed in: Thomas T. Allsen, Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles (Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1997).
24
around the Mediterranean would engender in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries a culture of conspicuous consumption shared by the cosmopolitan mercantile
and ruling classes aIl around this inland sea.50 There are numerous scattered references to
the importing of metalwork, furniture, glass and ceramics, carpets and precious textiles
in Florentine as much as in Venetian documents.51 Ifby the sixteenth century the sheer
volume ofthese imports from the east seems to have declined, their continuing influence
on consumption patterns and tastes are witnessed by the rise of a "veneto-saraceno"
handicraft style and by the production, in Tuscany as elsewhere, of metalwork and
furniture "alla domaschina" (à la Damascene).52 During the fifteenth cent ury Mamluk
ceramics from both Egypt and Syria were being exported to Europe (and into Medici
collections), both as individual items and as containers for the most expensive drugs and
spices.53 Chinese porcelains, long appreciated in Mamluk Egypt, where they were also
reproduced on a large sc ale, were purchased for the Medici Grand Dukes in Alexandria
and Damascus.54 Islamic met al crafts were even more appreciated and of greater
monetary value, witness the many specimens preserved in Tuscan museums and the
numerous references to ornate inlaid "Damascene vases" or vases "alla domaschina" in
inventories of the time.55
50 Michael J. Rogers, "To and Fro: Aspects of Mediterranean Trade and Consumption in the 15th and 16th Centuries," Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 55-56, no. 1-2 (1990): 57-61. 51 Marco Spallanzani, "Fonti Archivistiche per 10 Studio dei Rapporti fra l'Italia e l'Islam: Le Arti Minori nei Secoli XIV-XVI," in Arte Venéziana e Arte Islamica: Alti dei Primo Simposio Internazionale Sull'arte Veneziana e L'arte Islamica, ed. Ernst J. Grube (Venezia: L'Altra Riva, 1989),83. Metalwork, ceramics and glass were an important export from the eastern Mediterranean since the Middle Ages: David Abulafia, "Industrial Products: The Middle Ages," in Prodolti e Tecniche d'Oltremare nelle Economie Europee, Secc. XliI-XVIII: Alti Della Ventinovesima Settimana di Studi, [Prato] 14-19 Aprile 1997, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1998), 356. Note in particular Abulafia's reference to "hispanomoresque" tableware in Medicean Florence. 52 Spallanzani, "Fonti Archivistiche," 86-7. Marco Spallanzani, "Metalli Islamici nelle Collezioni Medicee dei Secoli XV-XVI," in Le Arti dei Principato Mediceo, ed. Candace Adelson (Firenze: SPES, 1980), 106, 109. 53 Marcus Milwright, "Pottery in the Written Sources of the Ayyubid-Mamluk Period (c. 567-923/1171-1517)," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 62, no. 3 (1999): 506-7, 511, 517. 54 Marco Spallanzani, "Ceramiche ne Ile Raccolte Medicee da Cosimo 1 a Ferdinando 1," in Le Arti dei Principato Mediceo, ed. Candace AdeIson (Firenze: SPES, 1980),74,81,91. Spallanzani also reports a gift in the late sixteenth century of a large vase from Istanbul, presumably a Turkish manufacture. Spallanzani, "Ceramiche ne lIe Raccolte Medicee," 85. 55 Giovanni Curatola, "Metalli Siriani al Museo Nazionale di Firenze," Il Veltro 28, no. 3-4 (1984): 300. Spallanzani, "Metalli Islamici," 98, 99, 100, 102, 106. Note the substantial monetary value of these collections, greatly superior to that of porcelains: 10-20 florins for a piece of metalwork against 0.5-2
25
The Oriental, and also more specifically Islamic, influence is clearest in the
consumption and later in the production of luxury fabrics. Islamic textiles and their
geometric patterns gained such currency that they were often depicted in medieval
Tuscan painting, from Guido da Siena's work (1270s), through Giotto's and Duccio di
Buoninsegna's (BOOs), to Filippo Lippi's (1430s), often complete with Arabic
inscriptions. 56 Lucca's luxurious silks are almost indistinguishable in design from
Sicilian and Egyptian Ayyubid models.57 Only accurate technical analysis can confirm
the attribution of gold and silver brocades to specific production areas in the Iberian or
Italian peninsula, the Middle East or Central Asia.58 Between the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, in fact, an international repertoire of silk designs was developed
which had wide currency from Central Asia to the Atlantic and mixed Chinoiserie
elements with Islamic motifs from before and after the Mongol conquest.59 Pomegranate
motifs, with their origin in Middle Eastern and Persian iconography, were fully
incorporated in Lucchese and then Florentine silk production.6o Specific pomegranate
motifs with their symbolism (regality and sacredness, but also resurrection and fertility)
were also incorporated in Tuscan and in Christian culture more in general, as witnessed
by Fra Angelico's and Botticelli's paintings of the "Madonna and Child with a
pomegranate."61 By the fourteenth century this repertoire also began to include sorne
motifs first developed in the Italian peninsula, particularly floral and vine leaf motifs, as
textiles produced there entered commercial circuits and began to reach into Central
florins for a ceramie vase. Note also that the importing of Islamic metalwork did not suffer as much of a de cline in the sixteenth century as that of ceramics. Spallanzani, "Metalli Islamiei," 1 08-9. 56 Cf. Alessandra Bagnera, "Tessuti Islamici nella Pittura Medievale Toscana," Islam - Storia e Civiltà 7, no. 4 (1988). The paintings had, of course, mostly religious subjects. Therefore the issue has been raised of the meaning of the numerous representations of the Virgin Mary wearing Islamic textiles with Arabie inscriptions. Partly, this was related to the pietorial realism ofthese representations (the textiles reproduced commonly bore epigraphic bands with Arabie inscriptions); but it was also partly related to the meaning ascribed to Arabie (decorative? or perhaps with other meanings?), hence its reproduction in a number of crafts: Curatola, "Metalli Siriani," 296-7. 57 Curatola, "Metalli Siriani," 298. 58 Anne E. Wardwell, "Panni Tartarici: Eastern Silks Woven with Gold and Silver (l3th and 14th Centuries)," Islamic Art 3 (1988-89): 95-6, 107-8. 59 Ibid.: 98-100,107,110,113. 60 Rosalia Bonito Fanelli, "The Pomegranate Motif in Italian Renaissance Silks: A Semiologieal Interpretation of Pattern and Color," in La Seta in Europa, Sec. XII-XX: Atti Della 'Ventiquattresima Settimana di Studi', 4-9 Maggio 1992, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1993),509-14. 61 Ibid., 521.
26
Asia.62 This exchange continued in the following centuries. Thus the ambassador of
Henry III of Castile reported in 1400 that sorne Florentine scarlet cloth had been
received as a gift at the court of Tamerlane.63 During the sixteenth century Florentine
luxury silks found favour at the Ottoman court and they began to be influenced by
Turkish motifs.64
The exchange of textiles was not limited to luxury items but included
increasingly larger quantities of more humble fabrics for mass consumption. The
manufacture of textiles became especially important to the medieval economy because
of the increasing volume of the exchange involved.65 It was part of a broader pattern of
exchange in commodities and manufactures which included grains, wool, silk, cotton,
linen, potash, alum, metals, coral and skins, variously used in the manufacture of
different varieties of textiles, of paper, of glass and of leather artefacts. This traffic was
complex and by no means just in one direction. If increasingly larger amounts of textiles
were brought from western Europe to the eastern Mediterranean, raw materials and
specie continued to flow to Levantine and North African markets.66 For Florence,
however, the exchange of textiles for raw materials with the eastern Mediterranean (as
weIl as with southern Italy, the Iberian peninsula and northern Europe), acquired great
significance already in the Middle Ages. Textiles would indeed become the mainstay of
the Florentine economy. Unlike Venice, which controlled the market in spices and could
pay cash for them, Florence developed important trade interests in Levantine markets as
an outlet for its textile production from a relatively early time. The volume and
62 WardwelI, "Panni Tartarici," 102, 108, 113-5. 63 Hidetoshi Hoshino, L'arte Della Lana in Firenze nel Basso Medioevo: Il Commercio Della Lana e Il Mercato dei Panni Fiorentini nei Seco/i XIII-XV (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1980), 189. 64 Louise W. Mackie, "Itatian Silks for the Ottoman Sultans," EJOS: Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies 31 (2001): 4, 6-9. Mackie distinguishes between two groups of these silks: those that exactly reproduced Turkish patterns and those that showed a clear influence of Ottoman on Florentine patterns. Both show a strong Turkish influence and a remarkable adaptation to the market for which they were destined. 65 Abulafia suggested, following Abu-Lughod, that the trade of the medieval Mediterranean showed a growing mutual interdependence based on the common enterprise of textile production. Abulafia, "Industrial Products," 358. Clothing and shelter, corresponding to very basic human needs, continued to create a large demand and to sustain a corresponding industry. Domenico Sella, "European Industries 1500-1700," in The Fontana Economie History of Europe: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla ([London]: Collins/Fontana, 1974),355-356. 66 Grain, cheese, honey, saffron, wine, coral were an integral part of the trade carried out by lesser cities David Abulafia, "The Levant Trade of the Minor Cities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Strengths and Weaknesses," Asian and African Studies (Tel Aviv) 22 (1988): 196-9.
27
significance of these trade interests, which were to grow over time, ultimately tied the
Florentine economy as much as the Venetian to the fortunes of other Mediterranean
economies.
The Peculiarities ofFlorence's Participation in Mediterranean Trade
Apart from Florence's heavy reliance on textile production (and banking) compared to
Venice, there were other profound differences in the manner in which they participated
in the Levantine trade. While not a "minor trading city," Florence lacked a full-fledged
navy of its own, as weIl as independent treaties and consular representation, hence it
ultimately faced many of the same challenges that cities like Marseilles, Messina and
Ancona did.67 Their merchants could only trade in Levantine ports under the flag and
consular protection of Pisa, Venice or Genoa. Florence, moreover, was landlocked and
even lacked its own port and vessels. Throughout the Middle Ages it only had access to
the sea through the ports of other cities. Pisa, just downstream on the Arno river at its
estuary on the Tyrrhenian sea (on the west coast of ltaly), would have been in many
ways the obvious choice for Florentine merchants. Yet relations between the two cities
were notoriously strained before Florence's eventual conque st of Pisa.68 Florentine
companies weathered these periods of hostility using other, much smaller, Tuscan ports
to ship their goods from the west coast of Italy.69 Ancona's port provided access to the
Adriatic sea (on the east coast of Italy). Therefore, in spite of sorne Florentine
participation in the crusades, its presence in the Levant and its involvement in Levantine
trade were fundamentally different from those of seafaring port cities such as Pisa,
Genoa or Venice. From the beginning, and in spite of subsequent changes, Florence's
influence upon the seas was indirect and was exerted through its manufacturing weight,
67 For this reason, Abulafia included Florence among the "minor cities" in the Levantine trade. Ibid.: 187. 68 The two cities fought numerous wars and skirmished throughout the Middle Ages. Their enmity took an ideological dimension as Pisa was in the Ghibelline (pro-emperor) camp, while Florence was in the Guelph (papal) camp in the conflict which opposed Holy Roman emperors to the Vatican on the issue of the primacy of spiritual over temporal power and also, more specifically, overlordship of the Italian penin sula. For a brief overview, together with reference to Pisan-Florentine wars, see John Lamer, Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch, 1216-1380 (London and New York: Longman, 1980),38-58. 69 Chiefamong these ports were Talamone (controlled by Siena), Piombino (with its own ruling family) and Motrone (controlled by Lucca). Federigo Melis, "Firenze è Stata Potenza Marittima?" Rivista dei Diritto della Navigazione 35, no. 1 (1969): 113-119.
28
financial institutions and diplomatic and mercantile networks.70 Its ability to utilize
different routes and different carriers as the need arose proved crucial to its success
within the Medieval economy.
Initially, Florentine presence in the eastern Mediterranean was modest.
Florence's trade was bound to be conducted through Pisan intermediaries, who were
powerfully entrenched in the region. Pisan supremacy in Levantine trade had been
achieved during the twelfth cent ury, when it had gained an important advantage in the
crusader states and a decisive presence in Acre.71 It also managed to achieve an enviable
position in Ayyübid Egypt, through several treaties which granted it substantial trading
privileges.72 Alone of aIl western merchants, Pisans had a funduq in Cairo as weIl as in
Alexandria, a clear testament to their integration in the commercial life of Egypt.73
During the course of the thirteenth cent ury, however, they lost this privileged position.
The shifting of Central Asian trade routes towards the north which led to a vigorous
revival of the Black Sea trade favoured the Genoese, who were st ronger in that area.74
Part of the reason for Pisa's decline might also have rested in its failure to capitalize on
the growing importance of the textile trade. While Genoa and Venice thrived by
marketing French, Flemish and Lombard fabrics, the expanding Tuscan textile industry,
centred chiefly around Lucca and Florence, did not always use Pisan ships.75 English
wool came to Florence on Genoese ships. Florentine textiles could be exported to the
kingdom of Naples on land routes. Transportation of c10th by sea was provided by
Genoa, Venice and Ancona, as weIl as by Pisa. The Tuscan textile industry, moreover,
was not as yet so important. The thirteenth cent ury saw the rise to prominence of the
Flemish, northern French and Lombard towns, with Tuscany as yet only in a subsidiary
position. For most of the thirteenth cent ury, the Tuscan-inc1uding Florentine
production of woollen textiles was still of low quality and their sales were mostly
70 Melis suggested that Florence could, paradoxically, be counted as a naval power in the sense that it indirectly controlled several ports and was able to mobilize commercial and occasionally war vessels as the need arose. Ibid.: 111-112. 71 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes," 340-1, 343. 72 Ibid.: 339-40. See documents l, II and III in the second series, Amari, Diplomi Arabi, 239-249. 73 The comparison with other merchants is made by Malanima. Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes," 340. 74 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 109-121, Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes," 345, 349. 75 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes," 350-6.
29
limited to the ltalian peninsula. The high-end markets throughout the Mediterranean
were dominated by the Flemish and Northern French textiles of the "Old Drapery"
industry, coIlectively known as panni fTanceschi. 76 By the time ofits defeat at the hands
of the Genoese at the battle of the Meloria in 1283, followed by its ousting from Acre in
1291, Pisa's decline was sealed.
Florence's continued success, both against Pisa and vis-à-vis other trading
centres, testifies both to its rising manufacturing primacy and to its ability to mobilize
merchant networks to redirect its trade as needed. While completely lacking a navy of
its own, as weIl as its own funduqs or colonies in the eastern Mediterranean, Florence
had begun establishing its presence in the form of a dense network of agents for
merchant houses engaged in commerce and money lending. Pisan attempts to establish
permanent and secure trade routes via Ancona and Dubrovnik into the Balkans during
the twelfth century had faHed because of Venetian opposition.77 However, trade with
Ancona continued because of the accessibility of its port from Tuscany. Florentine
goods to be shipped to the Levant by Venice, bypassing Pisa, would have had to go
through Ancona. Florence also continued ties with Dubrovnik, solidifying its merchant
networks in the Balkans. Already during the first half of the thirteenth cent ury important
Florentine companies such as the Bardi, Peruzzi, Acciaiuoli and Buonaccorsi aIl had
representatives there. 78
By the late thirteenth century Florentine merchants were also active in the
Eastern Mediterranean, mostly in surviving crusading states such as Lesser Armenia or
Cyprus, but also thanks to links with local Christian churches.79 Thus we find that many
of the same important companies were active in the Levant too. Francesco Balducci
Pegolotti, the author of the weIl-known merchant manual, was stationed in Cyprus for
76 Hoshino, L'arte della Lana, 37-41, 46-9. Sergio Tognetti, "Attività lndustriali e Commercio di Manufatti nelle Città Toscane deI Tardo Medioevo (1250 Ca. - 1530 Ca.)," Archivio Storico Italiano 159, no. 2 (2001): 428-9. 77 Abulafia, "The Levant Trade," 195. Krekié mentions in passing the 1169 trade pact between Pisa and Dubrovnik. BarH~a Krekié, "1 Mercanti e Produttori Toscani di Panni di Lana a Dubrovnik (Ragusa) nella Prima Metà deI Quattrocento," in Produzione, Commercio e Consumo dei Panni di Lana (nei Seco/i XIIXVIII), ed. Marco Spallanzani (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1971), 708. 78 Krekié, "Mercanti e Produttori Toscani," 708. 79 At this time a number of trading cities, Florence included, were able to gain privileges in the area. Abulafia, "The Levant Trade," 192-3. See also Silvano Borsari, "L'espansione Economica Fiorentina nell'Oriente Cristiano Sino alla Metà deI Trecento," Rivista Storica Italiana 70, no. 4 (1958): 486.
30
several years as a representative of the Bardi company, for example.8o From the Bardi
and the Peruzzi, to the Acciaiuoli, the Alfani and the Alberti, most of the major
Florentine companies of the thirteenth and early fourteenth century had subsidiaries in
Cyprus, Rhodes and sorne also in Constantinople, from where they engaged in banking
and trade.81 Banking involved chiefly lending to ecclesiastical authorities (both to the
papacy itself in its dealings with the Levant and to local authorities in the eastern
churches), as weIl as to local rulers such as the king of CypruS.82 Trade involved a
variety of commodities (grain, for ex ample ) and manufactures, especially textiles.
Levantine textiles continued to be exported to the west. For example, in the early
fourteenth century the Peruzzi were purchasing textiles in Cyprus for sale at the
Neapolitan court and in Sicily.83 They also traded in Florentine products and in cloth
from northern Europe. Woollens were central to this trade and it was on these markets
that Florentine prosperity would be built.84
The Fourteenth Century Crisis and Florence's Changed Position in Mediterranean Trade
Further changes in international trade created more opportunities for Florence. The
outbreak of the Hundred Years War and the subsequent end of the Champagne fairs had
momentous consequences. It was at this time that Florentine commercial interests in the
Levant took the basic shape that they were to preserve, through ups and downs, over the
next two centuries. The Flemish textile industry ran into difficulties at the beginning of
the fourteenth cent ury, also because of the reduction in supplies of English wool. The
Florentine economy-with its financial, commercial and textile interests-did not
escape the Fourteenth Century Crisis. The collapse of the Bardi and Peruzzi houses in
the 1 340s, both huge international companies with interests in trade as weIl as in
banking, showed the strains under which the two companies operated and had profound
80 Francesco Pagnini deI Ventura, Della Decima e di Varie A/tre Grandezze Imposte da/ Comune di Firenze. Della Moneta e della Mercatura de' Fiorentini Fino al Sec% XVI, 2 vols. (Bologna: Fomi Editore, 1967), III :71. 81 Borsari, "L'espansione Fiorentina in Oriente," 488, 490-500. Note, however, that penetration into Byzantine markets was limited by Venice. Borsari, "L'espansione Fiorentina in Oriente," 504-5. 82 Borsari, "L'espansione Fiorentina in Oriente," 494-504. 83 Ibid.: 491. 84 Hoshino highlighted the importance of Mediterranean outlets for the Florentine woollen industry. Hoshino, L'arte della Lana, 34, 46, 65-6, 80-1.
31
repercussions on the Florentine economy as a who le. 85 Like aIl other producers, Florence
was affected by the devastations of the 1348 plague and oflater outbreaks of the disease.
It was also profoundly shaken by the "Tumulto dei Ciompi," the wool-workers uprising
of 1378. But during the course of the fourteenth cent ury, like some other towns in
Tuscany and northern Italy, Florence found itself in a position to shore up its economy
by import substitution.86
How was this position achieved? An advantageous position in trade routes,
together with wide merchant networks, enabled Florence to gain from the crisis. More
and more of the expensive silks that had been bought in the Middle East for re-sale in
northern Europe, for ex ample, were substituted by locally-made fabrics, mostly from
Lucca.87 Florence did not have at this time a significant silk industry capable of
competing on international markets.88 The Florentine woollen industry, on the other
hand, found itself in an ideal position to substitute its product for that of the northern
French and Flemish industries in the re-export trade from north to south. The "Tumulto
dei Ciompi" might weIl have added to rising labor costs after the plague. Changing
conditions of trade and an advantageous position in trade routes then favoured one
particular solution to escape this impasse.89 Florentine commercial houses, in fact,
played a major role in the export of English wool to Flanders and of Flemish cloth to
Mediterranean markets.90 Sometime this cloth was exported unfinished to Florence,
85 Edwin Hunt suggested that the traditional explanation, default by the English king, who was one of their main creditors, is only a partial explanation. Both companies were facing financial troubles of their own. Cf. Edwin S. Hunt, "A New Look at the Dealings of the Bardi and Peruzzi with Edward III," The Journal of Economie History 50, no. 1 (1990). 86 Tognetti, "Attività Industriali e Commercio," 431-3. Increased competition on international markets thus added to the already very highly competitive conditions within Tuscany itself, leaving fewer prosperous and fully autonomous towns. Florence was already on its way to become the paramount centre in Tuscany 87 van der Wee, "Structural Changes," 24-5. 88 Bruno Dini, "L'industria Serica in Italia. Secc.XIII-XV," in La Seta in Europa, Sec. XII-XX: Atti Della 'Ventiquattresima Settimana di Studi', 4-9 Maggio 1992, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1993), 69-70, 72. Florence was a latecomer to silk cloth production in the Italian penin sula, lagging behind Lucca, Bologna and Veniee. 89 High labour costs alone do not explain why Florence moved into the production of expensive luxury textiles, that is. The industry could have gone into total decline at this stage. Simmering social conflict could have continued with the same intensity it took at the time of the uprising. An opportunity to move into this market must have existed, as weIl as a practical necessity. 90 Balducci-Pegolotti's career in the service of the Bardi company is telling. We have seen above that he had been stationed in Cyprus. We also know that in l317-21 he was based in England, where he dealt in raw wool from English monasteries, much ofwhich was re-sold in Flanders (many of the priees for English
32
where local artisans dyed it. Florentine merchants were therefore in an ideal position to
ship the wool directly to Florence and encourage the production of cloth for export in
their city.91 During the fourteenth cent ury, then, Florentine woollens progressively
increased in both quality and price and displaced the Flemish product first and chiefly on
Italian and especially south Italian markets (Naples), but also to sorne extent in the
lberian peninsula and in the Levant (Damascus and Alexandria).92 AIso, by the end of
the fourteenth cent ury, we increasingly find Florentine merchants directly marketing
their products in Alexandria, whereas in previous times this market had been a
secondary concern compared to their activities in Tunis, Rhodes or CypruS.93
Florence entered the fifteenth cent ury, therefore, with an improved position on
Mediterranean, including Levantine, markets. Between the second half of the fourteenth
century and the 1430s there was a contraction in the total quantity of textiles produced
in Florence.94 However, its product range shifted up market and for the first time
Florence gained a leading position in luxury woollen textiles.95 The Florentine industry,
however, did not stop the production of cheaper fabrics altogether. A whole range of
fabrics, in fact, were exported to the Levantine markets of Alexandria, Damascus,
Tripoli and Aleppo during the fifteenth century.96 Florence too continued to export a
wool that he quoted in his manual, though accurate, were relative to the Flemish market). Cf. John Paul Bischoff, "Pegolotti: An Honest Merchant?" Journal of European Economic History 6, no. 1 (1977). He was also in Bruges, dealing in this trade. Hoshino, L 'arte Della Lana, 121. 91 Tognetti, "Attività Industriali e Commercio," 433-434. 92 Hidetoshi Hoshino, "The Rise of the Florentine Woollen Industry in the Fourteenth Century," in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe, ed. N. B. Harte and K. G. Ponting (London: Heinemann Educational, 1983), 184-9, 197-204. Hoshino, L 'arte Della Lana, 176, 186-8,202. 93 Hidetoshi Hoshino, "1 Mercanti Fiorentini ad Alessandria d'Egitto nella Seconda Metà deI Trecento," in Industria Tessile e Commercio Internazionale nella Firenze dei Tardo Medioevo, ed. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Firenze: Leo S. OIschki, 2001), 104-5. 94 Exact figures are controversial. Hoshino suggested the figure of 20,000 to 30,000 pieces per year for the decades before the plague (down from the often quoted figure of 75,000 based on the chronicIer Giovanni VilIani's estimate). Production then would have further shrunk to 11,000 to 12,000 pieces by the 1430s. Hoshino, L'arte della Lana, 203-6. See also the lengthy footnote 37 in Tognetti, "Attività Industriali e Commercio," 435. 95 Hoshino discounted the idea that Florentine textiles were involved in the process of dumping on Levantine markets in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries suggested by Ashtor. Hoshino, L'arte della Lana, 187-8. See especially the lengthy footnote 115, where he also questions sorne of the prices arrived at by Ashtor. 96 Cf. Eliyahu Ashtor, "L'exportation de Textiles Occidentaux dans le Proche Orient Musulman Au Bas Moyen Age," in Studi in Memoria di Federigo MeUs (Napoli: Giannini, 1978). This is a detailed compilation ofsurviving records of transactions involving western textiles on Levantine markets and of the prices fetched by the different types oftextiles.
33
range of textiles.97 It was also during this period that Florentine production became
standardized on two lines: the top-quality San Martino cloth (panni di San Martino) and
the cheaper, medium-quality Garbo cloth (panni dei garbo).98 At this time, however,
demographic factors conspired with geographical ones to set limits to the amount of
woollens that could be sold on Mediterranean-as opposed to North European,
Anatolian and Balkan-markets.99 Another set of limitations, as far as the Levant was
concemed, had to do with the exchange that Florence and Mamluk domains could
actually effect to their mutual profit. The few complete records of business transactions
that have survived give us an idea of the kind of exchange taking place. Florentine
merchants took metal (silver, tin) but most of all wool cloth to Alexandria. They came
back with spices (pepper, but also sugar), raw materials (dyes, linen) and jewels (mostly
pearls, but also rubies).IOO For foreign merchants, spices reaching Egypt via the Red Sea
were indeed the main item to be had at Alexandria. The great challenge Florentines
faced was in marketing those spices in Europe in the face ofVenetian competition.
The Fifteenth Centwy: the Florentine Republic and the Rise of Ottoman Power
During the course of the fifteenth century Florentine involvement in the Levant
continued to expand. There was, at the same time, a concerted attempt on the part of
Florence to gain full control of its trade: it began to negotiate its own commercial
privileges and also attempted to develop its own navy.101 It was a typical case of state
involvement in merchant capitalism which characterized the high middle ages. 102 But
97 Ibid., 312-7. 98 Hoshino, L' arte della Lana, 206-11. The panni di garbo used western Mediterranean, chiefly Spanish wool. Only the panni di San Martino used by statute English wool, and high-grade English wool in particular. For the important distinctions in quality in English wool, see Hoshino, "Rise of the Florentine Woollen Industry," 191-7. 99 Full recovery from the demographic and economic slump caused by the Black Death would not be achieved until the middle of the fifteenth century. These broad demographic and economic trends are dealt with in the second section below, with a particular focus on the Balkans and the Levant. 100 Hoshino computed that the value of goods purchased in Alexandria by one Michele di Francesco Chele was distributed thus: spices 45%, raw materials 31%, jewels 24%. Hoshino, "1 Mercanti Fiorentini ad Alessandria," 103-4, 110. lOI It moved, that is, one step further than the third phase of the trajectory outlined by Abulafia whereby "minor trading cities" moved from partnership to trading under a flag of convenience, and then began to negotiate their own privileges. Abulafia, "The Levant Trade," 185. 102 Abu-Lughod, Belore European Hegemony, 113 and 128.
34
Florence was a latecomer to this game and it had to contend with sorne very powerful
established players, Venice above aIl. Venetian domination of eastern Mediterranean
trade routes, it has been recognized, was never complete. Indeed, Catalans and most of
aIl the Genoese challenged it whenever they could, with Mamluk encouragement. It left,
however, little room for minor contenders such as Florence. I03 The first chapter sub
section below deals with the growing competition between Florence and Venice in the
Levantine trade and with the situation that developed soon after the fall of
Constantinople. While Venice maintained a strong grip on trade with the Mamluk
domains, Florence enjoyed a period of cooperation with the rising Ottoman empire for a
while, satisfying a common need to keep the Venetians at bay. Florence then gained
access to expanding markets which it could reach through Balkan land routes (after only
a brief sea crossing) which were relatively safer from Venetian interference.
1 describe in sorne detail the pattern of trade established between Florence and
the Ottomans in the second chapter sub-section below. The Ottoman trade became
crucially important for the Florentine economy as it moved beyond the impasse observed
above. By the end of the fifteenth century, under Ottoman auspices, Florence was at the
centre of a two-way trade between north-western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean
based on the exchange of wool and woollen cloth for raw silk and silk clotho Florentine
companies imported wool from northern and western Europe (England and the Iberian
peninsula) and manufactured woollen cloth which they then exported around the
Mediterranean, particularly to Ottoman domains. There they were paid chiefly in raw
silk (as well as in dyes, carpets and camelots). Raw silk was used in Florence to
manufacture silk cloth which was then sold in northwestern and central Europe (but also
locally and on Ottoman markets). This pattern of trade conveniently bypassed the need
to sell spices on the retum journey from Alexandria and gave Florentine companies an
opportunity to realize double profits. Finally, 1 consider the diplomatie wrangling at the
103 Cf. Eliyahu Ashtor, "The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-Colonialism?" Journal of European Economic His/ory 3, no. 1 (1974). The idea of Venetian supremacy was tirst suggested by Scammel and this paper argues that it should be toned down, pointing to the limitations, as weIl as the strength, of Venetian presence in the Levant. For Catalan trade see Eliyahu Ashtor, "Catalan Cloth on the Late Medieval Mediterranean Markets," Journal of European Economic His/ory 17, no. 2 (1988).
35
end of the century which involved the fugitive Djem Sultan. While revealing the
fickleness of diplomatie alliances, including the Florentine-Ottoman one, the Djem
Sultan affair suggests that so long as the balance of power around the Mediterranean
remained unaltered and trade continued, episodes such as these were less likely to spiral
into an open confrontation.
Florence and Venice between Mamluk and Ottoman Alliances
At the beginning of the cent ury, Florence was stilliargely dependent upon other cities
for its trade with the Levant. The extent of this dependence is borne out by the statistics
about vessels unloading goods in the port of Beirut which can be assembled from Tuscan
archives. In the fifteen years between 1394 and 1408, Venice and Genoa dominated this
trade with approximately 270 deliveries each. They were followed closely by Catalan
carriers, with approximately 220 visits, and only distantly by Tuscan and by Provençal
cities, who se own vessels reached Beirut only 30 times during the same period. 104
Venetian domination over Levantine trade routes was only to grow in the course of the
cent ury. So was the importance of Levantine markets for Florence and hence its
dependence upon Venice. In 1423 the Doge Tommaso Mocenigo reminded Venetians
that every year Florence forwarded to their city 16,000 pieces of wool cloth for
distribution aIl around the Mediterranean: to North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Cyprus and to
the Balkans. lOs Slowly but steadily, Venice had also began to marginalize the Genoese in
the Levantine trade, leaving Florence ever more dependent upon Venetian vessels and
merchants alone to carry its goods. Just how problematic this dependence was felt to be
in Florence becomes clear when we consider the effort and expense that was lavished on
the development of independent trade links and vessels.
104 Federigo Melis, "Note Sur le Mouvement du Port de Beyrouth d'après la Documentation Florentine aux Environs de 1400," in Sociétés et Compagnies de Commerce en Orient et dans l'Ocean Indien: Actes du Huitème Colloque International D'histoire Maritime (Beyrouth - 5-10 Septembre 1966), ed. Michel MoHat (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1970),372. 105 Franz Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici e la Corte Ottomana," Archivio Storico Italiano 121, no. 3 (1963): 306. Strangely, Inalcik quoted the same source as reporting that 15,000 pieces of cloth were sent from Florence to Venice. inalcik, Economic and Social His/ory, 230. Babinger based this statement on work by S. Romanin. This is a high number in any case. It is not, however, totally incompatible with Hoshino's estimates (see above). It might simply suggest that the recovery in the output of woollens was weil underway by the 1420s. In the second half of the century it would eventuaHy reach the 18,000/20,000 mark (see below).
36
Florentine access to the sea improved dramatically with the conquest of Pisa in
1406, followed in 1421 by the purchase ofPisa's ports (Porto Pisano and Livomo) from
the Genoese for the staggering sum of 100,000 florins. That same year the office of the
"Consoli deI Mare" (the Sea Consuls) was instituted. Their task consisted in the
administration of the maritime infrastructure and, more broadly, in furthering foreign
trade. Work had already begun on the restoration of Pisa's naval arsenal. In 1421 the
construction began of a galley fleet with the aim of establishing a state-run system of
commercial freight based on the Venetian model. It was the beginning of a "commercial
offensive" aimed at aggressively furthering Florentine trade. 106 ln 1421 Florence
obtained from the Mamluks the transfer of Pisan commercial privileges to itself. 107
Between 1422 and 1424, aIl the initial trips of the gaIleys were to Alexandria. 108 The
very focus on this destination clearly shows the importance attached by Florentines to
the Egyptian market at this time. From the beginning, two routes were planned which
were meant to be complementary-westward, towards the Iberian peninsula and past
Gibraltar, with its ultimate destination England; and eastward, towards southem Italy
and Sicily, with its ultimate destination the Levant. 109 ln the late fourteenth century
there had been a clear need to market Egyptian spices obtained in exchange for cloth by
Florentine merchants. 11O The gaIley system answered this need: in their westward
joumeys they brought spices to northem Europe and retumed with wool and clotho
106 Michael E. Mallett, The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); 22. Vedovato also commented on the daring of Florentine efforts to gain access to distant markets: Giuseppe Vedovato, "Note sui Privilegi Capitolari Fiorentini deI Secolo XV," Arehivio Storieo ltaliano 97, no. 1 (1939): 174. 107 See document XXXVI, tirst series and document XXXVI second series in Amari, Diplomi Arabi, 151-164, 326-330. The treatise was signed in October 1421. It mentions Bartolomeo di Giacomo de Galea as Florentine ambassador. The tirst and second articles of the treaty specitically mention "Florentines and Pisans" (in that order), while subsequent ones only mention Pisans, suggesting this was a text adapted from previous treatises. 108 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 38. A letter of instructions to the Florentine ambassadors bound for Alexandria (Carlo di Francesco di Federighi and Felice di Michele Brancacci) told them to announce the intention to ship goods directly to Alexandria in Florentine ships ("intentione nostra di navigare con galee, et portare delle nostre cose ... et che insino a qui non s'è navicato, è per non avere avuto marina: ma che ora l'abbiamo per l'acquisto di Pisa"). Document XXXVII, second series Amari, Diplomi Arabi, 331-335. This tirst embassy did not obtain much. However, trips continued and so did negotiations. Note also the instruction in this letter to present the Florentines as friends of the Venetians and to try and obtain any benefits which the Venetians enjoyed over and above Pisan privileges. 109 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 62. 110 Hoshino, "1 Mercanti Fiorentini ad Alessandria," 101, 105.
