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ELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicasalimentaráelmundo.
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Juststandards:internationalregulatoryinstrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplex
resourceconflicts
JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraParkPaper#83
Apirila–Abril–April24,25,262017
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Juststandards:internationalregulatoryinstrumentsandsocialjusticeincomplexresource
conflicts
JenniferFranco,ClaraPark,ClaraPark
NOTE:THISISAFORTHCOMINGARTICLEINCANADIANJOURNALOFDEVELOPMENTSTUDIES2017
Abstract
Climatechangemitigationandlandgrabbingaredistinctbutnotisolatedphenomena.Thereisevidencethattheirintersectionandinteractioncontributetorapidagrariantransformationswithdiresocialandecologicalspillover,includingtheonsetandaggravationofconflicts.Severalexistinghumanrightsinstrumentsareapplicabletosuchspilloversituationsandarepreferabletootherkindsofregulation,astheytendtobeseenasmorelegitimatebythoseadverselyaffected.WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperarguesforarecalibrationofanalysisandactiononclimatechangemitigationandlandgrabsthatmovesbeyondregulationineachisolatedcaseandtowardintegratedsolutions.KEYWORDS:Climatechange;agrariantransformation;landgrabbing;conflicttransformation;regulation
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Theenvironmental,socialandgenderimpactsofclimatechangemitigationstrategies(biofuels,REDD+(ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandDegradation)andhydropowerprojectsportrayedasrenewableenergy)andoflandgrabbingcontinuetocapturetheattentionofscholars,practitioners,governmentandcivilsocietyactors.Relevantresearchofteninvestigatestheseprocessesseparatelyandconfinedwithindiscretetemporalandspatialboundaries(suchasaparticularlandholding)wheredispossessionorcompetinglandclaimsoccur.Yet,evidencefromthegroundincreasinglypointstotheneedforawideranalyticlens,suchaslandscapeorregion.Itistheintersectionandinteractionofthesephenomenathatcanproducesocialandecologicalspill-overeffects,chainreactionsandigniteneworaggravateoldsetsofcompetingclaimsandconflictsoverresourceswithinawiderarea.Whenclimatemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlap,competeorruninparallel,theydosonotjustspatiallyortemporally,butalsoinstitutionally,intermsofpolicies,landclaims,communitysocialdynamicsandmechanismsforsettlingdisputes.Futureconflictandcooperationoutcomes,particularlygenderedones,willdependonintersectingstrugglesofpowerandmeaningintheconstructionofnarrativesandcontestationsaroundthegrabbingofoneresourceoranother(land,forest,water,fisheriesoraquaticresources,orsomecombinationofthese).Understandingspecificconflictsinaparticularmomentintimerequiresanalysingthewiderspatial,social-ecologicalandhistorical-institutionalconditionsandcircumstancesinwhichtheyarise.Onlythencanwecontemplateappropriateinterventionsforinfluencingtheirtrajectoriesinthedirectionofgreatersocialjustice.Forthoseinterestedinpromotingsocialjustice-basedsolutionsinthesesituations,somekindofregulatorymechanismmayberelevantandusefulundercertainconditions.Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processesandbodiesareavailabletorespondtoissuesarisingfromtherelatedongoingagrariantransformations.Broadlyreferredtohereasinternationalregulatoryinstruments,isuchmechanismsareincreasinglyconsideredaspotentialsolutionstomanyoftoday’snaturalresourcerelatedproblems.However,fromasocialjusticeandpoliticallegitimacyperspective,acleardistinctionmustbemadebetweeninternationalinstrumentsadoptedbystates,suchasthehumanrightstreaties,andthoseinstrumentsthatareestablishedbycorporationsfortheostensiblepurposeofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Theformeraregroundedininternationalhumanrightslawandwithinthestatesystem,whilethelatterareessentiallyattunedtocorporateinterests(seeCoumans2017).After2008,followingthe(re)new(ed)globalattentiontolandgrabbing,anumberofinitiativesemerged–rangingfromintergovernmentalguidelines(PrinciplesforResponsibleAgriculturalInvestmentsjointlydevelopedbyUNCTAD,IFAD,FAOandWorldBank)tocorporate-ledself-regulation(forexample,Bonsucro,whichisamulti-stakeholdermembershipbasedorganizationwhichpromotes‘responsible’sugarproductionincludingthroughcertificationofstandards,andwhosemembersincludebigcorporationsalongsidefarmers,endusersandcivilsociety)–ostensiblytoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationtosocialandenvironmentalconcerns.iiWhilepotentiallyuseful,thereisatendencytoapplyregulatoryinstrumentsaccordingtotheprojectparametersofaninvestmentor
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initiativeinisolationandwithinasinglelandholding,asifthisishowsuchprocessesactuallyunfoldinreality.Whileinsomeinstances,a1:1correspondenceratiomayberelevant,thisisnotthecaseinothers.Often,thesephenomenaintersectandinteracttoproducecomplicatedsituationswithsocialandecologicaleffectsthatspillovertheinitialprojectparameters.Evenifaninterveningactor–beitacompanyorthestate–iswillingtoapplyorusehumanrightsinregulatinganintervention,inpracticetheirsenseofobligationmightstillstopatthephysicalortimeboundariesoftheirproject,whichwouldeffectivelyindicateadifferentlogicatworkthanhumanrights.WithinsightsfromCambodiaandMyanmar,thispaperproblematisesthecomplexrealitycurrentlyunfoldinginSoutheastAsia,andcallsforrecalibrationofanalysisofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsandaction,includingmovingbeyonda1:1applicationofregulationtoasinglecaseinisolation.Assumingthatinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanhelpavoidconflictordirectconflictdynamicstowardsmoresociallyjustoutcomes,itisarguedthattheireffectivenessdependsnotonlyontheunderlyinglegitimacyoftheinstrumentdeployedbutonotherfactorssuchasinterpretation,contextandstrategy.
