Post on 15-Dec-2015
Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Fragmentation: Trajectories of Militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan
Paul Staniland
Department of Political Science, MIT
MacMillan Center, Yale University
United States Institute of Peace
pstan@mit.edu
Greater Kashmir
“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
Greater Kashmir
“The public is the most powerful weapon and it is on our side” - JKLF senior leader Javed Mir, 1993
“the JKLF had an idea, but not a base” (interview, Kashmir, summer 2009)“by 1995, the JKLF as an armed group was no longer a force to seriously reckon with, although its agenda for a free, independent Kashmir still fired the hearts of many, if not most, Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)
“the most militarily well organized of all the jehadi organizations in Pakistan and Kashmir” (Rana 2004)
“not supported by a majority of Kashmiri Muslims” (Behera 2000)
The Rise of Hizbul Mujahideen
Who Cares? Effects of Insurgent Organization Victory and defeat in civil war
Rape and mass killing
Effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategy
Success and failure in peace negotiations
Questions How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?
Questions How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?
How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states?
Questions How do we conceptualize and measure
cohesion?
How do insurgent groups build themselves in the midst of rebellion against capable states?
What explains consequent variation in insurgent cohesion across time and space?
Findings Social networks matter more than popular support
or ideological appeal Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds
Findings Social networks matter more than popular support
or ideological appeal Robust, pre-existing social structures underpin
cohesion, not mass popularity, “the people,” or hearts and minds
When fighting capable states, external aid bolsters insurgent cohesion Resource-richness need not lead to loot-seeking and
indiscipline
Research Design Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
capable, politically-resolved states
Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: Kashmir, 1988-2008 Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 Sri Lanka, 1972-2009
Research Design Scope - ethnic insurgent civil wars in militarily
capable, politically-resolved states
Cases - 19 significant insurgent organizations in: Kashmir, 1988-2008 Northern Ireland, 1962-2005 Sri Lanka, 1972-2009
Sub-national comparisons Variation within the same war and society
Cross-national comparisons
Research Methods 13 months of fieldwork in N. Ireland, India,
Indian-administered Kashmir, and Sri Lanka
Interviews 130+ current and former militants, politicians,
government officials, journalists, academics, analysts, aid workers
Written sources Internal documents and diaries Memoirs and oral histories Propaganda Journalism History and anthropology
Defining and Measuring Cohesion Cohesion: fighters and factions obey orders and
rarely launch splits or violent internal challenges
Focus on: Internal Unrest: splits, feuds, coups, defiance Internal Compliance: fighters and leaders respect orders,
peaceful leadership successions
Measurement: examine each group over time along a variety of indicators Frequency, Intensity, Issues, Autonomy
Existing Theories
Popular Support
Political Economy
State Policy
Explaining Insurgent Cohesion Two key variables:
1. Group’s social base
2. Access to external state and diaspora support
Explaining Insurgent Cohesion Two key variables:
1. Group’s social base
2. Access to external state and diaspora support
Distinct types of insurgent organization emerge: Cohesive State-Reliant Consensus-Contingent Factionalized
Social Bases Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks
Social Bases Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks
These are insurgent social bases
Social Bases Pervasive “social appropriation” (McAdam et
al. 2001) of pre-existing networks
These are insurgent social bases
Variation in social bases: Embeddedness of insurgent leaders within local
communities Pre-existing social links between different leaders
Types of Insurgent Social Base Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social
relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local
social ties
Types of Insurgent Social Base Bonding Network: robust pre-existing social
relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and among leaders Historically-rooted overlap of local and extra-local
social ties
Coalition Network: weak pre-existing social relationships between local communities and insurgent leaders, and/or among leaders
Social Bases and Organizations Bonding Network Social Integration
Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below Elite Cooperation Local Incorporation
Social Bases and Organizations Bonding Network Social Integration
Pre-existing structures of collective action hold together organization at the top and from below Elite Cooperation Local Incorporation
Coalition Network Social Division “Median voter” or mass appeal insufficient if lacking