37
Figure 2: Routes of the Florentine Galleyslll
111 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 282-283, map2.
38
They thus formed an essential complement to the Levantine trade. They had sorne
commercial success, but most of aIl they served as a diplomatie tool and carried
ambassadors back and forth from Alexandria and later from Istanbul. 1 12
Trade negotiations were also opened in 1422 with the Byzantine emperor. They
dragged on for many years and would not come to fruition until after the Council of
Florence in 1439. This was at least in part because the Florentines had failed to respond
to a Byzantine request for aid against Bayezid 1. ll3 lndeed, the fortunes of Florence's
Levantine trade were to rise with the strengthening of Ottoman power. Already in 1455,
only two years after the fall of Constantinople, formaI negotiations were underway
between Florence and Mehmet II. Florence soon obtained a commercial treatise from
him. 114 But Florence also found itself in an increasingly difficult diplomatie position in
the Italian peninsula as cries for a crusade against the Ottomans were raised by the
Papacy and the Venetians. We can see here the importance of Florence's peculiar
position in the eastem Mediterranean for its relationship with the rising Ottoman empire
and with Venice. While Venice had numerous scattered territories and ports to
safeguard-and was naturally alarmed by Ottoman expansionism-Florence had
exclusively commercial interests in the region and could only bene fit from good
diplomatie relations with the new rulers in Constantinople. IIS Mehmet II might weIl
have been aware of these differences and have kept up his overtures to the Florentines in
112 Armando Sapori, "1 Primi Viaggi di Levante e di Ponente Delle Galere Fiorentine," Archivio Storico Italiano 114, no. 1 (1956): 73-87. Mallett, by contrast, played up both the diplomatie importance of the galleys and their commercial use, at least in guaranteeing supplies of key raw materials such as wool and dyes. Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 19,61,63, 113. 113 The request had come in 1401 and would have soured relations for many years thereafter.Vedovato, "Note sui Privilegi Capitolari Fiorentini dei Secolo XV," 176-8. Venetian opposition might weil have played a part too, since Venice was strongly entrenched in Constantinople. A letter sent to emperor Manuel Paleologus in 1401 stated that war with the ruler of Milan prevented Florence from intervening elsewhere. Document C, MUller, Documenti, 148. 114 This treatise has not survived. MUller suggested that a treatise re-published by Pagnini dei Ventura in his well-known manual could be a copy of the treatise granted by Mehmet II. MUller, Documenti, 496-7. However, this attribution was challenged by Camerani, who has suggested a later date (1513) for the treatise published by Pagnini. Sergio Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati Commerciali fra la Toscana e i Turchi," Archivio Storico [taliano 97, no. 2 (1939): 85-7. 115 Vedovato, "Note sui Privilegi Capitolari Fiorentini dei Secolo XV," 180. Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 83. Sapori, "1 Primi Viaggi," 71-2. This point was first made by Wilhelm Heyd: Hidetoshi Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino nell'Impero Ottomano: Costi e Pofitti Negli Anni 1484-1488," in Industria Tessi/e e Commercio Internazionale ne/la Firenze dei Tardo Medioevo, ed. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2001), 115.
39
order to undermine Venetian plans. If this was the case, the plan seems to have worked.
The idea of a crusade had its followers in Florence, sorne as highly placed as First
Chancellor Benedetto Accolti. 116 However, already in the late 1450s expanding trade
was reducing their sway.1l7 Through most of the sultanate of Mehmet II both economic
and diplomatic relations between Florence and the Ottoman empire were consolidated,
with profound implications for Florence's position in Mediterranean affairs.
Ignoring papal requests was difficult, given the business that many Florentine
banks, not just the Medici's, conducted with the Papacy (and in later years, the contract
for the alum mines at Tolfa). Therefore, during the pontificate of Pius II and beyond,
Florence maintained a careful balance between paying Hp service to a new crusade
against "infidels" and its commercial interests in the lands of these same "infidels." But
it proved increasingly difficult to toe the line with Venice too. For aIl intents and
purposes, the two cities were becoming rivaIs in certain branches of Levantine trade.
Already in 1451 disputes between them had led to the expulsion of Florentine merchants
from Venice and from the 1450s there are hardly any records of shipments of Florentine
cloth to Venice for re-export. 118 Tension continued to rise after the fall of
Constantinople, as Venice denounced Florentine reluctance to cooperate against the
Ottomans. The Florentine galleys were put to good use at this juncture. While Venetian
state galleys were banned from Istanbul for 25 years after 1453, the Florentine galleys
kept up their visits as best as they could. 119 Over the next years the number of galleys
regularly departing from Florence bound for Istanbul increased from one to three. 120 The
state galleys also proved invaluable at this time as a diplomatic too1. In 1460 Francesco
1\6 This is Robert Black's main contention in interpreting Acccolti's history of the First Crusade, written in the 1460s. Robert Black, "La Storia della Prima Crociata di Benedetto Accolti e la Diplomazia Fiorentina Rispetto ail 'Oriente," Archivio Storico Italiano 131 (1973): 20-1. Black's argument offers a counterbalance to the picture provided by other authors, who have exclusively focused on Florentine commercial interests and pragmatism. Vedovato, "Note sui Privilegi Capitolari Fiorentini dei Secolo XV," 180-1. Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 83. 117 Black, "La Storia della Prima Crociata," 10-1. 118 Hoshino, L'arte della Lana, 245-246. 119 According to Mallett the galleys were instrumental in ousting the Venetians as the predominant trading colony in Constantinople. Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 19, 151. 120 inalcik, "Ottoman Galata," 318. lnalcik notes that between 1454 and 1461 there were three yearly trips.
40
Vettori, the commander of the galley fleet, entertained Mehmet II on board his ship.12l
Most importantly, the pacification and expansion of land routes crossing the Balkans
facilitated the Florentine-Ottoman trade more than Florence's own galleys or those of
other navies. In fact, with the consolidation of Ottoman power in the Balkans and with
the granting of special commercial privileges to Dubrovnik, the latter city became a hub
for caravans traveling throughout the Balkans, reaching as far as Adrianople and
Istanbul. The old trade route from Tuscany to Ancona and to Dubrovnik could thus lead
aIl the way to Istanbul, with only a brief sea crossing between Ancona and Dubrovnik.
The increased co st of land travel was compensated for by savings on maritime insurance.
As Ottoman naval power grew, the safety of even the brief crossing of the Adriatic
between Ancona and Dubrovnik increased.
FormaI diplomatic and commercial ties between Florence and the Ottoman
empire were instituted during the 1460s and included a permanent Florentine consulate
in Istanbul.122 More important still, informaI ties were particularly strong at this
juncture.123 Benedetto Dei, the chronicler who was active as informaI ambassador and
spy in Istanbul until at least 1466, was on the rise as a confidant of Mehmet 11. 124 The
trust put in him by the Conqueror might weIl have been due to the help he provided
against Venice. Rumours were circulated that the Florentines sold weapons to the
Ottomans and even that they helped them by providing information about the Venetians
after the outbreak of hostilities between Venice and the Sultan in 1463.125 Benedetto
121 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 68-9. The episode was related by Benedetto Dei and the relative section ofhis chronicle is reported by Pagnini deI Ventura: Pagnini deI Ventura, Della Decima, II:253. 122 Inalcik, building on work by Wilhelm Heyd, thought that the Florentines only obtained a bailo or consul in the Ottoman capital under Bayezid II, in the 1480s. inalcik, "Ottoman Galata," 322. However, there are indications that Florentines had a consul much earlier. According to Benedetto Dei, the Sultan requested from the "Chonsolo de Fiorentini" that Florentines should take part in victory celebrations in 1462. Pagnini deI Ventura, Della Decima, II:255. A copy of a letter has survived in Florentine archives addressed to Mainardo Ubaldino, "consuli Perae." It is dated 29th April 1469 and commends previous work done by the same Ubaldino, asking him to put an end to disorders among Florentines in Pera. Document CLXIII Müller, Documenti, 210. From these references it is not clear, however, whether this consul was fully recognized by Ottoman authorities or else only held an informaI appointment. 123 According to Babinger, Florentine consuls only dealt with commercial affairs, while diplomatic issues were left to special embassies or informaI contacts such as Benedetto Dei (until 1466) and a certain Pagolo da Colle, who Babinger argues acted as a spy after 1466. Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 359. 124 Inalcik suggests that Dei was in close relations with Mehmet II until 1472. inalcik, "Ottoman Galata," 318. 125 Black, "La Storia Della Prima Crociata," 16-7. Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 83.
41
Dei's own chronicle would later claim as much. 126 As Florence moved closer to the
Ottomans, its relations with Venice continued to sour. In 1467 Venice intercepted and
looted Florentine vessels returning from Istanbul. I27 Florence continued to trade using a
combination of other commercial carriers, both her own and from other cities. 128 The
growing animosity was compounded by conflict over Italian affairs, culminating in the
brief war waged by Florence against Venice and the mercenary commander Colleoni in
1468.129 The Ottoman alliance resulted in sorne positive diplomatic gains too. The
Medicis reaped the benefits of close diplomatic ties with the Ottomans in 1479, when
the assassin of Giuliano de' Medici sought refuge in Istanbul after the "Congiura dei
Pazzi," the botched attempt by a rival faction to oust the Medicis from power. The
Ottoman authorities had him arrested and sent to Florence. 130
The Florentine-Ottoman Trade
The greatest benefits of Florence's close ties with the Ottoman empire, however, were
economic. It was the strength of the se shared trade interests that tied Florentine to
Ottoman politics. During the second half of the century, in fact, we see a reorientation of
Florentine commercial interests in the eastem Mediterranean. For a variety ofreasons
including continuing Venetian influence in the region-Florentine commerce did not
exp and significantly in Mamluk domains. The most important changes that took place in
the manufacture and trade of Florentine textiles at this time developed out of Florentine
Ottoman relations. The Florentine textile industry, as we have seen above, found a way
to weather the Fourteenth Century Crisis. However, it is crucial to note that the
126 Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 311-2. See, for example, Dei's claim that in 1464 Florentine spies warned the Sultan against a naval raid planned by the Venetians and that in 1466 sorne letters fell in the hands of the "Chonsolo de' Fiorentini" (incidentally, another mention of a Florentine consul) about Venetian plans against the Levant, which he duly forwarded to the Sultan. Pagnini deI Ventura, Della Decima, II:257, 259. 127 inalcik, "Ottoman Galata," 319. 128 Between 1467 and 1469, for example, Florentines continued to trade thanks to the Genoese. Ibid. 129 Mallett, The Florentine Gal/eys, 34. Florence mobilized fifteen war galleys against Venice. 130 Document CLXXXIX, part A. Müller, Documenti, 225. This is a letter dated June-July 1479 to the Consul in Pera. It states that a letter by Berbardo Peruzzi had informed the Signoria in Florence that the Sultan had arrested Bernardo Bandini, the murderer of Giuliano de' Medici, and that it was immediately despatching Antonio de' Medici to express gratitude to the Sultan and to bring Bandini back to Florence. It also expresses displeasure at the fact that news of the arrest had not come from the consul himself. It continues for several pages with detailed instructions regarding the affairs of the community of Florentine merchants in Pera.
42
quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) output of the Florentine textile industry would
only fully recover from the 1450s onwards, approaching pre-plague levels by the end of
the fifteenth century.131 The quantitative recovery achieved by the Florentine woollen
industry in the second half of the fifteenth century happened in large part thanks to an
expansion into Ottoman markets, which became the main consumers for Florentine
Garbo cloth. 132
The Guanti company, which had Bartolomeo di Piero di Simone di Guanti as its
agent in Bursa between 1484 and 1488, was typical of the 50 to 60 small woollen cloth
firms from Florence which were active in the Ottoman empire at the close of the
century.133 The relatively small size of the firm and its low profit margins point to a
signific ant departure from the thirteenth and early fourteenth century world of
Florentine capitalism, which had been dominated by giant firms such as the Bardi or the
Peruzzi. 134 The success of the Ottoman trade was also due to the fact that it bypassed
another central problem of the Florentine-Mamluk trade. This was the marketing of
spices which for Florentines were the main good to be had in Alexandria in exchange for
woollen clotho It added, also, a new element of profitability. Part of the reason why
companies such as the Guanti managed to stay in business was that they could easily
realize profits twice. This was thanks to developments in the Florentine silk industry
which created a demand for raw silk in Florence. In fact, the Florentine silk industry too
was significantly affected by Florentine-Ottoman relations. Both the differences in its
evolution compared to the wool industry and the complementary relationship that these
two industries had with each other are worthy of notice.
131 Hoshino estimates at least 17,000 pieces were produced in 1488 and quotes an estimate by Benedetto Varchi for 20,000 to 23,000 pieces per year for the second half of the fifteenth century. By the end of the century, that is, output was approaching once more the pre-plague levels, which Hoshino estimated amounted to between 20,000 and 30,000 pieces per year Hoshino, L'arle della Lana, 238-40. 132 Ibid., 240-3. Until the end of the century, most "San Martino" c\oth went to Mamluk markets, while most "Garbo" cloth went to Ottoman markets. Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino," 115. \33 Hidetoshi Hoshino and Maureen Fennell Mazzaoui, "Ottoman Markets for Florentine Woollen Cloth in the Late Fifteenth Century," International Journal ofTurkish Studies 3 (1985-6): 17,24. 134 This is contrary to what was assumed by Ashtor. See E\iyahu Ashtor, "Les Lainages dans l'Orient Médiéval: Emploi, Production, Commerce," in Produzione, Commercio e Consumo dei Panni di Lana (nei Seco/i XI/-XVII/), ed. Marco Spallanzani (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1971),683. Hence Ashtor's suggestion that small Levantine firms succumbed to competition by vast capitalist enterprises from the "west" is also doubtful.
43
Though Florence had had a silk guild since the twelfth century, it was only in the
fifteenth century that Florentine silk c10th production started to gather pace. 135 The link
with Ottoman trade came first and foremost through the exchange of wool fabrics for a
variety of raw materials, especially silk. 136 This kind of exchange was a very old
practice, dating back to the Middle Ages. 137 For Ottoman and Florentine merchants a
felicitous conjuncture in international trade and diplomacy consolidated mutual
interests. With Ottoman expansion, in fact, Bursa was given a significant boost as a
centre for the silk trade, at the very same time as Florentine merchants began to reach
Istanbul and its environs with their cargoes of woollen clotho The most valuable part of
the cargo of state galleys on the return trip from Istanbul (and occasionally from Syria)
consisted of bundles of silk and various quantities of expensive dyes such as indigo and
crimson.138 The representatives of wool cloth pro duc ers such as the Guanti company
were always paid at least in part in raw materials, including dyes like indigo and crimson
which were used in the manufacture of both wool and silk fabrics. 139 They also included
Persian raw silk. 140 This last fact is especially significant because these manufacturers of
woollens had no use for raw silk, but they could resell it in Florence to silk companies
and thus realize an addition al profit. We also find the reverse trade taking place: a silk
cloth manufacturer like Andrea Banchi, for example, sent his agents to Bursa with loads
of woollen cloth, to be exchanged for the raw silk he needed to run his renowned silk
company. 141 Caspian Sea silks were especially important to Banchi's company, but
represented a significant share of the raw material purchases of aIl Florentine enterprises
135 Bruno Dini, "L'industria Serica in Italia. Secc XII-XV," in Saggi su una Economia-Mondo. Firenze e L 'italiafra Mediterraneo ed Europa (Secc. XIII-XVI) (Pisa: Pacini, 1995),69-70. 136 It must be emphasized, however, that significant amounts of raw silk were also imported from Spain. Southem Italy and Bologna also fumished Florence with raw silk in srnall quantities (the first offered sorne of the cheapest silk, while the second offered sorne of the most expensive one). 137 inalcik, Economic and Social History, 219. 138 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 118-20. From Egypt the retum cargo tended to include mostly spices. Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 115-6, 120-1. 139 For dyes used in the silk industry and by the Banchi company especially: Florence Edler De Roover, "Andrea Banchi, Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in the Fifteenth Century," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 3 (1966): 243-4. Banchi seems to have bought most ofhis dyes from importers. 140 Hoshino and Mazzaoui, "Ottoman Markets," 21, 23. 141 De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 271-2.
44
dealing with silk.142 The main point is that, for these relatively small companies with
tight profit margins, the ability to realize double profits was crucial. Indeed, given the
cost of transportation, the sale of Garbo cloth in Florence itself could well have yie1ded
profits of the same order as its sale in Istanbul.143 In the latter case, however, a second
profit, comparable in size, could be made by the sale of silk in Florence. 144
The most important export markets for Florentine silk cloth at this time seem to
have been in the ltalian peninsula and in central and northem Europe. What Florence
achieved in the course of the fifteenth century was the ability to substitute its own
product for that of Levantine or other producers, such as Lucca, in markets in Europe.
Already in the 1420s the galleys were forbidden from loading silk cloth (as opposed to
raw silk) on their retum voyages from the Levant. 145 Close study ofwell-established silk
companies such as Andrea Banchi's or Tommaso Spinelli's, for which detailed account
books have survived, reveal where their regular markets were. 146 The Geneva fairs, with
which Florence had a positive balance of trade for a long time, seem to have been
especially important for the marketing of Florentine silk clotho Certainly, they were the
main export market outside the Italian peninsula for Banchi's company, but they were
also very important for Spinelli's.147 The latter's company dominated in Rome, and in
ecclesiastical circles in general, thanks to his relations with the papacy.148 Spinelli was
also very successful in selling his silk cloth in Lübeck, while Banchi had some success in
Barcelona for a while. 149 Neither one did regular business with Naples, where the sale of
silk cloth was dominated by the Strozzi company, with its ties to the Aragonese court,
142 Ibid.: 237-8. Banchi used Caspian silk the most (one third or more ofhis raw silk purchases), foIlowed by Spanish silk, then silks from Chios and several regions in Italy. These relative proportions seem representative of the Florentine industry as a whole. William Caferro, "The Silk Business of Tommaso Spinelli, Fifteenth-Century Florentine Merchant and Papal Banker," Renaissance Studies 10, no. 4 (1996): 425. However, Spinelli's company employed many more throwers for Spanish silk than for Caspian silk (21 and 12 respectively). Caferro, "The Silk Business," 426. Thus the relative importance of the two sources might weIl have been reversed. 143 Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino," 118. 144 Hoshino, based on records for the Guanti company, suggested that the net profit of around 10% from the sale of "Garbo" cloth in Istanbul could be doubled by the sale ofstravai silk in Florence. Ibid., 117. 145 MaIlett, The Florentine Galleys, 58. 146 The two companies were active in 1421-1463 and 1454-1478 respectively De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 225-34. Caferro, "The Silk Business," 422-5. 147 Caferro, "The Silk Business," 436-7. De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 264-7. 148 Caferro, "The Silk Business," 434-5. De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 263. 149 Caferro, "The Silk Business," 437-8. De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 268-9.
45
followed by the Medicis. 150 Significantly, they did not do much regular business with
Bursa or Istanbul either. Banchi sold sorne of his silks there, but only in relative1y small
quantities. 151 Other companies might have been more successfu1. 152 There were,
undoubtedly, sorne very large shipments of silk cloth and large orders which came from
the Porte. 153 Markets under the Mamluks also continued to absorb a variety of products,
silks included. 154 But these seem to have been occasional and not part of regular business
t · d ft 155 sus ame year a er year.
Florentine-Ottoman Diplomacyand Trade at the Time of the Djem Sultan Affair
The success of the Ottoman trade was partly responsible for the demise of the Florentine
galley system. As a commercial enterprise for the ferrying of goods the state galleys had
never been as successful as their Venetian and Genoese counterparts. With the
expansion of Ottoman trade, the need to market spices in northem Europe, which might
indeed have been felt more acute1y at the beginning of the cent ury, was gone. As we
have seen, Florentine-Ottoman trade was based chiefly on the exchange of woollen cloth
for raw silk (as well as dyes, carpets and camelots). Moreover, much of the trade
conducted with the Ottoman empire could take land routes, with only a brief crossing of
the Adriatic. 156 By 1480, the Florentine authorities suspended the regular trips of the
galleys and threw their ports fully open to unregulated commercial enterprise from any
carriers who might care to take Florentine goods to their markets. 157
150 Caferro, "The Silk Business," 437. De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 262. 151 De Roover, "Andrea Banchi," 272, 274. 152 The Medicis, perhaps, thanks to their political contacts. 153 A letter dated 28th February 1482 to the Florentine consul in Pera requested that he bring to account a Florentine agent sent to the Porte with a very valuable charge of gold brocades ("drappi con oro e sanza") who had failed to contact his masters in Florence after the sale (!). Müller, Documenti, 235, document CXCVII, part B. 154 A draft of the 1489 Mamluk treaty refers to a whole range of products: " ... panni, drappi, ciambellotti, sete ... " Amari, Diplomi Arabi, 364, article Ill. 155 MaIIett mentions a shipment worth 60,000 ducats in 1474. However, his conclusion that the Levant was "the principal market for the Florentine silk industry" seems based on an extrapolation from this episode alone. MaIIett, The Florentine Galleys, 122. 156 Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino," 114. inalcik, Economie and Social History, 232. 157 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 145. Sapori, "1 Primi Viaggi," 73. Sapori points out that this was a return to a policy tirst tried in 1419, when aIl duties were suspended on goods exported from Pisa to the Levant or to north-western Europe. There was a provision also that goods exported to Rome and Genoa would also be exempted, so long as they would re-exported within a year.
46
• • 11
!\ .' 1 1
1 1
""fI • ~~
i
Figure 3: Trade Routes of Balkan WOOl158
158 F. W. Carter, "The Commerce of the Dubrovnik Republic, 1500-1700," Economic History Review 24, no. 3 (1971): 381, map 1.
47
During the 1480s, however, another event (or rather set of events) highlighted the
potentially dangerous spiral in which diplomatie and commercial relations with the
Ottomans could be caught. Relations between the Republic of Florence and Mehmet II
had been very good indeed, in spite of a cooling offtowards the end of the Conqueror's
sultanate. 159 The renewal of Florentine capitulations by his successor Bayezid II,
however, was long delayed because of the diplomatie wrangle created by Djem Sultan's
exile. After the death of Mehmet II in 1481, the young Djem Sultan had for a time
occupied Bursa and struck coin. After his ousting by his eIder brother Bayezid II, he
retained a daim to the Sultanate and a following in several parts of the empire. 160 His
escape to the knights of Rhodes and from there to France and eventually to Rome, made
him aIl the more dangerous as a pawn in the hands of foreign powers. Florence found
itself embroiled in this affair. It was not unti11488 that the Florentines sought a renewal
from Bayezid II, and even then negotiations came to naught for several years. 161
Bayezid II neutralized the threat posed by his younger brother's alliance with
Christian powers by a mixture of aggressive diplomacy and military posturing.1 62 Djem
Sultan was first transferred to papal custody, where he was kept in retum for a large
yearly payment from the Porte and an undertaking from the latter not to invade any
Christian country. But many rulers aIl around the Mediterranean eyed Djem Sultan as an
instrument in a planned assault against the Ottomans. Chief among them were Matthias
Corvinus, the king of Hungary, Charles VIII of France and, significantly, the Mamluk
Sultan Qaytbay. Florence was approached by both the Ottomans and the Mamluks in
their attempts to have the contender to the Istanbul throne handed over to them. Trade
159 Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino," 113. 160 Halil inalcik, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II Regarding Djem Sultan," in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993),344-5. 161 Document CCIV in Müller, Documenti, 238. This is a letter to Andrea de' Medici, who had been nominated ambassador to Bayezid II, dated 2nd June 1488. It instructs him to congratulate Bayezid II on his accession to the throne (which had actually taken place in 1481, seven years before !!); to excuse Florence for the delay in sending an embassy, since the city had been very busy due to "the circumstances of the times" (?!) and to ask for a renewal of the capitulations. This belated embassy and the rather lame excuses made by Florentines are difficult to interpret. Babinger says it is cIear evidence that relations had been terribly strained. Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 357-358. The long delay in formally acknowledging Bayezid II as the new Sultan would seem to indicate that Florentines had hoped that Djem would eventually be recognized as the rightful heir. 162 inalcik, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy," 348.
48
negotiations with both were caught up in this more delicate affair. In 1483 Bayezid II
had sent an ambassador to Florence offering to purchase 5,000 pieces of cloth a year. 163
But Florentines were also concerned at this time with relaunching their trade with
Egypt, as demonstrated by the negotiations of 1486_9.164 There is strong evidence that at
least for a time Lorenzo de' Medici acted on behalf of Qaytbay in the matter of Djem
Sultan.165 This was probably the cause for a temporary breakdown in the relationship
with the Ottomans. 166
The entire affair carne to a head in 1494 when Charles VIII invaded Italy to lay
claim to the Neapolitan throne and from there to launch a crusade against the Ottomans.
Re got hold of Djem Sultan but the latter died during the march south. 167 By then,
Florence itself had entered a period of turrnoil and lost its previous usefulness to the
Ottomans as a diplomatic interlocutor and as a balance against Venice. For a while,
Bayezid II entertained close ties with Francesco II Gonzaga, the ruler of the Lombard
town of Mantua and also rnilitary commander of the Roly League, set up to counter
French forces in the Italian peninsula. These ties had been initiated at the time of the
Djem Sultan affair and were continued following Francesco II's victory against Charles
VIII and the hast y return of his forces to France, which removed the immediate threat of
invasion of Ottoman lands. 168 Soon, however, a far bigger military/diplomatic and
economic game was initiated in which neither Francesco Gonzaga nor Florence could
hope to play a major role. During the next century, in fact, fundarnental changes would
take place in the state system and in patterns of international trade which would
163 Hoshino, "Il Commercio Fiorentino," 113. The embassy was probably linked to negotiations over Djem Sultan: Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 329. 164 Wansbrough, "A Mamlük Commercial Treaty," 42. Amari published a letter which he dated from 1481 by Florentine merchants suggesting items for inclusion in a new commercial treaty with Mamluk Egypt. Given the contents (many of these suggestions did find their way into the 1489 treaty) it would seem that Florentine interest in the new treaty was almost a decade old. Amari, Diplomi Arabi, 361-2. The treaty of 1497 addressed also access to the Syrian market, witness the references to tol1s in Beirut, Damascus and Acre. See articles XIV and XIX: Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence," 502, 503, 514, 517 .. Arguably, it is linked to Florentine des ire to re-launch their trade in Syria, as weIl as in Egypt. 165 Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 348-9, 354. inalcik, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy," 346. 166 Babinger, "Lorenzo De' Medici," 357-8. 167 Inalcik, contra Babinger, gives credit to rumours that he had been assassinated on Ottoman orders: inalcik, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy," 344, 350-1. 168 Cf. H. 1. Kissling, "Francesco II Gonzaga ed Il Sultano Bâyezîd II,'' Archivio Storico ltaliano 125, no. 1 (1967).
49
eventuaIly relegate Florentine diplomacy and trade in the eastem Mediterranean to a
minor role.
The Sixteenth Century: the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Zenith of Ottoman Power
It has long been known that the discovery of the Cape route did not immediately bring
about an end to the Red Sea trade. After an initial setback, the spice trade via
Alexandria resumed. 169 For Florence, the discovery of new trade routes per se mattered
even less. As we have seen above, the spice trade had never been as important for
Florence as it was for Venice. Florentine prosperity in the Levantine trade was built over
and above aIl upon the exchange of raw materials for fini shed textiles. 170 Florence,
moreover, was not as closely tied to the routes of Levantine trade as Venice was.
Florentines had been a significant presence in Portugal aIready in the previous
century.17I In the early sixteenth century we find them boarding Portuguese vessels and
actively trading aIl along Portuguese routes to Asia. 172 This is arguably yet another
ex ample of the flexibility of Florentine merchant networks and of the remarkable ability
exhibited by Florence in using different carriers and/or redirecting its trade, which had
benefited the city so much during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This
characteristic strength of Florentine trade continued to pay off in the sixteenth cent ury .
Between the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for example, we find Florentine
merchants redirecting their trade into new markets in central and eastem Europe,
particularly in Germany and in Poland.173 Within the Mediterranean itself, however,
169 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols., vol. 1 (1972),543-570. 170 Portuguese attempts to capture the trade in Persian silk were never as successful as the temporary diversion they achieved in the spice trade. 171 Cf. Marcello Berti, "Le Aziende da Colle: Una Finestra Sulle Relazioni Comerciali tra la Toscana ed Il Portogallo a Metà dei Quattrocento," in Nel Mediterraneo ed Oltre: Temi di Storia e Storiografia Toscana (Secou XIII-XVIII) (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2000). 172 Cf. Marco Spallanzani, Mercanti Fiorentini nell'Asia Portoghese (1500-1525) (Firenze: S.P.E.S., 1997). 173 In the early sixteenth century these trade links had still been relatively weak. Cf. Bruno Dini, "L'economia Fiorentina e l'Europa Centro-Orientale ne Ile Fonti Toscane," in Saggi su una EconomiaMondo. Firenze e l'ItaUa fra Mediterraneo ed Europa (Secc. XIII-XVI) (Pisa: Pacini, 1995). However, central Europe and particularly Poland would become especially important later in the century. Domenico Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century (London and New York: Longman, 1997), 42. This point will be addressed below in the discussion of outlets for the Florentine silk industry.
50
Florence had to deal with the expansion of Ottoman and Habsburg power, which
eventually engulfed the entire region in conflict, reaching the very walls of Florence
itself. Its position in the state system was fundamentally altered. This fact, rather than
the discovery of new trade routes, spelled the doom of Florentine profits in
Mediterranean trade. Florentine merchants were eventually barred from or severely
restricted in their access to Ottoman markets.
The lucrative Florentine-Ottoman trade, in particular, could not continue
indefinitely under the new circumstances. It was left for the French, followed by the
English and then by the Dutch, to take over Florence's role both as trade partner to the
Ottomans and as diplomatie counterweight to their enemies (now the Habsburgs, even
more than the Venetians). The French had engaged in trade negotiations already early in
the century and received an important treaty in 1569, renewed in 158l.174 The English
obtained their capitulations in 1580 and the Dutch received their own trade treatise in
1612.175 By then profound changes were on the horizon. 176 However, through many
vicissitudes, the pattern of trade established between the Florentines and the Ottomans
in the fifteenth century had lasted for a good part of the sixteenth cent ury. The first
chapter sub-section below deals with the survival of this pattern of trade in the first
decades of the century and considers the weaknesses it exhibited. The next chapter sub
section focuses on the turbulent half century between the 1530s and the 1580s. With the
establishment of a Medici principality closely tied to the Habsburg camp, the Florentine
Ottoman trade went into its final decline (however, this was not before it enjoyed a brief
period of revival after the mid-century). Political circumstances, in fact, compounded
the weaknesses of the Florentine-Ottoman trade, bringing about its end. As we will see,
by the 1530s the relative position of Venice and Florence vis-à-vis the Ottomans was
reversed. At this time, moreover, France emerged as an important ally to the Porte.
174 Alexander H. De Groot, "The Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime of the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," Oriente Maderno 22, no. 3 (2003): 595-596. 175 Ibid.: 600-601. De Groot puts forward the controversial suggestion that with the French and then the English and Dutch capitulations a principle of mutuality was introduced. For the purposes of my argument, the relevant point in De Groot's thesis is only that the Porte initiated negotiations and was thus actively using commercial interests to cement political alliances. 176 Cf. Mehmet Bulut, "The Role of the Ottomans and the Dutch in the Commercial Integration between the Levant and Atlantic in the Seventeenth Century," Journal of the Economie and Social History of the Orient 45, no. 2 (2002).
51
During the course of the sixteenth century, therefore, the natural alliance pointed out by
Inalcik between Ottomans and Florentines at the expense of the Venetians progressively
lost aIl its meaning. In some ways the situation had been precisely reversed, as Venice
(closely followed by France) became the most important trading partner to the Ottomans
in Aleppo, a position it kept throughout the century. Florentine politics towards the
eastern Mediterranean after Lepanto, and particularly from the 1590s onwards, reflected
the lack of shared commercial and diplomatie interests after the final demi se of the trade
pattern which had previously bound them together. The final chapter sub-section focuses
on this peculiar last phase in Florentine-Ottoman relations, which culminated in the
Fakhr al-Dln affair-the last ofa string ofultimately unsuccessful schemes concocted by
the Medicis to revive their flagging trade and waning influence in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The Florentine-Ottoman Trade in the Barly Sixteenth Centmy
In spite ofthe uncertainties of the late fifteenth century, trade between Florence and the
Ottoman empire continued to follow the pattern it had taken in previous decades. l77
Florentine commercial privileges in Istanbul were finally renewed in 1500, after the
long, inconclusive negotiations which had followed the accession of Bayezid II. 178 Even
though trade continued as usual, the Sultan might have wanted to signify a downgrading
of Florence's diplomatie status at this stage. For the time being, in fact, the Florentines
were not allowed to keep a consul, but only an emin-a generic term for short-term
177 Cf. See Giovanni Maringhi's correspondence from Istanbul. Gertrude R. B. Richards, ed., Florentine Merchants in the Age of the Medici: Letters and Documents from the Selfridge Collection of Medici Manuscripts (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932). These documents were used extensively by Inalcik in his reconstruction of Ottoman-Florentine trade: inalcik, Economic and Social His/ory, 234-236. 178 ln 1499 another ambassador, Geri Risaliti, was sent to ask for new capitulations from Bayezid II after the failure of the 1488 embassy. Document CCIX. Müller, Documenti, 242-244. The instructions to the ambassador mention that he should first consult with the Florentine consul and that he should thank the Sultan for the kindness used towards Florentine merchants recently. Clearly, trade had continued and there had also been a thaw in relations. A copy of the 1500 treaty has not survived, but Camerani suggested that an undated copy he found might be the 1500 treaty Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 87, 93-95. (See also footnote above). We do have, however, a document sent from Istanbul to the Sea Consuls informing them that the treaty had been renewed, with a few modifications. Document III. Gino Masi, Statuti Delle Colonie Fiorentine All'estero (Secc. XV-XVI) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1941),97-102. (also in MUller's collection) The document specifies the differences with previous capitulations, also listing the articles left unchanged.