Background
CambodiaandMyanmarpresentsimilaryetdifferentcontexts,opportunitiesandchallengesforthedeploymentofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentswithregardtotheintersectionofclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbing(andtheconflictsthesemightignite).Bothcountrieshaveallowed,andsometimesproactivelypromoted,theexploitationandextractionofvaluefromlandandforestresourcesbyelite,militaryandprivatecompanies.Agribusinessdevelopmenthastakentheformoflargescaleflexcropandtreemonoculturesandhasoftenentaileddisplacementorevictionoflocalcommunities.Climatechangemitigationactivitiesarealsoongoinginbothcountries,albeitmoreevidentlylabeledassuchinCambodiawherethediscourseandrhetoricisbeingusedtojustifylargescaleforestryplantations,forinstance(ScheidelandWork2015).CambodiaisalsoaREDD+readycountry,meaningthatconcreteprojectsexistontheground,thoughthecollectionofcarboncreditsisyettostart.InMyanmarREDD+plansexistbuttherearenoprojectsattimeofwriting,althoughhydropowerprojectsareincreasingly(re)framedasclimatechangemitigation(Borrasetal.2015).Bothcountrieshaveembracedambitioussocio-economicandpoliticalreformagendas,althoughmuchearlierinCambodia(1992)thaninMyanmar(2011).Thistimelapsemeansthat,forinstance,Myanmarhasnotaccessedandratifiedmosthumanrightsinstruments(seetable1below),whereasCambodiaratifiedmostofthemfrom1983onwards,includingtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheConventionontheEliminationofallFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen.Theinstitutionalsetupandframework,aswellasinstitutionalcapacity,ismuchmoreestablishedinCambodiathanitisinMyanmar.Forinstance,inCambodia,the2001LandLawsetstheframeworkfortenurerightsinthecountry,includingintermsofindigenouspeople’saccesstocommunallandtitles.ThereiscurrentlynoequivalentcomprehensivepieceoflegislationinMyanmar,but
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existinglegislationdoesnotrecognisecustomarylandrightsorcommunallandsandinsteadseestheseareasas“vacant,fallowandvirgin”landandearmarksthemforlarge-scale(foreign)investment.iiiINSERTTABLE1HERE:StatusofratificationofhumanrightsinstrumentsinCambodiaandMyanmarRealityonthegroundinbothcountriesismarkedbymultiple,discreteland-basedinterventionsandinitiatives–eitherinmoreorlessthesameplace(butdifferenthistoricalperiods),atmoreorlessthesametime(butindifferentspaces),orbothinthesameplaceandatthesametime.Asinmanysocietieswherelandandwatergrabbingisoccurring,thetwocountriesexhibitanoverallfailuretoaddressland-basedconflict(Deininger2011;CollierandHoeffler2005).Meanwhile,theregulatorylandscapesinwhichtheseinterventionsoverlapandinteractarecharacterisedhereas“plurallegal”,withnumerousregulatoryfieldscompetingforstandingonthegroundandthestatelawbeingjustoneofthese.Toillustrate,inCambodia’sPreyLangForest,aonce-massivecontiguousforestarea,conservationandexploitationisoccurringinacontestedfieldofpoweroccupiedbyprivatecompanies,conservationorganisations,governmentministriesandthecommunitieswhohaveinhabitedandusedtheterritoryforgenerations.Eachactorinthelandscapeisattemptingtoassertitsownunderstandingofwhohaswhichrights,towhichland,forhowlongandforwhatpurpose;eachattemptstoperformthisallocationofnaturalresourcesinsociety.Likewise,inMyanmar’sNorthernShanStatesub-region,inadditiontothestatemilitaryandnumerousethnicarmedgroups,otheractorsarerecastingthelandscapeandexistingpatternsofsocialrelationsthrough:miningconcessions,illegallogging,treeplantationsbilledas“conservation”,agribusinesslinkingflexcropproductiontoprocessingplantsneartheborder,hydropowerdamprojectsandChina’sopiumsubstitutionprogrambeingusedbyentrepreneursasasteppingstonetoamasslargelandholdings.Inbothoftheserapidlychanginglandscapes,statelawisjustoneactor,amongmany,andveryoftenisnotthemostauthoritativeactorontheground,whilelocalisedcustomarylawsystemscontinuetooperatesimultaneously.Plural-legalsettingscanvaryfromoneplaceandtimetoanother,andthusplayavariableroleinstructuringlimitsandopportunitiesforcompetingrightsclaimsandinshapingresourcerelatedconflicts(Franco,2011).However,institutionsandprocessesthatcouldcontributetopreventingortransformingcomplexresourceconflictsmaybeweakorabsentintheveryplacesandatthescalewheretheyareprobablymostneeded.Inthecaseofcomplexresourceconflicts(involvingintersectionandinterplayofmultipleinitiativesandgrabs),forexample,theissueofscaleisimportant.Villagelevelcustomarypracticesareoftenveryrelevantandappropriateforhandlingsocialconflictwithinavillageandbetweenpartiesofrelativelyequalstatus.Butthesameinstitutionsmaynotbegearedtowardaddressingconflictsthatspillovervillageboundariestoinvolvemultiplevillagesatatime.Theymaynotbecapableofhandlingconflictswhereonepartyisrelativelymorepowerfulthananother.Institutionalstrengthispartlyaboutcapacityandpartlyaboutautonomyvis-a-vispowerfulactors/interestsinsociety(Fox1994).“Institutionalcapture”andthe
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vetopoweroflandlordshelptoexplainwhy,historically,inpredominantlyagrariansocietiesmarkedbyinequality,democratisingthedistributionofland(throughtitlingprograms,throughredistributivereformorthroughlandrestitution)isextremelydifficult.Similarly,thenotionthat“waterflowstopower”resonatesbecauseitdrawsalinkbetweendecisionmakingcontrolandpoliticalpowerandwaterallocationoutcomes(Roth,Boelens,andZwarteveen2005,2).
Recalibrationofanalysisandaction
InbothCambodiaandMyanmar,oneclusterofincreasinglyprominentland-basedinterventionsandinitiativesinvolvesgenericlandgrabbingontheonehand,andclimatechangemitigationontheotherhand.Whenithitstheground,eithersortofactivitymayengageexistingstructuralandinstitutionalfault-lines,potentiallyreignitingoldconflictsortensionsortriggeringnewones.Butthemorecomplicatedandpotentiallyexplosivesituationiswhenlandgrabbingandland-basedclimatechangemitigationstarttooverlap,interactwithandreshapeoneanother(Hunsbergeretal.2017).InthePreyLangForest,villagersarebeingsqueezedbetweenexpandinggovernment-awardedeconomiclandconcessionsontheonehand,andinitiativeslabeledasclimatechangemitigationactivities,suchasforestconservation,ontheotherhand(seeScheidelandWork2015).MembersofthegrassrootsPreyLangCommunityNetwork(PLCN)seekingtoprotecttheforestanddefendtheirplaceinitagainstillegallogginganddeforestationbycompanieshavesufferedviolentattacksbyarmedassailants.ivIntheTanintharyiRegioninMyanmar,governmentforestpreservationforcarbonsequestrationinitiativesandinternationalenvironmentalNGO-drivenmarine,forestandwildlifeconservationprojectsareaccommodatinglarge-scaleland-takingsthatareconsumingforestandforestcommunities:anexpansiveNavyconfiscationareaeatingupvillagers’long-standingcasheworchardsandcommunityforests,numerousminingconcessionscontaminatingtraditionallocalwatersources,asprawlingSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ)andamajorhighwayslashingthroughkilometersofold-growthforesttoconnectThailandtotheAndamanSea,andexpandingoilpalmandrubberconcessions(andthelucrativelarge-scaleloggingthatprecedesthem).Villagersareespeciallyvulnerablewhenconcessionsandconservationneedthelandbutnotthepeopleonit,asLi(2011)putsit.
