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Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
1. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO
227 SCRA 703G.R. No. 105371November 11, 1993
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
Subject: Title of a Bill, Bicameral Conference
Committee, Enrolled Bill Doctrine, Equal Protection,
Philipipne Postal Corporation
Facts:
RA 7354 was passed which contained a section
withdrawing the franking privileges of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. Thus, the constitutionality of this
provision was questioned by the petitioners, all
members of the lower courts, based on three grounds,
namely:
1.The title of the law embraces more than one subject,
without indicating its purpose;
2.The law was passed without undergoing the required
number of readings in both houses of Congress and
copies of the bill were not distributed to its members;
and
3.It encroaches upon judicial functions and
discriminates against the judiciary.
Held:
Title of a Bill
1. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.
2. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service
system. By virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the
title of the said law.
Bicameral Conference Committee
3. While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction
to settling differences between amendments made by
the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
4. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress.
5. The Court should decline to look into the charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of
the bill that eventually became the law and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of
the Constitution.
6. The Court is bound by the assurances provided by
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Equal Protection of the Laws
7. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a
more, specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
8. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
9. The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction.
10. However, the unequal application of the law should
be based on substantial distinctions which make fore
real differences, which is not present between the
Judiciary and the other agencies of government which
were also denied franking privileges. In lumping the
Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed
the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
belong.
Philippine Postal Corporation
11. The Philippine Postal Corporation, as a
government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the
public service.
12. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing
certain functions for the benefit of the public in
exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under
its charter.
2. Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) vs Drilon (1988)
G.R. No. L-81958 | 1988-06-30
Subject: Police Power is inherent and plenary which
enables the State to promote the general welfare; Valid
delegation of Police Power; The right to travel is subject
to the requirements of public safety as may be
provided by law; Protection to labor does not signify
the promotion of employment alone; The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to
Government legitimate purpose
Facts:
PASEI, a firm engaged in the recruitment of Filipino
workers for overseas placement challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 of the
DOLE. The Order covers “Guidelines governing the
temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.”
The PASEI argued that the Order discriminates since
that it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills and
that it is violative of the right to travel. It also asserted
that the Order is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power since police power being legislative and not
executive in character. It also invoked constitutional
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provision on worker’s participation in the policy and
decision- making processes since the Order was
passed in the absence of prior consultations. Lastly, it
contended that the Order will be in violation of non-
impairment clause.
The Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary of
Labor invoked the police power of the State in the
issuance of the Department Order.
Held:
Police Power is inherent and plenary which
enables the State to promote
the general welfare
1. Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police
power measure. The concept of police power has been
defined as the state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Its scope is ever-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done.
2. Police power is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. It may be said to be
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society. It may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance
the public good.
Valid delegation of Police Power
3. It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority
may not be lawfully delegated. In this case, the Labor
Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof.
Equality before the law does not mean a perfect
identity of rights among men and women but it
admits of classifications
4. The Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does
not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits ofclassifications, provided that
(i) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(ii) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(iii) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(iv) they apply equally to all members of the same
class. The classification made-the preference for
female workers rests on substantial distinctions.
5. All the requirements for valid classification are
present in this case. First, insofar as classifications are
concerned, distinction and discrimination are justified
and indeed call for a deployment ban. As a matter of
judicial notice, women domestic workers are being ill-
treated, tortured or raped abroad in massive instances
as confirmed by testimonies of returning workers
abroad. The same, however, cannot be said of our
male workers because there is no evidence that,
except for isolated instances, our men abroad have
been afflicted with an identical predicament.
6. Second, the classification in this case is germane to
the purpose behind the measure. It is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers
because of the mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad. A deployment ban will be for their
own good and welfare.
7. Third, the Order does not narrowly apply to existing
conditions but intended to apply indefinitely so long as
those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order
itself that should the authorities arrive at legal
measure of protection impressed with a greater degree
of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. A stop-gap
measure includes bilateral agreements with the
Philippines and mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
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Filipino workers.
8. Finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to
all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not
apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
unconstitutionality because what the Constitution
prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group
of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons.
The right to travel is subject to the requirements
of public safety as may be provided by law
9. Department Order No. 1 does not prescribe a total
ban on overseas deployment. From scattered
provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total
ban has not been contemplated. The consequence the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not
impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among
other things, to the requirements of public safety as
may be provided by law.
10. The Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to
the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
Protection to labor does not signify the
promotion of employment alone
11. The Constitutional guaranty of worker participation
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits must be submitted to the demands
and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution
more paramountly is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane. The Government
is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates
have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence of the lack or inadequacy of
such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely
ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution
must yield to Government legitimate purpose
12. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution
must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like
all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions.