52
administrators in the Ottoman empire. 179 The renewal of capitulary privileges after
Bayezid II's death and the accession of Selim II in 1512 went rather more smoothly.
Florence received a new treaty in 1513.180 However, if Florentine-Ottoman trade
continued essentially unchanged in the first decades of the sixteenth century, there were
also sorne minor changes which pointed to its future demise. Florentine trade continued
to be heavily centred upon the exchange of fini shed woollen cloth for Persian silk and it
involved few other products (these included dyes, jewels and also fini shed products such
as camelots and carpets). To provide a contrast, the merchants of Genoa and Venice also
participated in the trade from the Black Sea and the Red Sea and dealt in a wider variety
of products. Florentine merchants were instead heavily dependent upon a particular
exchange tied to the caravan routes which brought Persian silk to the Mediterranean.
When in 1499 a Florentine agent in Istanbul, Zello di Alberto Zelli, wrote home to warn
that aIl further transactions had to await the arrivaI of the great Persian silk caravan, his
comments exposed a significant weakness of Florentine-Ottoman trade, namely its
specialization.181 Anything that adversely affected this flow of goods would immediately
impact the Florentine economy. One important change that affected Florentine profits at
this time was the progressive increase in the priee of the Persian silk that they purchased
in Bursa: 24.6% between the 1480s and 1512-1513.182 At the same time, Florentine
woollen cloth sold on Ottoman markets began to increase in price and in quality, using
only the best Spanish wool for the production of a variety of Garbo cloth known as
"sopramani.,,183 Perhaps this trend, reflecting a change in demand, was also necessitated
by the squeeze on profit margins due to the increased prize of raw silk.
179 Masi, Statuti, 99. 180 Document CCXXXIX. Müller, Documenti, 267. This is a letter from Selim 1 simply acknowledging the renewal of previous capitulations following an embassy by Francesco Antonio Nori. See also, Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 87. 181 Hidetoshi Hoshino, "Alcuni Aspetti dei Commercio dei Panni Fiorentini nell'Impero Ottomano Ai Primi dei '500," in Industria Tessi/e e Commercio Internazionale nella Firenze dei Tardo Medioevo, ed. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 2001), 127. This point is also highlighted by Dini: Bruno Dini, "Aspetti dei Commercio di Esportazione dei Panni di Lana e dei Drappi di Seta Fiorentini in Constantinopoli, Negli Anni 1522-1531," in Saggi Su Una Economia-Mondo. Firenze e L'italia Ira Mediterraneo ed Europa (Secc. XIII-XVI) (Pisa: Pacini, 1995),269. 182 Hoshino, "Aspetti dei Commercio dei Panni," 134. 183 Ibid., 131-3. The average value of Garbo c\oth increased by about 20% in real terms.
53
During the 1520s, the decreased availability and rising price of Persian silk on
Ottoman markets became an even bigger problem than it had previously been, with an
increasingly adverse effect on Florentine trade. Indeed, throughout the century,
Ottoman-Persian hostilities periodically halted the silk trade. The Ottoman embargo of
1514-18 on Persian silk did not eliminate the trade altogether but dramatically reduced it
for a time. 184 Florentine insurance documents show a dwindling in imports of Persian
silk and a growing reliance on products which previously had figured only in a secondary
role in shipments from Istanbul to Florence: leather, camelots and carpets. 185
Increasingly, but not always successfully, Florentine merchants sought to be paid in
currency.186 This suggests that none of the other products they found on Ottoman
markets were as useful and profitable to them as raw silk. They also continued to export
their silk and wool c10th to Alexandria and Beirut (where they also sent soap, alum, oil,
cash and foreign c1oth), endeavouring to sell the spices they obtained in return on the
markets of Venice, Naples and Lyons. 187 But the bulk of Florence's Levantine trade at
this time went through the Ottoman capital and suffered the strains, just mentioned. 188
Therefore, with the first signs of future difficulties in the supply of Persian raw silk, a
painful process of adaptation to new terms of trade began at this stage. By 1534,
Florentine commerce in Istanbul had declined so much that the percent age tribute levied
on Florentine merchandise was no longer sufficient to pay all consular expenses. 189 In
later years, the consul would be granted a fixed salary.190
184 inalcik, Economic and Social History, 229. There was, at the same time, an increase in the priee of Spanish wool which further reduced Florentine profits. Dini, "Aspetti dei Commercio," 238-239. 185 Dini, "Aspetti dei Commercio," 229-30. Dini based his study upon the set of insurance documents by Raggio di Nofero Raggi. 186 Ibid., 227. 187 Ibid., 218. 188 Ibid., 218-9. For the set of insurance documents studied by Dini, 84.52% of the goods by value were bound for Istanbul. There seems to have been a lot of smuggling in Tripoli, involving also expensive cloth, whieh attracted the attention of Mamluk authorities around 1507 because of the loss of revenue it caused. Cf. D. S. Richards, "A Late Mamluk Document Conceming Frankish Commercial Practice at Tripoli," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 62, no. 1 (1999). Sorne ofthis smuggling could weil have involved Florentine goods (see second section below for remarks made by Venetian ambassadors). 189 A one-off payment of 150 ducats was allowed to the consul himself, while the rest of the "cottimo" (percentage tribute) was destined for general expenses. Document XI in: Masi, Statuti, 149. 190 Documents XII and XIII (dated 1544 and 1546 respectively) in: Ibid., 150-153. The emin, however, had been given a fixed salary.
54
A very sharp decline in the Florentine-Ottoman trade had undoubtedly taken
place, but it was not quite as catastrophic as it would seem. If fewer and fewer
Florentines were taking their products to Istanbul and Bursa, their textiles were still
reaching Ottoman markets. During the course of the sixteenth cent ury, in fact, we
increasingly find Ottoman merchants active in the Italian peninsula. Historians have
long been aware that a thriving Ottoman merchant community was established in
Venice by the second half of the century.191 ln other cities such as Ancona and Florence,
which in the Levantine trade had never had as strong a merchant class as Venice, a
significant Ottoman presence was already clear at the beginning of the century. Thanks
to Ottoman protection, merchants based in DubrovnikIRagusa and in A vlona had
become especially active on Adriatic routes and partially displaced Venetians from the
carrying trade in the region. 192 Already in 1514 Ottoman merchants had obtained a
fondaco (funduq) and trading privileges in Ancona, motivated in good part by the role
Ancona played in the Florentine-Ottoman trade. 193 During the 1520s and 1540s we find
them purchasing, directly in Florence, between 42% and 12.5% of the total sales ofsome
Florentine producers of woollens, a steadily decreasing but always significant amount. 194
1 emphasize that it was still significant because this shows that in spite of aIl difficulties
Florentine textiles still found a market in the Ottoman domains and this continuity
explains the rapid recovery of sales later in the century.195 Ragusans were also active in
191 Cf. Giorgio Vercellin, "Mercanti Turchi a Venezia alla Fine dei Cinquecento," Il Veltro 23, no. 2-4 (1979). Cemal Kafadar, "A Death in Venice: Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima," Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986). Many were specifically engaged in the textile trade. Cf. Giovanni Curatola, "Ebrei, Turchi e Veneziani a Rialto. Qualche Documento sui Tessili," in Islam and the Italian Renaissance, ed. Charles Burnett and Anna Contadini (London: The Warburg Institute, 1999). An overview of scholarship dealing with the activities of Ottoman merchants in international trade, and sorne additional examples of Ottoman Muslim merchants in particular who were active in Venice, can be found in: Eric Dursteler, "Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modem Era," Turcica, no. 34 (2002). 192 inaJcik, Economic and Social History, 262-269. For the importance ofthese routes to Florence, both the old route through Ancona and Dubrovnik and the new route via Puglia and Valona, see: Dini, "Aspetti dei Commercio," 228-9. 193 inalcik, Economic and Social History, 243. 194 For the company of Francesco da Sommaia, in 1518-22, sales to Ottoman merchants amounted to 31.53%; for the company of Piero di Alamanno Salviati, in 1525-32, they represented 42.32%; for Francesco and Giuliano de' Medici's company, in 1534-42, these sales were 22.82%; for the company of Alessandro Siaviati, in 1538-44, they were worth 12.52%. Dini, "Aspetti dei Commercio," 235-41. 195 Dini, by hisemphasis on this declining series alone, concluded that the Florentine-Ottoman trade was dead by the 1540s. But as we will see, it enjoyed a briefrevival in the 1550s-1570s.
55
the sea trade through Livomo, on the Tyrrhenian coast, which at this stage was centred
upon agricultural goods. Between 1549 and 1568 most ships carrying goods between
Livomo and the Levant (chiefly Alexandria) belonged to Ragusans and imported grain,
chick peas, lentils, as well as flax and small quantities of spices. 196 The more sizeable
trade with the Balkans and with Istanbul, however, continued to go mostly through
Ancona.
Political events at home compounded the difficulties that Florence experienced
in its commercial transactions. Hostility with Venice continued. In 1510, for example,
Anconitan ships carrying a very large consignment of Florentine woollens bound for
Istanbul were seized by the Venetians, sparking a diplomatie roW. 197 The sack of Rome
in 1527 had profound consequences for the many Florentines with large investments
there. The last years of the Florentine Republic were characterized by continued turmoil
both in the city itself and in the ltalian peninsula. 198 At one point in 1529, as noted by a
Venetian ambassador, Florentine textile production had come to a virtual standstilL I99
This proved to be a golden opportunity for Venice to further its own textile industry,
taking advantage of the difficulties that Florence and other producers experienced at this
time. Venetian production of woollen textiles had been negligible during the fifteenth
century and Venetian merchants had mostly re-exported woollens produced elsewhere,
chiefly in Lombard cities and in Florence. Between 1520 and 1569, however, the
Venetian yearly output of woollen cloth expanded from some 3,600 to around 26,500
pieces of cloth (1), at a staggering 9% average annual growth.200 lt used large quantities
of Balkan wool and was destined mostly to Ottoman markets.201
196 Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, Navires et Marchandises à L'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611) (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1951),33,36-7,38. The grain trade between the eastern and western Mediterranean was more important at this stage than often assumed by historians, but it was still mostly in the hands of Venetian and Genoese merchants. Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 131-141. 197 Document CCXXXII. Müller, Documenti, 260-262. 198 For the social conflict and differing visions between oligarchie and popular factions which plagued the second Florentine Republic, Diaz, Il Granducato, 21-37. 199 Domenico Sella, "The Rise and Fall of the Venetian Woollen Industry," in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Brian Pullan (London: Methuen, 1968), 114. 200 Ibid., 108-10. 201 Carter, "The Commerce of the Dubrovnik Republic, 1500-1700," 380, 382.
56
Florence and the Medici-Habsburg Alliance
The political turmoil experienced by Florence in the early decades of the century had
another more profound and long lasting consequence: the creation of a Medici
principality closely tied to the papacy and to the Habsburgs. The Medicis had built their
banking fortunes at least in part thanks to their ties to the papacy. From 1512 onwards
these ties took a new meaning. That year a joint Spanish-papal army defeated the
Florentine Republic and their French allies, restoring the Medicis to power.202 Then a
year later, in 1513, Lorenzo de' Medici's second son was elected as Pope Leo X. The
renewal of Medicean ascendancy over Florence at this time took place thanks to his
power and influence. The Florentine elite once again flocked to Rome in large numbers
to receive papal patronage and a period of Medicean govemment by proxy, from Rome,
began.203 The family was headed by another Medici pope, Clement VII, when they
retumed to power in Florence after the republican experiment of 1527-30. During the
rest of the cent ury, in spite of occasional conflict (with Paul III and Paul IV, for
example), the Medicis cultivated a close alliance with the papacy. Relations with the
Habsburgs were just as close but not quite as cosy. The Medicis had retumed to Florence
in 1530 in the trail of a Spanish army which had laid siege to the city.204 For a time, the
Habsburgs retained troops on the isle of Elba and a right to occupy all Florentine
fortresses should the Medici line fail. When the latter were granted the title of dukes, it
was as vassals of the Habsburgs. Ultimately, the Habsburg-Medici alliance was an
uneasy relationship of dependence and it vitiated Medicean policy at home and abroad
over the next decades.205
Having relied on the Habsburgs for their retum, the new rulers found their
protectors' tutelage difficult to shrug off. In spite of occasional Florentine overtures to
202 Diaz, Il Granducato, 11-14. 203 J. R. Hale, Florence and the Medici: The Pattern of Control ([London]: Thames and Hudson, 1977),83-87,95-106. 204 Ibid., 118-122. Although there was a Spanish promise that the Republican constitution would be preserved, soon Clement VII found a way to set up one of his nephews Alessandro de' Medici as the first duke. Florentine republican institutions and the social forces behind them might well have been fundamentally weakened by this stage, making sorne kind of aristocratic/princely govemment inevitable. Diaz, Il Granducato, 31-37. What is important here is that Florence (like much of ltaly) fell into the Spanish and not the French sphere of influence. 205 Giorgio Spini, "Il Principato dei Medici e il Sistema degli Stati Europei dei Cinquecento," in Firenze e la Toscana dei Medici nell'Europa dei '500 (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1983), 177-9.
57
the French crown, relations with both France and the Ottomans deteriorated. The latter
had already found in France a more useful ally against the Spanish than Florence could
ever hope to be.206 In 1536 trade negotiations were opened between France and the
Porte, with the granting of sorne trade privileges which in due time were to lead to
comprehensive capitulations.z°7 More important still, after the Ottomans had overrun
sorne of the last remaining possessions of the Venetians (besides the islands of Cyprus
and Crete) in the war of 1537-39, the centre of conflict moved to the western
Mediterranean and focused around the Habsburg-Ottoman confrontation. The disastrous
expedition against Algiers led by Charles V in 1541 escalated conflict in this new phase.
The Ottomans reciprocated by striking at trade along the Tyrrhenian (west) coast of
ltaly, which linked the kingdom of Naples, now in Habsburg hands, to Genoa. Tuscan
ports inc1uding Piombino, which remained outside ofMedici control unti11552, stood at
the middle of this trade. For at least a decade, a power struggle was waged for the
control of Piombino, from where a Franco-Turkish force would have caused serious
damage to Habsburg trade.208 In 1543 and again in 1544 Khayr al-Dln Barbarossa
appeared on the Tuscan coast, in agreement with the French, and attacked sorne
strongholds with a view to establishing a bridgehead.209 In 1553 a joint Franco-Turkish
fleet led by the ruler of Tripoli appeared on the coast ofTuscany.z1O
Remarkably, neither the Florentine woollen industry nor Florentine-Ottoman
relations had yet been damaged beyond repair at this stage. During the 1550s the
206 For an overview of the rise of the Franco-Ottoman alliance see: Dorothy Margaret Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (New York: AMS Press, 1976), 104-134. As observed also by Venetian ambassadors, this was an alliance of convenience needed by both sides and especially by the French against the increasing might of the Habsburgs in Europe. Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 446-447, 614. Firpo, Relazioni, 556. French lack of commitment at times frustrated the Ottomans and eventually led to the demi se of the alliance. 207 Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, 121. The comprehensive plans for capitulary privileges of 1536 did not come to fruition. inalcik, Economic and Social His/ory, 194. France continued to trade with the partial privileges of 1517 until the capitulations of 1569, renewed in 1581. De Groot, "The Historical DeveJopment of the Capitulatory Regime of the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," 595-596. 208 The western (or Tyrrhenian) coast of Italy, though less well-known to Ottoman admiraIs than the eastern (or Adriatic) coast had seen its share ofnaval activity since the beginning of the century. Piri Reis described the Tuscan coast and its defences and also reported an earlier assault on the coast around Piombino. Laura Galoppini, "Isole e Città Toscane nel Kitâb-Ï-Bahriyye di Piri Reis," Archivio Storico Italiano 151, no. 1 (1993): 10-11. 209 Spini, "Il Principato," 181. 210 Ibid., 188.
58
Medicis enjoyed a period of relative independence vis-à-vis the Habsburgs.211 Cosimo 1
pursued at this juncture a more assertive policy both at home and abroad, inc1uding
commercial and industrial initiatives?12 This often put him at loggerheads with the
Habsburgs. He eventually obtained the title of Grand Duke in 1569 (he had previously
only held the title . of duke). His territorial and commercial successes were equally
striking and are more directly important for my argument. The annexation to the Grand
Duchy in 1557 of the large territory of Siena, in the south of Tuscany, occurred in the
teeth of Spanish opposition.213 Whether as part of a deliberate development plan or
otherwise, Florence also obtained a new commercial treaty with the Ottomans in 1557
which guaranteed it the same rights enjoyed by Venice?14 The recovery of the Florentine
output of woollens at this stage was swift and remarkable: 30,000 pieces were produced
in 1560 and 33,000 in 1561.215 Part ofthis output went to European markets, which were
undersupplied because of the rebellion of the Netherlands and because of the religious
wars in France.216 But Florentine production ofwoollen c10th was still buoyant in 1572,
when it reached its peak of over 33,300 pieces, and much of it went to the Levant,
causing sorne alarm amongst the Venetians?17 There is evidence of a positive outlook
among Florentine wool c10th producers in the early 1570s, an outlook derived largely
from hopes offurther expansion in Ottoman markets.2lS
Florentine-Ottoman diplomatie relations, however, remained preearious during
this rapprochement. A latent conflict persisted as the Medicis failed to find a balance
211 Diaz, li Granducato, 116-21, 183-8. 212 Spini, "Il Principato," 190-191. Judith Brown has recently argued that these activities, while similar to those of many absolutist states, also exhibited a remarkably modem conception of political economy and expressly sought to encourage industrial development, particularly in textiles. Cf. Judith C. Brown, "Concepts ofPolitical Economy: Cosimo 1 De' Medici in a Comparative European Perspective," in Firenze e ia Toscana dei Medici nell'Europa dei '500 (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1983). 213 Diaz, Il Granducato, 110-123. The Habsburgs considered Siena part of their sphere of influence. Its territory in central Italy was strategically important for control of the peninsu1a. 214 Sella, "Ri se and Fall," 116. Notice that this agreement came at the height of conflict between the Habsburgs and the Medicis over the latter's annexation of Siena, which the Spanish crown contrasted vigorous1y. 215 Diaz, li Granducato, 140. 216 Ibid., 141. 217 Sella quotes the figure of 20,000 pieces for 1560, thus giving even more significance to the 1572 peak. Sella, "Ri se and Fall," 115-7. See also Paolo Malanima, La Decadenza di un 'Economia Cittadina: i'lndustria di Firenze nei Seco/i XVI-XVIII (Bo10gna: Il Mulino, 1982),256. According to Malanima more than half of the total production of woollens in 1572 was destined for the Levant 218 Ma1anima, Decadenza di un 'Economia, 257. Sella, "Rise and Fall," 116.
59
between the Ottoman and the Habsburg camps. Cosimo l founded in 1562 a latter-day
crusading order known as the "Cavalieri di Santo Stefano" (the Order of Saint Stephen).
They were equipped as a naval force, with galleys, galleons and bertontJS.219 In the
hostile climate of the mid-sixteenth century they could have provided a much-needed
policy instrument-a more aggressive equivalent of the galley fleet of the fifteenth
cent ury. But in many ways this naval force was an expensive failure. Sorne of their
armed galleys were charted to carry expensive merchandise such as silk cloth (but
occasionally also woollens) along the increasingly dangerous trade routes.220 It was a
mutually beneficial agreement between the Medicean state and the Florentine economy,
whereby the first saw its war fleet subsidized by commercial enterprise and Florentine
merchants had a means of delivering their goods safely in the face of growing piracy and
rising insurance costs. The Order of Saint Stephen, however, failed in the crucial task of
controlling piracy along trade routes even in the Tyrrhenian sea (close to Florentine
ports) and aH too often itself indulged rather unscrupulously in acts of piracy when it
came across opportunities for a quick profit. 221 Worst of aH, the Order was misused by
the Grand Dukes themselves in their policies towards the Ottomans.
The Order's role in the defence of Malta in 1565 did not yet cause a permanent
rift with the Porte, but serious signs of tension appeared in that year because the
Florentines were denied the right to keep a bailo/consul in Istanbu1.222 Sorne Tuscan
ships participated in the batt1e of Lepanto.223 FinaHy, with the accession of Francesco l
as Grand Duke in 1574, a pro-Habsburg policy was openly resumed.224 During the trade
negotiations conducted with the Ottomans that same year, Florentine emissaries insisted
on the absurd request that the Porte should not retaliate against their merchants on
219 The bertone was an armed sailing vessel of Atlantic origin, smaller and more manoeuvrable than galleons. 220 Marcello Berti, "La Marina da Guerra Mediceo-Stefaniana e l'Attività Commerciale nel Mediterraneo (Secoli XVI-XVII)," in Nel Mediterraneo ed Oltre: Terni di Storia e Storiografia Toscana (Secoli XIIIXVIII) (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2000), 67-8. 221 Ibid., 63, 69. 222 Spini, "Il Principato," 197. 223 This participation seems to have been unwelcome to the Spanish crown. However, during the period leading up to the battle and especially after the victory, there was a rapprochement between the Medicis and the Habsburgs. Braudel dated the final decline of the anti-Spanish stance of Cosimo 1 to the time of the battle ofLepanto. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 1105. 224 Diaz, Il Granducato, 231,238-9.
60
account of piracy or war activities conducted by the Cavalieri di Santo Stefano (!).225
These negotiations floundered but the Porte showed itself willing to re-open talks in
1577. As a display of good will, it issued an order for the capture in its domains of
Florentine exiles who had been involved in yet another plot against the Medicis.226 But
the negotiations of 1577-78 saw the Medicis' emissaries insist again, albeit more subtly,
on the request that the activities of the Order of Saint Stephen should not affect
Florentine merchants, while at the same time writing to the Spanish crown to reassure
them that aH was being done to make the Tuscan fleet available for Habsburg designs.227
This time around it was the Venetians who had an easy time of demolishing Florentine
commercial enterprise in Ottoman domains by gaining the ear and the trust of Ottoman
high officials?28 The tables indeed had tumed, since the heyday of Benedetto Dei at the
Porte. Tuscan piracy in the eastem Mediterranean was to continue increasing during the
last decades of the sixteenth century.229 One Venetian diplomat after the next reported
that, although the Ottoman fleet was still numericaHy large after Lepanto, the quality of
the vessels, of the commanders and of crews was not what it used to be.230 This gave
free rein to Christian pirates in the eastem Mediterranean and, as the same diplomats
were quick to point out, Tuscans were particularly resented at the Porte for their
frequent incursions.231
The report prepared by Filippo Sassetti in 1577 on Tuscany's Levantine trade
sheds sorne light on the perceived importance of this trade and on the concems of
Florentine planners faced with the breakdown of Ottoman-Florentine diplomatic
225 Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 88-9. The absurdity of the request is thrown into even starker relief when we consider that one of the reasons for the Ottoman invasion of Cyprus which spurred the Holy League and led to the battle Lepanto was precisely the need Ottomans felt to control soaring giracy which used the island as a base. Goffman. The Ottoman Empire, 155.
26 Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 89. The exiles included Pierino Capponi. 227 Ibid.: 90-1. 228 Ibid.: 90. 229 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 877-880. 230 See Giacomo Soranzo's report of 1576, Giovanni Correr's report of 1578, Giacomo Soranzo's report of 1584, Lorenzo Bernardo's report of 1590 and Girolamo Cappello's report of 1600. Respectively at: Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 206-207, 238-241, 277-279, 326-330, 429-430. Not aIl of the diplomats mentioned were ambassadors (one was a bailo, another one was a nobleman on sorne diplomatie mission). 231 Ibid., 313, 496-498,501-502.
61
relations.232 It was addressed to Francesco Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, the Florentine
ambassador to the Porte during the 1577-78 negotiations.233 Significantly, the report
starts by discussing the need to encourage Levantine merchants to trade in Tuscany and
delves into this point at sorne length?34 Partly, this concern points to the fact that
Ottoman merchants might have been less active in Florence around this time than they
had been at the beginning of the century?35 Levantines, Sassetti remarked, operated
directly out of Dubrovnik, Venice and Ancona, where they purchased Florentine goods,
but only at a higher price that made them less competitive.236 But the concern was
probably also due to the fact that the report, in line with granducal policy, aimed at the
development of sea trade via the port of Livorno (the major expansion of which had
started in 1576) and specifically addressed the need to attract Levantine merchants
there, rather than to Florence itself.237 Had Livorno been an entrepot for international
commerce, Sassetti suggested, Ottoman merchants who had completed their purchases
of imported goods would be tempted to load whatever Florentine manufactured goods
were av ail able into their cargoes bound for home, further stimulating the Florentine
economy.238 Even more important for Florentine industry, however, was the
establishment in the Levant itself of permanent colonies of Tuscan traders. The report
suggests that the greatest difficulties experienced by the latter were due to the fact that,
because Florentine merchants did not reside permanently in Levantine ports, they were
forced to conclude what deals were available to them when they first arrived, before
232 Sassetti's report probably reflected and addressed the concems of producers of woollens and merchant elites, as weIl as of ambassadors and the Medicis themselves. Lucia Frattarelli Fischer, "Livomo Città Nuova: 1574-1609," Società e Storia, no. 46 (1989): 879-880. 233 Filippo Sassetti, "Sul Commercio tra la Toscana e le Nazioni Levantine: Ragionamento di Filippo Sassetti (1577)," Archivio Storico Italiano - Appendice 9, no. 28 (1853): 169. Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 89. 234 Sassetti, "Sul Commercio," 171-177. 235 Ibid.: 171, 179. Here Sassetti remarks that luring Ottoman merchants to Tuscany would be hard because it amounted to starting a new enterprise. 236 Ibid.: 172, 178, 180. Sassetti explicitly pointed out that the more intermediaries were involved, the higher the cost of the merchandise. Hence he believed that an important objective of the Grand Dukes ought to be to bypass intermediaries. 237 Ibid.: 172, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180. For Medicean efforts to give a new boost to the port of Livomo see: Frattarelli Fischer, "Livomo." 238 Especially, he explained, if the Florentines would copy the more fashionable Venetian woollens, which he reckoned could be produced in Florence at a smaller cost: Sassetti, "Sul Commercio," 178-179, 180.
62
their ships turned around for home.239 Lacking a permanent presence, therefore,
Florentines were particularly exposed to the vagaries of the market. This point was
heeded by Florentine negotiators. Their draft for the proposed 1578 treatise did at least
insist on the right to have once again a baiJo take care of Florentine interests in Ottoman
lands.240
By the late l570s the decline of Florence's Levantine trade was already evident.
Sassetti pointed out that the proverbial expression "to double one's capital without
going to the Levant" ("raddoppiare il suo sanza and are in Levante") only continued to be
used in his days as a matter of habit. In actual fact, many merchants were doing
precisely this and making their fortunes elsewhere.241 After the failure of trade
negotiations in 1578 Florence's Levantine trade became ever less important to the
economy as a whole. The amount of woollens exported to the Levant decreased
significantly. Silk cloth production, by contrast, continued to increase in importance
throughout the cent ury. It would eventually replace the wool cloth industry as the
leading sect or of Florentine industrial production?42 This process was already at work
during the last decade of the century.lfby 1588 the output ofsilk cloth was still inferior
to that of wool cloth, from the 1590s onwards it took the lead as the most important
sect or in Florentine textiles and during the seventeenth century it compensated for the
serious decline in the production of woollens.243 The Grand Dukes also encouraged the
development of a silk industry in Pis a during the last quarter of the sixteenth cent ury.
The deliberate policy of attracting skilled silk workers from Lucca (then outside the
Grand Dukes' dominions and still a strong competitor), together with favourable loans
to those who set up shop in Pisa, eventually succeeded in creating a Pisan industry.244
239 Ibid.: 182-183. 240 Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 95, 98-99. 241 Sassetti, "Sul Commercio," 182. 242 Malanima, Decadenza di un 'Economia, 7, 25. Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century, 42. 243 Malanima, Decadenza di un'Economia, 313-4, 322-4. Goodman suggests that by the 1620s silk production was already worth twice as much as that of woollens. Jordan Goodman, "Tuscan Commercial Relations with Europe, 1550-1620: Florence and the European Textile Market," in Firenze e la Toscana dei Medici nell'Europa dei '500 (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1983),332. Employment also shifted, with the silk industry becoming the biggest employer. 244 Rita Mazzei, Pisa Medicea: L'economia Cittadina da Ferdinando 1 a Cosimo III (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1991), 65, 69, 86.
63
Since the fifteenth cent ury, the most important export markets for the Tuscan
silk industry had been in Europe. This pattern continued and was possibly even
reinforced during the sixteenth century and beyond; Florentine firms were strong in
Spain, France, the Low Countries and England,245 Pisan firms exported most of their
production to Germany and Poland.246 The sale of silk cloth to the Ottomans did not end
and sorne luxury silks found their way into the Seraglio, but these were relatively rare
transactions and did not constitute the bulk of Pisan production?47 There was,
ultimately, a profound geographic realignment of the export markets for Florentine
textiles which coincided with the shift in the emphasis of Florence's textile production
away from woollens and towards silk cloth?48 The markets from which raw materials
were imported were affected by a comparable realignment. During the course of the
sixteenth cent ury, faced with the uncertainties in the long-range supply of raw silk,
suppliers were found closer to home.249 Tuscan raw-silk production also increased.
Although self-sufficiency was never achieved, in 1660 sorne 70% of raw silk used was
loca1.25o This makes for a striking difference with the fifteenth cent ury, when by far
most raw silk used had been imported. After this retrenchment, both parts of the
Florentine-Ottoman trade (exchange of wool cloth for raw silk) had ceased.
Trade with the Levant did not stop altogether, of course. Ships bound for
Levantine ports stillioaded goods at Livorno. The Levantine trade of Livorno, however,
was never very great during the sixteenth century.251 In fact, as we have seen, much of
Florentine trade with the Ottoman domains was carried on via Ancona or sent to other
locations such as Marseilles for re-export.252 Moreover, the opening up of Livorno to
international commerce, when it was declared a free port in 1593, would eventually
245 Malanima, Decadenza di un 'Economia, 263-5. 246 Mazzei, Pisa Medicea, 93-4. Sorne Florentine companies also carried a brisk trade with Germany. Cf. Francesco Guido Bruscoli, "Drappi di Seta e Tele di Lino tra Firenze e Norimberga nella Prima Metà dei Cinquecento," Archivio Storico Italiano 159, no. 2 (2001). 247 Mazzei, Pisa Medicea, 96. 248 Goodman, "Tuscan Commercial Relations," 337, 339. 249 Sella points to the increased use ofCalabrian silk. Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century, 20. 250 Malanima, Decadenza di un 'Economia, 112-113. 251 Braudel, The Mediterranean, 633. Note, however, that the documents used by Braudel and Ruggiero are incomplete. See footnote 17 in: Frattarelli Fischer, "Livomo," 876. Thus they would have to be integrated with the remaining documents for a more thorough assessment. 252 Braudel and Romano, Navires et Marchandises, 42-44, 55.
64
encourage precisely this kind of third-party re-export trade. The fact that a Compagnia
Orientale was founded in Livomo in 1603 should indicate that trade with the eastem
Mediterranean was still alive at that date.253 A Venetian ambassador reported that in the
years before 1609 a significant amount of Tuscan silk cloth had been smuggled via the
Ancona-Dubrovnik route and occasionally also shipped by Venetian merchants
themselves, much to the detriment of sales of the equivalent Venetian product. 254 In the
early seventeenth century there were a few Tuscan ships based in Livomo which offered
regular service on the routes Livomo-Izmir and Livomo-Alexandria, between two and
four times a year?55 When we add to these the many other vessels passing through
Livomo (English, Dutch, French, other), a very significant proportion of the trade
through the main Tuscan port was bound for the Levant.256 Much of it, however, would
have been exclusively transit trade in the hands of foreign merchants.
Ultimately, the exchange between Tuscany itself and the Levant had lost its
economic raison d'être and its profitability by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
cent ury. It was English merchants who would eventually resume on a vaster scale and
with far superior profit margins, the two-way trade consisting in the exchange of
woollen cloth for raw silk with the Ottomans and the Safavids.257 lronically, this trade
was conducted out of Livomo, which became a major base for English and Dutch
commercial operations in the Mediterranean. Their trade would be concentrated,
253 Ibid., 21. 254 This was the 1609 report by ambassador Ottaviano Bon. Another report from 1584 had made a similar point: Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 521, 305. 255 Vittorio Salvadorini, "Traffici con i Paesi Islamici e Schiavi a Livorno nel XVII Secolo: Problemi e Suggestioni," in Atti dei Convegno "Livorno e Il Mediterraneo nell'Età Medicea" (Livorno 23-25 Settembre 1977) (Livorno: U. Bastoggi Editore, 1978), 21l. By this time Livorno had become one of the main centres in the Mediterranean for the sale of slaves. 256 Ibid., 212. Salvadorini suggested that at least 25% was bound for what he caUs "Islamic countries." It should be pointed out that his estimate is only a rough one, based on the number of permits issued for quarantine purposes, not on bills of lading indicating the value and type of goods carried. AIso, he thus includes north African ports such as Tunis or Algiers. These indeed grew significantly in importance for Tuscan trade since the second half of the sixteenth century: Braudel and Romano, Navires et Marchandises, 45-47. 257 Benjamin Braude, "International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1650: A Study in Undevelopment," Review 2, no. 3 (1979): 442-445. Murat Çizakça, "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650," The Journal of Economie History 40, no. 3 (1980): 542-543, 545-546. Both Braude and Çizakça pointed out, respectively, that Ottoman wool and silk cloth remained competitive with their English counterparts. However, the Levant Company was able to depress prices ofwoollen and silk garments (even selling below cost!) because it made double profits in its two-way trade, and especially rich profits in England thanks to its monopoly (see footnote below).
65
moreover, in the hands of one company (the Levant Company, then to be merged with
the East India Company) and not scattered among a myriad of small or medium-sized
enterprises as the fifteenth-century Florentine trade had been. English and then Dutch
merchants enjoyed their own advantageous capitulary privileges in the Ottoman
empire.258 Their mutual enmity against the Habsburgs worked at this juncture to favour
closer trading relations too. Indeed, paraphrasing Inalcik, we could say that at this stage
political and economic circumstances created a natural alliance first between the Sultan
and France, then between the Sultan, England and the Dutch Republic, against the
Habsburgs. By contrast, the commerce carried out by Florentine companies continued to
be mired down by an inconclusive Tuscan foreign policy which mixed the occasional
effort at restoring diplomatie and commercial ties with crusading fantasies and desultory
attempts at prying open Ottoman markets by force.