Inadditiontorecastingthewaylandisused,inbothCambodiaandMyanmar,thisconvergenceofeconomiclandconcessionsandforestconservation-as-climatechangemitigationbuildonportrayalsofvillagers’customarywaysoflifeandproductionasdestructiveand/orinefficient(Borrasetal.2017),therefore(re)producingnarrativesthatcanmakethenewarrangementsseemmoreacceptableaspartoftheprocessoftakingcontrolofthelandawayfromthevillagers(ScheidelandWork2015).InMyanmar,portrayalsofshiftingcultivatorsasforestdestroyersoriginateinnineteenthcenturycolonialrulewhen,“asColonialforestdepartmentsenteredintocompetitionwithswiddenersforcontrolofland,theybegantocharacterizeswiddencultivatorsasprimitive,unproductive,even‘pre-agricultural’incontrasttoforester’sso-called‘modern’,‘scientific’management’”.vFast-forwardingtotoday,accordingtoonecloseobserver,“[m]anyofthe[resulting]policies,andthehostileassumptionsandattitudeson
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whichtheyarebased,persisttothisday.Eventhoughtheyarerarelybasedonmorethansubjectivepreference,theyhavebeenselectivelyemployedtounfairlyde-legitimatecultivators’rightsinwaysthatwouldbeinacceptableforlowlandcultivators.”viAsonestudynotes,whilethedebateonthepersistenceordemiseofswiddencultivationhasneverceasedamongstgovernmentsandacademics:
FromtheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangein1992
totheKyotoProtocolin1997,thepoliciesofinter-governmentalorganizationhaveimmenselypromotedresearchontherelationshipsamongswiddenagricultureandforestdegradationandglobalwarming[…]NegativeperceptionsfromgovernmentstowardsswiddeningingeneralinSEAhaveacceleratedthedemiseofthistraditionalswiddensystem.(Lietal.2014,1656,1658)
Insuchsettings,nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,or
companyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymayseektopromoteoneoranotherinternationalregulatoryinstrumentasapotentialsolution,ofteninthenameofconflictmitigationorconflictresolution.Buttoooftendeploymentofsuchmeasures,whenitoccurs,failstotakeintoaccounttheinteractionofmultipleresourcegrabs,hencetheneedforrecalibrationofanalysisandaction.Similarly,evaluatingrule-of-lawandjusticereforminitiativesintheearly2000s,Carothers(2003)foundthemsufferingfromaprofoundknowledgedeficitwithmuchtobelearnedandunlearned,atatimewhensuchinitiativeswerestillhighonofficialdevelopmentaidagendas.Heobservedthatthenatureandconsequencesofproposedrule-of-lawchangesofteneludedlegalreformers,andthatthefieldofrule-of-lawpromotionwasslowtoscaleupempiricalknowledgegainedinpracticeintolessonslearned.Hedrewattentiontothe“embeddedobstaclestotheaccumulationofknowledge[that]existbelowthesurface”suchas:(1)thecomplexityanddiversityofsocietiesandofhowlawfunctionsandoperatesand(2)theweakimpulsesofaidorganisationsandlawyerstoundertakesystematic“ruleoflawinsociety”knowledge-accumulation(Carothers2003,14–15).Theresultingknowledgedeficitendedupreinforcingexistingtendenciestowardtop-down,technicalreforms(Decker,Sage,andStefanova2005).
Fromaregulatoryperspective,andwithinsightfromCarothers,perhapsitwarrants
askingthefollowing:Iswhatisperceivedasoneproblem,infactaclusterofproblems?Arethetoolsofanalysisandactionbeingbroughttobear–includingrelevantinternationalregulatoryinstruments–moresuitedtodealingwithasingle(typeof)initiative/interventionatatime,andtowhatextentcantheydealwithaclusterofproblems?Climatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingincidentseachhavethepotentialtoreviveoldconflictsandsparknewconflicts.Whentheyariseatthesametimeorspilloverintothesamelandscape,theirintersectionandinterplaymayturnseeminglydiscreteconflictsintoa“conflictcocktail".Howtoaddressthesecomplexsituationswithdifferentpossibleaggravatedconflictscenariosisnotobvious.
Regulatoryinitiativesdonotnecessarilyorautomaticallydetecttheseinteractions,
nordotheynecessarilyorautomaticallyadjusttotheinterplayevenifdetected.Would-beregulatorsofconflict,whethertheyarefromthegovernment,theprivatesectororthecivilsocietysphere,maysimplyfinditeasiertofocusonjust
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oneproblem,ratherthanaclusterofproblems.Agivenregulatoryinterventionmaybeprogrammedtofocusonjustonetypeofsituation,andtheimplementersofthatprogramsimplyunabletoadjustevenifaclusterofproblemsisdetected.Towhatextentdoesfocusingonjustoneproblem,forwhateverreason,havethepotentialtoaggravateratherthanregulateconflict?Meanwhile,notallregulatoryinterventionsarethesameeither.Therealmofregulatoryinterventionsandof(inter)nationalgovernanceinstrumentsisalsohighlydifferentiated.Forexample,today,thereareverysharpdifferencesinhowtheUSGovernmentandmanyindigenouspeoplesmovementsintheworldunderstandandusetheprincipleofFee,Prior,andInformedConsent(FPIC),andwhenthesedifferentunderstandingsaredeployedintheformofaparticularregulatoryinitiative,itismoreasanassertionofwhichparticularunderstandingshouldprevailoverandagainstanother,thanasanexpressionofauniversallyagreedunderstanding.Giventhatalackofconsensussurroundingthemeaningandpurposeofdifferentinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsisindeedpartoftheregulatorylandscapetoday,whichunderstandingofwhich“standard”oughttoapplyinagivensituation?Andequallyimportant,whataretheimplicationsandconsequencesofusingoneunderstandingandstandardoveranother?
Withthesequestionsinmind,thisarticleaimstolaysomeanalyticalfoundationsfor
exploringtheideathatrecalibrationofanalysisandactiondescribedearliermustalsoproblematisetheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments.Thepointisnottocriticiseusingthemingeneral,oranyoneinstrumentinparticular,butrathertoputforwardsomepreliminarytheoreticalreflectionsonthefollowingquestion:wherediscreteprocessesoflandconcessionsandland-basedclimatechangemitigation/adaptationandconservationoverlap,interactwith,andreshapeoneanother,underwhatconditionscanwhichinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscontributetotransformingconflictinthedirectionofgreatersocialjustice?