13. This Court understands the grave implications the
questioned Order has on the business of recruitment.
The concern of the Government, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the
ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as
a result of Government regulation. The interest of the
State is to provide a decent living to their citizen which
is the intent of the Department Order.
3. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included
in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-
out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found
the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review
board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents
including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
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before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only
as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.
8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-
post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members
of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the
party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary
when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all
cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,
generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
However, upon examination of the amended information, there
was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed
the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that
the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
4. INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) v. QUISUMBING
FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent
International School. The school hires both local and
foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more
benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is
because of dislocation factor and limited tenure.
Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is
discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial
discrimination.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay
for equal work, persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility
under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords the same rank and position, the
presumption is that they perform equal work. Here,
both groups have similar functions which they perform
under similar conditions. There is no evidence that
foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local
hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly
accorded by the benefits they received.
INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13;
G.R. NO. 128845; 1JUN 2000]
Facts:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad,
the local-hires of privaterespondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paidmore
than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the
point. The point isthat employees should be given equal pay
for work of equal value.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for
short), pursuant to PresidentialDecree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreigndiplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To
enable the School to continue carryingout its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of
the samedecree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selectedby it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exemptfrom otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws thathave
been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty,classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded
local-hires. These includehousing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-
hiresare also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local-hires. The School justifiesthe difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure,namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure.
Issue:Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to
foreign hires and not to local hiresdiscriminative of their
constitutional right to the equal protection clause.
Held:
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honoredlegal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equalqualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paidsimilar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
"international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence
that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The
Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is thatthese employeesperform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and humanexperience. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee toexplain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult toinjury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explainwhy the employee is treated unfairly.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-
hires,salaries should not be usedas an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services asforeign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the"dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for thedistinction in salary rates.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare,""to afford labor full
protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to
regulate therelations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are soimpressed with
public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included,must yield to the common good. Should
such contracts contain stipulations that are contraryto public
policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify thedistinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
Thereis no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is
hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and
employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are
herebyreversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent school of accordingforeign-hires higher
salaries than local-hires.
5. Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)
F: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the
medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp
Catitigan, Davao City was implicated in the
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. After the informations for murder
and attempted murder were filed w/ the
RTC, the trial court issued an order
suspending petitioner until termination of
the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975,
w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension
Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP
for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for
his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807,
that his suspension should be limited to 90
days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB,
and Layno v. SB. The motion and the
subsequent MFR were denied.
Hence, this petition
forcertiorar i andma nda mus.
HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of
merit.
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(1) The language of the first sentence is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The
second sentence xx providing the trial must
be terminated w/in 90 days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the
first sentence. The 2 can stand
independently of each other.The first refers
to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals
w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial should
be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the
90day period, should the suspension of
accused be lifted? Certainly no. While the
law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the
phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days,"
there is nothing in the law that suggests that
the preventive suspension of the accused
will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
w/in that period.
But this is w/o prejudice to the
administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate
cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should
the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the
fault of the accused, he may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should this be refused,
he can compel itsdismissal bycer tiorari,
prohibition orma nda mus, or secure his
liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD
807. A meticulous reading of the section
clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of
the preventive suspension in pending admin.
investigation, not in crim. cases, as
here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that
the CS law and its implementing rules shall
apply to members of the PNP insofar as the
provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and
Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019
upon w/c the preventive suspension of the
accused in Layno and Deloso was based was
silent w/ respect to the duration of
the preventive suspension, such that the
suspension of the accused therein for a
prolonged and unreasonable length of time
raised a due process question. Not so in the
instant case. Petitioner is charged w/
murder under the RPC and it is undisputed
that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975
w/c categorically states that
hissuspension shall last until the case is
terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on National Defense
relative to the bill that became RA 6975
reveal the legislative intent to place on
preventive suspension a member of the
PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of
imprisonment and w/c suspension continues
until the case against him is terminated.
237 SCRA 538 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection –
Suspension of PNP Members Charged with
Grave Felonies
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was
charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the
attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was
placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides
that:
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D.
807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should
be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection
guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than
that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged
with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or
more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension
cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently
of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The
second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from
the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word
“shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”,
there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the
case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts
so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably
delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his
right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for
the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the
case, the accused can compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
6. GALLARDO VS PEOPLE GR 142030 21
APRIL 2005
Facts: Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur
filed letter-complaint for alleged refusal to
appropriate in the municipal budget the amount
representing payment of their salaries by the
Municipality of Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo
Gallardo with the Ombudsman. Probable cause
was found and information was filed stating that
Gallardo caused undue injury to PHW workers.
Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was
granted by Sandiganbayan, However
Ombudsman Desierto recommended his
disapproval. Petitioner filed motion to quash on
the ground that they were not accorded equal
protection of the law. They contend that similar
cases were dismissed by Desierto previously ans
should be accorded the same to the case at bar.
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Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto
violated equal protection right of the petitioners
on the ground of not uniformly deciding similar
cases?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The equal
protection clause requires that the law operates
uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons are treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable
classification. If the classification is characterized
by real and substantial differences, one class may
be treated differently from another. The
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he
believed there were no sufficient grounds for the
accused therein to undergo trial. On the other
hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate
information against petitioners because there are
ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only
exercising his power and discharging his duty
based upon the constitutional mandate of his
office.
7. Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 (2005)
Facts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
Held: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.
Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) released its final report of
a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled
“Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking
System.”
It was revealed that of the blood units collected in
1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks,
14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based
blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks ;
showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. It was further found, among other things, that
blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three
times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or
blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria,
syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act was
the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from
its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail
the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others
that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative
power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when
it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a
standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the
performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by the
Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood
banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the
Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of
legislative power.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719
CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER
Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or
any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as
to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a
general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the
Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the
health of the people and has mandated several measures to
attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of
commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary
of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of
public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood
through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has
conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.
The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act
No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides
that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be
extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on
the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the
existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary
may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be
delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the
power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is
illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
8. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 190582 APRIL 8, 2010
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds.
In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies
for registration as party-list.
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for
registration should be granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in
denying petitioner’s application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in
Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against
morality must be for a secular purpose (that is,
the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed
is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress
of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate
their allegation that allowing registration to
Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the
exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of
general application should apply with equal force
to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any
international laws to which we adhere.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ
ofpreliminary mandatory injunction, filed by
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against
theResolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First
AssailedResolution) and December 16, 2009 (the
Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL)(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to
accredit AngLadlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-ListSystem Act.
FACTS:Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued
that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transgender)community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because oftheir sexual orientation
and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, andviolence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexualorientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in
AngBagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out
its nationalmembership base consisting of
individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined itsplatform of
governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
filed a Petition for registration with
theCOMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the
petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division)dismissed the Petition on moral grounds
that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religiousbeliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied
accreditation not only foradvocating immoral
doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it “or any of itsnominees/party-
list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulationsrelating to
the elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC,
Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to
anenvironment that does not conform to
the teachings of our faith. When Ang
Ladlad soughtreconsideration, COMELEC still,
on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed
Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition,
praying that the Supreme Court annul the
AssailedResolutions and direct the COMELEC to
grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.
Ang Ladladalso sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the
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COMELEC, whichhad previously announced that
it would begin printing the final ballots for the
May 2010 elections byJanuary 25, 2010.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by
COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion.
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions
contravened the constitutional rights to privacy,
freedomof speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as
constitutedviolations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination
based on sexualorientation.
HELD:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III,
Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting
anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious
matters.” Clearly,“governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.” The Supreme Court ruled
that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for theCOMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad. Rather thanrelying on religious
belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, onwhether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mereconformity to
religious doctrine. The government must act for
secular purposes and in ways thathave primarily
secular effects.
2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified
any specific overt immoral act performed by
AngLadlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor
General agrees that “there should have been a
finding bythe COMELEC that the group’s
members have committed or are committing
immoral acts.” Respondent have failed to
explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why specialprotection is required
for the youth. Under our system of laws, every
group has the right topromote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normaldemocratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of ademocratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but alsoto those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state
interest, it is not for theCOMELEC or the
Supreme Court, to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, theCOMELEC is
certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting anapproved
message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws
of general application should applywith equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the samebasis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
This is in accord with the country’sinternational
obligations to protect and promote human
rights. The principle of non-discrimination
as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and
theICCPR should be recognized. The
Constitution and laws should be applied
uninfluenced bypublic opinion. True democracy
should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous
debate due toconflicting opinions.
The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions
of the Commission on Elections
datedNovember 11, 2009 and December 16,
2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and
theCOMELEC was directed to GRANT
petitioner’s application for party-list
accreditation.
Equal Protection Clause Cases 2015
9. BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION (2010)
G.R. No. 192935 and G.R. No. 193036 | 2010-12-07
Subject: Requisites for the exercise of Judicial Review;
Locus Standi (Direct Injury Test and Transcendental
Importance); Power to create a new office is not
included in the power to reorganize; Power to create a
new office is not covered under the President’s power
of control; Executive Powers of the President not
limited to those specifically mentioned in the
Constitution; No appropriation but merely an allotment
of existing funds; Investigative power vs. Adjudicative
power; EO1 violated the equal protection clause by
singling out the Arroyo Administration
Facts: President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1
(EO1) creating the Philippine Truth Commission. The
Truth Commission is an ad hoc body with the power to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
involving third level public officials and higher ranking
officials of the Arroyo administration. The investigative
powers of the Truth Commission include fact-finding
and assessment of evidence of graft and corruption
and then making recommendations. However, it does
not have the power to determine whether probable
cause exists as to file an information in court. It also
does not have the powers of a quasi-judicial body, that
is, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or
render awards, nor can it cite people in contempt or
order an arrest.