Florentine-Ottoman Relations at the Dawn of the Seventeenth Century
The accession of Ferdinand l as Grand Duke in 1587 escalated the confrontation
between Tuscany and the Ottomans until his death in 1609. As the Fakhr al-Dln episode
indicates, this escalation continued in the second decade of the seventeenth cent ury.
Cosimo II inherited many of his father's policies and continued them, if only half
heartedly, until 1621, when he was succeeded by his infant son?59 Thus the more
belligerent attitude exemplified by the founding of the Order of St. Stephen continued
between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Moreover, Tuscan piracy and
military activities focused ever more on the eastem Mediterranean, taking advantage of
relative Ottoman weakness after Lepanto, aggravated by the economic crisis at the end
258 From its inception, the English-Ottoman trade was based on a royal chart granting a monopoly on the import of Ottoman goods into England. This was later consolidated with a similar monopoly for trade between Venice and England, which included re-export trade from Ottoman lands and hence was a potential competitor of the direct English-Ottoman trade. Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London: Frank Cass, 1964), 10-11, 18-2l. 259 The heir was Ferdinand Il. As a minor, he was under the tutelage of his mother (Maddalena) and grandmother (Cristina) until 1628 and beyond, as their influence continued for several years. Sorne ofthe letters exchanged between these women and Fakhr al-Din have been published by Carali. They are mostly courtesy letters intended to keep relations alive and encourage trade between Tuscany and the emir's domains. They pertain to exchanges of gifts and personal recommendations of merchants. See, for example, documents CIX and CX in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:320-322.
66
of the century.260 Already in 1587 it must have been obvious that the new Grand Duke
would impart such a direction to Tuscan foreign policy. This was not merely because of
the personal differences and the mutual dislike that divided him from his brother
Francesco l, who had left no heirs.261 He distanced himself somewhat from the
Habsburgs by choosing a French bride, but this did not lead to a significant change in
Medicean-Ottoman relations.262 Ferdinand l had been destined for the church and was
actually still a cardinal when he succeeded to the Grand Duchy. He left the church in
order to secure a legitimate heir, but his policies and sympathies remained mostly
aligned with those of the papacy.263 If Ferdinand l could continue pursuing an anti
Ottoman stance so single-mindedly, however, it was in large part because the
realignment of Florentine political and commercial interests discussed above was far
advanced. His aggressive policies did not go counter to powerful entrenched interests,
but simply fini shed undermining what was left of them.
The diplomatie and commercial ties established with Fakhr al-DIn belong to this
last phase of Florentine-Ottoman relations. The first Tuscan effort at interference in
Ottoman internaI affairs, however, took place in the Balkans. In the early 1590s the
simmering hostility between the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs erupted into
open conflict. The occasion was provided by the ambiguous status of the principalities
260 The Porte quickly rebuilt its fleet after the battle. Andrew C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History," Past & Present, no. 57 (1972): 62-63. As we will see, however, a full Ottoman naval revival would not occur until the mid-seventeenth century. The financial difficulties which began in the 1570s hit the Porte even harder than the defeat at Lepanto and left its finances in disarray for a long time. Venetian reports often refer to cash shortages as the main problem faced by the Porte. See, for example, Ottavio Bon's reports of 1608 and 1609 in Firpo, Relazioni, 465. Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 478. See also Giorgio Giustinian's report of 1627 Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 541. 261 These differences were undoubtedly important. Diaz, Il Granducato, 280-281. They did not impart an altogether new policy, however, butjust brought in a new political style and sorne new administrators. 262 Ibid., 285-286, 292. Even at the height of this pro-French and anti-Habsburg stance the Medicis had no choice but to participate in the attempted invasion of England. Anna Maria Crino, "La Partecipazione di un Galeone deI Granduca di Toscana Ferdinando 1 All'impresa d'Inghilterra di Filippo II di Spagna nel 1588," Archivio Storico Italiano 533, no. 4 (1984): 589, 604-606. Eventually, the ties with the papacy and the counter-Reformation would force a de-facto realignment of Medicean policy alongside the Habsburgs'. 263 Ferdinand 1 renounced his cardinal hat in 1588 and married in 1589. For an overview of his political formation while a cardinal in Rome, cf. Stefano Calonaci, ""Accordare 10 Spirito col Mondo". Il Cardinal Ferdinando De Medici a Roma negli anni di Pio V e Gregorio XIII," Rivista Storica Italiana 112, no. 1 (2000). See particularly his patronage of an "oriental press" for propaganda purposes and the planning of missionary activities in the Levant that he encouraged. He seems to have patronized the Maronite community in Rome. See footnote 1, Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:160. For his fame as an ally of the counterReformation papacy: Diaz, Il Granducato, 290-292, 321-323.
67
of WaIlachia, Moldovia and Transylvania, aIl three of which owed sorne form of
allegiance to both emperor and sultan. The growing popularity of the Reformation in
these areas ensured a special interest on the part of the papacy?64 AIready in 1592
Medièean diplomats were involved, alongside papal envoys, in negotiations with
Sigismund Bâthory, the ruler of Transylvania.265 The latter was willing to rebel against
the Ottomans andjoin in the crusading plans put forth by the papacy. In 1594 the Grand
Duke provided financial aid to the Habsburgs and a contingent of soldiers who fought in
the Hungarian campaign that same year.266
Political ties to the Habsburgs and the papacy were partly responsible for
Florentine involvement in this affair. But the Medicis were clearly also intent upon
furthering their trade. In 1593 an embassy by Bâthory to the Grand Dukes had discussed
the opening of Transylvania to Florentine commerce.267 During the second half of the
sixteenth century central European producers had gained a foothold in the area
corresponding to modern day Romania in the export of woollens for mass consumption.
In the 1570s local industry also thrived and the towns of Brassov and Sibiu set up
manufactures which attracted specialized workers (particularly dyers) from Germany
and Italy.268 If Tuscan cloth had any circulation, it would have been only very limited
and almost exclusively among the elite.269 With the growth of Tuscan trade elsewhere in
eastern Europe (particularly Poland), it is easy to see how the Medicis might have been
hoping to improve the position of their merchants in Transylvania. Just how flimsy these
hopes had been was revealed when Bâthory opened up to the Ottomans in 1597 and fen
fouI of the Habsburgs.270 By 1598, however, the Medicis themselves had once more
264 The intricacies of the successive revolts and the escalation of conflict to involve the Habsburgs, the papacy and the Crimean Khans are detailed in: Carl Max Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperia/ism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 123-204. 265 Spini, "Il Principato," 211. 266 Ibid. 267 Ibid., 212. 268 Including one Antonio Morosino who was a member of the Florentine Arte della Lana. Samuil Goldenberg, "Commercio, Produzione e Consumo dei Panni di Lana nei Paesi Romeni (Secoli XIV-XVII)," in Produzione, Commercio e Consumo dei Panni di Lana (nei Seco/i XII-XVIII), ed. Marco Spallanzani (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1971),643-4. 269 Ibid., 636, 638. 270 Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperia/ism, 173-175.
68
started trade negotiations at the Porte.271 They seem to have cultivated sorne important
contacts at the Porte at this time.272 Yet, as the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Cappello
gleefully reported to his Senate in 1600, the Ottomans were so upset by Tuscan piracy
that he succeeded in sabotaging Tuscan plans even though their envoy had almost
reached a commercial agreement with the Porte.273
The failure ofthese negotiations did not induce a rethinking of Medicean policy,
which continued to spin out its machinations against the Ottomans. The Venetian consul
in Syria reported that sometime between late in 1599 and 1602 emissaries of the Medicis
twice visited the ruler of Tripoli, who was temporarily at odds with the Porte and with
the Venetians, to establish sorne kind of links (diplomatie and commercial links, most
probably, though the consul did not specify).274 The Tuscan agents were harshly rebuked
in Tripoli but continued to seek a way to gain access to Syrian trade. In 1605 Raffaello
Cacciamarri, a Venetian in the service of the Grand Duke, prepared a report on the trade
that Tuscany could profitably conduct with Beirut, advising his patrons to establish
relations with Fakhr al-Dln, who controlled the sanjals of Beirut-Sidon and of Safed
Acre. Cacciamarri's report listed the types of textiles in demand in the area, inc1uding
velvets, brocades and woollens, and the goods that could be obtained in exchange.275 The
outbreak of 'Ali Janbulad's rebellion in Aleppo in 1605 offered the Medicis a new
opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Syria and it is on Janbulad that Tuscan policy
initially concentrated. Soon the Medicis sought to establish ties with him and to help
him in his efforts against the Ottomans, much as they had done with Bathory. In 1607
271 Camerani, "Contributo alla Storia dei Trattati," 85. 272 "Nothing is more important," the Venetian ambassador remarked, "then to have friends inside and outside the Seraglio ( ... ) in the manner which, it is known for certain, the Grand Duke of Tuscany does with 'Giafer' Pasha ... " Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 460. 273 Ibid., 453-454. Cappello mentioned the Tuscan envoyas Neri Girardi. He also referred to a Tuscan attack on "Scio" (Chios) which had particularly upset the Ottomans. 274 Berchet, Relazioni, 125-126. No specific date is given for this episode, but the Consul was Vincenzo Dandolo, who was in Syria between 1599 and 1602 and presented his report to the Venetian senate in 1603. He refers specifically to "the emir of Tripoli," not to an Ottoman official. Therefore, he must have been referring to Yüsuf Sayfii. The Venetians were moving their shipping activities from Tripoli to Alexandretta around this time, with the approval of the Porte. See Section Two below for details on the emir and on Venetian shipping from Alexandretta. A general report on the emir of Tripoli, dated from 1605, is also preserved in Tuscan archives. It confirms that Tuscan agents were seeking information, and possibly contacts, with rulers on the coast ofSyria. Document Il, in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:138. 275 Document 1 ("progetto Cacciamarri") in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:137. The Venetian suggested that in the right circumstances a 30% profit could be made.
69
the order of Saint Stephen attempted to capture Famagosta,z76 The as sault took
advantage of Janbülad's revoit, which had focused Ottoman attention on Aleppo, and
sought to establish a Tuscan bridgehead from which operations could be conducted to
help the rebellious pasha. It failed disastrously, but negotiations between the two sides
continued, for Janbülad concluded an agreement with emissaries of the Medicis'
promising them extensive commercial privileges in Aleppo should his plans succeed.277
The importance of commercial interests to Medicean policy at this stage becomes clear
when we read the articles of the treatise they made with JanbÜlad. They were concerned
for the most part with extensive commercial privileges which included exclusive
consular representation among Christian merchants and the control of seaports.278 Had
this outlandish treatise ever been implemented, it would have wrested the trade of
Aleppo from Venetian and other merchants and put it under Tuscan control.
Janbülad' s defeat by the Ottomans later that year put an end to this fanciful
scheme but not to Tuscan ambitions in the area. The Medicis now reverted to
Cacciamarri's rather modest trade project and focused on establishing relations with
Fakhr al-Dln, who had been an ally of 'Ali JanbÜlad's. They instructed an agent of
theirs, the Lyonnais Ippolito Lioncini, to hand over a shipment of harquebuses which
had been destined for Janbülad to the emir instead.279 For a time, they also patronized
Sultan Y$ya, a younger brother of Mehmet III, who tried to press a claim to succeed at
the Porte after the latter's death in 1603.280 In 1609 they sent him to the coast of
SyriaIPalestine aboard Tuscan ships, which were instructed to cruise the area to see
what following he could muster.281 But YaQya was no Djem Sultan and had no strong
following in Ottoman lands. Tuscan and papal schemes to interfere in Ottoman internaI
affairs over the next years, therefore, inevitably focused on courting Fakhr al-Dln. He
was their last remaining hope for a strong ally in the region. Between 1608 and 1611
276 Spini, "Il Principato," 214. 277 Document VII in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1: 143.
278 Document II in: Roncaglia, "Fabr Ad-Oïn," 535-540. Articles 5 through to 30 detail extensive privileges and include the exclusive right of Tuscan agents/consuls to represent aIl other Christian "nations" trading in Aleppo in any dispute arising over trade (speIled out in article 8). 279 Document VIII, in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1: 145. 280 Tamborra, Gli Stati Italiani, 70-71. 281 Document XII in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 1: 155-157.
70
there was an exchange of letters between the Court of Tuscany, the Papacy and the
Druze emir. Paul V wrote to Fakhr al-Dln recommending to him the Maronite patriarch,
who corresponded at this time with both the Vatican and Tuscany.282 In 1611 the bishop
of Cyprus wrote on behalf of the patriarch to present a plan that the latter had allegedly
discussed with Fakhr al-Dln to capture the coast of Palestine from the Ottomans.283
These discussions continued during Fakhr al-Dln's stay in Tuscany, but they were as
tangled and half-hearted as those that had taken place with Bâthory.
The French were the first to distance themselves from the rebellious emir, as they
feared for their trade. Already well-entrenched in Beirut and Sidon (where they had a
consul), they also had extensive interests in other parts of the Ottoman empire. During
his stay in Tuscany, Fakhr al-Dln wrote a long letter to the French ambassador in Rome
seeking help to regain his lands.284 The unforthcoming response led to a temporary
cooling off of relations between the emir and the French.285 News came to Florence from
Aleppo that the French consul was trying to obtain from the qaçfi in Sidon a statement
that Fakhr al-Dln had commandeered, not hired, the French ships he used to sail to
Livomo, thus denying legitimate suspicions of French help to the rebellious emir.286 The
Medicis themselves, while continuing to investigate the possibility of military action,
also opened negotiations to reconcile themselves with the Ottomans. Already in 1613,
just after the arrivaI of the Druze emir in Tuscany, their envoy in Rome wrote to wam
that Paul V seemed disinclined towards taking up arms in favour of Fakhr al-Dln. The
pope, he pointed out, was particularly concemed by the progress the Ottomans were
making in Transylvania in the ongoing struggle initiated by the Bâthory affair and felt
that such schemes were not only unlikely to bring any gains, but could weIl result in
losses for their cause and an increased Ottoman threat.287 In 1614 a letter sent from the
282 Documents XI, XIV, XV, XVIII, in: Ibid., 1:154, 158, 160, 165. 283 Document XVII, in: Ibid., 1: 163. 284 Document XXXIV, in: Ibid., 1:196. 285 Ibid., 1: 110. 286 Document XXXV, in: Ibid., 1:201-202. Actually, the French consul in Sidon had sailed with the emir and stayed with him in Tuscany for a while. AIso, Tuscan reports indicate that eighteen French artillerymen played a key role in defending fortresses in the hands of the Druze emir against the Ottoman onslaught. They were most probably "renegadoes" or slaves, however, not agents of the French crown. 287 Document XXIX, letter from Piero Guicciardini, in: Ibid., 1: 189. The explicit mention of the affairs of Transylvania is particularly interesting, for it clearly shows the two episodes were linked in the mind of the
71
grand vizier Na~U4 pasha to Tuscany, with a pardon for the emir, made references to
previous overtures from the Medicis to the Porte.288 So did otherJetters sent by Ottoman
dignitaries in 1615.289 Fakhr al-Dln himself was attempting a reconciliation with the
Porte and might have supported these contacts on the part of the Medici too. Certainly,
he saw an opportunity to restore his good name at the Porte after the death of Na~U4
pasha, who had decided to move against him. The Habsburgs seemed keenest on the idea
of a crusade, since they insisted on having the Druze emir as their guest in Messina in
1615 and kept him there for two years, most likely against his wil1.290 However, no
concrete action was taken at this stage even by the Habsburgs.
Fakhr al-Dln's safe retum to Lebanon early in 1618 and the successes and
prosperity he enjoyed for sorne fifteen years thereafter proved the wisdom of a more
conciliatory policy towards the Ottomans. He seems to have maintained contacts with
the papacy and with the Habsburgs and continued to contemplate the possibility of a
crusade with them.291 The court of Tuscany was probably aware of these discussions.292
Again, however, no concrete action was taken on their part. They responded, instead, to
Fakhr al-Dln's entreaties to establish direct commercial ties between his domains and
Tuscany. Having written to the emir to recommend to him a certain merchant called
Bacigalupo, they saw the latter retum in 1629 with a gift of eight baIes of silk from the
emir and a letter in which Fakhr al-Dln asked them to send a permanent consu1.293 Their
vessels would be welcome, so long as they took the precaution of trading under the
French flag. 294 This must have been requested by Fakhr al-Dln in order not to flaunt
Ottoman capitulations. Thus in 1630 the Medicis despatched five merchant vessels
pope. Since 1605-1606 the situation in Transylvania had tumed decisively against the papacy and the Habsburgs: Kortepeter, Ottoman lmperialism, 162-163, 198-204. 288 It specifically mentions letters sent by Lorenzo Usimbardi to the Porte. Document LXVI, in: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:262-263. 289 Documents LXX, LXXI, in: Ibid., 1:272-273. 290 Ibid., 1:113. 291 Documents XCI, XCII, XCIV, CI, cn, CV, in: Ibid., 1:297, 299, 302, 311, 311, 315. 292 Carali reported that he could not find any documents specifically concemed with relations between the Medicis and Fakhr al-Dïn for the period 1615-1629 in Tuscan Archives. Ibid., 1:293. 293 Documents CVII, CVIII, in: Ibid., 1:319-320. 294 Document CXIl, in: Ibid., 1:323.
72
loaded with merchandise together with Francesco da Verrazzano, who would act as their
consul in Sidon.295
However, in spite of the exchange of letters and gifts between the Druze emir
and the Tuscan court, trade with Tuscany did not reach a new high at this stage?96 For
one thing, only three years later the Ottomans would capture and eventually execute
Fakhr al-Dln. There were also sorne disagreements over the commercial deals first
attempted between these two sides. The emir instructed one of his agents to try and
purchase Florentine cloth in exchange for raw silk. 297 Negotiations over the terms of this
barter of cloth for raw silk, however, must have run into difficulties. The documents
report that the Tuscan merchants sought to sell their goods in Damascus, irritating the
emir.298 Deals that met the satisfaction of all parties were certainly harder to reach in the
more competitive atmosphere of the early seventeenth cent ury. Fakhr al-Dln, for his
part, seems to have been eager to promote the sale ofraw silk and also to have been well
aware of the strong negotiating position he had, both politically and especially
economically. To understand this position and what Fakhr al-Dln had to gain in his
dealings with the Medicis-beyond the immediate episode of his exile in 1613-17-we
must now tum to developments in the Syrian provinces following the Ottoman
conquest.
295 Documents CXVII, CXVIII, in: Ibid., 1:328-330. 296 Carali himself made much of the expansion of trade: Ibid., 1:61, 123. However, the very documents he published suggest the exact contrary. These show that Tuscan agents were trying, over and again, to establish direct trading relations, but not that they actually shipped many goods to the area at this time. We see here an example ofCarali's bias. 297 Document CXXV, in: Ibid., 1:340. 298 Verrazzano wrote back to Tuscany mentioning the displeasure of the emir and his complaints about the high expectations of the merchants. Document CXXX, in: Ibid., 1:349.
73
FAKHR AL-DIN AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF OTTOMAN POWER IN
THE SYRIAN PROVINCES (1516-1633)
One historiographie al tradition has portrayed Fakhr al-Dln as a strong independent ruler,
the founder, or at least precursor, of modem Lebanon as an independent nation-state.299
The sheer length of his tenure, sorne four decades between 1593 and 1633 with only
brief interruptions, shows a continuity compatible with the task of founding a regional
state. The power achieved by the Druze emir also seems to support this view. In the late
1620s the Ma'anids controlled almost all of the coast of Syria/Palestine. With the
exception of Alexandretta, all the main ports between the Nile Delta and Anatolia were
ultimate1y under Fakhr al-Dln's control. His revenues and wealth fuelled both a strong
and independent military establishment and a flourishing investment in public building
and economic activities.300 But the huge wealth and the powerful position he occupied in
such a strategie location could not fail to alarm the Ottomans. The forces they mobilized
against him in 1633 left even this powerful emir litt le choice but to capitulate. Other
historiographie al interpretation have challenged this tradition, therefore, stressing the
unofficial and necessarily transit ory nature of Fakhr al-Dln's power. He was never
granted, for example, the title of Su~tiin al-Barr (sultan of the open country) by the
Ottomans and the mühimme defteri only ever refers to him, officially, as a sanjakhey.301
Similarly, Venetian reports simply refer to him as "the emir of Sidon," when they
explicitly referred to him at all?02 These interpretations tend to privilege external
299 Father Carali, for example, belongs in this tradition. See his own remarks in the introduction to the collection of documents that he edited. Ibid., 84, 130. More recently, this view has been put forward by Chebli. Cf. Michel Chebli, Fakhreddine II Maan, Prince du Liban (1572-1635) (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1984). 300 Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 47-55. 301 Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 8, 13. Rafeq reports that Murad IV conferred the title of Su~tiin aIBarr on him: Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Syrian Provinces from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale: Southem Illinois University Press, 1977), 61. This would have been an unofficial title, at any rate. If it was indeed conferred, it would have been part of the flattery and cajolery practised by the Porte towards provincial notables which included gifts of robes of honour and commendations. Tuscan agents and Cosimo II himself claimed that Fakhr al-Dln was "a prince ofSyria" and one of the most important men in the Ottoman empire. Document XXII Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:171-172. 302 See quotes below. While Tuscans were prone to exaggerate the importance of their contacts, the Venetian viewpoint seems to have been rather closer to the Ottoman perspective.
74
factors, which interacted with local developments at a particular conjuncture to allow
such a tremendous concentration of power in the hands of a local ruler.
Abu-Husayn, for example, while recognizing the importance of the background
of trade and diplomacy in the region, ultimately gives pride of place to the deleterious
effect of external interference upon the internaI divisions of the Syrian provinces of the
Ottoman empire. He has stressed the strength of ethnic/religious ties and the long
standing mutual suspicion (if not outright enmity) between the Druze and the Sunni
administration of Damascus.303 This was fuelled by external interference which sought
to diminish Ottoman power in the area. Because of periodical scheming by European
powers and because of the trade in weapons (muskets, but also occasionally cannon)
which added to Druze military effectiveness, he concludes: "it thus appears that the
Druze rebellion against the Ottomans, certainly until1633 and probably to the very end,
was fuelled to a large extent by European designs upon Syria."304 But, as we have seen in
the previous section, Tuscan attempts at interfering in the Balkans and in the Levant at
the turn of the century were fundamentally weak, unrealistic and doomed to failure.305
Tuscan meddling in the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the century, in fact,
belonged to a period when Florence had effectively lost aIl influence in the area and also
much of its political independence. After the failed intervention in Transylvania and the
disastrous loss at Famagosta in 1607, both the Grand Dukes and the papacy were wary
of intervening in Ottoman lands. The Medicis, foolishly for their own trade, continued
their piratical activities, capturing a large convoy of Ottoman ships in 1608. But the
naval forces that they could muster were only effective as pirates and for the occasional
coups-de-main, certainly not for challenging Ottoman control of the eastern
303 Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration," 666-667. This enmity continued after the Ottoman conquest. Considered to be heretics, Abu-Husayn points out, the Druze did not fit in the millet system. 304 Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 23. In the same paragraph Abu-Husayn goes on to describe Venice and then Tuscany as "the sponsors of much bolder designs, as the cases of the Janbulad and the Druze rebellions tend to indicate." However, as we have seen in the previous section, Venice maintained good relations with the Porte for most of the sixteenth century. 305 Abu-Husayn cites Griswold on the interference of Tuscany in the Levant after Lepanto: Ibid., 19. Griswold described at sorne length Tuscan piracy and the Tuscan alliance with Jiinbliliid. William J. Griswold, The Great AnatoUan Rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983),78-85, 128-132. He relied on Carali's collection of documents to describe these events. Like Carali, however, he seems to have taken Tuscan plans at face value, whereas as we have seen in the previous section and as we will see in more detail below, Tuscan interference was feeble and ineffective.
75
Mediterranean. One Venetian bailo trenchantly summed up the foHy of Tuscan piracy
with a hunting metaphor: "smaH bites do not harm great animaIs but sure enough irritate
them bitterly; tierce wild creatures that one cannot bring down should not be assaulted
at aH; those who do otherwise, as the saying goes, dig their own grave. ,,306
Another set of external factors that has been emphasized concerns Ottoman
power itse1f. Fakhr al-Dln's success can be seen largely as the by-product of temporary
difficulties in the Ottoman central administration and of its vast military commitments
both in the Balkans and in Central Asia. The devaluation of the currency in the 1570s
and 1580s/07 foHowed by the decreasing effectiveness of the janissaries as a tighting
force and then by the jelali revoit s, certainly constrained the Porte in its ability to deal
with ambitious local rulers.308 Inalcik thus conc1uded that "the extensive power and
autonomy which Fakhr al-Dln enjoyed was due primarily to the jelali upheaval in Asia
Minor and Syria in the period 1596_1610."309 But, as we will see, while these
circumstances were certainly favourable to the Druze emir, they cannot be the primary
reason for his success. On the one hand, local insubordination thrived long before the
jelali revolts and shows a direct continuity all the way through to Fakhr al-Dln. Indeed,
after the incredibly swift conquest of the entire Mamluk empire in 1516-17, the
Ottomans were engaged for almost a century in a 10ng-drawn-out process of bringing
these vast provinces (and not just the main cities) under their authority. On the other
hand, and crucially for our argument, Fakhr al-Dln's power rose to new heights from
1618 onwards, following his return from Tuscany. This was well after the main tires of
the jelalirebellions had been put out.310
306 Tuscan pirates, in other words, were like a hunting dog which assaulted an animal much larger than itself. Report from the bai/o Cristoforo Valier of 1616. Firpo, Relazioni, 663. 307 ~evket Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 960. 308 Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship," 53, 57-59. 309 Halil inalcik, "Tax Collection, Embezzlement and Bribery in Ottoman Finances," in Essays in Ottoman History (Beyoglu, istanbul: Eren, 1998), 182. Rafeq too gives prominence to the context of the jelali revoIts: Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship," 53, 61. 310 Griswold pointed out that after 1610, following the elimination ofmany ofthe "greatjelalis," there were no major revolts in Anatolia for at least a decade, though sorne unrest persisted. AIso, the economy ofmany are as had been severely affected and would take longer to recover. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 208, 212-214. In economic and administrative terms, the effect of the je la li revolts lasted weil beyond 1610, but the immediate threat to the Porte had been removed by then.
76
In this section, therefore, l would like to develop in detail a point that Abu
Husayn and Inalcik only made in passing and largely ignored. Abu-Husayn suggested
that a power struggle took place over the role of provincial govemors in trade as it was
inherited from Mamluk times.311 The interference of European powers in Syrian affairs,
moreover, was closely tied to mutual interests in the trade they could conduct with
Fakhr al_Dln.312 Inalcik mentions the tussle over appropriation of revenues between the
Porte and provincial administration (including, specifically, Fakhr al-Dln) at a time
when Syrian trade was still buoyant.313 This section will argue that these long-term
economic and political trends in the coastal regions of SyriaIPalestine should be given
pride of place as an explanatory factor. It was these trends which, skillfully exploited by
Fakhr al-Dln, provided the thrust that buoyed up Ma'nid power. These trends, then, were
the primary cause behind the rise of the Ma'ns, while the opportunities offered by
foreign interference in the area and by temporary Ottoman weakness simply allowed the
Ma 'ns' power to rise to an even higher peak.
The first chapter below considers the "secular trend" affecting the demographics
and the economic development of the Syrian provinces. It also highlights the difficulties
that were to arise as the Ottoman state started to introduce changes in the
administration of the Syrian provinces. At the same time as economic expansion offered
local rulers an opportunity to enrich themselves and increase their power, the Ottoman
empire itself was attempting to administer and exploit the Syrian provinces more closely
and directly, integrating them in its own vast state machinery. Therefore, the framework
within which to understand relations between Druze leaders, including Fakhr al-Dln, and
the Porte is one ofbargaining between provincial elites and the Ottoman state.314 In the
main cities and in sorne areas (particularly in northem Syria), govemors were
increasingly state functionaries appointed from the centre of power. This was not so in
the coastal areas of southem SyriaIPalestine, where the cooperation of strong local rulers
311 Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 17-18. 312 Rafeq makes a passing reference to the emir's "fostering of trade relations with European powers." Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship," 61. 313 inalcik, "Tax Collection," 173, 181. 314 This is the main approach adopted by Barkey in her study of Ottoman state centralization around the time of the jelaU revolts. Cf. Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1994).
77
was indispensable to the Porte in maintaining order and administering the area. These
regions, therefore, offer an interesting picture of state/elite relations which complements
that observed elsewhere in the Ottoman empire?15 1 suggest that the Ma'ns, like other
provincial elites, were involved in a brokerage style of bargaining with the Ottoman
state?16 Precisely because the Ma'ns' power was so firmly rooted in certain are as,
however, they also present a substantiaIly different picture than that of many jelalis.317
During the sixteenth century Fakhr al-Dln's predecessors led an armed and unruly, yet
weIl-organized, local population. Together, they succeeded in keeping for themselves a
considerable share of the local surplus.
The second chapter in this section focuses on the early career of Fakhr al-Dln. 1
will suggest that he was more closely co-opted into the emerging system of Ottoman
provincial govemment than his predecessors had ever been and that his behaviour should
be largely understood in terms of Ottoman provincial politics within Syria. Yet, in spite
of his integration into the Ottoman administration, many of the dynamics which
promoted a measure of independence and even insubordination among his predecessors
continued under Fakhr al-Dln, if only under a new guise. In fact, while the Ma'ns were
progressively co-opted in the expanding Ottoman state machinery, they accumulated at
the same time more wealth and power in their locality. They even formalized their
power by developing their own military forces and fortifications. CruciaIly, in aIl ofthis
they maintained strong local roots and a clear role in local economic development. AlI of
these factors (cooptation into the Ottoman state, strong local roots, foresight in long
term development of his areas) mark Fakhr al-Dln apart from rebels like 'Ali Jiinbüliid
and also from local rulers who operated more closely within the Ottoman fold, like
Yüsuf Say ta, as we will see below. The last chapter focuses on the final phase of Fakhr
al-Dln's career, after his flight to Tuscany. It argues that the very same dynamics which
315 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," in An Economie and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 565-567. Here Faroqhi draws largely from Abu-Husayn's study. 316 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 11-12. 317 By contrast, Faroqhi sees Fakhr al-Drn as replicating the 'Ali Jïinbüliid's rebellion. Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 416-418.
78
had made him successful in his early years propelled him to new heights of power but
also set insurmountable ultimate limits to this power.
Throughout the entire section below 1 draw a distinction between international
and regional trade. By international trade 1 mean the long-distance trade in spices, raw
silk and luxury goods passing through Ottoman domains, whereas by regional trade 1
refer to trade in locally produced goods, whether they were sold on the emerging world
market or whether they had a more limited local circulation. This distinction is
important because the contentious relationship between the Porte and provincial elites
was somewhat different in each case. 1 also want to draw attention to the significance of
the regional economy of the province of Damascus, which is relatively understudied.
There is a growing appreciation among scholars of the continued survival of
international trade during the sixteenth century, as well as the role played by the Porte
in this process.318 Despite numerous difficulties, the economy of the Syrian provinces
showed strong signs of vitality during the best part of the sixteenth century and beyond
and also fuelled a thriving regional trade. As the trade in commodities expanded, more
and more products from the provinces of Damascus, Tripoli and Aleppo were sold on
world markets or exchanged for a variety of imported goods.
When we look at Fakhr al-Dln's domains, however, this economic vitality seems
to have coincided with relegation to the status of provider of raw materials to emerging
world markets. Indeed, the selling of commodities on these markets seems to have been
the most important source of revenue for the emir, in a development which in many
ways anticipates the rise of eighteenth-century ayans. 1 want to avoid, however, fitting
this example into a ready-made paradigm of "western" industrial supremacy over a
mostly agricultural "east." For one thing, when we look beyond specifie areas, we see
that there was no wholesale incorporation of Levantine economies in the world economy
as "peripheral" suppliers ofraw materials at this stage.319 Moreover, in an age in which
318 Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 175-176, 181-182. inalcik, Economic and Social History, 246-249,344-347. 319 Cf. Murat Çizakça, "Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World-Economy," Review 8, no. 3 (1985). Çizakça also pointed out that it is important to distinguish between the three different branches of textile production: wool, silk and cotton textiles, a distinction 1 have followed below. Only woollens saw a relatively clear preponderance ofnorth European textiles at this stage.
79
movable capital far outweighed fixed capital and technological investment, so-called
industrial decline was always relative and liable to be reversed.320
4
<\8· .. __ --.L 1
1
----..--- ._-_.-
! 1
42' 1 1
___ L-
1 1
--+--- _.- +-----·----1
1
1
1
1.
SYRIAN OTTOMAN PROVINCES AND SANJAKS IN THE '6th.SI7th.
CENTURI ES
LEGEND:
• CITIES
• ,. ........ -..................
TOWNS
APPROXIMATE PROVINCE BOUNDARY
APPROXIMATE BOUNDARI ES OF' IMPORTANT SANJAKS
Figure 4:Syrian cyalcts and sanjak. in the 16th & 17th centuries321
320 Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, "Merchant Networks and Ottoman Craft Production (1 6-1 7th Centuries)," in Urbanism in Islam: The Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam (Icuil), Oct. 22-28, 1989 (Tokyo: Research Project "Urbanism in Islam": Middle Eastern Culture Center in Japan, 1989). 321 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 82.
80
The Mamluk Legacy and the Beginnings of Ottoman Rule in Syria
The transition from Mamluk to Ottoman rule in Syria saw a fundamental continuity in
important demographic and economic trends which had already began during the
fifteenth cent ury. At the same time, the Ottomans started introducing changes in the
administration of the Arab provinces which deviated from established practices. The
impact of these changes was felt (and opposed) particularly strongly in the coastal areas,
where a certain tradition of independent rule had survived under the Mamluks. The
relative buoyancy of the local economy and of population levels ensured that the
struggle between centralizing and localizing tendencies was particularly hard fought and
drawn out. The eastem Mediterranean, in fact, participated in the overall process of
demographic recovery of the entire basin from the slump which followed the Black
Death. Population levels, having recovered from the devastations of the plague, began a
new phase of expansion in the middle of the fifteenth century.322 Extant statistics from
the Arab provinces confirm this trend, although very approximately.323 The unreliability
of available statistics is partly due to the need to convert existing data to actual
population figures.324 Another important factor to take into account when interpreting
Ottoman registers, however, is their very nature as products of vast exercises in
administrative centralization. The figures they report reflect the success of census takers
and the compliance (or lack thereof) of local populations as much as actual demographic
trends.