Regulatingandtransformingconflict
Aplural-legalapproach(vonBenda-Beckmann2001)combinedwithBourdieu’s(1987)conceptof“fieldsofaction”allowsrurallandscapestobeviewedasregulatedbutdynamicspaces,markedbytheco-existenceofseveralfieldsofsocialregulation,wherestatelawisjustoneamongseveralcompetingforstanding.viiThisanthropologicalviewoflawemphasisesthesocial,political,economicandintellectualcontextofenforceablenorms,andtheroleofstateandnon-stateactorsinmakingthemauthoritativeinsociety.Suchanapproachallows“Inquiries[…]intothewaynormsaregenerated,howmandatorinessiscreated,andhowregularitiesaremaintained”(Moore2005,1).Forinstance,untilrecentlyinWesternsocieties,avarietyofsocialregulation,includingreligiouslaw,localcustomarylawandpersonallaw,historicallycoexistedandcompetedwithstatelaw.Theinterplayofvariousregulatorysystemsdeterminedwhichregulatoryfieldheldgreaterswayrelativetotheothers,andtheoutcomescouldvaryovertimeandfromonelocaletoanother.Bytheendofthelastcentury,neither“increasingcentralisationofauthority”nor“increasingimportanceofinternationalandtransnationallegalobligationsandinstitutions”haserasednon-statelawfieldsorunderminedthe“complexarrayofjurisdictions”theyentail(Cotterrell1992,28).
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LegalpluralismcharacterisesmanycountriesinSoutheastAsiatoday,anditisnotunusualtofindShari’asystemsexistingalongside(diverse)customarysystems,andbothoftheseexistingalongsidenationalConstitutionsandstatutorysystems–whatBourdieu(1987)callsthe“juridicalfield”comprisingtheensembleofnationalofficialinstitutions,agents,legalinstrumentsandnormsparticulartoagivennationalterritory.Thisjuridicalfieldisconstitutiveofthestate,butnotcoterminouswithit,sinceitisreproducedbytheactionsnotonlyofstateagenciesandjudges,butalsolawyers,lawfirms,professionalassociations,non-governmentallawreformorganisationsandcivilsocietyrights-advocacygroups(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Thejuridicalfieldmaybecentraltostatelawmaking,butitisnotnecessarilyorautomaticallycentralto“makinglawmatter”insociety(Crook2001).Instead,itisjustoneofseveralfieldsofactionwherepeoplemayactuallyendupgoingtoregulateconflictandgetredressandprotection.Anotheriscustomarylaw,whereface-to-facedisputeprocessingbyordinarypeopleatthevillagelevelmayinvolvedirectnegotiation,informalmediation,retaliationandothercustomarypracticestoaddresstheirgrievances.viiiCustomarylawpracticeshaveraisedconcernsoverhowso-called“traditionalauthority”andcustomarylawallowsinjusticetocreepin,tothedetrimentofwomenandthelandlessruralpoor(Agarwal1994).Itisrelevanttonotethatvillagersmaysometimesresolveaconflictsimplyby“lumpingit”inordertorestoresocialharmony(Galanter1981).InsightsfromAfricasuggestthatbecausebothstate-juridicalsystemsandcustomarysystemscanproduceunjustoutcomes,thequestionforresearchishowdifferentpeopleorgroupsofpeoplenegotiatesuchplurallegalcontextsintheireffortstoclaimrightsandgetjustice(Ikdahletal.2005).
Usingalegalpluralismlensdoesnotassumethattheco-existenceofdifferent
regulatorysystemsisnecessarilysmoothorunproblematicorevenalwaysvisibletoeveryactororobserver.Theremaybecompetitionand/orcomplementationbetweenwhatColchesterandChao(2011)call“diversepathstojustice”,andmorelocalisedregulatorypathsmayormaynotmeshwellwithregulatorypressuresandinstrumentsoriginatingfrom“outside”.Suchanapproach,however,makespossiblebetterdetectionofdiverseandpossiblycompetingunderstandingsofjusticethatdifferentpartiestoaconflictmaybringtobear.“Makinglawmatterinsociety”canthenbeseenasaprocessthatextendstoandispartlycontingentupontheperceptionsandchoices,andactionsandinteractions,ofindividualsorgroupswhomaybeseekingjusticeorlookingtoresolveadisputeortoaddressagrievance.Intheory,aggrievedindividualsandgroupsonthegroundcontributetodeterminingwhereandwhenconflictsemergeoutintheopen,whichregulatoryorder(s)areactivatedinresponse,andwhetherandhowtheseconflictsgetresolvedortransformed.Butexactlyhowandhowmuchtheycontributeisanempiricalquestionthatinvitesfurtherinvestigation.
Resolvingortransformingconflictincreasinglyinvokesapplication/useof
internationalregulatoryinstrumentsbydifferentactors,butisnotnecessarilyorautomaticallydeterminedbythesealone.Increasedinterestinusinginternationalregulatoryinstrumentstoaddressconflictinplaceswhereclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingisoccurringhasbeendriveninpartbyaperceived“weakness”ofstate/juridicalinstitutionsinhandlingtheresulting
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conflicts.Thisispartofthedeclaredlogic,forinstance,behindincreasedcorporateinterestinusinginternationalgovernancemechanismstoregulatenaturalresourceallocationanduseinrelationtotheso-called“globallandrush”inrecentyears.Buttheunderstandingsoftheassociatedconflictsandtheinstrumentschosentoregulatethemcanvaryconsiderably,ascanthelegalreformmeasuresprescribedtoaddressperceivedunderlyinginstitutionalweaknesses.Forinstance,“…the[World]Bank’slegalreformfocusisontheabilityoflegalsystemstofacilitatemarkettransactionsbydefiningpropertyrights,guaranteeingtheenforcementofcontractsandmaintaininglawandorder”.ixBycontrast,somecriticsoftheWorldBankhavearguedthatwomen’sindividuallandrightshavebeenusedasatrojanhorseforneoliberalagriculturalandlandmaskingcommodificationandprivatisationoflandrightsunderhumanrightslanguagewhileobscuringtheneedtostrengthenwomen’sdistinctrighttolandindifferenttenuresystems(O’Laughin2009;Monsalve2006).Forsome,“[i]ndependentjudiciariesandfunctioningcourtsystemsareclearlyimportanttoolsforhumanrightsprotection”(Harris2007,1),whileforothers,itismoreaboutprotectingpropertyrights.