embedded links to community and between leaders Elite Distrust Weak Local Incorporation
Effects of External Support In capable-state context, external aid crucial
Effects of External Support
Aid leads to military strength High organizational
capacity Resource
centralization Fighters and factions
join and remain
In capable-state context, external aid crucial
Effects of External Support
Aid leads to military strength High organizational
capacity Resource
centralization Fighters and factions
join and remain
Lack of aid leads to military weakness Low organizational
capacity Resource diffusion
Fighters and factions defect and dissent
In capable-state context, external aid crucial
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
High External Aid Cohesive (Durable)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
Low External Aid
High External Aid Cohesive (Durable)
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
Low External Aid
High External Aid
High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
State-Reliant (Intermediate)
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
Bonding Network
Coalition Network
Low External Aid
High External Aid
Low External Aid
High External Aid
Cohesive (Durable)
State-Reliant (Intermediate)
Consensus-Contingent (Intermediate)
Factionalized (Fragile)
Insurgency in Kashmir Territory divided between India
and Pakistan Central to India-Pakistan wars and
confrontations
Insurgency, 1988-Present ~70,000 dead
Militancy has spilled out into broader subcontinent
Major Areas of Insurgency
Insurgents Fighting India in Kashmir Comparative Cases:
6 indigenous Kashmiri organizations
3 Pakistani organizations
Research 2 trips to Kashmir Valley (May
‘08 and July ‘09) Multiple trips to New Delhi Interviews with all sides of
conflict Primary and secondary written
sources in English and Urdu
Two Empirical Puzzles
Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive Not a popularity contest
Two Empirical Puzzles
Highly popular JKLF was the most fragmented, while far less politically popular Hizb the most cohesive Not a popularity contest
Pro-Pakistan groups varied in cohesion despite common sponsorship Not driven solely by Pakistani machinations
My Argument: Varying Social Bases Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91
My Argument: Varying Social Bases Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91
Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different
popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation
My Argument: Varying Social Bases Groups structurally able to mobilize different types
of social networks/institutions in ‘88-’91
Groups built around coalition networks were unable to channel and control Pakistani aid effectively JKLF, Ikhwan, MJF [Harkat, Jaish] - despite different
popularity and ideologies - took broadly similar trajectories Loss of aid contributed to further fragmentation
Groups built around bonding networks channeled command and material through robust, pre-existing social relationships Hizbul Mujahideen [Lashkar]
Cohesive
Hizbul Mujahideen (90-)*
Lashkar-e-Taiba (1987-)
State-reliant
JKLF (‘88-91)*
Ikhwan (‘91-’95)
MJF (‘89-’96)
Al-Umar (‘89-’94)
Harkat (‘80-’99)
Jaish (‘99-’01)
Consensus-Contingent
Hizbul Mujahideen (‘89)*
Factionalized
JKLF (‘91-’96)*
Ikhwan (‘95-98)
Jaish (‘02-)
Harkat (‘99-)
JKLF: Social Base Structure: no routinized access to sources of
collective action in Kashmir Valley Not linked to parties or religious authorities
Result: rapid, heterogeneous expansion Individuals and factions merge in and out of the
JKLF at will No pre-existing social control mechanisms
JKLF Fragmentation Pakistani support: 1988-1990
State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid
JKLF Fragmentation Pakistani support: 1988-1990
State-reliant group that attracts recruits and (some) compliance due to Pakistani aid
Loss of external support: 1991-1996 JKLF factionalized and internally-divided over
numerous issues Splits (up to 20), feuds, fratricide
High popular support insufficient to hold group together
“The JKLF had an idea, but not a base”Interview, Srinagar, July 2009
Hizbul Mujahideen: Social Base Non-violent Jamaat-e-Islami cadre party
Overlap (since 1940s) of: Traditional JI families Local party branches and schools Ijtimas, annual congregations, intermarriage across
villages and over time
Limited popular support “incapable of reaching out to vast numbers of
ordinary Kashmiris” (Sikand 2002)
Forging Hizb Cohesion Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
Forging Hizb Cohesion Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991
Forging Hizb Cohesion Jamaat network mobilizes for war in 1989
High command and Shura Council dominated by Jamaatis Key leaders almost all JI or JI-linked by 1991
Local Jamaatis spread throughout Kashmir as fighters, recruiters, talent spotters Expands without fracturing
Implications and Extensions Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions
Implications and Extensions Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions
No simple relationship between material variables and organizational outcomes Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)
Implications and Extensions Insurgency not about the median voter: focus
instead on social networks and institutions
No simple relationship between material variables and organizational outcomes Beyond “greed” (and “narco-insurgency”)
Next Steps: Expanding empirics Studying change/evolution
Q & A
The State: Strategic Manipulator? Reasons for skepticism:
1. Bad intelligence 2. Disconnect between military and political aims 3. State internally disorganized
State more reactive than proactive
The State: Examples State does not drive fragmentation:
Tamil Jaffna 1980s Kashmir rural areas, early/mid-1990s PIRA and INLA splits from OIRA, late 60s/early
70s
State fails to fragment groups despite efforts: PIRA in mid-1970s Hizb until 2000 LTTE, 1972-2009 (Karuna split not exception)
External Support: Logics
Exogenous: external actors support groups for reasons largely unrelated to their prior cohesion
Endogenous: external actors support groups for reasons closely related to their prior cohesion
Find empirical support for exogenous logic: sponsors support groups with same war aims - even if fragmented or internally divided Early years marked by massive uncertainty - sponsors
hedge by supporting groups with similar goals
External Support: Examples “the role the Provisionals saw for themselves, defending
nationalists in the North and defending the British Army, was far more in keeping with what people, especially Irish America, understood.” Swan 2008, p. 223.
“like the Pakistan government, organizations such as the Jamaat [of Pakistan] are highly selective in which militants they support: basically those that share their Islamic ideology and have the same aspirations for Kashmir.” Malik 2002, p. 298.
Fine-Grained Measurement and PredictionsFrequency Intensity Autonomy Issues
Cohesive [I] Rare Low Low Political-Military
State-Reliant [II]
Intermediate Low Low Distribution
Consensus-Contingent [III]
Intermediate High High Political-Military
Factionalized [IV]
Common High High Many
Extending the Empirics: Capable state & ethnic minority rebellion Turkey (Kurdish areas) Iraq
(Kurdish/Shiite/Sunni) Russia (Chechnya) China (Tibet) Pakistan (NWFP/Sindh) India (Northeast/
Punjab)
Indonesia (Aceh/Dar-ul Islam/East Timor)
Anti-Soviet/German partisans
Algeria (1992-) Thailand Palestinian territories Burma
Other Resources? Do drugs, minerals, and other illicit flows have a
similar effect as state/diaspora aid? Research agenda:
In India, Pakistan, and SE Asia, will examine groups with access to mineral and drug resources
Two possibilities: Different nature of resource flows (not top-down) may
diffuse power and authority and lead to fragmentation, or Some groups may be able to harness these resources in a
similar manner to external aid Initial sense: heavily dependent on state power -
when strong, constrains group behavior
Types of Social BaseStrong Local Embeddedness
Weak Local Embeddedness
Strong Leadership
Ties
Bonding Network Foco-ist Network
(Coalition)
Weak Leadership
Ties
Parochial Network
(Coalition)
Anomic Network
(Coalition)
Where Do Social Bases Come From? Deeply historically-rooted
Products of complex, contingent processes of social mobilization and state response in previous decades or centuries
“Sticky” over time - facts on the ground by the time of a conflict, reproduced by family and social relationships and identities
Not endogenous to onset of conflict in question Can be traced back decades or more prior to war Often originally non-militant or even apolitical
Why These Scope Conditions? Civil wars vary dramatically
Insurgent vs. Conventional Secessionist vs. Center-seeking Ethnic vs. Ideological Strong state vs. Weak state Democracy vs. Authoritarian
I focus on one common context that poses a shared set of challenges to cohesion
Tight scope, but lays basis for cumulative research within and across types of wars
What is Cohesion? In this conceptualization, looks at both the
structural integrity of the group and the commitment of individual members
Not the same as success - can contribute, but is not a sufficient condition for victory
Focused on insurgent organizations - not the same as “ethnic group” or “opposition movement” cohesion
Overall Distribution of CasesCohesivePIRA (72-05)
LTTE (83-09)
Hizb (90-)
LeT (87-)
State-reliantIkhwan JKLF (‘88-90)
MJF Al Jehad
Al-Umar
EPRLF (87-90)
TELO
Jaish (99-01)
Harkat (80-99)
Consensus-ContingentEPRLF (81-87)
PIRA (1969-72)
Official IRA (1962-76)
LTTE (1972-83)
Hizb (‘89)
FactionalizedINLA JKLF (‘91-96)
PLOT Jaish (01-)
EROS
Ikhwan (95-)
IPLO
RIRA
Harkat (99-)
Social Ties Over Ideology “we couldn’t disagree with a word the man [an OIRA
representative] said, all his arguments were totally right, totally justified. The Provisionals leadership was reactionary and Catholic, they went against what we believed in. But we just said: ‘Yeah, but what’s my da and ma going to say if I go home and tell them I’m going with the Reds?’ There was a real thing about the communist threat about that time. And family tradition counted for a lot.” Devenport and Sharrock 1997, p. 69.