Demographie and Economic Trends
Parts of Palestine were affected by a decrease in population during late Mamluk times,
because of the financial crisis faced by the Mamluk state and of successive attempts at
322 Braudel, The Mediterranean, 402-403. 323 inalcik, Economie and Social History, 28-29. 324 Ottoman documents report the number of households (defined as tax-liable family units) and of bachelors. The number of individuals counted under each household is absolutely critical to total population numbers. The factor adopted by Barkan (an average of 5 persons per household) has been criticized under several counts. As far as the Syrian provinces are concemed, changes in fiscal practice over time and between one region and the next were such that this factor ought to be treated with particular caution. WolfDieter Hütteroth and Kemal Abdulfattah, Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century (Erlangen: Frankische Geographische Ges.; Erlangen: Palm und Enke [in Komm.], 1977),43-44.
81
raising taxation revenue (this was true especially in Tripoli, but also in centres such as
Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron).325 In sorne towns such as Gaza and Safed and their
surrounding areas open rebellions against the invading Ottoman army and the ensuing
repression caused this decrease.326 But the overall trend affecting the whole province of
Damascus (including the coast al are as of Palestine and ofsouthern Syria) during the first
half of the sixteenth cent ury was one of sustained and remarkable population growth
which lasted until at least the 1560s. This was followed, in the last decades of the
century, by a more or less slow process of decline which can be observed in many are as
throughout Syria.327 Not all towns and areas adhered to these apparent trends equally
closely and a few seem to have departed from them more markedly than others.328 Safed,
for example, probably witnessed only a very slight decline in population more
appropriately described as stagnation towards the end of the century.329 In Sidon and in
areas such as Baalbeck and the surrounding region (including the Kisrawan) there were
sorne signs of stagnation or population decline in the 1530s. However, Beirut, the Gharb,
and most of the Shüf (where the Ma'ns were originally based), show the more typical
pattern of sustainedgrowth weIl into the middle of the cent ury. When the pattern of
growth and successive decline is considered over large areas, one notices that regardless
of ups and downs the population at the end of the century was still significantly higher
than at the beginning.330
Demographic expansion sustained growth in a number of economic sect ors ,
involving both the production of commodities and of textiles, as weIl as products such as
soap from Tripoli. The expansion in the exports of woollens from Florence to the
Balkans and Anatolia which is observable in the second half of the fifteenth century
325 Amnon Cohen and Bernard Lewis, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978),23-24. 326 Ibid., 24-25. 327 Hütteroth and Abdulfattah, Historical Geography, 45. Cohen and Lewis, Population and Revenue, 20-21, 26-27. Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1982),44,52,55,69. 328 Cohen and Lewis, Population and Revenue, 22. 329 The population, based on the debatable multiplier of 5, has been calculated as: 17,112 (in 1553-57) and 16,514 (in 1596-97). Hütteroth and Abdulfattah, Historical Geography, 45. Over the following decade, however, Safed seems to have suffered from a severe crisis. 330 For Palestine, it has been observed that "the total figure at the turn of the century was at least one third higher than the figure recorded after the Ottoman conquest." Cohen and Lewis, Population and Revenue, 21.
82
responded to this rise in demand, as well as to favourable conditions for trade after the
Ottomans had consolidated their control over the entire area. In fact, cities like
Dubrovnik, with direct access to the new market, were the first to benefit from this?31
The very considerable exports to the Balkan interior attracted many foreigners to its
burgeoning trade, including numerous Florentine merchants and sever al Tuscan
artisans.332 Another city to benefit significantly from the development of a unified
Balkan market was Salonica. Its textile production was increasing already by the middle
of the fifteenth century.333 In the first half of the sixteenth century the opportunities
provided by this expanding market enabled the massive resettlement in Salonica of
Jewish artisans expelled from Habsburg dominions.334 The expansion of Salonica textile
production then moved onto a new phase thanks to the massive influx of labour and
thanks also to the introduction ofmechanical fulling.335
A similar expansion of the market for woollens, accompanied by a rise in local
production as well as in imports, can be seen in Egypt and Syria. In a Mamluk letter of
1473 addressed to the Venetian Doge we find the Egyptian authorities specifically
seeking redress against the Venetian practice of shortening the pieces of c10th that they
brought for sale to Alexandria?36 It seems that external supply, in the hands of the
331 ina\cik, Economic and Social History, 258-9. 332 Krekié, "Mercanti e Produttori Toscani," 709. The creation of a Prate se community in Dubrovnik/Ragusa was suggested by Mirjana Popovié-Radenkovié, for the early fifteenth century. The quantity of Ragusan production (4,000 cloth pieces a year is often suggested) is not substantiated. Krekié, "Mercanti e Produttori Toscani," 713. 333 Salonica suffered much from the second Ottoman conquest of 1430, which affected both its textile industry and led to population tlight. Alan Harvey, "Economie Conditions in Thessaloniki between the Two Ottoman Occupations," in Mediterranean Urban Culture 1400-1700, ed. Alexander Cowan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000), 121-122, 124. H.W. Lowry, amongst others, has pointed that already in the second half of the fifteenth century the Salonica industry showed signs of recovery. Benjamin Braude, "The Rise and FaU of Salonica WooUens, 1500-1650: Technology Transfer and Western Competition," Mediterranean Historical Review 6, no. 2 (1991): 221-222. 334 Braude, "The Rise and FaU," 218-9. 335 Ibid.: 223-4. Braude makes much of the introduction ofnew technology. However, the point of interest here concerns the socio-political developments which permitted it. The successful introduction of mechanical weaving was possible thanks to the availability of a market to absorb production, not necessarily to special inventiveness or skills which Ottoman subjects could not have otherwise obtained on their own. Faroqhi has also pointed to the importance of regional trade networks which sustained this industry, by providing raw materials, foodstuffs and other goods to the city's thriving economy. They would survive the decline of the textile industry in the early seventeenth century. Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, "Trade and Revenue Collection in Later Sixteenth-Century Salonica," Oriente Moderno 20, no. 1 (2001). 336 John Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter of 877/1473," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 24, no. 2 (1963): 212. Articles VIII and XI. Therefore less, not more, cloth was reaching the
83
Venetians, was not keeping up with demand. In the 1497 treaty between the Mamluks
and Florence there is an intriguing reference to the sale of wool, as weIl as cloth, by
Florentine merchants visiting Alexandria.337 Is it possible that at least small quantities
of wool were being imported into Egypt to feed local production? It is worth recalling
that Florence was both one of the main producers of woollens around the Mediterranean
and a major importer of English and Iberian wool. At this juncture, moreover, Florentine
and Mamluk representatives were engaged in talks in order to relaunch trade between
their states at the expense of Venice. Local production of woollen textiles certainly
picked up after the Ottoman conque st. Safed, in particular, developed a thriving textile
industry during the sixteenth cent ury, in a manner which closely paralleled that of
Salonica.338 The many fast streams and water mills in the region of Safed must have
made it an ideal place in which to set up mechanical fulling.339 There are several
mentions in Ottoman chancery documents of its manufactures and of the Jewish
community active in them, showing the authorities' concem with the continued
prosperity of the industry.340
The cotton industry of Syria was noted both for the excellent raw material
produced locally and for its finished textiles. Acre cotton, in particular, was already
renowned for its quality in the fifteenth cent ury. The Florentine galleys occasionally
loaded cotton in their retum voyages for resale in the Italian peninsula.341 It was
Venetian merchants, however, who were particularly active in the region purchasing
Egyptian market. Certainly, the practice of shortening pie ces of c10th is not compatible with dumping, which involves exporting mass quantities of a product and depressing prices. Strangely, Ashtor did not draw this conclusion from the very same document published by Wansbrough and quoted it in his discussion of dumping. Ashtor, "Les Lainages dans l'Orient," 676, footnote 202. 337 Article III in the 1497 treaty: Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence," 466, 511. This contains a specific reference to previous sales. The terms used ("~uÎ' and "jukh") leave no doubt that Florentine merchants were taking to Egypt both raw wool and woollen clotho 338 Braude, "The Rise and FaU," 225. 339 Note the mention ofa dyeing establishment and of 150 (!) water mills active at various times in Bakhit's
study of waqf documents for the town. Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, "~afad at Sa Région D'aprés des Documets de Waqf et des Titres de Propriété 780/964 H. (1378/1556)," Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 55-56, no. 1-2 (1990): 105-6. 340 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Textile Production in Rumeli and the Arab Provinces: Geographical Distribution and InternaI Trade," Osmanli Ara:;tirmalari/The Journal of Ottoman Studies, no. 1 (1980), 72. 341 Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, 119, 121.
84
both raw cotton and cotton thread.342 Their agents in Acre occasionally experienced
difficulties in obtaining cotton, suggesting that the Levantine cotton industry was doing
well in the 1470s and that merchants involved in it had sufficient purchasing power to
outbid their competitors.343 Tellingly, we find Venetian treaties with the Mamluks
referring to the practice of travelling in the interior of the country and to the purchasing
of Baalbecki cloth, besides cotton.344 Florentines were asking, in their treaty
negotiations, to be granted the same rights as Venetian merchants, so that they could
engage in this trade too. The purchase of locally produced cloth to be resold on local or
European markets must have been seen as a lucrative trade, one into which Florentine
merchants were eager to enter. During the course of the sixteenth cent ury, French
merchants (and to sorne extent English merchants) began shipping large quantities of
cotton from Tripoli.345 Faced with increasing international demand, the Ottomans
attempted to regulate these exports. This was partly in response to demand from local
producers.346 It was also partly because cotton was considered a strategic material, since
it was used in the manufacture of sails. At any rate, local producers of cotton textiles
were still thriving at the end of the sixteenth century. Venetian reports contain
numerous mentions of heavy stuffed cotton cloth which competed successfully with
imported woollens, particularly in the resale to Persia.347
The Syrian silk industry too was known both for its raw material and its fini shed
product. During the course of the sixteenth century, faced with fluctuations in the
supply of Persian raw silk, local silk production expanded. Sorne areas around Mount
Lebanon were already specializing in the production of raw silk by mid-cent ury. We
leam that in 1558 a snowfall caused much hardship as it spoiled both the fruit and the
raw silk crop around the Qarusha river.348 Levantine manufacturing was well known
both for its fine silk textiles and for mixed fabrics occupying a number of market
342 Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence," 492, 495, 495. Benjamin Arbel, "Venetian Trade in FifteenthCentury Acre: The Letters of Francesco Bevilaqua (1471-1472)," Asian and African Studies (Tel Aviv) 22 (1988): 240-241, 245. 343 Arbel, "Venetian Trade," 258-259. 344 Wansbrough, "Venice and Florence," 518, article XXI. 345 Faroqhi, "Textile Production," 72, 74. 346 Ibid.: 73-74. 347 See consul Sagredo's report of 1611 and consul Morosini's report of 1614: Berchet, Relazioni, 131, 158. 348 Duwayhl, Tiirïkh Al-Azminah, 424.
85
niches.349 Already at the beginning of the sixteenth century travellers who visited
Tripoli remarked on the local silk production and industry, which was only to grow in
importance during the course of the century.350 Homs had a textile industry which was
particularly weIl known for its alaca, a mixed fabric of wool and silk. It continued to
thrive in the second half of the sixteenth century, attracting the attention of Ottoman
officiaIs who wanted to impose a dut Y on the silk consumed by this industry, which
seems to have previously escaped taxation.351
Damascus, of course, had a very old and established silk industry. It was there
that the damask fabric, which became so popular in Europe and figured prominently in
the output of Florentine producers, had been perfected. During the sixteenth century it
was still renowned for its production of silks, including both taftas and fine silks for
clothing. It also produced a mixed cloth of silk and cotton.352 Damascene producers were
sending silk fabrics (especially satins) to the Bursa market in the early 1600s, where they
joined locally produced silks on this very competitive market.353 It is worth recalling, in
this context, that Bursa silk brocades were appreciated in Florence and occasionally
imported, though only in small quantities.354 Foreign merchants visiting Aleppo in the
second half of the century commented on the many looms at work there.355 A Venetian
consul reported in 1612 that the Aleppine and Damascene silk industries continued to
refine their techniques and also that their satins were approaching Venetian satins in
quality but were selling for a very competitive price.356
349 A diversitied production of this sort is arguably the sign of a mature industry catering for a diverse market. 350 Benjamin Arbel, "The Port Towns of the Levant in Sixteenth-Century Travel Literature," in Mediterranean Urban Culture 1400-1700, ed. Alexander Cowan (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2000), 159-160. 351 Faroqhi, "Textile Production," 72. The use of wool and silk mixtures was old and well-established. Ashtor, "Les Lainages dans l'Orient," 660. 352 Faroqhi, "Textile Production," 73. 353 Haim Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700 (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1988), 109. Syrian and Egyptian textiles are the only manufactures from these provinces which appear on official price lists for Istanbul. Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 494. 354 inalcik, Economic and Social History, 239-40. 355 The Venetian consul Lorenzo Tiepolo tirst reported in 1560 that sorne 5,000 looms were at work in Aleppo. Berchet, Relazioni, 23. 356 Ibid., 141.
86
Local Forces, Ottoman Administration and International Trade
If demographic and economic trends in the Syrian provinces show a fundamental
continuity after the Ottoman conquest, the same cannot be said for the patterns of trade
and administrative practices. The impact of this was especially noticeable in areas such
as the coast of SyriaIPalestine, and of Mount Lebanon in particular, which had long
before developed strong, independent power structures. At the time of the Crusades,
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, these had been march areas which had
attracted relatively independent groups, alternately engaged in Holy War and pragmatic
compromise with the Frankish principalities along the coast. 357 Several Arab clans
settled in the area after the fall of Beirut to the crusaders, to be followed in early
Mamluk times by Turkoman settlers.358 Between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
an arrangement emerged whereby the Druze Bu.pturids of the Gharb (just south of
Beirut) and the Turkoman settlers of the Kisrawan (to the north of the city) shared in the
dut Y of guarding the port of Beirut and the access routes to Damascus, while keeping
each other in check.359 After the reconquest of Beirut, in fact, the need remained to
guard its port from the interior against naval raids, particularly from the Genoese (the
Venetians had become trading partners of the Mamluks).360 The Bu.pturids might also
have played a role in defending the area around Sidon, where they held sorne lands and
probably the post of governor, occasionaIly, alongside the I:Ianash.361
For most of the Mamluk period the Bu.pturids and other similar power groups
maintained their role in the defence of the coast and a relative autonomy. They were in
357 There is a significant parallel here with the concept of march principalities suggested by Kafadar to describe Anatolian Turkoman settlements. Cf. Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califomia Press, 1995). Salibi described the social constellation which developed after the Arab conquest as a "march warrior community," fertile breeding ground for heterodoxy. Kamal S. Salibi, "The Bul].turids of the Garb. Mediaeval Lords of Beirut and ofSouthem Lebanon," Arabica, no. 8 (1961): 77-79. 358 In the twelfth century the Arab clans had included the Banil Bul].tur, the Banil Sa'diin and the Banil Ma'n. Salibi, "The Bul].turids of the Garb," 79-81. The Bul].turids and the Ma' anids would later embrace the Druze faith. 359 Ibid.: 92. 360 Ibid.: 93. Taha Thalji Tarawneh, The Province of Damascus During the Second Mamluk Period (784/1382-922/1516) ([Jordan: Deanship of Research and Graduate Studies, Mu'tah University], 1994),79. 361 Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, "Sidon in Mamluk and Early Ottoman Times," Osmanli Ara:jtirmalari/The Journal of Ottoman Studies, no. 3 (1982): 55. Tarawneh, The Province ofDamascus, 87.
87
this sense the "forerunners of the Ma'nids.,,362 This role seems also to have been
institutionalized, to a certain extent, through Mamluk reliance upon local rulers first to
provide iJalqa troops and then as muqaddams/administrators of the regions they
effectively controlled.363 During the course of the fifteenth century the involvement of
the entire Levantine coast in international and regional trade grew.364 These conditions
permitted the continued independence of local actors, both by renewing their function in
guarding the coast and by allowing them to benefit from increasing trade revenues.365
Between the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century the Bupturids and the ijanash saw
their power fade or be vigorously curbed by the Mamluks.366 This only allowed other
groups such as the Ma'nids, initially muqaddams active under the Bupturids, to emerge
as power brokers at the turn of the century.367 We might debate, perhaps, whether
Ottoman rule brought about a qualitative break or only a relative increase in the amount
of pressure brought to bear on local groups, compared to Mamluk rule. It is c1ear,
however, that during the course of the sixteenth century the Porte did apply more and
more pressure and that the resulting tussle over control of trade and the associated
revenues was partly embroiled in the changing routes of international trade.
Duwayhl reported that in 1516 several Lebanese emirs, inc1uding Qurqmaz Ibn
Yunis Ibn Ma'n, went to meet Selim 1 in Damascus and were confirmed in their
provinces ("wilayat"), with a warning that they should maintain good behaviour.368
362 Salibi, "The Bu1}.turids of the Garb," 97. 363 Kamal S. Salibi, "Mount Lebanon under the Mamluks," in Quest for Understanding: Arabie and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm H Kerr, ed. Samir Seikaly, Ramzi Baalbaki, and Peter Dodd (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1991), 18,20-22. 364 Cf. Jean Claude Garein, "La «Méditerranéisation» de l'Empire Mamelouk sous les Sultans Bahrides," Rivista degli Studi Orientali 48, no. 1-4 (1973-74). This article argues that with the growing importance of the spice trade for the Mameluks the economie-strategie axis of their domains shifted away from the Nile Valley towards the Red Sea and the Mediterranean coast of the Levant. The point was taken up and developed by Raymond: André Raymond, Cairo (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 169-171. 365 Abu-Husayn, The Viewfrom Istanbul, 17. 366 Tarawneh, The Province ofDamascus, 79-80, 87-88. 367 Ibid., 80-81. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 67-68. 368 DuwayhI, Tiirïkh Al-Azminah, 394. The claim that either this Qurqmaz or his father Fakhr aI-Dtn were grailted the title of Su~tin aI-B8fT by Selim 1 is probably apocryphal and an exaggeration of the reception that Selim would have accorded to these muqaddams. Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 18. We should also be careful not to confuse the se two Ma'nids with their descendants Fakhr aI-Dtn II (the central figure of this paper) and his own father Qurqmaz. Cf. Kamal S. Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Ma'n," International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 4 (1973).
88
AIready in 1518, however, we find that Janbirdi al-Ghazali, the Mamluk appointed as
governor of Damascus, moved against Na~ir al-Dln al-H~ash of Sidon and imprisoned
with him a number of Ma'nid emirs, presumably his allies.369 In late 1520 al-Ghazali
himself rose in rebellion. The revoit was occasioned by the death of Selim l but
prompted in part by discontent with Ottoman administrative practices.370 The ensuing
confusion seems to have reduced Ottoman control of the area. The two harsh campaigns
waged by the Ottomans against the Druze in 1522 and 1523, with the buming of many
villages, testify to the need they felt to reassert their authority.371 The precarious control
that the Porte exercised over Damascus and the surrounding region at this stage was
probably responsible for a decline in the part that the city played in international
trade.372 Aleppo had stood firm with the Ottomans against al-Ghazali and its rise to a
new prominence in the long-distance international trade was due partly to its initial
cooperation with the new rulers.373 Already in the 1530s, moreover, sorne European
merchants were fleeing Beirut because of the extortionate practices of certain officiaIs
there.374 Whether these were due to lack of Ottoman control over local rulers or to
maipractice by Ottoman officiaIs themselves, they added to the decline of international
trade through southern Syria. Aieppo's position was seaied by the conquest of Baghdad
in 1534 and of Basra in 1549, followed by the renewal of commercial navigation on the
Euphrates and by the creation of a greatly expanded economic zone in northern Syria
and southern Anatolia.37~
369 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 68-69. N~ir al-nln al-Banash had recently been dismissed as governor of Sidon, Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 16-17. 370 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 23, 25. 371 Ibid., 164. 372 Beirut and Sidon were the main commercial ports of Damascus and the area occupied by the Druze was crucial to communications between Damascus and the coast. 373 Bruce Masters, The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750 (New York and London: New York University Press, 1988), 10, 12. This is not to say that Ottoman control over Aleppo was always so secure. Later in the century, in particular, we find cases of Janissary insubordination, particularly regular disobedience of Sultanic orders. Cf. Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "Janissary Insubordination in the Province of Aleppo at the Tum of the Sixteenth Century as Depicted in Ottoman Documents," in Actes du Vie Congrès du C.I.E.P.o. Tenu à Cambridge Sur: Les Provinces Arabes à l'Époque Ottomane. Etudes Réunies et Présentées par Abdeljelil Temimi, ed. Comité international d'études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes (Zaghouan: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Ottomanes et Morisco-Andalouses, 1987). Such disobedience was perhaps part of established practice at a time when communications with the administrative centre were so slow. 374 Arbel, "The Port Towns," 158. 375 Masters, The Origins, 13-14.
89
The movement of international trade towards Aleppo was reflected in the
locations of consular residences. The Venetians moved their consul from Damascus to
Tripoli in 1546 and from Tripoli to Aleppo in 1548.376 They were followed by the French
in 1557.377 Until the end of the century both continued to use Tripoli as the main port
from which to ship the goods they acquired in Aleppo from the great caravans crossing
northern Syria. This move coincided in part with a deliberate Ottoman policy which
sought to make of Tripoli one of their strongholds in Syria. Already in 1521 they had
attempted to create a separate eyaJet of Tripoli, on a par with Aleppo and Damascus.378
The attempt failed at this point, for Tripoli remained in the eyaJet of Damascus for the
time being. However, the Porte sought to use local notables it could rely upon in the
vicinity of Tripoli to ensure both the security of the city (and of its routes to Aleppo)
and to keep a watch on the region to the south (Mount Lebanon). After the Ottoman
conque st , in fact, the old policy of using Turkoman settlers to guard the coast, which
had decIined under the Circassian Mamluks, was partly resumed?79 The Ottomans
initially bestowed their favour upon the Shu'aybs. Soon, however, they chose as their
main power brokers in the region the 'Assafs, Turkoman emirs of the Kisrawan who
were also assigned in 1518 the tax farm of Jubayl, in the province of Tripoli, which
eventually became their stronghold.380 After the confusion of the al-GhazaIi's revoit,
Man~iir 'Assaf "came to power in 1523 as a friend of the Ottomans.,,381 So did the
Sayfiïs, a dynasty of Turkoman levends who ruled the 'Akkar region and controlled the
strategically important Homs-Tripoli route?82 Initially, they were under the' Assafs, but
in due time they would come to supplant them.
The 'Assafs and the Sayfiïs were therefore an integral part of the Porte's strategy
to control the coastal are as of northern Syria, which provided outlets to the sea for the
376 Berchet, Relazioni, 19. 377 Masters, The Origins, 15. 378 Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 91. 379 Kamal S. Salibi, "Northem Lebanon under the Dominance of Gazïr. (1517-1591)," Arabica, no. 14 (1967): 148-149. 380 Ibid.: 150, 152. 381 Ibid.: 156. 382 "The ri se of the Sayfiis to power in the course of the sixteenth century is, in fact, intimately connected with early efforts of the Ottomans to make their rule effective in Syria." Kamal S. Salibi, "The Sayfâs and the Eyalet of Tripoli, 1579-1640," Arabica, no. 20 (1973): 28. For the relationship between Sayfiis and the 'Assafs, Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 14-15.
90
lucrative international trade passing through Aleppo. An ethnic-based preference might
have been at work in the selection of these Turkoman groups. But it is clear that the
main reason why the Porte chose the 'Assafs and particularly the Sayfiïs was because
they were less established than other clans in the region. They were therefore more
dependent upon Ottoman favour for their position ofpower.383 In the short run, however,
this policy amounted to exchanging one set of problems for another. In the first place,
administrators appointed by the Porte or local rulers dependent upon Ottoman favour
would still embezzle funds. 384 Both the 'Assafs and then the Sayfiïs in fact became
notorious for their malpractice.385 Secondly, Ottoman appointees sooner or later
attempted to "strike roots" and create their own independent power base in the area they
ruled.386 But so long as the Porte could rely on more than one such power group, it could
use them as leverage against each other. By 1579 the Porte had grown worried at the
power accumulated by Man~Ur 'Assaf over the past five decades, as he had acquired
control also over the port of Beirut and several other areas beyond Tripoli and its region
(a development presaging, in a way, what Fakhr al-Dln would later achieve). Tripoli was
then made into a separate eyalet and Yusuf Sayfiï was appointed as its beylerbeyi.387 In
1585 this policy was temporarily reversed and the 'Assafs ruled over the province of
Tripoli again, with the Sayfiis in a subordinate position.388
Local Forces, Ottoman Administration and Regional Trade
If international trade was partly re-routed north and under closer Ottoman
administrative control, regional trade could not suffer the same fate and presented an
altogether different challenge for the Ottoman fisk. At the same time, the production of
commodities and textiles in the province of Damascus and their exchange for foreign
383 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 27-28. 384 inalcik, "Tax Collection," 173. 385 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 62-63. For the' Assafs, see example below of complaints brought by the Venetians against them. 386 This strategy was deliberately attempted by the Sayfiis in the early sixteenth century, for example. Ibid., 28-29. The' Assafs had a stronger local power base than the Sayfiis from the beginning. 387 Duwayhï, Tiirikh Al-Azminah, 445, Salibi, "The Sayras," 30. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 15. 388 Duwayhï, Tiirikh Al-Azminah, 448. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 19-20. Duwayhï specifies that the city of Tripoli itself, however, was not granted to 'Assaf at this time. He might have obtained it at a later date or could have still exercised influence over sorne appointments there, for we find Venetians complaining against his men at a later date (see below).
91
goods and specie continued, in keeping with the "secular trend" outlined in the first
chapter sub-section above. Foreign merchants certainly began visiting Tripoli more than
Beirut or Sidon, but they did not stop visiting these cities altogether, nor did the large
and mostly unrecorded coast al trade on small vessels involving these two cities
diminish?89 The following table shows the highest ten sources of revenue for the city of
Sidon, out of twenty two different taxes collected there, according to successive Tapu
Defters.
Table 1: Annua/ revenues as muqiJ.tii'a From Sidon according to Tapu DeBers (akçesY90
YEAR 1525-31 1523 1543 N.D. 1545 1568 1596
~T APU DEFTER NO.~ ~169~ ~40Q ~383~ p83~ ~423~ ~543~ ~177~
Market inspection and weighing (IV) 2,000 3,100 15,000 20,000 20,000 22,000 26,000
Revenues from the Port (1) 1,000 2,000 8,000 16,000 16,000 18,000 25,000
Taxes on wine shops and trade (IX) 2,000 6,000 6,000 10,000 12,000
Toll-tax enroute to Wiiru Mayli (XIII) 2,400 9.500 10,000 12,000
Toll-tax enroute to Wiidi l:labis (XII) 2,400 9.500 10,000 Il,000
Taxes on winter pasturage (XV) 1,000 1,000 4,000 6,000 6,000 7,000 8,000
Taxes for night-watching (XIX) 12,000 12,000 2,000 8,000
Irregular taxes and marri age fees (VII) 2,000 2,000 2,000 3,750 3,750 5,000 6,000
Revenues of absent/miss. persons (VI) 2,000 2,000 3,000 5,000
Market for horses, donkeys (V) 400 400 400 300 300 3,200 4,500
It is immediately apparent that aIl five of the highest sources of revenue were directly
related to trade-he it trade passing through the port, deals transacted in the market of
the city, or trade routed to the interiOf (the tax on wine inc1uded biij tariffs on wine
brought to Sidon by Christian and Jewish merchants)?91 The constant increase observed
in successive registers reflects a combination of two distinct factors: expanding trade
389 Arbel, "The Port Towns," 163-164. 390 Data from: Bakhit, "Sidon," 64-68. See the legend he provided for further details on the tax revenues. A similar table could be drawn for revenues from Safed over the same period which also shows to11s and market dues to be the highest sources of revenue. Cohen and Lewis, Population and Revenue, 162-169. 39\ The Biijwas a system of internai tariffs on assorted goods (the province of Damascus did not constitute a single tariff zone). Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 160-161.
92
volume and increased ability of the Porte to extract revenue.392 It is impossible to
discern what was the relative contribution of each factor, but it is clear that the value of
the area to the Ottoman treasury was growing. The strategic value of the area further
encouraged its economic development. The coast controlled communication with the
rich Egyptian province. Both Egyptian goods and Egyptian tribute bound for Anatolia
would sail along the coast or progress along coastal roads. Damascus might have lost its
primacy in the east-west caravan trade through Syria, but it became a centre for the
organization of the pilgrimage. With the great prestige thus accrued, there also came a
boost to north-south trade with the ijijaZ.393 Jerusalem enjoyed a similar revival. It
seems there was a deliberate and concerted effort by Ottoman authorities to invest in
public building, inc1uding economic infrastructure, and to revive local trade.394
The exploitation of revenues from local trade provided a different and arguably
more serious challenge for the Ottomans than the problem they faced over control of
international trade. After the defeat of al-Ghazali, resistance to Ottoman rule in certain
areas of the province of Damascus simply took more diffuse and indirect forms. The
most important insight into the Ottoman conque st provided by the mühimme defteri is
that, outside of Damascus itself and of a few other cities in its province such as
Jerusalem and Gaza, the Ottomans were constantly faced with challenges to their
authority. Janissary insubordination and the jelali revolts became a serious problem
mostly during the second half of the sixteenth century.395 However, as emphasized by
Abu-Husayn, the hinterlands of the coastal areas saw periodic non-cooperation with
392 From the 1570s the devaluation of the akçe could also have contributed to the higher figure. But the underlying trend un until 1568 could not have been affected much by inflation. Nor was there any change in the relative importance of each of the top five sources of revenue, of course. 393 Cf. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Damascus and the Pilgrim Caravan," in Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, ed. Leila Fawaz and C.A. Bayly (New York; Chichester [UK]: Columbia University Press, 2002). 394 Cf. Amnon Cohen, "Local Trade, International Trade and Govemment Involvement in Jerusalem During the Early Ottoman Period," Asian and African Studies (Tel Aviv) 12, no. 1 (1978). Cohen also argued that the increased attention paid to Jerusalem was partly due to its symbolic/ideological value. Cf. Amnon Cohen, "Ottoman Involvement in Europe: Its Relevance for 16th Century Palestine," in Ciépo: Osmanlt Oncesi Ve Osmanb Ara.~flrmalan Uluslararasl Komitesi: VII. Sempozyumu Bildirileri, Peç, 7-1/ Eylül /986, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, iIber Ortayh, and E. J. van. Donzel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Baslmevi, 1994). White 1 do not agree with his emphasis upon fear of pirates and of crusading plans, Jerusalem undoubtedly had a great symbolic value to Muslims and Christians alike that the Porte sought to exploit to legitimize its rule. 395 Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship," 53, 58.
93
Ottoman authorities, widespread unrest and the occasional open revoIt throughout the
period under consideration.396 Orders issued from the Porte to the beylerbeyis of
Damascus and Tripoli reiterated, over and again, the command to collect tax arrears and
to disarm local groups. These two tasks were reciprocally related. One of the main
difficulties faced by Ottoman authorities in their attempts to collect taxes was that local
rulers could rely on loyal, well-trained and well-armed forces. (Significantly for Ottoman
studies, this points to the existence of a rebellious and well-armed peasantry, in
particular).397 Conversely, 1 would like to emphasize, the ability to resist increasing
taxation at a time of relative economic prosperity allowed these forces to maintain their
strength. In its insistence that only the janissaries should be allowed to carry firearms,
the Porte displayed the typical concem of aIl states intent on asserting their monopoly
over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.398 It was also attempting to
break out of a vicious circ1e which perpetuated conditions that favoured challenges to its
authority.
One mühimme defteri after the next mentions the need to disarm local groups,
often in conjunction with the task of collecting taxes. In 1546 the beylerbeyi of Aleppo
was ordered to supply troops to help the beylerbeyi of Damascus. Following a previous
order, the latter had attempted to collect muskets from the Druze, who had rebelled and
proven more than a handfu1.399 We learn that in 1564-65 the people of 'Ayn Dara (Dayr
al-Qamar), not far from Beirut, had rebelled and refused to pay taxes. This time the
396 This is one of the main points which has emerged from Abu-Husayn's study of Ottoman documents. Abu-Husayn, "Problems in the Ottoman Administration," 668. Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 14-16. 397 There has been sorne debate on the extent of peasant participation in the jelaU revolts. In most cases the participation of the peasantry as a whole social group seems to have been limited by structures which prevented mobilization en masse. Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 2, 88-89. In sorne areas of Anatolia, however, specifie political traditions might have favoured sorne peasant involvement. Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 435-437. This seems to have been the case even more in the mountain areas of southem Syria. Druze insubordination, however, was not strictly speaking part of the jelaU revolts, as it seems to have been more structured, thanks to leadership involvement, and rooted in local society. 398 This is, of course, Max Weber's well-known definition of modem states. Sorne defters relating to southern Syria and Palestine explicitly affirm that only Janissaries and timar-holders should be allowed to bear arms, not ordinary peasants. See for example document 32 (M.D.19, No.99) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 80. The Porte had been very strict in this policy since the beginning of the sixteenth century, when firearms began to be widely diffused. Halil inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East," in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, ed. Vernon Perry and M. Yapp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 195-196. 399 M.D. 26, No.} 0 1 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 24.