statejusticeinstitutionsmaybe(1)vulnerabletoelitecaptureand(2)inaccessible
either“becausetheyareincompatiblewithlocalnormsandcustomsandtheyarephysicallyoreconomicallyinaccessible,orbecausepeoplelacktheknowledgeorcapacitytonavigatethesystem”.x“[I]nstitutionalsafeguards,transparency,andtheexistenceofacivilconstituency”maythusbeseenasrelevantmeasuresneededtoboostjudicialindependenceandaccountability.xiAllthismayseemlogicalandappropriateatfirst.Yetthewayforwardstillremainsobscured.Forexample,howexactlydoesincreasedtransparencyboostpublicaccountability?AsFox(2007,350–351)hasnoted,transparencydoesnotnecessarilyorautomaticallyproduceaccountability;andonlycertaintypesoftransparencymightdoso,andthenonlyundercertainconditions.Toooften,globalprescriptionsrelyonanalyticalframeworksthatignorethewiderregulatoryfield,institutionalisedinequalitiesandtheagencyofdifferentactorsthatinhabitthegroundwheretheyareintroduced,whilealsoignoringcomplexprocess-to-outcomepathways,whichcanthenimpedeaccesstojusticeandleavewhatsomeaggrievedpartiesperceiveastherealconflictstofesterunresolved.
Analytically,bringinginternationalregulatoryinstrumentstobearinsituationsmarkedbynaturalresourceconflictorclusterofconflictsisperhapsbestunderstoodasacontingent,dynamic–andpotentiallycontentious–politicalprocessthatunfoldsinthe“shadowofthelaw”(Cooter,MarksandMnookin1982),where“law”inageneralsensecomprisestheentiretyofwhatGalanter(1981,6)referstoasthe“backgroundofnormsandproceduresagainstwhichnegotiationsandregulationsinbothprivateandgovernmentsettingstakeplace”.Howthisprocessunfoldscanvaryacrosstimeandplace,sincenolaworregulatoryinstrumentisself-interpretingorself-implementing.Instead,lawsandregulatorymeasuresareinterpretedandimplementedinspecifichistorical-institutionalcontextsbyreal“flesh-and-blood”peoplewhoseperceptions,interests,politicalcalculationsandpowerresourcesarevariablyshapedbypersonalexperiencesandby“structuresinheritedfromthepast”(HoutzagerandFranco2003;Franco2011,2014).Theperceptions,interests,meaningsandpurposesthatgetactivatedbyorenduptappingintotheseprocessescanalso
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influencewhetherandhowanygiveninternationalregulatoryinstrumentistakenupandwhereitmightlead.
Problematisingtheuseofinternationalregulatoryinstruments
Anarrayofnationalandinternationalmechanisms,processesandbodieshaveemergedandarebeingusedinresponsetoissuesarisinginaneraof“globallandgrabbing”andrelatedfalloutintermsofagrariantransformation.Numerousinternationalinitiatives,fromintergovernmentalguidelinestocorporate-ledself-regulation,aspiretoinfluencehowinvestmentsarecarriedoutinrelationtosocialandenvironmentalconcerns.Suchmechanismsareincreasinglytakenforgrantedaspotentialsolutionsorpartofasolutiontomanyoftoday’snaturalresourcerelatedproblems.Internationalgovernanceisoftenapproachedasamatterofapplyingcertainfit-for-purposeproceduralinstrumentsortechnicaltoolsinordertoobtainmoreorlessanticipatedresults,orimplicitlymakesone-size-fits-allassumptionsaboutwheretheyarerelevantorappropriate.Itisincreasinglytakenforgrantedthatdifferentinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsareonequalfootingintermsoftheiroriginsandlegitimacy.Theseassumptionsareproblematic.Anysituationthatisdeemedillegitimatebythosewhoareaffectedislikelytobeworsenediftheregulatoryresponseislikewisedeemedillegitimate.Inthefollowingsections,wereflectontheseissuesandputforwardfourpropositionsforamorecalibratedapproachtointernationalgovernancethatpromotessocialjusticeoutcomes
Proposition1–interpretation“Makinglaw”isacoreprocessinsocietythatincludes,butalsogoesbeyondwhat
happensinnationallegislaturesandcourts,toinvolvestrugglesbetweendifferentactors(stateandnon-state)tomaketheirpreferredinterpretationsofregulatorynormsandrulesauthoritativeinsociety(HoutzagerandFranco2003).Competinginterpretationsofwhatcountsasgoodgovernance,deployedorperformedbydifferentactorsinthefield,arealsofactorsinshapinghownaturalresourcesarebeingallocated,usedandmanaged.Relatedly,differentformsanddegreesoflegitimacymayshapetheinterpretationandenforceabilityofdifferentinstruments,forinstancehumanrightstreatiesvs.corporate-ledinstruments.Itisthusimportanttoproblematisetheveryconceptof“goodgovernance”inthecontextoftheinternationalpoliticaleconomyinwhichthedifferentinitiativesarise(Margulis,McKeonandBorras2014).
InterpretationanduseoftheinternationalhumanrightsprincipleofFreePrior
InformedConsent(FPIC)xiiisillustrative(Franco,2014).UseofFPICoritsfunctionalequivalents(“communityengagement”)isontheriseinlandandnaturalresourcegovernanceinitiativesgloballyxiiifollowingcallsforgreatertransparencyandfulldisclosureinbiglanddeals.Yetverydifferentactorswithverydifferentpurposesinmindandindifferentsettingstranslatetheprincipleintopracticeverydifferently.Forsome,FPICisabasicdemocraticprinciplethatincludestherighttoveto.Forothers,FPICenablesoutcomeswherebothcommunitiesandcompaniesbenefit,evenifsuchsharingofresourcesandbenefitsofuseisnotautomaticallyornecessarilypromotingsocialjustice(IIED2012).Forstillothers,FPICisatoolforavertingsocialconflict,whileproviding
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sociallicensefordealstoproceed(minusthesocialconflictanditsdisruptionsandcoststodevelopers).