This case was a consolidation of two cases, one
instituted by Louis Biraogo as a citizen and taxpayer;
while other case was instituted by Edcel Lagman,
Rodolfo Albano, Jr. and Simeon Datumanong, all of
whom are members of the House of Representatives.
The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 and the creation of the Truth
Commission on several grounds. It is argued that (1)
the EO1 violates the separation of powers between the
Executive and Legislative Departments regarding the
creation of public offices and allocation of funds, and
(2) that EO1 is unconstitutional for superseding the
quasi-judicial functions of the Ombudsman, and (3)
that EO1 violates the equal protection clause as it
specifically targets graft and corruption reports during
the Arroyo Administration.
The OSG, on the other hand, refuted these arguments
by stating that the creation of the Truth Commission
falls within the President’s executive power and
control, as the creation of a fact-finding body is
necessary in assisting the President in the performance
of his administrative functions to enforce laws. The
OSG further argued that the creation of a fact-finding
commission such as a truth commission is not
legislative per se, rather it is included in the President’s
power to reorganize the Office. Moreover, the OSG
insisted that the Truth Commission does not duplicate
or supersede the quasi-judicial functions of the Office
of the Ombudsman because it is merely a fact-finding
body. The OSG also counter-argued that EO1 does not
violate the equal protection clause because it was
created for “laudable” purposes. The OSG also
questioned the legal standing of the petitioners to
question the Order.
Held:
Requisites for the exercise of Judicial Review
1. The power of judicial review over an act or issuance
may be exercised by the courts when there is a)
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; b) the person challenging the act must
have standing to question the validity of the act or
issuance, that is, if the person stands to be benefitted
or injured as a result of the enforcement of the law; c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and d) the constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
Locus Standi (Direct Injury Test and
Transcendental Importance)
2. A person has locus standi to impugn the validity of a
statute upon meeting the “direct injury test”. That
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is, a person must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.”
3. The Court held that the petitioners have legal
standing. The legislators-petitioners have a legal
standing to “see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution” to the Congress
are not violated.”
4. Mr. Biraogo was likewise held to have legal standing.
The direct injury test can be relaxed when the matter is
of “transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of a paramount public
interest.” A matter is of transcendental importance in
view of its seriousness, novelty and weight.
Power to create a new office is not included in
the power to reorganize
5. The power to create an office is not included in the
power to reorganize. The President’s power to
reorganize is limited to “a) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit or another; b)
transferring any function under the Officer of the
President to any other Department or Agency, or vice
versa; or 3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. The power to reorganize includes a modification
of an office that already exists; not a creation of a
completely new office.
Power to create a new office is not covered
under the President’s power of control
6. The power of control is the power to “alter or modify
or nullify or set aside” an act done by a subordinate
officer and substitute the judgment of the person of
power with the judgment of the subordinate. This
power does not contemplate the creation of an office.
Executive Powers of the President not limited to
those specifically mentioned in the Constitution
7. The powers of the President are not limited to those
specifically mentioned in the Constitution. While the
President inherently has the power to reorganize and
the power of control, the power to create offices is not.
Considering that the President has the duty to ensure
that the laws of the land are faithfully executed, thus,
he possesses the necessary powers to fulfill that
duty. The President necessarily has the power to create
ad hoc committees that can aid in the enforcement of
the laws of the land.
No appropriation but merely an allotment of
existing funds
8. The Court held that there will be no appropriation
but merely an allotment of existing funds already
appropriated for the Executive Department.
Investigative power vs. Adjudicative power
9. The Truth Commission is a fact-finding body. It does
not possess quasi-judicial powers, hence, it will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ. It has the power
to investigate, but not the power to adjudicate.
The power to investigate means to explore, inquire
or probe into a specific matter while the power to
adjudicate means to adjudge, decide, resolve, rule on
and settle.
EO1 violated the equal protection clause by
singling out the Arroyo Administration
10. Equal protection does not mean the universal
application of laws on all persons and things. It leaves
room for classification as long as such classification
meets the following: a) the classification rests on
substantial distinctions; b) it is germane to the purpose
of the law; c) it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and d) applies equally to all members of the same
class.
11. The Court held that EO1 violated the equal
protection clause by singling out the Arroyo
Administration. While the Arroyo administration had