94
govemor of Damascus had been successful in quelling the disturbance, but the task had
been particularly arduous because the locals possessed large numbers of muskets and
particularly of long muskets capable of firing seven or eight dirhe111S of pellets, which
made them superior to Janissary weapons.400 The fundamental issue remained unsolved,
however. One order from 1574 states that "the villages of the nahiyes of the Jurd, the
Matn, the Gharb and Shuf al-Bayad have owed taxes in arrears for more than twenty
years" and that it was impossible to collect this revenue. It went on to point to the
necessity to disarm local groups, requiring that two muskets be collected from each
household (!) and one thousand muskets from each of four local notables, inc1uding
Qurqmaz Ibn Ma'n, Fakhr al-Dln's father.401 Another order from two years later gives us
more insight into the problem. The Druze of the Jurd, the Matn, the Gharb and the Shuf
controlled by the Ma'ns were in a constant state of rebellion and no one would accept
the iltizam to collect the state (hass) revenue from their lands. Ottoman-appointed emins
and even the qii{li who sought to investigate the matter had been harassed. The govemor
of Damascus reported that the Druze "do not pay their taxes according to the register,
c1aiming that they are paying according to the old register (defter i-atiR). But they do
not pay even this", and for the past seventy years they had owed sorne 100,000 akçes
yearly to the treasury.402 The same problem existed in Safed. An order from the Porte in
1581 complained that in the absence of the sanjakbeyand his forces, engaged in the war
against Persia, order and revenue-collection had collapsed: "during the last three years
the fief-holders have been unable to collect a penny oftheir revenues. ( ... ) The peasants,
who in the sanjak of Safed alone possess 7,000 muskets, indulge in raiding villages,
attacking travellers and killing people.,,403 The Druze in the sanjak of Safed were still
400 M.D. 5, No.565 in Ibid., 24-25. 401 M.D. 26, No.488 in Ibid., 26-27. It also requested that 2,000 muskets be confiscated from Man~iir 'Assaf. The Ottomans were growing uncomfortable with the power the latter was accruing. The Ottoman estimate that each household possessed two muskets shows just how widespread firearms were in the perception of officiaIs. 402 M.D. 29, No.70 in Ibid., 29. Few months before, in February 1576, yet another order had been issued ordering the collection of muskets from the Druze. M.D. 27, No.686 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 28-29. Bakhit emphasizes the fact that no solution had been found between 1574 and 1576 to the problem and that there is no record that the 1576 order was ever acted upon. Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 167. 403 Document 42 (M.D.46, No.518) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 88. The same order can be found in AbuHusayn, The View from Istanbul, 30-31.
95
acquiring muskets in 1582. The qii.di of Acre was ordered to confiscate any weapons on
ships in the port of his city which exceeded legitimate needs of self-defence in order to
prevent sea-captains from fuelling this illegal trade.404
The evidence is unequivocal: it was difficult to collect taxes, let alone increase
revenues as much as the Porte might have wished, because the local population was
armed.405 The other side of the equation, namely the ability of local groups to keep
purchasing arms as they could withdraw a significant part of local surplus from the
Ottoman treasury, is equally important. To sorne extent, the widespread availability of
firearms in the region was due to the activity of foreign merchants. Certainly, there were
complaints that ships were reaching Sur (Tyre) in 1577 to purchase grain and other
commodities, bringing significant quantities of muskets.406 It should be remembered,
however, that one of the main sources of muskets at one point were the stockpiles
captured from the Venetians after the conquest of CypruS.407 Local sources were also
important. The bey of Safed wrote to the Porte complaining that sorne timar holders
sold muskets to peasants.408 Reports to the Sultan in the 1560s carried the news that
firearms were being manufactured in the vicinity of Sidon.409 Most of aIl, the strong
demand for firearms, whichever source they came from, was matched by purses capable
of financing the purchase. One sultanic order made the connection, if only implicitly, by
mentioning that while the Druze continued to refuse paying taxes (and cIaimed that their
farms were unproductive), each of the muskets they owed was valued at fifteen to
404 Document 34 (M.D.46, No.854) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 82. 405 Inalcik cites an observation made by Evliyia Çelebï, later in the seventeenth century, that because the Druze and the Yazïdï owned sorne 50,000 muskets (!) they could only be taxed by force. Inalcik also points that to the problem created by firearms in Tunis in the 1570s, when the local population also gave the Porte cause for concem. inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects," 202. This is an intriguing parallei. It might weIl fit into the pattern that Braudel alluded to and that 1 am investigating here with an exclusive focus on the coast of Syria/Palestine. 406 M.D. 31, No, 325 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 141-142. From this order it is not absolutely clear whether the merchants were foreign. It indicates, on the one hand, that janissaries who claimed to be beyond the jurisdiction of the sanjakbey were involved in purchasing the muskets and reselling them to locals. This order is particularly interesting, on the other hand, for the explicit connection between trade and the acquisition of muskets. 407 M.D. 26, No.488 in Ibid., 27. 408 Document 32 (M.D.19, No.99) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 80. 409 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 166. From the beginning, the high demand for firearms encouraged both smuggling and the growth of local private enterprise, although the trade was a state monopoly. inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects," 197-198.
96
twenty go Id pieces.410 The central point is that populations along the coast had substantial amounts of disposable income for such purchases.411 And so long as they did, it was also extremely expensive for Ottoman authorities to attempt to disarm them.
MOUNT LEBANON
f 1
1
1 1
/ " 1
! CI 1
,,/ ..c::-
I ~ 1 __ WADI AL -TAYM
o
Figure 5: Mount Lebanon412
" 'v
G BAALBEK.
410 M.D. 26, No.488 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 27. The claim that farms were unproductive (yet the Druze continued cultivating them!) was made in another order: M.D. 29, NO.70 in Abu-Husayn, The View jrom Istanbul, 29. 411 With regards to firearms, Heyd remarked that " ... the ability of the bedouins and peasants in the province of Damascus to pay such high priees is noteworthy." Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 79. See documents 33 and 35 on succeeding pages. 412 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 108.
97
Fakhr a1-DIn 's Rise and his Escape to Tuscany: 1585-1614
The conflict between local rulers and the Porte over trade and its revenues continued,
with essentially the same pattern highlighted above, during the period at the turn of the
century which saw Fakhr al-Dln's rise. Despite its efforts, the Porte was unable to break
out of the vicious circ le that favoured a measure of independence among the populations
around Mount Lebanon and their rulers. What changed was the context in which the tug
of war over appropriation of revenues took place. In 1585 the Ottomans mounted a
major offensive to subdue the region. It marked a change in the policies of the Druze
leadership which was reflected in Fakhr al-Dln's cooptation into Ottoman provincial
administration, with its political dynamics. Indeed, Fakhr al-Dln provides an example of
a local ruler gaining increasing autonomy not in outright opposition to the Porte, but
thanks to his ability to play into Ottoman politics. From the second half of the sixteenth
century onwards, this was increasingly characterized by a rampant culture of gift-giving
which spread throughout the Ottoman administration.413 Moreover, in a development
re1ated to this, the contrast between centre and periphery was attenuated and saw
provincial poli tics interact ever more with factional politics at the Porte. Thus we find
Fakhr al-Dln enjoying the support of certain factions at the Porte which found him
useful both for his gifts and for his ability to keep order in the region.
The period of the jelali revolts certainly helped the young emir to consolidate his
power, but mostly in that the revolts added to Ottoman problems and made him even
more indispensable to his allies at the Porte and in the Ottoman provincial
administration. This is the first point argued below. The confusion of the jelali revolts
and Tuscan attempts at intruding in the area did not give Fakhr al-Dln a free rein. We
find him instead working within the Ottoman administration, while at the same time
advancing his own power. Secondly, even though international trade continued to move
away from southern Syria and disorder threatened the regional economy, growth
continued to favour local rulers who knew how to extract revenue from their terri tories.
413 This was a phenomenon common to both the Habsburg and the Ottoman empire, as weil as the French monarchy. Braudel highlighted both these similarities and the implications they had for weakening the large bureaucracies which supported these empires. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 687-691.
98
Fakhr al-Dln's power derived in good part from his ability to foster and exploit
economic activities in the coastal areas. Finally, we find that thanks both to his
resources and to the way in which he played into Ottoman politics, the Ma'nid emir was
able to construct a significant military force of his own. Most of all, l will suggest that
he presided, with other local rulers such as Yusuf Sayfii, over what has been described as
the "re-emergence of the coast" of SyriaIPalestine.414 The Mamluks had deliberately left
many coastal fortifications in utter disrepair, so these could not be used by an invading
army to dig itself in and resist larger forces. Instead, as we saw above, they had relied on
groups in the hinterland of the coast to provide sorne protection. During the first fifty
years of Ottoman rule fortifications had began to appear in the interior but not yet along
the coast.415 By the turn of the century, however, more and more fortresses appeared,
both in the interior and along the coast.
Provincial Administration, Factional Politics and Fakhr al-DIn's rise
The 1585 military campaign mounted by the Ottomans against the Shuf, the Druze
dominated area of Mount Lebanon to the south of Beirut, marked in many ways a
tuming point in the history of the coastal areas of Syria. The scale of the enterprise
marked it apart from previous efforts. The govemor of Egypt, IbrahIm Pasha, was put in
charge of a sizeable Ottoman force with the task ofbringing the Druze are as to order.416
The govemor of Damascus had to assist him with whatever troops he could muster from
Damascus itself and from Tripoli.417 The official reason for this campaign, as reported by
Duwayhl, was that the previous year the caravan carrying the Egyptian tribute to
414 CF. Amnon Cohen, "Ottoman Rule and the Re-Emergence of the Coast of Palestine," Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée, no. 39 (1985). 415 Ibid.: 163. Cohen suggests that the Ottoman navy was sufficiently strong at this stage to provide protection to coastal trade. From the 1570s onwards, however, it was not capable of controlling piracy. 416 One estimate had this force number 20,000 troops, not counting local auxiliaries. Yet they suffered heavy los ses as they ventured into Ma'nid controlled territory.Yassine Soueid, Histoire Militaire des Muqâl-:la'a-S Libanais à l'Époque des Deaux Émirats. L'émirat Ma'nite (1516-1697), 2 vols., vol. 1 (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1985), 83-84. 417 M.D. 53, No. 724 (February 1585) and M.D. 58, NO.635 (August 1585), in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 34-35. The second order implies that the govemor of Damascus was having trouble of his own asserting his authority in the city and over the surrounding areas, for it points out that "it is necessary and important that you act in accordance to the former order and take control of Damascus. The former order is still the same: take control of Damascus, maintain and guard the territory, protect the people and exert yourself."
99
Istanbul had been attacked in the' Akkar (in the vicinity of Tripoli).418 This might weIl
reflect official concems with the strategic importance of the area as a link between
Anatolia and the rich Egyptian province. It is not certain, however, whether there
actually had been any accident involving the tribute-bearing caravan. It is instead clear
that the tribute was actually delivered to the Ottoman capital and that the campaign
waged by IbrahIm Pasha was the culmination of years of Ottoman frustration with the
well-armed unruly subjects of the hinterland of the coastal areas.419
Many local leaders were brought into line by this show of force. IbrahIm Pasha
then moved resolutely against the Shiïf and against the Ma'ns in particular (Qurqmaz
Ibn Ma'n, Fakhr al-Dln's father, had been singled out as a special cause for concem in an
early sultanic order).420 Numerous villages were bumed and many Druze levies killed.
Qurqmaz Ibn Ma'n died in hiding while trying to escape the Ottoman onslaught.421
Large stocks ofmuskets were confiscated.422 However, disorder seems to have continued
even as IbrahIm Pasha proceeded victoriously to Istanbul to be made a Grand Vizier. In
fact, an order from just one month after his campaign had ended instructed the govemor
of Damascus that the Druze were still in rebellion and that he should move against them
once more and confiscate their arms.423 It was probably only in 1586 that several emirs
were arrested by the govemor of Damascus, instead ofby IbrahIm Pasha.424
If the Porte could not completely pacifY the area, nor remove most firearms, it
had proved that it was capable of dealing with uncooperative local rulers and bring them
to account. Thus the 1585 campaign was significant politicaIly, as weIl as militarily,
because it ushered in a new phase in Ottoman-Druze relationships. When Fakhr al-Dln
began his own political career, he did so by courting the favour of Ottoman officiaIs. In
1592-3 Murad Pasha, who had been appointed beyJerbeyi of Damascus, arrived in the
418 Duwayhï, Tëirïkh AI-Azminah, 447. 419 The official explanation is reviewed in sorne detail and debunked in: Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Ottoman Invasion of the Shüf in 1585: A Reconsideration," AI-Abhath, no. 33 (1985). A shorter statement to the same effect can also be found in: Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 79-80. 420 M.D. 53, No. 724 (February 1585) in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 34. Note also that neither this order, nor later ones, make any mention of the tribute caravan. 421 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 167. 422 Ibid., 168. 423 M.D. 58, No. 636 (August-September 1585) and M.D. 60, No.24 (October 1585) in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 35-36. 424 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 80.
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port of Sidon. Fakhr al-Dln took the initiative to go and meet the newly appointed
govemor and welcomed him with generous gifts. The young emir was shortly thereafter
raised to the station of sanjakbey of Sidon and Beirut, where his father had been simply
a muqaddam, most likely as a reward for the early help he had provided to Murad
Pasha.425 It is clear, most of aH, that Fakhr al-Dln's success in later years was due to his
continued cooperation with the latter, even after Murad Pasha was made Grand Vizier,
moved to Istanbul and was replaced by a new govemor in Damascus. This fruitful
cooperation was "mainly due to Fakhr al-Dln's generous bribes," or gifts, to highly
placed Ottoman officials.426 The young Druze emir had understood that it was better to
play a part in Ottoman politics rather than remaining aloof from them. Throughout his
career he proved his ability to advance his own power while cooperating with elements
within the Ottoman establishment. An opportunity to do so came soon after his
appoint ment to the sanjakof Sidon and Beirut. In 1590 Yüsuf Say ta had acquired lands
in the Kisrawan from his former enemies, the 'Assafs. The govemor of Damascus would
have been as alarmed as Fakhr al-Dln himself, whose sanjak included the Kisrawan, at
this intrusion from the govemor of Tripoli in the province of Damascus. In 1598 the
Druze emir, backed by the ijarfUshes of Baalbeck, moved against Say ta with the
approval of the govemor of Damascus and won a resounding victory at the Dog River
Gust north of Beirut).427 Even though the Say tas regained their lands (presumably for a
payment), their power south of Tripoli had been checked.
Enjoying official favour, Fakhr al-Dln could act for a while in concert with the
Ottomans to provide a counterbalance to the power of the Say tas after the 'Assafs had
effectively disappeared from the political scene. In 1602 he was granted the sanjak of
Safed.428 This included both more Druze areas in the southem Shüf and, significantly,
the ports of Acre and ~ür. Thus Fakhr al-Dln began expanding his control over the coast.
The first contacts with Tuscany, dating at the earliest from 1603 and more probably
from 1605, came therefore at a time when the Druze emir had already established his
425 Ibid., 81. Arguably, this is an example of the pragmatic cooptation/incorporation of local rulers into the Ottoman administration highlighted by Barkey: Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, l3. 426 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 81. 427 Ibid., 22-23, 83. 428 Khlilidi states that this was in 1602 and the point is taken up by Abu-Husayn. Ibid., 93.
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power and was benefiting from good relationships with the Ottomans. A sultanic order
from 1605 commended Fakhr al-Dln for his endeavours in pacifying the countryside,
keeping the bedouins in check and furthering agriculture in the vicinity of Safad.429 The
praise lavished on the emir shows that he enjoyed favour in Istanbul (at least in sorne
quarters/factions) and that he was thought to be instrumental in keeping the area under
contro1.430 His cooperation with 'Ali Jiinbülad in 1605-07, who was Tuscany's main ally
in Syria, stemmed in good part from local rivalries which spiralled out of control at a
particularly delicate moment for the Ottoman administration in Syria. Local power
struggles which opposed Fakhr al-Dln to the Sayfiis (over control of the Kisrawan)
played a key role in his decision to join forces with 'Ali JanbÜlad.431 Abu-Husayn
concluded that "Fakhr al-Dln, acting out of opportunism, joined 'Ali Jiinbülad only after
his (i.e. Janbülad's) decisive victory over Sayfii in ijama.,,432 In fact, it was most
probably in 1606-07 and thanks to his alliance with the rebellious Jiinbülad, that the
Druze emir finally won from the Sayfiis their lands in the Kisrawan, cementing his
control over the sanjakofBeirut and Sidon.433 As for YüsufSayfii, he was maintained in
power by the Ottomans after his ignominious defeat by 'Ali Jiinbülad in 1606 because he
could be controlled aIl the more easily.434
It is difficult to see how Fakhr al-Dln's actions could have been influenced by
Tuscany, given this context of intense local rivalries at a time when he enjoyed Ottoman
favour thanks to his contacts with the Grand Vizier Murad Pasha. The opportunistic and
necessarily limited character of the alliance between Fakhr al-Dln and Jiinbülad and
Tuscany at this time also emerges from another consideration. Having achieved his own
objectives, Fakhr al-Dln wisely refrained from taking part in the fight between Murad
429 M.D. 75, no. 548 (March 1605) in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 138-139. 430 Heyd published the very same order and pointed out that copies were sent the sanjakbeys of LajjÜll and of 'AjlÜll, both in the vicinity of Safed. The Porte probably wanted to let the last two beys know that it supported Fakhr al-DIn. Document 6 in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 53-54. See especially footnote 2. 431 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 84. 432 Ibid., 84-85. Duwayhl reports that an agreement between Fakhr al-DIn and 'Ali Jiinbüliid was reached after the latter had come into open conflict with Sayfii. Duwayhï, Tiirïkh Al-Azminah, 458-459. 433 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 24-25,85,87. 434 Salibi, "The Sayras," 35.
102
Pasha and 'Ali Janblilad.435 He later would tell his Tuscan allies that in 1607 he had not
openly sided with Janblilad and had not come to their aid (following their assault on
Famagosta) because he knew that the project was doomed to failure. Whether this was
true, or whether he was merely trying to justify his actions in a moment of need years
later, is beside the point. Fakhr al-Dln at this stage offers the image of a relatively
independent local ruler with solid connections in the Ottoman administration through
his links with Murad Pasha. He explored any opportunity to advance his position of
power, but always while working within the framework of Ottoman provincial
government. It was from this position that he entertained and skillfully manipulated
contacts with foreign states such as Tuscany. Once Murad Pasha had defeated 'Ali
Janblilad, Fakhr al-Dln immediately despatched a delegation to Damascus to once again
be in the good graces of the Grand Vizier, having failed to rally to his side in 1607. The
delegation carried the very generous gift of 300,000 piast ers (half in cash and half in
silk) for Murad Pasha.436 It was a reminder to the Grand Vizier of the usefulness of
cooperating with the Druze emir.
Fakhr al-Dln did continue contacts with the Tuscan court, but by 1608 his
relationship with the Grand Vizier had been restored437 and it was not until 1611, after
Murad Pasha had died, that he seriously started contemplating Tuscan proposals.438 In
fact, it was most probably the succession of Na~li4 Pasha as Grand Vizier that pushed
Fakhr al-Dln into open rebellion and to seek the Tuscan alliance.439 Apparently, sorne
animosity arose between the two because Fakhr al-Dln had only sent him a very small
"gift" of 20,000 piasters, much smaller than the gifts he had lavished on the defunct
Murad Pasha. Na~lih Pasha then assembled a large Ottoman army, accompanied by naval
unit s, which converged on Fakhr al-Dln's domains late in 1613. After his escape to
435 Given the early successes enjoyed by the rebellious Pasha, Fakhr al-DIn would have naturally wanted to hedge his bets, in case Jiinbülïid managed to force the Porte to recognize his own position of authority over Syria, with disastrous consequences for anyone who had openly opposed him, such as Yüsuf Sayfiï. 436 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 85. 437 In 1610 there was an attempt to install someone other than a Ma'n as sanjakbey of Sidon-Beirut. A Sultanic order addressed to an IbrahIm Bey granted him the sanjak of Sidon-Beirut in March of that year, but it is not clear wh ether the order was carried out. M.D. 78, No.438 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 76. Perhaps this was tied to factional struggles at the Porte and it might be a sign that the protection of Murïid Pasha was no longer sufficient to protect Ma'nid interests at the Porte. 438 Documents XVII and XXV in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 1: 163, 178. 439 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 87-89.
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Tuscany his mother and others acting for him in his absence paid Na~lil) Pasha 300,000
piasters (again, half in cash and half in silk) in the hope that he would withdraw his
army.440 But hostility between them must have predated this episode. The new Grand
Vizier still refused to make peace and would later write to Fakhr al-Dln in Tuscany
offering him a sanjak in Greece (incidentally, this was the same arrangement that had
been reached with 'Ali Jiinbûlâd, who had had to accept it).441 Clearly, what was at stake
was the control of the region and Fakhr al-Dln had found himself on the opposite side of
the faction currently on the rise at the Porte. The episode of the "gift" is significant,
however, for what it reveals about the struggle over the appropriation of provincial
revenues. In particular, it is a testament to the Ma'nids' ability to tap into the wealth of
the region they controlled, in spite of the changing patterns of international and regional
trade. It was this ability which made them a power in the region. It allowed them both to
bribe factions at the Porte in order to influence central government in their favour and to
cement the Ma'ns' hold on their own territories.
Changing Trade Patterns, Economic DeveJopment and Revenues (1)
International trade in goods ferried by central Asian caravan routes continued to move
north, further away from the city of Damascus and its province. The Venetian consul
Tommaso Contarini, vexed by the endless and unpredictable extortions that foreign
merchants suffered in Tripoli, began negotiations to develop and open the port of
Alexandretta to international commerce. He had arrived in Tripoli at the end of 1589
and found that his consulate was loosing sorne 80,000 ducats a year to pilfering and
extortion from local tax officials.442 It was the last year of Muhammad 'Assâfs power in
Tripoli. Contarini mentioned the fact that powerful lords from the surrounding areas
paid little heed to his own complaints and even to pressure from the Porte, while fully
trusting and giving free rein to their own tax officiaIs in the city. He did not name
440 Document XXXIX (a report by al-Shaykh Yazbek) Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 206-207. The new Grand Vizier was apparently offered 150,000 in cash and 150,000 in silk (the latter contributed by the country at large). This would have been the exact same payment that was made to Murad Pasha. The new Grand Vizier took the payment but detained the emir's mother on the pretext that sorne 20,000 piasters were missing. 441 Document LXVI in Ibid., 1:264. 442 Berchet, Relazioni, 74.
104
'Assaf, but in this context he explicitly mentioned GhumaY':Îa ("Gomeda"), 'Assafs
kethüda, as "a most dangerous man and a particular enemy of the Franks.,,443
Significantly, it is around this time that Yusuf Sayfii was reinstated as governor of
Tripoli. He was certainly back in power in 1590 and was given orders to arrest
GhumaY':Îa in conjunction with possible irregularities in the payment of taxes for that
year ('Assaf himself had been killed earlier in 1590 by Sayfii).444 Possibly, Venetian
pressure had added to other concerns by the Porte causing the final dismissal of 'Assaf.
Ottomans and Venetians certainly cooperated actively to keep the lucrative international
trade as free from the interference of local rulers and officiaIs as possible.
It seems that Venetians found the Porte responsive to the need to reduce costs,
delays and uncertainties in the transit trade through their dominions (as the Venetians
maximized their profits, so the Porte increased its revenues).445 But while this
responsiveness had immediate and beneficial effects in Istanbul and its environs,
communication delays and provincial politics created a different problem in provinces
further removed from the seat ofpower.446 The development of the port of Alexandretta
to act as the main seaport for Aleppo, from 1592-3 onwards, was a partial solution to
this problem. It was in many ways one of the first colonial seaports, set up in a very
short time from a very modest original settlement, by agreement between an imperial
power and foreign merchants.447 For the Ottomans, its raison d'êtrewas to wrest control
of international trade from alliocai rulers, to the exclusive bene fit of themselves and of
443 Ibid. 444 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 20-21. See especially the lengthy footnote 34 for biographical infonnation on Ghumayçla. There are also several sultanic orders commanding that numerous individuals associated with Man!'Üf 'Assar should be seized and aU state money found in their possession be confiscated. M.D. 42, Nos. 144, 145 and 146 in: Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 92-93. 445 An overview of Ottoman-Venetian cooperation was provided by Faroqhi. See particularly her point regarding the Porte's des ire to increase revenue, and the specific section on the Aleppo trade: Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire (1600-1630)," Journal of European Economic His/ory 15, no. 2 (1986): 348, 374-382. 446 Cf. Daniel Goffman, "The Ottoman Role in Patterns of Commerce in Aleppo, Chio s, Dubrovnik, and Istanbul (1600-1650)," in Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Caesar E. Farah (Kisksville, Missouri: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993). 447 Masters, The Origins, 17. It was similar, in sorne ways, to Izmir. The latter, in fact, also lacked a sanjakbey, something that both Ottomans and foreign merchants must have found desirable. But unlike Alexandretta, and more like Sidon, as we will see, Izmir in its early days relied chiefly on local trade in items such as gaUnuts, cotton and contraband grains. Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 481,505-506.
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their trading partners. In practice, however, a struggle took place which probably
involved different factions at the Porte. We find, in fact, that Yusuf Sayfiï managed to
obtain in 1605 a reversaI of the decision to let the Venetians trade through
Alexandretta.448 For a while, the Venetians were ordered to have aIl their vessels go
through the port that Sayfiï controlled.449 Possibly, the latter enjoyed greater favour
under Na~iï4 Pasha than he had enjoyed Murad Pasha.
Regional trade in locally produced goods again presented a different challenge. It
remained important throughout this period and it was to be the cornerstone on which
Fakhr al-Dln built his wealth. In fact, part of the reason why Tripoli had attracted
foreign merchants was that they could tap into the regional trade which involved
surrounding areas, as weIl as into the international trade of Aleppo. The Venetians
themselves would continue debating during the 1590s whether it was best for them to
trade from the new port of Alexandretta or to return to Tripoli.450 The first to broach
the subject in an official report at the end of his term was Alessandro Malipiero, who
had taken over from Contarini. He argued in 1596 that Tripoli should once more become
the main Venetian shipping port in preference over Alexandretta and even that the
consulate should be moved from Aleppo back to Tripoli.451 He thought that because the
port of Tripoli was for the time being entrusted to an Ottoman official, not to a powerful
emir, the major problem with extortion should have been solved.452
Significantly, Malipiero gave the addition al reason that, with the consulate back
in Tripoli, "the merchandise of the regions of Tripoli, Beirut, Acre, Damascus and other
places near Tripoli, which consists of silks, cottons, yam, lime, (alkali) ashes and many
448 Masters, The Origins, 16. 449 In 1611 consul Francesco Sagredo reported that the reversai of shipping operations to Tripoli from Alexandretta had been greatly damaging to ail foreign merchants but to Venetians in particular. Berchet, Relazioni, 132. His wording implies that as of 1611 most traffic was going through Tripoli. 450 Consul Giorgio Emo reviewed the pros and cons in 1599 concluding in favour of Alexandretta. Consul Vincenzo Dandolo also reviewed this issues and concluded against Tripoli mainly on account of the exactions ofyusufSayfii. Ibid., 106-107, 123-126. 451 Tripoli always had a sub-consul, while the main consul was in Aleppo. Presumably Malipiero wanted the main consul for the whole of Syria to move back to Aleppo. A specifie conjuncture in international trade might have made this especially desirable around 1595. 452 Berchet, Relazioni, 85. At times, the city of Tripoli and its port were administered by a different official than the governor of the province of Tripoli. Ottoman officiais, though they could occasionally be very corrupt, were more amenable to pressure from the Porte than locally entrenched rulers. Alexandretta, however, presented less of a problem at this stage, because according to consul Emo (in a 1599 report) it was free both ofhigh Ottoman officiaIs and ofpowerful local lords. Berchet, Relazioni, 106.
106
other goods yet, which are now handled by Jewish and other merchants, would once
again fall into the hands of our own (merchants)."453 Information on this trade is
chequered, yet it supports Malipiero's concem that his countrymen should regain part of
it. Most importantly, this trade was entangled in a crucial dynamic affecting the
provinces. Continuing unrest made a diffuse and permanent control of the territory
essential to the prosperity of the agriculture, manufactures and trade of the Syrian
provinces. In the long run, this tended to favour local rulers, who were best placed to
guarantee this control. Thus we find that if Venetians were losing control of regional
trade to other merchants (sorne of whom at least must have been local merchants), the
Ottomans were losing their share to local rulers like Fakhr al-Dln.
During the second half of the cent ury, and particularly during the last decades,
the Anatolian and Syrian countrysides and provincial towns had suffered severely from
continuing disorders.454 In Syria, the struggle between the Aleppine and Damascene
Janissaries caused considerable disruption both in the two cities and in the countryside
between them.455 The jelali revolts added to the plight of populations in Anatolia and
northem Syria, to the point that whole areas of the countryside had been deserted by
peasants who sought refuge in more peaceful territory.456 In southem Syria, Bedouin
insubordination and brigandage were rife. They were compounded by fighting among
local rulers. The stagnation and even decline of population mentioned at the beginning
of this section was partly related to these disorders. It must be emphasized, however,
that this should not be thought of as a catastrophic decline and that the regional
economy still gave clear signs ofvitality. One Venetian consul remarked that in his trip
between Tripoli and Aleppo in 1574 he had seen a countryside "so fertile and bountiful
that, although it is only inhabited in two parts out of ten, produces everything that is
453 Berchet, Relazioni, 86. 454 Rafeq suggests that disorder had begun to impoverish the countryside already in the 1560s, with dire consequences as the century progressed. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Making a Living or Making a Fortune in Ottoman Syria," in Money, Land and Trade: An Economic History of the Muslim Mediterranean, ed. Nelly Hanna (London and New York: LB. Tauris, 2002), 101-102. He also found evidence in I:Iama court records from the sixteenth century of numerous monetary transactions and the beginnings of indebtedness, as weil as ofincreasing mismanagement ofagricultural waqfS. Rafeq, "Making a Living," 109-110, 116-118. 455 Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, "Aleppo and the Ottoman Military in the 1 6th Century (Two Case Studies)," Al-Abhath, no. 27 (1978-9): 28-30. 456 Disorder led many Anatolian peasants to flee elsewhere in 1603-1606. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 49-50.
107
necessary for the good living of the inhabitants and much more besides," included, he
went on to add, much cotton, but also silk and wool which were then sold in Aleppo.457
Later in the century Venetian consuls remarked generically upon the devastation
they saw.458 They were occasionally more specifie: ijama and the countryside around
Damascus were said to have particularly suffered at the hands of the Damascene
janissary.459 Even then, however, the devastation they remarked upon did not
characterize the entire region. We know, for example, that agriculture and particularly
grain production in the province of Aleppo continued to thrive towards the end of the
sixteenth century and beyond, in spite of the devastation visited upon certain areas.460
We have seen, in the overview of demographic and economic trends above, that the raw
silk production of the regions around Tripoli and around Mount Lebanon continued to
expand throughout the century and beyond and that manufacturing involving these raw
materials also continued. A detailed study of Venetian commercial interests in Syria in
the late 1570s and early 1580s sheds light on the trade that Malipiero mentioned. Raw
silk from Beirut (paesana) and from Tripoli (decana) was an important item for
Venetians trading in Syria.461 So were cotton thread and cotton cloth from Aleppo and
also from ijama.462 The Damascene production of onnesini, a light silk cloth, was
particularly sought after and there is a record of a very large shipment made by
Venetians merchants in 1580.463 The cargo of a Venetian ship which sailed from Tripoli
late in 1590 shows that local raw silk, cotton thread and cotton textiles still figured
457 Report of Andrea Navagero, who had been elected consul in 1574. Berchet, Relazioni, 60. 458 Malipiero himself, white eyeing the trade in regional products, remarked in 1596 that the province of Syria was reduced to "a miserable and unhappy state" and that only major cities like Aleppo and Damascus still thrived. Ibid., 88. 459 Consul Giorgio Emo, who was in Syria between 1596 and 1599, remarked that "the country is destroyed and ruined" and went on to remark on the plight of the peasantry around Damascus. Ibid., 101-102. 460 Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 479. 461 Ugo Tucci, "Un Cielo di Affari Commerciali in Siria (1579-1581)," in Mercanti, Navi, Monete nel Cinquecento Veneziano (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981), 101. 462 Ibid. Thus I:Iama seems to have been still flourishing in the 1570s. Speaking of the Syrian cotton trade in general, Tucci remarked that it only stopped with the complete mechanization of the relative production processes introduced by Arkwright and Hargraves. 463 Ibid., 105. The Damascene product was sorne 20% cheaper than the Aleppine equivalent. See the lengthy footnote 30. There was a prohibition on imports of ormesini to Venice in order to protect local industry. Exceptions were made, ±rom time to time, for Neapolitan and Florentine ormesini when market demand was so high that Venetian producers could not keep up with it. The large shipment reported by Tucci was destined for Germany. Hence, either it was shipped directly to Germany, or it was felt that demand was so high that the prohibition could be ignored.
108
prominently in Venetian trade alongside spices and raw silk imported via Aleppo
(presumably Persian), just before the port was first moved to Alexandretta.464 Sorne ten
years later this regional trade was still consistent enough to attract the consul' s
attention.
The same consullamented Ottoman unwillingness to build fortifications to guard
the countryside and believed that this policy was responsible for the destruction he
witnessed in sorne areas. The Ottomans, he pointed out, relied on their military might to
ho Id the country in check and wanted no fortifications, for without them, "whoever
controls the open country will control everything."465 The consul captured very weIl
indeed what was a real strategie concem for the Ottomans, but had totally failed to
notice that, little by little, fortifications had started to multiply in many parts of Syria
and Palestine. For example, we find out from Duwayhl that in 1576 the Druze emir al
Tanukhl constructed a caravanserai and a tower in the village of' Abayh, in the Gharb.466
Often this took place with Ottoman approval, since numerous sultanic orders relate to
the construction of fortifications.467 A who le range of structures were authorized by the
Porte, showing its concem with the pacification of the countryside and with the
protection of local agriculture, industry and trade. Sometime these fortifications were
simple watch-towers to guard against brigands. Often they were fortified
khans/caravanserais to host merchants, which might also have watchtowers of their own
and a permanent detachment of soldiers assigned to them.468 In other cases full-blown
fortresses were built, with Ottoman approval. They were needed to control the important
464 Ibid., 101-102. 465 Berchet, Relazioni, 88. 466 DuwayhI, Tiirïkh Al-Azminah, 441. The term used by DuwayhI ("burj") could relate to anything from a simple watch-tower to a very considerable fortification, but he gives no detaits. 467 Bakhit provides an overview of the fortresses in the province of Damascus, pointing out that sorne were also assigned waqfs for their upkeep and for paying the garrison. Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 94-101. 468 A fortified caravanserai was to be buitt in Jenin in 1564 and defended by a detachment of 40 musketeers. Document 56 (M.D. 6, No. 240) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 104. A fortified caravanserai with four watchtowers, each to be manned by ten soldiers, was to be built near Mount Tabor, were pilgrims and Egyptian merchants had been robbed and killed. Document 62 (M.D. 46, No. 246 and 380) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, llO-lB.