Theexampleraisesseveralissues.First,whoisinitiatingwhichinstrumentforwhat
purpose?Second,howcanoneknowwhenagivenstandard(whetherFPICorsomeother)hasbeentrulymet?Achievingconsent,forexample,isnotnecessarilythesameaspeoplehavinghadarealchoicetobeginwith,andinmanylandgrabbinghotspotsinMyanmar,forinstance,toooftenthechoiceofferedtovillagerswhentheirconsentissoughtisbetweenquittingtheirlandwithcompensationorwithout.Third,towhatextentcanconsentbetreatedasaone-time,isolatedandfixedoutcomewheninactualitycommunitiesaredifferentiated,projectsarefluidandimpactsareexperiencedwithinalarger,livinglandscape?Somevillagersmayresistatthestartandlaterswitchtoacceptance,whileothersmayendupwithdrawinginitialacceptance.Or,somevillagesthatwerenotaffectedinitially,maygetdrawninduetospilloverorchain-reactioneffects,suchaswhenvillagersdisplacedbyahydropowerdamprojectmove,oraremoved,ontolandinadjacentvillages.Fourth,whoismakinglawonnaturalresources,andfromwhichgenderperspectivespecifically,whetherintermsofformulatingregulatoryresponsesincorporateofficesorstatecorridors,orintermsofinterpretingtheminthefield?xivWhatarethevariedwaysinwhichgenderisconsideredandmanifestedinregulatorymechanismsaroundnaturalresources?Whataretherisksofexclusionofwomenfromtheassociatedprocesses,andconversely,whichkindsofprocessesmightfavorwomen’sinclusion?Relatedly,inwhatwaysistheperceivedlegitimacyofagivenregulatoryinstrumentgendered,therebyshapingitsuseorreceptioninthefield?
Finally,ifthereareopportunities,therearealsolimitstointerpretation,andsoanalysismustconsiderthatbydesignsomeinstrumentsmaybelessopentointerpretation(includingsocialjusticeinterpretations)thanothers.
Proposition2–(pro-socialjustice)design
Here,differentspecificinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbesituatedalongacontinuum–forexample,ashoveringsomewherebetweenamore“pro-business”poleandamore“pro-socialjustice”pole,usingcriteriatolocatetheminitiallyandtotrackchangesintheircharacterovertime(visionandprocessofdevelopment,whoparticipates,arethehumanrightsbased,dotheypromotesocialjustice,genderequality)asillustratedinFigure1below.INSERTFIGURE1HERE:ThecontinuumofinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsWhilesomeinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaybemorepro-socialjusticebydesign,designalonemaynotimpedeorpromotesocialjusticeinpractice.Alsorelevantistheinclusivenessoftheprocessbywhichagiveninstrumentisdeveloped,aswellasitsrelationtohumanrights.Evenwhenaregulatoryresponseostensiblyis,byprovenanceanddesign,pro-socialjustice,thisdoesnotnecessarilyorautomaticallymakeitsoinpractice.TheCFSTenureGuidelines(TGs),forinstance,weredraftedthroughwhatiswidelyconsideredahighlyparticipatoryprocess–consultationswithmorethan1000peoplefromgovernments,CSOs,privatesector,academiaandinternationalorganisations,
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fromnearly150countries.TheTGsareexplicitlyhumanrightsbasedandincludeamongtheprinciplesforimplementationnon-discrimination,equityandjustice,genderequalityandaccountability,amongothers.Althoughtheyareasoftlawinstrument(incontrasttotheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESCR),forinstance,whichislegallybindingonceaccessedbythestates),xvsincetheiradoptionin2012,onecanfindtheTGsbeingdeployedbyawiderangeofactors,inavarietyofways,includingforpurposesthatcouldbesaidtounderminesomeactors’visionsofsocialjustice.Accessibilityisanotherbasisonwhichtoassesstheextenttowhichagivenregulatoryinstrumentispro-socialjustice.Forinstance,theRoundtableonSustainableBiomaterialscertificationschemedoeshaveazero-tolerancepolicyforinvoluntaryresettlementandgrievancemechanismstoaddressconflict.Yettheprocessforpresentingagrievanceiscomplexandnoteasilyaccessible,particularlyforindividuals,andpresentslimitationsintermsoftime(past12months),numberofappeals(onlyoneallowed)andtypeofgrievances(thosefallingoutsidethepredeterminedtypologyareconsideredinadmissible).Inanotherexample,theIFCPerformanceStandardsonEnvironmentalandSocialSustainabilitystatethatlandacquisitionandinvoluntaryresettlement(bothphysicalandeconomicdisplacement)aretobeavoidedorminimised,withcompensationbeingprovidedifdisplacementcannotbeavoided.ButthedefinitionofFPICiswatereddowntoa‘goodfaithnegotiationbetweentheclientandtheAffectedCommunitiesofIndigenousPeoples’,whichdoesnotnecessarilyrequireunanimityandmaybeachievedevenwhenindividualsorgroupswithinthecommunityexplicitlydisagree.
Tosupportpro-socialjusticeanalysisandaction,itmakessensetoprivilegeinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsthatcomeoutofmoreinclusiveprocesses,aswellasthosethatareexplicitintheirhumanrightsfoundations,whilebeingattentivetotheirpluralinterpretations,discoursesanduses.Butwheremultiplelandgrabbingandland-basedclimatechangemitigationinitiativesoverlap,interactwithandreshapeoneanother,asinMyanmarandCambodia,attentionmustbegiventocompetinginterpretationsacrossmultiple,intersectinginitiativesandhowthesemayundermineorreinforceeachother.