“the success of the Officials in hanging on to the Lower Falls is more a tribute to his [Sullivan’s] personality than to the popularity of his political message.” Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 146.
Guns and Money Over Ideology Northern Ireland
Joe Cahill: “they wanted to know if we had guns for them. That was their main concern. . . they would not give up their allegiance to the Official IRA until they were certain they would get weapons.” Anderson 2002, p. 188.
PIRA recruit: “I never thought of joining the Stickies [the Official IRA]. I felt that Provies wanted to get the gear and that was good enough for me.” Bishop and Mallie 1987, p. 153.
Kashmir “I agreed to send some of our boys to Pakistan for training [in
JKLF camps] in handling sophisticated weapons as it would have helped us in our plans.” Noorani in Thomas 1992, p. 263.
Ghulam Rasool Shah:”We took training from them [JKLF], but made it clear that we stand for merging Kashmir with Pakistan.” “Profile in Passion,” Newsline, Feb 2001, p. 34.
The Importance of External Aid “state support has had a profound impact on the
effectiveness of many rebel movements. . . . out of the 74 post-Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state support, we believe, played a major in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting 44 of them.” Byman et al 2001, p. xiv.
“Without the constant supply of weapons, the IRA would be lost and the whole republican structure would quickly break down.” Holland, p. 62.
“no militant group can operate for long [in Kashmir] without outside funding, training and arms.” Malik 2002, p. 298.
Lyall and Wilson III 2009, Johnston 2009, Salehyan 2009
Does External Aid Lead to Thuggery? “the IRA’s resources, however dubiously or criminally
attained, are overwhelmingly channeled back into mission-related activities. . . . group-oriented, nonpecuniary, and nonegoistic motivations have been key to both recruitment and retention.” O’Leary 2007, p. 207
“Our evidence of the rank-and-file terrorists does not support the view that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable.” Moloney 2002, p. 174 quoting British Army in 1978
Hizb “became a sophisticated political movement, not just a bunch of gun-toting thugs” Joshi 1999, p. 86
Sri Lanka 5 major Tamil militant groups, 1972-2009:
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS)
Extreme variation on DV Argument:
LTTE: Cohesive (caste/regional networks + Indian, then diaspora support)
TELO: State-reliant on India EPRLF: intermediate case (elements of both consensus-
contingent and state-reliant at different points) PLOT and EROS: Factionalized
Jamaat-e-Islami
“the JI shows a uniform pattern: a committed, hard core following that amounts to only a small fraction of the population. Thus, as a political party the JI has consistently fared poorly in electoral contests in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kashmir, incapable of mustering more than a few percentage points of the popular vote. Nonetheless, all these JI branches have a long-standing reputation for committed cadres and organizational acumen”
- Bose 2007
Trajectories of MilitancyBonding Network Coalition Network
Significant External Support
Cohesive [I]Disciplined and controlled in both war and peace - “organizational weapon”
(Provisional IRA, LTTE, Lashkar-e-Taiba)
State-reliant [II]Insurgent proxy armies propped up from afar; rely on sponsor materiel for internal control
(TELO, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Ikhwan)
Minimal External Support
Consensus-contingent [III]Rely on norms and trust, but weak internal coercion and fighting power
(Official IRA, EPRLF)
Factionalized [IV]Deeply divided and fractious - split over numerous issues
(INLA, PLOTE, IPLO)