109
caravan routes in southem Syria and Palestine, essential both for the pilgrimage to
Mecca and for trade between Egypt and Syria.469
The safety of communications at sea and of coastal areas was also acutely felt.
As piracy became a major problem once again, after the battle of Lepanto, we find the
Porte also authorizing the construction of fortresses along the coast. In 1610, for
ex ample, the Porte issued a series of orders to the beylerbeyi of Tripoli to allow the
people of "Antartus," (Tartus?) not far from Tripoli, to build a fortress at their own
expense. It was needed to guard against incursions from pirates who took refuge in the
nearby island of Arwiid to raid the coast by surprise.470 From these orders we learn that
the request had first been made by Yusuf Sayfii, who had meanwhile been dismissed
because he is referred to as the "previous beylerbeyi." Significantly, all of these orders
express, in different words, the concem that the fortress should not be "seized by villains
and (that those who man it) do not harm any passers-by, merchants, or travellers.,,471
Whether or not they were meant to guard caravan routes or the coast, in fact,
fortifications were likely to fall under the control of undesirable elements or of local
rulers, who would then be all the harder to dislodge.
Fakhr al-DIn, with his long period of undisturbed tenure as sanjakbey first of
Beirut-Sidon and later also of Safed-Acre, was in an ideal position to control the
t errit ory, to provide order, to prevent intrusion from rapacious outsiders and thus
ulti,mately to prolong the flourishing of the economy of the sanja1s under his command
(even if at a slower rate than earlier in the century). He too built sorne fortifications for
these purposes. In 1590 he only had the mountain fortress of Nil},ii ("Nic a" in Tuscan
reports), a far-flung refuge in the Shuf, more than anything else.472 But in 1594, soon
after he had been made sanjakbey of Sidon-Beirut, he began restoring the existing
469 An order was issued to the beylerbeyi of Egypt to construct a fortress for this purpose in 'Arlsh, an uninhabited place along a route frequented by pilgrim and merchant caravans in 1559, which was detinitely tinished by the early 1590s. Document 55 (M.D. 3, No. 563) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 103. In the early 1570s the fortress of Ra's al-'Ayn was built in the smyak ofNablus: document 57 (M.D. 14, No. 108) and document 59 (M.D. 22, No. 547) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 103, 107. The fortress, undermanned, was later annexed to the sanjak of Gaza: document 60 (M.D. 22, No. 547) in Heyd, Ottoman Documents, 108. ' 470 M.D. 78, Nos. 1563a; M.D. 78, Nos. 1563b; M.D. 78, Nos. 1564; Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 101-103. 471 This quote is from the tirst order: M.D. 78, Nos. 1563a, Ibid., 101-102. 472 Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 200.
110
fortress in Sidon that guarded its approach from the interior and built anew a fortress to
guard its port that still carries his name.473 The revenues of Fakhr al-Dln's own sanja1s
must have benefited from his tenure. This is suggested both by the large sums that the
Ma'nids were able to rai se to pay off Ottoman viziers and by what seant information on
his revenues we find in Tuscan reports. Giovan-Battista Santi,474 a Tuscan agent who
had been especially sent to Sidon to report on the state of Fakhr al-Dln's domains after
the latter had arrived in Tuscany, included the following approximate breakdown of the
emir's own revenues.
Table 2: Estimate of Fakhr al-DJn revenues trom 1614 (in piasters/75
Silk Mise.Taxes Wine and Oil Cotton Grain and Hay ToUs Cattle and Sheep TOT AL
80,000 70,000 50,000 30,000 30,000 20,000 15,000 295,000
The agent commented on the flourishing of agriculture and particularly of the
cultivation of raw silk in his domains.476 He went on to estimate that Fakhr al-Dln's
main expense was the upkeep of his professional soldiers (80,000 piasters) and that he
owed to the Ottoman treasury slightly less (70,000), leaving him with a very large yearly
surplus (around 150,000 piasters) which went to fuel a fabulous treasury accumulated in
25 years during which he had been left unmolested by the Ottomans.477 This breakout
invites several comments. It should certainly be treated with great caution, for it is not
clear what sources the agent used (presumably from Fakhr al-Dln's entourage in
Lebanon, but they certainly would have had an agenda to serve, which might have led
them to inflate figures, for example).478 It should also be noted that it seems to mix
figures for Fakhr al-Dln's personal fortune and lands, with official revenues that were
473 Ibid., 201-202. 474 Santi was an "alfiere," or military engineer. Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:25. 475 Document XLI (Relazione Santi) in Ibid., 1:222. 476 Ibid., 1:218. 477 Ibid., 1:222-223. 478 The figure of20,000 piasters for tolls, which were port revenues, might not be unrealistic. It seems to be compatible with the revenue derived by Bakhit from tapu defters (See table above).
111
farmed out to him by the Ottoman state (e.g. the tolls/"gabelle" were mostly port
duties ).479
Yet, three interesting general points emerge from this report which we can
reliably work with. In the first place, a large portion of Fakhr al-Dln's revenue derived
from the sale of agricultural commodities (silk, cotton, oil, grain) with silk as the leading
entry. The woolIen textile industry of Safed, whose output at any rate was never as
important as that of bigger centres such as Damascus, had already declined quite
severely before Fakhr al-Dln's takeover of the sanjak. Khiilidi laments the state of Safed
and of its surrounding areas when the Druze emir took it over in 1602.480 But in the
conditions of the turn of the cent ury raw materials like silk and cotton were increasingly
in demand, while foodstuffs such as grain and oil were growing in price because of
mounting demographic pressure on scarce resources.481 Rence the revenue potential at
Fakhr al-Dln's disposaI was certainly considerable, especialIy when we take into account
the second point that emerges from the report: the presence of numerous merchants,
including foreign merchants, in his ports. AlI the above products, in fact, would have
been sold both 10calIy and to Ottoman and foreign merchants, for the same agent
reported that "French, English and Turkish merchants" were all active in his domains.482
Fakhr al-Dln seems to have been particularly aware of the need to keep good relations
with foreign merchants from the beginning ofhis political career.483 Both the French and
479 The Santi report states that he owned ail the land in the region and that he directly cuItivated ("raccoglie in proprio") silk and cotton. Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:221. A shorter report by another agent similarly suggests that he had many lands under cuItivation ("far lavorare à sua mano moite terre"). Document XL (Relazione Macinghi) in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dm, 1:208. Such confusion is to be expected given the conditions under which these reports were put together and the prejudices of these agents. These might have been encouraged by the fact that in second half of the sixteenth century, the Grand Dukes of Tuscany made no difference between their personal fortunes (e.g. as grain traders, a very lucrative activity) and those of the state of Tuscany, which were ail administered under one general account book. Diaz, Il Granducato, 146-148.The suggestion that Fakhr al-mn had accumulated this fortune in 25 years also implies that Santi probably included, without distinction, the emir's activities before he became sanjakbey of Sidon-Beirut in 1593 (hence his personal wealth and possibly any activity as muqaddam). 480 Khalidr, Lubniin Ft 'Ahd Al-Amir Fakhr Al-Din, 2. 481 Already in mid-century priees had risen so much in the Italian peninsula that they were two to three times higher than in the Levant, stimulating a brisk trade in grain. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 584-585, 591-592. 482 Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:221. 483 Inalcik reports that Fakhr a1-mn was responsib1e for heavy exactions against merchants in Tripoli in 1593. inalcik, Economie and Social History, 349. However, there is no evidence that Fakhr a1-mn was in any way invo1ved in Tripoli in 1593. On the contrary, we have seen that Venetian complaints were directed
112
the English had consuls in Sidon since at least 1608.484 This might have run contrary to
sorne Ottoman interests. It seems that at one point they wanted to restrict foreign traffic
exc1usively to the three ports oflstanbul, Alexandria and Alexandretta.485
Finally, we can surmise that Fakhr al-Dln was able to stay ahead of Ottoman tax
assessments and to keep a significant portion of local wealth for himself and his allies.486
He did this at least in part by promoting economic development and trade in locally
produced goods. But like many other provincial lords, he also seems to have delayed or
simply avoided paying sorne taxes for as long as he could. An order from 1595 to the
govemor of Tripoli instructed him to "collect old and new revenue and the arrears
(bakaya) from the beys of the Druzes.,,487 Another order issued late in 1607 to 'Ali,
Fakhr al-Dln's son who was then in control of Sidon and Beirut, commended him for his
loyalty and for his courage in guarding the territ ory and securing revenue. "But," the
Porte went on to add, "1 have leamed that there are no independent hasses in the sanjak
that you control. 1 thus order you to have 200,000 akçes (collected) as annual taxes
(salyane), as was previously the custom.,,488
against the 'Assafs. 1 was unable to check Inalcik's source (a publication by Steensgaard from 1970, see footnote 119). However, Steensgaard's later work provides a positive appraisal of Fakhr al-DIn's efforts towards trade. See the lengthy footnote 45: Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 162-163. Moreover, Steensgaard's discussion of Venetian trade in Tripoli during 1590-93 makes no mention of any specifie ruler, let alone of Fakhr al-Dïn. 484 When Tuscan emissaries were trying to reach an agreement with Fakhr al-DIn in 1608 they also met, in Sidon, with both the French and English Consuls. We can only assume that they must have been resident there. Document IX, sections 2 and 3 in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:148-149. It is also worth recalling that when Ferdinand 1 had sought to establish contacts with Fakhr al-DIn he had relied on the Lyonnais Hyppolite Lyoncini. Documents VI and VII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 1:142-143. 485 This was one of the conditions dictated by the Grand Vizier to pardon the Druze emir in 1614. Document LXVI in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 1:263. 486 The figure of 150,000 piasters saved per year cannot be trusted, but it might be of the right order of magnitude when we compare it to the gift of 300,000 piasters made to the Grand Vizier. The estimate of the govemor of Damascus that the Druze owed sorne 100,000 akçes yearly to the treasury (see above) also suggests that the surplus retained locally was substantial and of a similar order of magnitude. 487 M.D.73, No. 453 in Abu-Husayn, The View from Istanbul, 94. The reference to "new revenue" suggests that the Ottomans were trying to raise new taxes, as weIl as to collect arrears on the old ones. 488 M.Z. 8, No. 164 (Mühimme Zeyli, supplement for non-consecutive years) in Ibid., 75-76. Hass lands were choice agricultural estates reserved in every province for Ottoman officials-both provincial officiais (sanjakbeys, beylerbeyis) and high officiaIs in Istanbul or members of the court (viziers, women of the court, the sultan himselt). It seems that the alienation of hass estates was a major problem. Sorne were illegally taken over by Damascene janissaries, for example. (Several sultanic orders relate precisely to this problem).
113
Ma 'nid mi/itary power and the re-emergence of the coast of Syria/Palestine
The surplus revenue available to Fakhr al-Dln was weIl spent in buying him political
favour and keeping order throughout his domains, as weIl as fighting his rivaIs in the
region, such as Yusuf Sayfii. We find that in this process he also came to build a
significant military power. The main strength of Fakhr al-Dln's army continued to be
provided, as with his predecessors, by locallevies at his command and other such troops
provided by his allies. For one thing, locallevies were often seasoned fighters loyal to
the local leader, as often remarked by Tuscan agents. They certainly had proven their
military worth at many points during the sixteenth cent ury, causing no small trouble to
the Ottomans. Most importantly, locallevies provided the bulk ofhis army. Estimates of
their numerical strength by foreign military observers in the early years of the cent ury
vary between 10,000 and 30,000, with the intermediate figure of 20,000 being most
often cited.489 Santi offered a plausible explanation which reconciles the conservative
estimate of 10,000 with the often quoted figure of 20,000. According to him, Fakhr al
DIn had at his disposaI some 10,000 locallevies and could call upon another 10,000 from
his allies (according to Santi mostly Bedouin cavalry).490
These forces could only be fielded for short periods of time and could not be
despatched very far.491 At times, economic activities impaired their immediate
availability. Khiilidi mentions an episode in 1617, while Fakhr al-Dln was still in Italy,
when the Ma'nid party was trying to raise troops to fight in a local dispute, but this
interfered with the silk cycle (another sign of the continued importance of silk
production in the Shuf, the Gharb and the Matn at this time): "if the occupation of the
489 Here are the figures and their respective numbers, in parentheses: document XLI, the Santi report of 1614 (10,000); document XXXII, a despatch from Tripoli of November 1613, unsigned (11-12,000); document l, Raffaello Cacciamarri's report of 1605 (20,000); document XXXVIII, unsigned report destined for Rome of April 1614 (20,000); document X, letter by Arrigo Wotton (30,000). Respectively at: Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:220, 194, 134,204. Other figures were also quoted, for example 70,000 (in 1611) by the Maronite patriarch and 100,000 by al-Ml$ibbl. Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 169-170. They are probably both inflated: the first, because the patriarch might have wanted to encourage crusading plans; the second because it might refer to a later period (1620s). 490 Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:220-221. The other sources do not distinguish between levies and mercenaries. Hence the number of 11-12,000 quoted by the despatch from Tripoli could weB be accounted for as comprising the 10,000 levies and the 1,000 to 2,000 mercenary troops, while excluding aIl allied soldiers. 491 Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, ed. Vernon Perry and M. Yapp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 288.
114
people then had not been raising silkworms, a greater number would have come.,,492 But
even with these limitations, local levies still remained important because they were a
constant presence in the region. The Ottomans could field vast armies, but the expense
involved was such that they could not keep them indefinitely in a certain area. The local
levies available to rulers like Fakhr al-Dln could amount to significant numbers (never as
great as Ottoman armies, of course), but they were permanently "stationed" in the
region, as it were. Rence, for the most part, they could be assembled in sufficiently large
numbers within a relatively short time when pressing need arose. We learn that when the
goveroor of Damascus attempted to collect taxes late in 1614, after much of the
Ottoman force that had converged on Mount Lebanon the previous year had been
disbanded, he suffered a resounding defeat.493
There was nothing new in the resistance provided by local populations to
Ottoman taxation. What was different was the manner in which their resistance was
made harder to tackle, for the Ottomans, by two new developments. These were the
employment of professional soldiers and the construction, restoration and garrisoning of
fortresses. We have seen that, according to the Tuscan agent Santi, Fakhr al-Dln's main
expense was the pay of his professional troops. In fact, while the emir was being co
opted ever more within the Ottoman provincial administration, he was at the same time
building an ever stronger military force ofhis own. Nor where the two things necessarily
incompatible, since the Ottoman provincial administration did rely on him at times to
keep order. We learn from the same source that this large expense went to maintain
1,500 professional infantry and 150 cavalry and their mounts.494 These would have been
sekban troops, armed with muskets.495 The sekbans were mercenary infantry (but
492 Khâlidï, Lubniin FI 'Ahd Al-Amïr Fakhr Al-Dïn, 60-61. 493 Document LXVII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 265. His force was said to have numbered 10,000 and to have suffered losses amounting to 6,000. Both seem unrealistically high numbers. The important point remains that in 1614 the govemor of Damascus could not collect taxes with the forces still at his disposaI. 494 Document XLI (Relazione Santi) in Ibid., 1:222. 495 Rafeq, "The Local Forces," 283, 285. Rafeq reports that the cavalry were known as "lawand' in Syrian sources and considers them as ifthey were a different corps.
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occasionally also cavalry), hired by the Ottomans for their campaigns to supplement the
Janissaries, but released at the end ofhostilities.496
This is the most direct link we can find between Fakhr al-Dln's rising power and
the jelali revolts. In 1596 the Porte had outlawed a large number of sekban troops, who
had not taken part in the latest Austrian campaign, sending thousands of men to join the
ranks of the jelalis in Anatolia and Syria.497 The end ofwar in the Balkans in 1606 would
have added to their ranks and 'Ali Jiinbüliid was said to have employed them in very
large numbers. The number of 1,500 for infantry who were in Fakhr al-Dln's permanent
pay is relatively high but not implausible for a standing force. It is confirmed by Khiilidi,
who states that upon leaving for Tuscany the Ma'nid emir assigned 10 companies
totalling 1,000 sekbans to one fortress and 5 companies totalling another 400 sekbans to
another.498 By way of comparison, the Damascene janissary in the last quarter of the
sixteenth century was estimated to be around 1,000 in number, but its actual fighting
complement could have been smaller.499 Na~ü4 Pasha, when he was still the beylerbeyi
of Diyarbekir in 1607, was said to have 1,000 sekbans under his direct command.500
The crucial new element in Fakhr al-Dln's control over the territory of his
sanjals were the fortifications that he could rely upon.501 In 1612 he added two key
fortresses to those that he had already built or restored: Shaqlf Amun, which guarded
access to his terri tories from the south and Banyiis, which guarded access from
Damascus.502 Both rose on the site of crusading castIes but had been considerably
strengthened and well-garrisoned. Such a decision on Fakhr al-Dln's part might weIl
496 Ibid., 283-284. Their specialty arose from the Ottoman need for more and more infantry skilled in the use of firearms, especially during the long war of 1593-1606 on the Balkan front. inalcik, "The SocioPolitical Effects," 200-201. 497 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province, 169. 498 KhiilidI, LubnéJn Fi 'Ahd Al-Amir Fakhr Al-Vin, 2. Khalidi states that 10 "bulükabashl" (bOlükba~i, or sekban company commanders, each sekban company typically numbering between fifty one hundred men) and 1000 sekbans were assigned to Banyas and 5 "bulükabashl" and 400 sekbans to Shaqlf Arnm. Macinghi, the other Tuscan agent who went to Syria in 1614, wrote that the emir had 3,000 soldiers in his pay. The figure of 1,500 thus seems a sensible compromise, closer to KhalidI's own figure. Document XL in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:210. Soueid takes these 3,000 to be officers: Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 167. However, aIl that Macinghi's report says is that they were in permanent pay ("3 mila dei quali ne paga continuamente"). 499 Rafeq, "The Local Forces," 281. 500 inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects," 201. 501 Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 215. 502 Ibid., 202-203.
116
indicate that already in 1612 he feared a showdown with the new Grand Vizier. In its
turn, this move could have precipitated the Ottoman invasion. It is also important,
however, because it reveals the strategy that Fakhr al-Dln was pursuing to consolidate
his hold on the territory entrusted to him. The sekbans, like all mercenary troops, could
not always be trusted.503 Nor were their numbers so great. They wereparticularly
important, however, as an instrument of power for the emir and others like him who
could afford to employ these standing forces. In the first place, they constituted a ready
at-hand mobile force which responded to orders from the emir alone.504 Second, and
most importantly, they were also used to provide permanent control of the territory,
alongside with the system of fortresses.
One of the sekbans' most common uses, in fact, was as garrisons stationed at key
strongholds around Fakhr al-Dln's domains.505 Khiilidi mentions several episodes of
small sieges conducted by sekban forces and of the despatching/assignment of sekban
forces to take over and man fortresses.506 The sekbans' most common use must have
been as garrisons that held the territory in check and guarded over key routes.507 They
would have served both to control brigandage and internaI enemies ofthe Ma'ns and as a
keyelement in the defence aga,inst external aggression. Fakhr al-Dln certainly put great
stock on this system of defence. He told his Tuscan guests that he had supplemented the
garrisons, provided them with supplies and abundant pay and that he trusted them to
ho Id out for a long period against the Ottomans because the sekbans in his employment,
being consideredjelalis by the Porte, would likely be decapitated ifthey surrendered.508
Reports from late 1613 indeed show that these fortresses held out against Ottoman
assaults. The large Ottoman army under the command of the governor of Damascus had
503 Rafeq, "The Local Forces," 291. 504 Khülidï gives numerous examples of minor engagements in which the Ma'ns participated with small detachments of sekban infantry and/or cavalry amounting to a few hundred men. Khalidï, Lubniin Fï 'Ahd Al-Amïr Fakhr Al-Dïn, 82, 89, 129. 505 Rafeq, "The Local Forces," 284. 506 A permanent force of sekbans was stationed in Dayr al-Qamar, the main seat of Ma'nid power in the mountain. In 1614 sorne ofthem were despatched to take over and presumably man another stronghold. In 1618 the Ma'ns battled the Sayfiîs over control of sorne fortresses and occupied them with their sekbans. Khülidï, Lubniin Fï 'Ahd Al-Amïr Fakhr Al-Dïn, 31-32, 77. 507 They certainly also fought in pitched battles and probably provided the emir and his entourage with personal escorts and mobile forces. However, the greater number was probably employed, for most of the time, in garrison duties. 508 Document XX and document XXIV, section 2, in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Dïn, 168, 174-175.
117
stopped to lay siege to some of the main fortresses and suffered very heavy losses.50
9
Tuscan agents confirmed early in 1614 that the fortresses were holding out and that the
Ottomans besieging them had suffered heavy losses.510
The Zenith of Fakhr a1-DIn 's Power and his Demise: 1614-1632
The Ma'ns were soon able to resume their rule after Fakhr al-DIn's flight to Tuscany.
Most importantly, the reasons underpinning their continued rise to power later in the
century were essentially the same that had seen Fakhr al-DIn's rise in his youth. Bence,
by way of conclusion, this chapter will revisit the argument of the previous chapter and
see how it still applies to the later period. We will see, first, that the Ma'ns had become
weIl entrenched in the region and could not be so easily dislodged even by a large
Ottoman army. Ultimately, however, their retum to power, Fakhr al-DIn's return from
Italy and his new successes were aIl due to a combination of two factors. As argued
above, the se were Ottoman favour coupled with the remarkable financial meanS that the
Ma'ns controlled. This points once again to the importance of the Ma'ns' ability to raise
revenue, while also keeping a substantial proportion of it to themselves. Bence the
second chapter sub-section below considers the regional economy once again and argues
that the areas under their control were still thriving economically in the 1630s. The third
and final chapter sub-section below suggests that we should reconsider the military
build-up that Fakhr al-Dln was able to put together and see also its limitations. Fakhr al
DIn' s downfaIl, as much as his rise, was ultimately decided by the possibilities and
limitations offered by the socio-economic and geo-political circumstances of southem
Syria and Palestine at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
509 Documents XXXII (November 1613) and XXXIII (December 1613) in Ibid., 193-194. According to these despatches the Ottoman army numbered altogether sorne 60,000 men and rumours were circulating that they had lost sorne 10,000 in the sieges. 5\0 Document XXXVIII in Ibid., 204-205. According to this report the Ottoman army numbered sorne 80,000 and had 10st sorne 2,500 from two corps commanded by two different pashas (it seems like each corps had lost 2,500 for a total of 5,000, but the report is ambiguous in this respect) in the siege of Shaqlf and sorne 3,500 in a pitched battle.
118
Provincial Administration, Factional Politics and Fakhr al-DIn's retum
The system of defence provided by Fakhr al-Dln served its purpose well during the first
year after the Ottoman expedition. As we have seen, Ottoman forces could not capture
the main fortresses by assault. This meant that they could neither remove Ma'nid forces
from the area, nor gain complete control of the territory. In the ensuing chaos they could
not collect taxes from the well-armed local population. The aftermath of the Ottoman
invasion and of Fakhr al-Dln's escape to Tuscany, however, had serious consequences
for Ma'nid power too. The Sayfiis sided with the invading forces in the hope ofrestoring
their position of power, so weakened after the defeats they had suffered at the hands of
Janbiiliid and then Fakhr al-Dln in 1606. Their task was made easier by a new
deve1opment. Once the Ma'ns had been weakened by the Ottoman onslaught and were
left without the legitimation provided by official Ottoman approval, a challenge to their
leadership emerged from among other Druze parties that had been so far subordinate to
them.511 The sekban forces, too, could not be trusted indefinitely to serve the Ma'ns.512
However, the important point is that while the Ma'ns were undoubtedly weakened, they
held out for long enough that the Ottomans would want to consider negotiations. More
important still, they held out for long enough that their fortunes at the Porte began to
change. Na~U4 Pasha, the Grand Vizier who had so resolutely wanted to drive the Ma'ns
from power, saw his own position in Istanbul deteriorate irreparably. In
OctoberlNovember 1614 he was executed.513 The govemor of Damascus who had been
Na~U4 Pasha's ally and who had led the Ottoman army against Fakhr al-Dln, was
replaced a few months later, in April 1615.514 The renewal of hostilities with Persia in
1615 would have made the Porte all the more willing to reach a settlement with the
Ma'ns.
Most important of all, the new Grand Vizier who took over from Na~ii4 Pasha
was well disposed towards Fakhr al-Dln. Mu4ammad Pasha, in fact, had been the
5lI Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 100-102. Abu-Husayn also reviews the emergence of a Shiite challenge to Ma'nid leadership: Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 103-107. 512 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 94, 97. Abu-Husayn is particularly negative about the effectiveness of the sekbans. But, to put things in perspective, they held out for the best part oftwo years. 513 Ibid., 97. 514 Ibid.
119
govemor of Egypt and had received generous gifts from Fakhr al-Dln as he had left
Egypt to move back to Istanbu1.515 Two letters from the Porte were received in Tuscany
during the summer of 1615 which contained pardons for Fakhr al-Dln and assurances
that he would be restored to power.516 It is not certain whether the Druze emir was able
to read these letters because they arrived in Tuscany just as he left for the kingdom of
Naples, where he was to spend the next two years.517 Negotiations between Ottoman
authorities and the Ma'ns certainly proceeded with less difficulty in Syria. AIready in
1615, in fact, the Ma'ns were reappointed to the sanja.ks ofSidon-Beirut and ofSafed.518
The Ottomans were promised significant gifts in retum, as weIl as an increase in the
yearly contribution from these sanja.ks to the treasury of sorne 50,000 piasters.519
Negotiations between the two sides continued over control of the castIes of Banyas and
Shaqlf. The Ma'ns initially agreed to have Ottoman forces stationed in these castIes
alongside their own, but it is clear that the Ottomans were concemed about the
fortifications and wanted a different solution. News was brought to Fakhr al-Dln in 1615
that key fortresses were still in his possession.520 The Ottomans, however, were
attempting to persuade the commanders of the fortresses to surrender to them and very
nearly succeeded in gaining total control of these key strongholds. EventuaIly, an
agreement was reached in 1616 with the Ma'ns themselves. These two fortresses would
be dismantled and Ottoman forces would be stationed in the remaining citadels of Beirut
515 Ibid., 37-38. 516 Documents LXX and LXXI in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:272-275. In the first one, signed by an 'Alï Pasha (presumably a high dignitary in Istanbul), a few !ines allude to previous contacts and to the networks through which influence was exercised at the Porte. The Pasha acknowledged having received a supplication in a letter directed by Fakhr al-DIn to a certain Kaspar, who was 'AII's friend, and said that he had spoken to the Grand Vizier (who is named as Mehmet Pasha in this letter, following Ottoman spelling). Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:273. 517 The importance of the Spanish viceroy from the Kingdom of Naples in the episode of Fakhr al-Din 's exile would deserve a separate study. It seems that at this stage the Habsburgs were more interested than the Medicis in using Fakhr al-DIn as an instrument to advance their plans. 518 YUnus Ma'n and 'Ali Ma'n, Fakhr al-Dïn's brother and son, were appointed respectively sanjakbey of Safed and sanjakbey of Sidon-Beirut while Fakhr al-DIn was in Sicily. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 98. 519 Ibid. 520 A letter written by Fakhr al-Dln to MU!'.tafii (presumably MU!'.tala Kethüda) and given to the French consul to take back to Sidon indicates that the latter had reassured him (in July 1615) that the main fortress ofBiinyas was still holding out. Document LXVIII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 268.
120
and of Sidon.521 One of Fakhr al-Dln's confidants, Hiijj Kaywan, wrote to him in
Tuscany around this time (in 1616) to reassure him that conditions were favourable for
his return. He added a note on the margin of his letter saying that he had personally met
the Grand Vizier in Aleppo and that he had found him sincere and extremely well
disposed towards the Ma 'ns. 522
With Ottoman favour Fakhr al-Dln eventually retumed by 1618 and resumed his
rise to power. Immediately after his return he set out to reassert full control over the two
sanjaks that he had ruled. He oversaw the raising of taxes once more. With his authority
over Druze areas re-established, he could once again turn his attention to the region. In
1619 war broke out between Fakhr a1-Dln and the SaYIas, who were still entrenched in
Tripoli. Fakhr al-Dln soon had the upper hand. Unable to stand up to his forces, the
SaYIas took refuge in iju~n al-Akriid (the Krak des Chevaliers), which they had
refurbished and tumed into a stronghold of their own (it would eventually come into
Ma'nid possession).523 The Ottomans seem to have intervened at this stage because they
did not want Fakhr al-Dln to completely eliminate the SayIas.524 During the following
years, however, he kept up his pressure on them. He also used financial means to
undermine the SayIas. It is clear that the latter were facing increasing financial
difficulties and became indebted to Fakhr al_Dln.525 In 1620 he sent Mu~tala Kethüda to
Istanbul to press for Yüsuf SayIa's dismissal as beylerbeyi of Tripoli. Fakhr al-Dln
requested that either he or a previous berylerbeyi who SaYIa had taken over from
(ijusayn Pasha al-Jalafi) should replace SayIa. To obtain this, he bid 100,000 piasters (l)
521 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 98. See particularly footnote 103. It points to Ottoman documents confirming the (at least partial) dismantling of fortifications. Soueid, relying on western sources alone, instead of on Khalidi or on Ottoman documents, suggests that these fortresses were never surrendered and that they held out until Fakhr al-Dtn's retum in 1618. Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 206. Perhaps the dismantling had only been partial and was easily reversed at a later date, hence the confusion of foreign observers. 522 Document LXXXII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-D"in, 1:285-287. One line in the note on the margin might suggest that Fakhr al-mn knew the situation would tum in his favour. It reassures Fakhr al-Dïn that the Grand Vizier had given the impression of being a sincere friend to the Ma'ns, and ends by stating: "(you should) know this much; and you know more" ... A suggestive few words which indicate that the emir and his confidante might have been privy to other information than the one explicitly reported regarding the latter's meeting with the Grand Vizier. 523 Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 43-44. 524 Ibid., 44. 525 Ibid., 45-46.
121
more than was customary for the governorship of Tripoli.526 The bid won, for al-Jaliifi
became the new governor and Mu~tafâ Kethüda was assigned the sanja1s of Jabla and
Latakia, to the north of Tripoli.527 The Ma'ns continued to exp and their hold on the
region. Over the next couple of years they secured for themselves also the sanja1s of
Niiblus and 'AjlÜll. They thus began extending their influence also to the south.
In 1623 the Ma'ns suffered a reversaI, for the sanja1s ofSafed, Niiblus and 'AjlÜll
were temporarily revoked from them. A coalition of other provincial leaders who had
established an alliance with the governor of Damascus and who must have had sorne
leverage in Istanbul were responsible for this reversaI. Fakhr al-Dln reacted first by
securing, through his agent at the Porte, imperial orders commanding the restoration of
the sanja1s to the Ma'ns.528 As the governor of Damascus did not acknowledge these
orders, Fakhr al-Dln moved against him and his allies and won a resounding victory at
the battle of 'Anjar, capturing the governor himself. He then won his old sanja1s back
and extracted more concessions from the captive governor, obtaining also the sanja1s of
Gaza and of Lajjun.529 Fakhr al-Dln was now free to resume his expansion towards
Tripoli, which he besieged in 1625. After Yusuf Sayfâ's death that same year, Fakhr al
DIn finally consolidated his ho Id on the province of Tripoli. By 1627 he was firmly in
control of the cyalctofTripoli.530 This was the pinnacle ofMa'nid power.
Changing Tradc Pattcms, Economic Development and Revenues (II)
As we have seen, Fakhr al-Dln's power rose to new heights thanks to a combinat ion of
Ottoman favour and financial means. Ottoman favour itself was secured at least in part
through financial means, since Fakhr al-Dln skillfully bought himself influence with
important officiaIs/factions at the Porte. Therefore, to understand his rise to power, we
have to retum once again to the question of the origins of Ma'nid wealth. It was not
based on control of long-distance international trade, even when the Ma'ns eventually
526 Ibid., 46. 527 Ibid. 528 Ibid., 117-118. 529 Ibid., 120-121. 530 Ibid., 111. The nomination as govemor of Tripoli is reported by Duwayhl and by only one other source. There is no confirmation from Ottoman documents that Fakhr al-Oïn was officially appointed beylerbeyi of Tripoli. See footnote 112.
122
came to rule over Tripoli. By 1614, in fact, Alexandretta had won back from Tripoli the
role as the main port for Venetian trade.531 Over the next decades it became the main
outlet for merchandise bought in Aleppo by all western merchants, not just Venetians.532
The Ottomans were eager to continue developing this trade. Commenting on their
concern for the safety of merchant vessels at sea against attacks by pirates, one Venetian
consul remarked that "it is clear that the Turks are no less anxious than anyone el se
about the expansion and continuation of trade.,,533 The Ottomans were equally
concerned with ensuring the safety and smooth operation of merchants inland, applying
as much pressure as they could on their officiaIs in order to facilitate the trade.534 In fact,
northern Syria and the adjoining parts of Anatolia were very important at this time for
the Ottoman state.
The value of these areas to the treasury in Istanbul is revealed in a special
memorandum requested by the Sultan in 1636.535 It details both the revenues and the
expenses of each region, giving a sense of the region's importance to the Ottoman fisk.
As a yardstick for comparison, according to the memorandum Bursa was worth "only"
5,000,000 akçes in revenue at this time.536 This was significantly smaller than what was
paid by other regions:
531 The report by consul Girolamo Morosini, given in February 1614, commented positively on the change but did not give an exact date. Berchet, Relazioni, 159. 532 Masters, The Origins, 120. Suraiya Faroqhi, "Traders and Customs OfficiaIs in 1660s iskenderun," in Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands, 1480 to 1820 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995),217,219-220. 533 Berchet, Relazioni, 152. This was consul Giovanni Francesco Sagredo, who was in Syria before 1612. 534 Consul Girolamo Morosini remarked on the good relations that the Venetians enjoyed at the Porte around 1614 and went on to say that "the basha (of Aleppo) and other ministers have express orders from the Porte to honour, protect and respect (Venetian merchants) and to ensure that they will be respected and honoured." Ibid., 158. 535 This memorandum was brought to public attention by Rhoads Murphey, who published it and analyzed its data. CF. Rhoads Murphey, Regional Structure in the Ottoman Economy: A Sultanic Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax-Farm Revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions ofSyria (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987). 536 Ibid., 137,219. It had, however, very few expenses and most ofit went to the treasury, but even so it was much smaller than thee contribution made by Zulkadriyye and small even compared to Aleppo, with its great expenses.