Proposition3–contextInternationalregulatoryinstrumentsmaytakeonvariedmeaningsandoperationalcharacteristicsdependingonthehistorical-institutionalcontext,includingthelocally-specificassemblageofrulesandprocedures(informalandformal)thathavebeensociallyconstructedandreconstructedovertime.Forinstance,inCambodia,theHunSengovernmenthasdismissedtheTGscompletelyonthegroundsthatthecountryalreadyhasawell-establishedlegalandpolicyframeworkaroundlandandnaturalresourcemanagementandadministration–andarguingthatitisonlytheimplementationwhichposesproblems.Thegovernment’sstance,inturn,hasmeantthatCambodiancivilsocietyorganisationshavealsolargelychosentonotrefertotheTGsintheiradvocacyandpoliticalworkoncasesoflandgrabs–atleastfornow.Bycontrast,somecivilsocietyorganisationsinMyanmarhavebegunexperimentingwithusing
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theTGsintheirorganisingandadvocacywork.ThecaseofTGuptakeinMyanmarshowshowchangesinagivencontext,howeversmallandseeminglyinsignificant,canpresentnewopportunitiestoinfluencelawmaking.There,untilrecently,fewobserverscouldhaveimaginedanofficialpublicconsultationonanewnationallandusepolicy,orthatitcouldbeanythingmorethanademonstrationconsultation–heldunderhighlycontrolledconditionsandaimedatmerelysignalingratherthanactingingoodfaithtointernationaldonors,governments,andinvestors.xviYetinOctober2014theTheinSeingovernmentinitiatedsuchaprocedureandprogrammedittostartandfinishintwomonths.Whatevertheintentionsbehindit,theofficialprocessunexpectedlylastedfarlongerandwentfardeeperthanoriginallyplanned,aspreviouslyexcludedsocialactorsespeciallyfrom“below”mobilisedtopoliticallyengageandregistertheirconcernsandproposals,andasmoderatepoliticalcurrentsonthe“inside”workedtoaccommodatethesenewvoices.Exploitingthegovernment’sopeninguptointernationalstandards(afterdecadesofisolation),somecivilsocietyorganisationsandgrassrootsgroupsusedtheTGstoframetheircriticismsandrecommendations,whichperhapscontributedtoreshapingthepolicyinsignificantwaysandpushingitinarelativelymoreacceptabledirection.Takentogether,theexamplesfromCambodiaandMyanmarshowhowtheexistinghistorical-institutionalcontext–includingchangesinthiscontext–caninfluencethepoliticalperceptionsandcalculationsofkeyactors–includinggovernmentauthoritiesandcivilsocietygroups–onwhetherandhowtotakeupwhichregulatoryideas,framingsandtoolsthatmayoriginatefromtheinternationalarena.Proposition4–politicalstrategy
Insituationswherepowerfulactorsareconvergingtoreallocatelandandrelatednaturalresourcesawayfromruralworkingpeople,internationalregulatoryinstrumentsarelikelytobeperceivedaslegitimatebythose(potentially)adverselyaffectedifthesearegroundedexplicitlyinhumanrightsprinciplesandprovisionsbecauseofthelatter’scoreconcernforremedyingsocialinjustice.Suchinstrumentsarelikelytobemostrelevantifusedinawaythatopensuppoliticalspaceforaffectedpeopleandpeoplestoorganiseandmobilisetoputpressureonespeciallystateauthoritiestoactintheirfavor.Withthisinmind,internationalhumanrightsinstrumentscanbeenvisionedashavingatleastfourtacticalandstrategicuses.
First,theycanbeusedtoinformandframesocialmovements’andotheractors’
understandingsofthenaturalresourcerelatedproblemsthataffecttheirlivesandlivelihoods,aswellasthepossiblesolutionstotheseproblems.xviiThewayinwhichsomeCSOsandgrassrootssocialactorsusedtheTGstohighlighttheproblemoflandgrabbingwhilevalidatingtheirownresponsestoitduringthepublicconsultationonadraftnationallandusepolicyinMyanmarisagoodexample.Second,theycanbeusedtomake(more)visiblegenderdimensionsoftheseconflicts,andtoputforwardmoregenderequitablesocialjusticeplatforms.Again,recentexperienceinMyanmarprovidesanexample:there,softlawandhardlawhumanrightsinstruments(CEDAW,theRighttoFood,andtheTGs)weredeployedbyCSOstoexposeseriousweaknessesinthegovernment’shandlingofwomen’slandrightsinthedraftnationallandusepolicy,andtoputforward
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alternativepolicyproposals,manyofwhichwereeventuallyaccepted.Third,multipleinternationalregulatoryinstrumentscanbeusedtoidentifyarangeof(potential)institutionalleveragepointstobetargetedbyadvocacyandcollectiveactioncampaignsatdifferentscales.Fourth,specificinstrumentscanbeusedtodevelop“verticallyintegrated”strategies(Fox2001),wherestateauthorityistargetedatdifferentlevelssimultaneouslyinordertominimiseaversionofresponsibilitythroughdisplacement(or“passingthebuck”).
Conclusion
InCambodiaandMyanmar,bothclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbinginterventionsarerecastingthewaylandisused,whileenflamingoldorsparkingnewconflicts.Nationalandinternationaldevelopmentworkers,activists,orcompanyofficialsinchargeofcorporatesocialresponsibilitymaybetemptedtolaunchtheirowninterventionsinthesesimmeringcomplexsituations,bypromotingoneoranotherregulatoryresponseasasolution.Towhatextentsuchinterventionsareaddressing–andcapableofaddressing–notoneproblem,buttheclusterofproblems(theoverlap,intersectionandinterplayofactivitiesthatareeachintheirownwayrecastinglandrightsandlanduse)remainsanopenquestion.
Inlightoftheabovepropositions,andinthecontextofcomplexlandscapeswhere
climatechangemitigationinitiativesandlanddealsoverlapandintersectsuchasCambodiaandMyanmar,itmakessensetoprivilegetheCFSTenureGuidelines,forbothanalysisandaction.Thisdoesnotmeandiscardingotherinternationalregulatoryinstrumentsasinappropriateorirrelevant,butthattherearecompellingreasonstoemphasisethisparticularinternationalstandardininanalysisandactiononthisspecificproject.Thereasonsareasfollows:
First,theTGsalonewereformulatedtoaddressandanswertheunderlying“land
question”whichisattheheartofcomplexresourceconflicts,namely:Whoshouldhavewhatrightstowhichnaturalresources(land,fisheriesandforests),forhowlongandforwhatpurposes,andwhogetstodecide?
Second,theTGsareuniqueamongthearrayofregulatoryinstrumentsmost
commonlybeingappliedintoday’sresourceconflictsgloballyinexplicitlyanchoringthemselvesininternationalhumanrightslaw.Notonlydotheymakereferencetovariousotherspecificinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,butbasichumanrightsprincipleshavebeendirectlyintegratedinspecificprovisionsaswellasgloballythroughoutthedocument.
Third,theTGsareunprecedentedinthedegreetowhichtheyareimbuedwith
politicallegitimacy.Theseguidelines,incontrasttootherinstrumentscurrentlyinuse,aretheofficialproductofalengthyandinclusiveintergovernmentalnegotiationandagreement,whichuniquelyinvolvedthedirectparticipationinthedebates(butnotinthefinaldecision)ofcivilsocietyactors,specificallyNGOs,humanrightsorganisationsandsocialmovementrepresentatives,andwasbuiltuponarelativelyextensiveandintensiveandinclusiveformalconsultationprocess.
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Fourth,theTGshaveimmediatesocialrelevanceincomplexresourceconflict
settings:theirparticularcharacter(describedabove)meansnotonlythatstateshaveanobligationtoimplementtheseguidelines,butalsothatcivilsocietyorganisationsandgrassrootssocialactorsneednotwaitforthistohappenandcaninsteadimmediatelymakeuseoftheprinciplesandprovisionscontainedintheseguidelinesto(re)frametheiranalysesandactions,includingassessingtheirownsituations,monitoringandevaluatinggovernmentandcompanyinitiatives,anddevelopingawarenessraising,organisingandmobilisingstrategies.