123
Table 3: Ottoman Treasury Revenues trom Five Highest Paying Regions (in akçes)537
(n.h. for Anatolia, Northem and Coastal Syria)
Revenue Defence Expend. Admin. Expend. Treasury Deposits Missing
Amount Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Zulkadriyye 30,911,760 4,596,868 14.9 1,306,470 4.2 21,024,693 68.0 3,983,729 12.9
Diyarbakir 25,019,750 19,660,000 78.6 1,090,000 4.4 4,150,450 16.6 119,300 0.5
Aleppo 24,106,727 10,541,900 43.7 1,810,000 7.5 7,958,127 33.0 3,796,700 15.7
Tripoli 15,382,000 7,174,800 46.6 2,673,000 17.4 5,532,000 36.0 2,200 0.01
Erzurum 12,399,400 433,000 3.5 104,000 0.8 Il,862,400 95.7
With the exception of Erzurum, which is in eastern Anatolia, aIl the other four highest
paying regions are in northern Syria and the bordering lands of southern Anatolia.
Diyarbakir is just to the north east of Aleppo, while Zulkadriyye is to the north west.
The very high tax return for the latter include revenues from market inspection and from
dues on silk, spices and other goods to the tune of 14,000,000 akçes from
Alexandretta.538
This tremendously lucrative trade rested in Ottoman hands. However, the ports
of Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut still saw their fair share of activity. It is likely that sorne
foreign vessels continued using Tripoli to ship goods purchased in Aleppo.539 AIso, the
shift of international trade routes towards northern Syria did not completely deprive
southern Syria of aIl goods from Central Asia. Sidon and Beirut would have been used
by foreign merchants to ship what merchandise reached Damascus. Most of aIl, these
three ports continued to be active in regional trade and in the marketing of 10caIly
produced goods, for they certainly did thrive at this time. It seems that when Fakhr al
DIn had laid siege to Tripoli in 1625, the governor of Aleppo had sought to induce
foreign merchants to move to areas that he controlled by having the fortress of Tripoli
537 Ibid., 221. Note that percentage figures are rounded to one decimal point and may not exactly add up to 100% as a result. 538 Item 14 on section II of the register: Ibid., 221. Neither the report, nor Murphey in his footnotes, explicitly mention Alexandretta in relation to this entry for the Ottoman treasury. The explicit references to dues from market inspection and weighing, as weIl as to dues on spices ("bahar") and silk ("harir") for such a high total, however, point to Alexandretta as the only centre in the region where such high revenues from trade in these goods could be generated. 539 In earlier times Venetian consuls had complained about the difficulty of enforcing the rule that aH trade should go through Alexandretta. See Dandolo's report of 1602: Berchet, Relazioni, 125.
124
destroyed (hence presumably making the place less safe and less easily controlled by
Fakhr al-Dln toO).540 As a Venetian consul remarked, the plan had backfired because
"being those merchants mostly French and Flemish, they withdrew to Sidon, where they
are benignly and courteously treated by the emir there.,,541 Trade in Sidon was booming
to such an extent that the consul thought it could "shortly become a most frequented
port, with ever greater detriment to the trade of Aleppo."542 The trade of Sidon and of
southem Syria in general could never quite hope to rival that of Aleppo, no matter how
much it grew. But it was significant enough to attract attention. The continued
prosperity of the area around Tripoli (and by extension of the trade of the entire region)
after it fell in the hands of the Ma'ns is borne out by Ottoman documents. We have seen
that in 1636, only three years after Fakhr al-Dln's capture, Tripoli was still one of the
highest paying regions for the Ottoman treasury. Dues from the port alone were worth
over 2,000,000 akçes, while tax farms from the interior, which spanned areas between
'Akkiir in the north and Ba!rUn in the south, were worth nearly 11,000,000 akçes.543
The continued prosperity of the region is borne out by Tuscan documents too,
particularly by the new commercial projects envisioned (but never quite implemented)
during these years, as well as by reports sent home by their consul, Verrazzano. The
trade that so appealed to Tuscan agents consisted largely in gallnuts, leather, cotton and
especially raw silk produced in areas in and around Mount Lebanon and around Tripoli.
The French profitably exchanged their cloth for these goods, when they did not pay cash
for them.544 The English and the Dutch were also very active in this trade. Raw silk
production, as we have seen, was the main source of revenue for Fakhr al-Dln at the
beginning of the century. He certainly continued developing it. After his acquisition of
Tripoli in 1627 he oversaw significant investment in the agriculture of the region. We
540 Ibid., 163. Consul Giuseppe Civran read his report to the Venetian Senate on the 21 S! of August 1625. He
had been in Syria since 1622. He refers in this episode to an as sault that "the emir of Sidon" conducted while he was fighting the govemor of Damascus. This would suggest that it was part of fighting took place around the time of the battle of 'Anjar, in 1623. However, we know from other sources that Fakhr al-mn did lay siege to Tripoli in 1625, causing much destruction (as reported also by the Venetian consul) and prompting the intervention of the Pasha of Aleppo. He had earlier laid siege to the fortress of Tripoli (with Ottoman approval, in 16121) Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 55, 110. 54\ Berchet, Relazioni, 163. 542 Ibid. 543 Items 1 and 6 in Section VII of the register. Murphey, Regional Structure, 91-93. 544 Section CXV, Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:327.
125
learn from Duwayhl that Fakhr al-Dln repaired the irrigation system in the lowland
region and had two vast orchards of mulberry trees planted.545 The first orchard
consisted of 14,000 trees near the gulf of Tripoli, while the second was said to be even
bigger.546 Raw silk indeed continued to be a crucial export commodity for southern Syria
during the seventeenth cent ury and French traders continued to play a significant role in
·t 547 1 .
Another increasingly important commodity for export were basic foodstuffs,
which were ever more in demand at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Wheat is
mentioned over and over again in Tuscan despatches from the region.548 Dutch traders
seem to have played an especially important part in the wheat trade around the
Mediterranean at this time.549 They often operated out of Livorno and we do find the
Medicis writing to Fakhr al-Dln specifically to recommend to him "Flemish" merchants
on their way to the Levant to buy grain.550 The size of this trade must have been
considerable. There were reports that in 1631, apparently a year of scarcity, sorne one
hundred and twenty Frankish ships had come to the port of Acre looking for wheat.551
545 DuwayhI, Tiirikh Al-Azminah, 496. 546 Ibid. According to DuwayhI, the first orchard was located near the gulf/inlet of Tripoli, while the second and bigger one was "in the lands of 'Issa." Presumably these were in the Tripoli region too. 547 Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," 506-507. 548 Documents VII, XL and CXXV in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:144, 200, 340. Rice is also occasionally mentioned, but these reports also make clear that only a little rice was grown locally, while the main source of rice at this time was Egypt, from where it was also exported to SyriaiPalestine. 549 Braudel first pointed out that the arrivaI of the Dutch in the Mediterranean in the l590s was linked to their role in the grain trade. Braudel, The Mediterranean, 629. More recently, Israel has re-affirmed the importance of Dutch participation in the grain trade, but also suggested, contra Braudel, that they played an important role in many other branches of the carrying trade already in 1607 to 1621, surpassing the English. Jonathan I. Israel, "The Phasis of the Dutch Straatvart, 1590-1713: A Chapter in the Economic History of the Mediterranean," Tijdschrift vo Geschiedenis 99 (1986): #3, 5-7. 550 Documents XCVIII (actually, a letter from the archbishop of Cyprus dated 1629), C[X (note mention of Flemish consul), CX (mentions vessels bound for the Levant to load grain) and CXLIX (with specific mention of Flemish vessels full of grain and oil), in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, [:307, 321, 322, 378. See also
document XVIII in Roncaglia, "Fabr Ad-DIn," 561. This is a letter from the Grand Duchess Cristina to Fakhr al-DIn recommending to him an agent of the Dutch consul in Livomo who had sailed towards Fakhr al-DIn's domains to purchase grain. The Medici Grand Dukes ran a large grain trade operation and it is not unlikely that at least sorne of the merchants they recommended to the emir could have worked for the Medicis. 551 DuwayhI, Tiirikh Al-Azminah, 497. Ships also went to Tripoli and SUr to load wheat.
126
This they obtained thanks to Fakhr al-Dln's help, with the effect of raising local priees
to very high levels but also, presumably, offilling Ma'nid coffers.552
The continued prosperity of the region (though not necessarily of the population
at large), was ensured by Fakhr al-Dln's control of the territory, as weIl as by the direct
investment he made in agriculture and trade. Certainly, the numerous wars that saw him
at loggerheads with the Sayfiis brought destruction to the countryside. But in areas
firmly under his control he seems to have provided the security needed for economic
activity to thrive. Having rebuilt the irrigation system around Tripoli, he also built
towers to ensure the safety of the countryside.553 The importance of this policy is
c1earest in his efforts to pacify the coast. A Venetian consul remarked that although by
the early decades of the seventeenth century piracy had become a scourge on the
Levantine coast, merchants still continued to flock to Fakhr al-Dln's ports because of
the good protection they found there.554 This was a strong point of Fakhr al-Dln's policy
which was especially emphasized also by his biographer Khalidi. Whereas Yusuf Sayfii
had neglected protecting foreign merchants and had even occasionally seized their goods
in his ports, the Druze emir exerted himself in favour of merchants to the point of
reimbursing them for their losses.555
Fakhr al-Dln dealt with piracy in a number of ways. He used his contacts with
Tuscany to try and rein in Christian pirates. He wrote to the Medicis, for example,
asking for action against certain pirates who had attacked his coast.556 He also took
vigorous action against pirates himself. Even though devoid of a naval force, Fakhr al
DIn was able both to prevent raids on the coast under his control, and to hamper the
operations of pirates near his coast (for example by preventing pirates from putting
552 Ibid. The priee of a "shanbal" of wheat reached three piasters in Tripoli, while the same amount of corn or barley sold for two piasters. 553 Ibid., 496. 554 Berchet, Relazioni, 163. 555 Khalidï, Lubniin Fi 'Ahd Al-Amir Fakhr Al-Din, 126-127. The episode took place in 1621. The same episode involving Sayfii's seizure of goods of foreign merchants was reported by the Ottoman historian Naima and bears a striking resemblance to the account offered by Khlilidi. Abu-Husayn reports the lengthy passage from Naima: Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 65. 556 The request was actually forwarded by the Florentine consul Verrazzano. Document CXLIII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:370-371. It highlights another instance of the usefulness, for Fakhr al-Din, of formaI diplomatie relations with the court of Tuscany, which he himself had initiated (see above), besides a desire to foster commerce.
127
ashore for water or any other needs requiring them to approach land).557 Most of all, we
find that he had continued building fortifications~specially along the coast-and that
he had endowed these fortification with adequate artillery. When in 1623 a pirate vessel
approached the port of Sidon to prey on merchantmen coming to lay anchor there, the
artillery barrage from the fortress kept it at bay and the vessels eventually withdrew
when Fakhr al-Dln arrived with a sizeable contingent of sekbans.558 For a long-serving,
shrewd and strong ruler like the Druze emir the breakdown in Ottoman naval control of
the eastem Mediterranean offered a host of opportunities.559 One ofthem was to attract
foreign merchants to his well-guarded ports, where he could also sell them grain at high
priees (this was contraband trade: although exceptions were made, the Porte typically
forbade the export of wheat). Another one was to continue building fortifications that
gave him control of the coast and of the territory, providing the order and stability
needed for the continued growth of areas under his control.
Ma 'nid Military Power and the Re-emergence of the Coast ofSyria/PaJestine
Fakhr al-Dln's concem with the order and stability of the are as under his control is clear.
The Ottoman expedition against him which eventually resulted in his capture seems to
have been triggered by his refusaI in 1632 to allow Ottoman troops retuming from war
with Persia to be billeted in his territories.560 This billeting of troops caused great
disruption in the areas where it took place and was much feared by local populations.
Fakhr al-Dln's resistance might also have had sorne legitimacy. We know that for the
sanjak of Sidon-Beirut he had been making a yearly payment of well over 2,000,000
akçes (25,000 gUIU§) known as maJ-i mukabe1e, which was at least originally intended as
557 Kh!ilidi reports several episodes in which sekban troops prevented pirates from putting ashore or attacked stranded pirate vessels. Khâlidï, Lubniin Fi 'Ahd Al-Amïr Fakhr Al-Dïn, 103, 109-110, 131-132. Note that piracy often relied on the connivance of lords along the coast, both to operate and to seIl the goods seized. 558 Sorne 70 artillery shots were fired from the fortress of Sidon. Ibid., 194-195. The pirates in this incident were Moroccans. 559 The contrast with Sayfii is developed up by Abu-Husayn. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 64. It is important to bear in mind, when considering such strikingly different behaviour between the two, that that Fakhr al-Dïn served longer and without interruptions. It was aIl the more natural, therefore, that he would develop a long-term view towards the extraction of revenue from his lands. 560 Ibid., 125. The point was originaIly made by Naima.
128
a lump-sum payment in lieu of quartering and provisioning of army troopS.561 Whether
legitimate or not, however, Fakhr al-Dln's resistance was effective. He engaged the
Ottoman troops, defeated them in battle and forced them to withdraw from his territ ory.
Among sorne factions at the Porte the buildup of Ma'nid military power which enabled
such a strong resistance must have been a greater concern than the alleged
insubordination in refusing the billeting of troops. One of the key items Ottoman
authorities had insisted on, when they agreed to restore the Ma'ns to their possessions,
had been the dismantling of fortresses. Yet both the fighting in the region and rampant
piracy in the eastern Mediterranean perpetuated conditions under which fortifications
were needed and would continue to be built. After his return from Tuscany, Fakhr al-DIn
continued to acquire, restore or improve fortresses. 562 He acquired new ones, for
example by taking over (and restoring) fortresses that had been in the possession of the
Sayfiïs, such as I:Iu~n al_Akrad.563 He seems to have been able to at least partially restore
important fortresses he had previously held, such as Banyas and Shaqlf Amun.564
FinaIly, he also started fortifying locations that had previously received little attention.
The port of Acre, for example, saw considerable improvements after Fakhr al-Dln's
retum in 1618, which left its defences considerably stronger.565 At the same time, the
military forces under his command expanded. The sekhan troops in his pay increased in
number and so did the levies he could rely upon. He ultimately found himself in
possession of a series of strongholds aIl around the terri tories he controlled. These
ensured both a diffuse presence around the territory and a measure of defence against
external aggression.
561 This entry was an addition to Section VII ofthe register of 1636. Murphey, Regional Structure, 95. See especially the lengthy footnote 8 for an explanation of this tax. Murphey suggests that this payment might have been for the entire revenues of the sanjak, because ofits size. Even so, it is possible that the Ma'ns felt they should be absolved from the duty of quartering troops. 562 Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 218. 563 Ibid., 211. ~64 Documents CXIlI and CXIV (these relate to the activity of Tuscan engineers sent to Druze emir and mention plans made for the fortress of Banyiis). Carali, Fakhr Ad-D'in, 1:324-325. In 1633 the Ma'ns had large forces stationed in Banyiis once again. Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 298. This time, however, the fight with the Ottomans was decided on the battlefield. 565 Luciana Menozzi and Gabriele Sansone, "Akko Modema tra Città Civile e Città Fortezza. La Presenza Islamica e la Sintesi Della Forma Urbana," in San Giovanni D'acri, Akko. Storia e Cultura di Una Città Portuale dei Mediterraneo, ed. Luciana Menozzi (Rome: Graffiti Editore, 1996), 77-79. The authors rely chiefly on Carali's collection as a source, supplemented with maps and archaeological/topographical evidence. They suggest that Fakhr al-Dïn restored and strengthened the Burj al-Surtin in the harbour.
129
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A contemporary observer remarked that the Ottomans had to move against Fakhr
al-Dln because he controlled thirty fortresses and such a vast army of sekbans that the
566 Soueid, Histoire Militaire, 217. Note that sorne fortresses are not represented on the rnap, for example, Acre's fortress. Conversely, not ail of the fortresses were manned and equipped for sieges at ail times.
130
only thing left for him to do would have been to claim the Sultanate itself.567 Did he
really prove to be such a threat to Ottoman power? This is one noticeable case in which
Ottoman sources were prone to exaggeration in order to justify the very harsh reaction
of the Porte. By contrast, Tuscan sources ultimately agree with Venetian ones in a more
sombre assessment of the power of the Ma'nid emir. They suggest that Fakhr al-Dln
alone could never have mounted a serious threat to Ottoman control of Syria, let alone
to the structure of power within the empire at large.568 His position compared to the
period before 1614 had not been fundamentally altered. He had simply put together once
again a strong "hand" with which to engage in a bargaining game with Ottoman central
authorities. Tuscan military observers reporting to the Medicis in 1614 had noted the
ultimate limitations/weaknesses of Fakhr al-Dln's position and none of these had
changed. On land, he could only resist the Ottomans for so long. He would soon have to
yield the coast and the plain to their military superiority.569 He did not possess a navy
and could not build one without immediately attracting Ottoman attention. Hence he
was always vulnerable to a naval blockade of his ports. He would have been totally
dependent upon Christian fleets had he decided to defy the Ottomans.570 FinaIly, his
fortresses were also in need of improvement and most of aIl of advanced artillery. This
too he could not start building in his domains without attracting Ottoman attention.
Thus we find him as king the Medicis on many occasions for the despatch of heavy
artillery and of military engineers.571 Here too he would have been totally dependent
upon outside help. The only real military threat to the Ottomans thus came from the
possibility that a sizeable force with naval support and heavy artillery led by the
567 The observer was Ml$ibb1. The number of actual fortresses he controlled was probably smaller, but the high number cited (30) gives a sense of the perception contemporaries had of his power. The Ottoman historian Naima also remarked that his military power was such that he could have conquered Damascus. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 125. 568 Soueid, who has also used Carali's collection, cornes to the same conclusion. Soueid, Histoire Militaire. 130. 569 Document XXXVIII in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:204. This did in fact prove to be the case in 1633. 570 Documents XVII (in 1611 Fakhr al-Din suggested he only lacked a navy to stand up to the Ottomans and asked for 15 galleons and 20 galleys), XXVIII (report points out that Fakhr al-Din was wanting in sea forces), XXXV (1614 report noticed that harbour of Sidon could host 50 vessels in case ofwar, suggesting what kind of plans Tuscan agents had in mind), XLI (The Tuscan agent Santi pointed out that Fakhr al-Din was only really vulnerable from the sea) in Ibid., 1:163, 187,200,219. 571 Documents LI and LVII (both from 1614) and document CXXIII (a 1631 letter from Fakhr al-Din to the Grand Duke, in which he thanks the latter for 2000 artillery munitions) in Ibid., 1:243,252,336.
131
Habsburgs (not the Medicis, who simply lacked the necessary resources), would seize
fortified ports along the coast ofSyriaIPalestine with Ma'nid connivance.572
Would Fakhr al-Dln have really wanted to let a Christian army seize the coast?
Or was he simply pushed by circumstances in a dangerous game in which his choices
were more and more restricted and his chances of success ever more slim? It seems that
in the hard bargaining game that he had began with the Ottoman state Fakhr al-Dln
eventually found himself adopting a policy of brinksmanship. Barly in 1614, just after
his arrivaI in Tuscany and at the height ofhis conflict with Na~u4 Pasha, joint military
plans were actually discussed with the Medicis. Fakhr al-Dln seems to have suggested
that Medicean/Habsburg forces take over several of the ports and fortifications formerly
under his control, while helping him regain power in the hinterland of the coast.573 The
proposaI was put on the table that Fakhr al-Dln would help in a campaign to conquer
Palestine and capture Jerusalem.574 The lure of the Holy Land and most importantly the
propaganda value of such a coup to counter-Reformation monarchies is obvious. But this
plan might have also been discussed, at least in part, in order to compensate Christian
powers with lands away from the main Druze strongholds. The fear cannot have been far
from Fakhr al-Dln's mind that otherwise he would have had to give up substantial
portions ofhis territories to get the help he needed.575 The possibility that he might have
become a puppet in Habsburg hands-with or without such an extensive 10ss of
territory-must have always loomed large over aIl military plans. Fakhr al-Dln was
undoubtedly better off in the Ottoman fold, so long as there was a sympathetic faction in
power at the Porte. What contacts he entertained with Christian powers served his
purposes in acquiring weapons for his campaigns against other local rulers and, on
572 The military plans outlined by Tuscan agents in 1614 and in the 1620s point precisely to this. Documents XLII (plan of ~ür made by 1614 Tuscan expedition), LXXXVIII (a despatch by Santi evaluating the possibility of taking Sür and then digging in a small force), XCIX (1629 letter by the bishop of Cyprus mentions fortresses in the emir's domains which could offer protection to a Christian landing force) in Ibid., 1:224, 293, 308. 573 Documents XXV, L in Ibid., 1: 179,241. 574 Document XXV in Ibid., 1:179. 575 An indication of the exaggerated promises that were being made in order to stir up interest in an expedition to the Levant is provided by a 1628 letter from Santi to cardinal Barberini in Rome. Santi told the cardinal that Fakhr al-Din was ready to be baptized (?!) and that he would hand over to Christian forces "provinces, cities and ports" in his now vast domains which stretched as far north as Antioch. Document XCIV in Ibid., 1:302.
132
occasion, in threatening antagonistic Ottoman authorities. But the actual prospect of an
invasion was as bleak for him as it was for the Porte.
Fakhr al-Din, it must he emphasized, remained resolutely non-committal through
all his discussions of military plans with Christian powers. We have seen how he failed
to rise against the Ottomans in 1607, when the Order of Saint Stephen had attacked
Famagosta. In 1614 relations with the Medicis became dangerously strained for a similar
lack of commitment. Tuscan military planners, after their own fact-finding mission
around Mount Lebanon, wanted to send Fakhr al-Din aboard their ships to the area. This
he refused to do under a variety ofpretences.576 We can only speculate as to his reasons,
but being seen aboard a Medicean ship would have undeniably marked him once and for
all as an ally of theirs.577 When galleons were especially provisioned and fitted out for
him, with the great expense of 30,000 ducats, he refused at the last minute to take to the
sea.578 A report of a very harsh questioning of the emir by Tuscan agents, following this
episode, indicates rising Medici suspicions as to the real motives behind his coming to
Tuscany.579
The Habsburgs proved more persistent than the Medicis, for long after the latter
had given up on Fakhr al-Din, they kept him at their court in the attempt (real or
feigned) to organize sorne military action against the Ottomans.580 Nevertheless, during
his long stay at the court of the Habsburg viceroy of the kingdom of Naples, Fakhr al
Din likewise managed not to commit to any military plans. Similarly, it seems that when
French agents sought to make a closer alliance with him between the early 1620s and
576 Document XLV (April 1614) in Ibid., 1:231-234. 577 It is quite likely that Fakhr al-DIn also had in mind Yap.ya Sultan's poor showing when the latter went to the Levant onboard Tuscan ships. 578 Document XLV in Carali, Fakhr Ad-Din, 1:232. Document XIN (sic) i.e. XIV/l4 in Roncaglia, "Faor Ad-Din," 556-558. This last document is a report of a questioning of the emir. The Medicis were growing impatient at the emir's promises to board their ships and his excuses when galleons were actually armed and ready to leave port. This report mentions the expense incurred by the Medicis of 30,000 ducats and states their willingness to spend twice as much again, but only if the emir "gave his firm will, so to avoid doing as they had done so far, with arming, dis-arming and re-arming (the galleons)."
579 Document XII in Roncaglia, "Faor Ad-Din," 54-556. Carali did not include this document in his collection. This is telling, perhaps, because it so runs counter to the image of good relations between the Medicis and the Druze emir that he proposed, although Carali admitted that in 1614 relations became strained. 580 The Habsburgs might weIl have kept Fakhr al-DIn in Messina as a potential threat against the Ottomans. The possibility of organizing an expedition alone, that is, might have been useful to the Habsburgs at this stage.
133
early l630s, wooing him away from renewing close diplomatie ties with the Medicis,
Fakhr al-Dln declined to play into French hands.58\ Why, it has been asked, would the
Druze emir have kept an alliance with such a feeble partner as granducal Tuscany?582
Seventeenth-century France was an infinitely more powerful state. The answer is most
probably that such an alliance suited his needs better than any other. It helped him to
obtain weapons, it gave him a refuge from Ottoman wrath should a11 el se fail and,
fina11y, it gave him an opportunity to raise the spectre of a foreign invasion without
actua11y having to bring it about.
58\ Document XXIV (a 1631 letter by a French agent preserved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris)
Roncaglia, "Fabr Ad-Din," 564-565. 582 Ibid.: 529.
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CONCLUSION
The episode of Fakhr al-Dln's temporary exile in Tuscany and in the Kingdom of Naples
offers a unique insight in a complex web of relations involving trade, diplomacy and
state formation in the early modem Mediterranean. When we unravel this web we find
the Medicis engaging in risky diplomatie games to further their flagging trade in the
Levant by courting local rulers. The Druze emir, for his part, engaged in a no less risky
bargaining game with the expanding Ottoman state which eventually cost him his life
in 1635, two years after his defeat and capture by an Ottoman army, Fakhr al-Dln was
executed in Istanbul. For a period of sorne three decades, the threads of these two stories
were intertwined. By using Tuscan and Venetian documents to delve in greater detail
into Florentine-Ottoman affairs than Inalcik did and by integrating these documents
with the Arabie and Ottoman sources already used by Abu-Husayn, 1 have endeavoured
to make two related points. In the first place, as concems the circumstances of Fakhr al
Dln's flight to Tuscany in 1613, 1 have sought to put into perspective the weight of
Tuscan involvement in this affair and at the same time to give more importance to Fakhr
al-Dln's own actions and skills. The second and most important point of this thesis
concems the place of dealings between the Medicis and the Druze emir within the
context of long-term economic and political developments in the Mediterranean. It is
only by considering these broader developments that we can make sense of the
possibilities and ultimate limitations ofMedicean and Ma'nid policies alike.
The perspective offered by Venetian documents has been especially useful for the
first point, namely the reassessment of Tuscan involvement in the entire affair. The
Venetians were, after aIl, old hands at the game of Levantine trade and diplomacy. The
report read by the Venetian bailo Giorgio Giustinian to the Senate after his retum from
Istanbul in 1627 provides a suit able summary of the Venetian viewpoint, with its
concems and attitudes:
The Turks suffer much harassment and damage at the hands of the armed vessels of Florence and of Malta and therefore have continued harbouring extremely ill feelings towards both; and nevertheless they have not failed to lend an ear to (a proposaI) of trade with the Grand Duke made by the sanjakbey of 'Secazar', a
135
proposaI very difficult for them to stomach and which, (being) extremely dangerous for own trade, 1 have continuously undermined with due dexterity ... 583
Giustinian's report also contains an incisive epitaph for Tuscan involvement in
the area which suggests that by the late 1620s the Medicis had finally tired of plotting
against the Porte:
The Grand Duke Ferdinand l, grandfather of the current one, used to 'infest' Turkish seas with pirate galleys and also with armed roundships which he kept with great expense; and he was in contact with the emir of Sidon and with other rebels of those coasts, with plans to wage surprise attacks on the reign of Cyprus and on other places. These (plans) have tumed out to be as futile as they were expensive and they have therefore been abandoned by the current Grand Duke, who has left the roundships at their docks. Certainly, these schemes and provocations have served no other end than inciting the Turks to pay attention once more to the affairs of the sea and to their arsenals, which would otherwise be in a greater state of disrepair than they are. And may God wish these provocations were not such as to lead to a resurgence of their past grandeur, which the current kapudan basha seems resolved to achieve.584
This last observation indeed proved prophetical, since the Ottomans did revive their
naval strength sufficiently to attack Crete a few years later and defeat Venice.585 The
acumen of Venetian diplomats like Giustinian thus adds to the picture which emerges
from Tuscan documents themselves, indicating the fundamental limitations of Tuscan
involvement in the Levant from the late sixteenth cent ury onwards. Tuscan
machinations in the Balkans and the Levant at the tum of the century, including the
Fakhr al-Dln affair, were the swan song of astate which had already lost aIl influence in
the region and much of its political independence at home too. The uncontested rise of
French, English and Dutch trade in the eastem Mediterranean already in Fakhr al-Dln's
days showed just how precarious this brief moment of glory had been.
583 Pedani Fabris, Relazioni Inedite, 623. Note also the reference to other sarijakbeys with whom the Medicis were trying to establish relations. 584 Ibid., 624. 585 For an assessment of the large expense and relative limitations of this renewal of Ottoman-Venetian rivalry in the Mediterranean, see: Rhoads Murphey, "The Ottoman Resurgence in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean: The GambIe and Its Results," Mediterranean Historical Review 8, no. 2 (1993). Molly Greene, "Ruling an Island without a Navy. A Comparative View ofVenetian and Ottoman Crete," Oriente Moderno 20, no. 1 (2001).
136
This reassessment of the significance of Medicean interference in Levantine
affairs suggests a more active and autonomous participation in these events on the part
of Fakhr al-Dln. While 1 would not suggest that the Druze emir was the founder or even
precursor on a modem nation-state, he certainly cornes across as an independent player
in the complex dealings between the Syrian provinces, the Porte and the court of
Tuscany. Fakhr al-Dln's career as a local ruler in Ottoman Syria is an exceptional
parable of political savvy, economic shrewdness and military brilliance. Thanks to these
qualities, the Druze emir defeated, or kept in check, numerous other local rulers,
inc1uding his long-standing adversary Yusuf Say ta. He also engaged in a long bargaining
game with the Ottoman state that won him a significant measure of autonomy within
the increasingly centralized Ottoman provincial administration of Syria for a
considerable time. His dealings with the Tuscan court show him to be a strong local
ruler in his negotiations with foreign states, not merely an exile seeking protection from
the Medicis or the Habsburgs, and certainly not as a puppet in their hands.
The second point lies at the heart of the argument of this thesis. The context of
long-term economic and political developments is essential to make sense of the
Medicean/Ma'nid alliance and to understand its limitations. The reckless, even foolish,
Medicean policy towards the Levant that Venetian diplomats remarked upon makes
more sense in the light of these long-standing trends. Far from being the product of an
old and natural enmity between Florence/Tuscany and the Porte, these antagonistic
dealings belong to a peculiar phase in the history of the two. By the late sixteenth
century, changes in the state system and the patterns of trade that it sustained around
the Mediterranean had driven a wedge between Florence and the Porte. Political and
economic developments reinforced each other. The Medici Grand Dukes, ever more
c10sely in control of the city, had been drawn more firmly towards the papacy and the
Habsburgs than previous Florentine governments had been. Whether they gravitated
more towards the Holy Father in Rome or rather towards the "most Catholic" Spanish
crown, their policy was likely to exhibit a strong anti-Ottoman bias. Moreover, the
geography of Florentine (and more generally Tuscan) trade was being altered by a
variety of other factors. But as trade began to re-orient itself away from Mediterranean,
and particularly eastern Mediterranean, markets to focus more towards western and
137
central-eastern Europe, the very commercial interests that would have dictated caution
and compromise in dealing with the Porte, as they had done in the previous cent ury,
were being eroded. Ferdinand 1 and then Cosimo II were thus free to engage in reckless
policies which responded mostly to their political and dynastic needs, only really
attempting to revive their trade in the eastern Mediterranean in opposition to the Porte,
rather than in cooperation with it.
Fakhr al-Dln's rise to unprecedented heights of power for a local ruler in the
Syrian provinces under the Ottomans also makes more sense in the context of long-term
economic and political developments affecting the area. While not at aIl detracting from
the exceptional abilities of this emir, such a tremendous concentration of power in the
hands of an individu al who started off as a mere tax farmer in the Shlifwas only possible
thanks to these underlying trends. Fakhr al-Dln was able to pro long and exploit the
flourishing of the economy of the areas that he controlled for a considerable amount of
time. His ability to extract revenue from his sanja1s allowed him to play a part in
Ottoman poli tics and curry favour in sorne very high quart ers within the Ottoman
establishment. At the same time, he built an increasingly strong military ofhis own and
began to consolidate his hold over the territories under his control by building, acquiring
or restoring fortresses. These allowed him both to keep banditry and internaI opponents
in check and to fight off other local rulers. But they also allowed him to play a much
harder bargaining game with the Porte, prolonging under a different guise that tussle
over revenues and control of local politics which dated from the earliest years of the
Ottoman conquest of Syria. The stakes in this bargaining game eventually became so
high that it is hard to see how they could not have led to Fakhr al-Dln's demise. The
most remarkable fact in his career is that he was so successful for so long.
There were ultimate limits to what small political entities like Granducal
Tuscany and the Ma'nid emirate could achieve, even though circumstances between the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries seem to have favoured them. In this
respect, the history of Florentine/Ottoman and MediceanIMa'nid relations can shed light
on important dynamics affecting the system of states involved in trade around the
Mediterranean before the seventeenth century. Florence and then granducal Tuscany, as
weIl as the Ma'nid emirate, were actively involved in fostering economic development
138
and were relatively successful at it, even during a time of economic difficulties and
increasing competition, such as the late sixteenth and early seventeenth cent ury. But
ultimately the success of these small political entities depended upon circumstances
partly controlled by large states such as the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. During the
fifteenth cent ury, Florentine trade in the eastern Mediterranean had flourished thanks to
Ottoman protection. The coast of SyriaIPalestine had thrived thanks to Mamluk and
then Ottoman interest in keeping open the flow oftrade. (Ottoman-Persian wars affected
Florentine trade by diminishing the availability of raw silk, but at the same time
stimulated raw silk production in the Syrian provinces.) This was an era preceding the
development of territorial states which combined, in different measures, capital, large
internaI markets and also sizeable armies and navies, without the vast military
commitments of empires so likely to drain their coffers. At this time, city-states and
smaller political entities more in general were able to thrive in symbiosis with the large
empires who were their neighbours. But their political independence and their economic
prosperity were particularly dependent upon the politics they pursued vis-à-vis these
powers. As the latter grew to unprecedented proportions and began at the same time to
exp and their administrative apparat uses, smaller political entities found their room for
manoeuvre ever more constrained. The tasks faced by the Medicis and the Ma'ns in
fostering their trade and maintaining a measure of independence from their political
patrons was increasingly difficult. Even before empires like the Habsburg and the
Ottoman faded from the historical scene, it was these small political entities who were
the first casualty of the changes that would usher in the modem world economy, despite
the brief moment ofbrilliance that they enjoyed after Lepanto for a few decades.
139
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