Finally,asaresultoftheirparticularorientationandcharacter,theTGshaveawide-
rangingapplicabilitythatisintrinsictotheirpurpose.Ratherthanbeingbuilttobeusedinrelationtoaspecificprojectorinitiative,theycanbeusedformultipletypesofinterventionsandinitiativesthatcutacrosspolicyarenasandissueareas.TheTGs’built-in,wide-rangingapplicabilityisespeciallyrelevantforsituationssuchasthefocusofourpaper–whereclimatechangemitigationinitiativesandlandgrabbingimpulsesoverlap,intersectandinteract.
Acknowledgements
Thispaperisinformedbyinsightsfromtheproject“MOSAICClimatechangemitigationpolicies,landgrabbingandconflictinfragilestates:understandingintersections,exploringtransformationsinMyanmarandCambodia”,2014-2018,fundedbyNWOandDFID.Forinformationvisittheprojectwebsiteathttps://www.iss.nl/research/research_programmes/political_economy_of_resources_environment_and_population_per/networks/mosaic/
NotesoncontributorsJenniferFrancoisaresearcheractivistwiththeTransnationalInstitute.After
receivingaPhDinpoliticsin1997intheUS,shebeganworkingwiththePhilippinesolidaritygroupintheNetherlands,andwithlocalpeasantorganizations,ruralcommunityorganizingandhumanrightsgroups.Since2012shehasbeenleadingresearchonruralpoliticsandlandgovernanceinMyanmar.JennyisalsoadjunctfacultywiththeCollegeofHumanitiesandDevelopment(COHD)attheChinaAgriculturalUniversityinBeijing.
ClaraMiYoungParkisaPhDcandidateattheInternationalInstituteofSocialStudies
inTheHague,Netherlands.Herresearchfocusesonthegenderedand‘generationed’politicaleconomyofclimatechangeandresourcegrabbinginMyanmar.ClaraisRegionalGenderRuralandSocialDevelopmentOfficerwiththeAsiaPacificRegionalOfficeoftheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsinBangkok.
RomanHerreholdsaM.A.ingeography(minoringinethnology)fromWestfälische
Wilhelms-UniversitätMünster.Heisseniorpolicyadviserlandandagriculture2007-presentwiththehumanrightsorganizationFIANGermany.Hismainactivitiesincludecaseworkonselectedcasesoflandconflicts,humanrightsexpertiseonlandissuesandpolicydevelopment.Heisalsopartofnationaland
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internationalnetworking,researchinrurallandrelatedconflicts,consultationofgovernmentsandNGOs,educationalwork,lectures.
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i Here, we refer to international regulatory instruments, processes and monitoring
mechanisms, tools and entities collectively as international regulatory instruments.
However, these instruments vary considerably in terms of legitimacy, ownership,
accountability and enforceability. For instance, “corporate-led” instruments are developed
by private sector actors, sometimes together with civil society actors, as self-regulatory
tools and can be sector-wide or company-specific. ii Margulis, McKeon, and Borras (2013, 5) highlight “the rapid elevation of land grabbing
onto the global governance agenda and a flurry of global rule-making projects at various
scales involving a multiplicity of actors to regulate land-grabbing.”
iii See TNI 2016. “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Policymaking n
Myanmar: A response to the draft National Land Use Policy”. 13 (Accessed 5 April 2016).
https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_challenge_of_democratic_and_inclusive_land_poli
cymaking_in_myanmar.pdf.
iv See http://iphrdefenders.net/cambodia-prey-lang-community-network-plcn-press-release-
attempted-murdered-plcn-activist/
v Springate-Baginski, Oliver 2013.
vi Scheidel and Work 2015.
vii Bourdieu (1987) differentiates between diverse fields of social regulation to illuminate
different individual actors and groups of actors embedded in field-specific institutions and
forms of stratification. Their unique combination of bases of power, institutions and forms
of stratification give fields a particular logic and coherence of their own, and therefore, a
degree of autonomy from each other. viii Such practices are a basic feature of many societies, whether they originate in pre-
colonial cultures, or with European Christian missionaries seeking to spread a “harmony
legal model” (Nader 1990; 2001, 21). As von Benda-Beckmann (2001, 52) argues, “Even
if one’s main orientation is to accept the inevitable primacy of the state and state law as the
means for change, one nevertheless has to take into account the overall constellation of
normative and institutional orders in which the state apparatus, its institutions and
regulations, are only one part.” In recognition of customary law, many official legal and
judicial reform initiatives include “non-state justice” components as a way to expand
access to justice without further burdening regular courts. ix Harris 2007, 1. x Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 156. xi Decker, Sage, and Stefanova 2005, 7, 157.
xii FPIC refers to the right to self-determination and to freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development. It is clearly articulated in the United Nations Declaration on the
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from
their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.” (Article 10)
xiii FPIC is appearing in initiatives “…ranging from the safeguard policies of the
multilateral financial institutions; practices of extractive industries; water and energy
development; natural resources management; access to genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge and benefit sharing arrangements; scientific and medical research;
and indigenous cultural heritage” (as noted by Antoanella-Julia Motoc and the Tebtebba
Foundation in a legal commentary submitted to the Commission on Human Rights Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Prosecution of Human Rights, Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, at the twenty third Session, 18–22 July 2005). xiv While it is safe to assume that most international regulatory instruments will address
gender, it is important to remember that gender equality is a contested notion, including in
Asia (Roces 2010), which can lead to different constructions of meanings and politics. The
evidence indicates that overall, women are disproportionately affected vis-a-vis men by
land dispossession (Doss, Summerfield and Tsikata 2014, 3) due to existing hierarchical
structures and patriarchal norms. Conflicts, shocks and competition over scarce resources
can exacerbate existing gender and social disparities and further marginalise those who are
most vulnerable.
xv There are ten core international human rights instruments. For each there is a committee
of experts to monitor implementation of the treaty provisions by its states parties. xvi The term “demonstration” is used here conceptually, as in Herman and Brodhead
(1984). xvii On the “framing” function of social movements, see McAdam, McArthy, and Zald
(1996).
Elfu
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entació
nylaAgricu
lturaenelSigloXXI.
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NazioartekoHizketaldiaELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:
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InternationalColloquiumTHEFUTUREOFFOODANDCHALLENGESFORAGRICULTUREINTHE21stCENTURY:
Debatesaboutwho,howandwithwhatsocial,economicandecologicalimplicationswewillfeedtheworld.
April24th-26th.EuropaCongressPalace.VitoriaGasteiz.Álava.BasqueCountry/Europe
ColoquioInternacionalELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:
Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicasalimentaráelmundo.
\]/\^deAbril,\_`a.PalaciodeCongresosEuropa.Vitoria-Gasteiz.Álava.PaísVasco.Europa.
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2017koapirilaren24/26.EuropaBiltzarJauregia.Vitoria-Gasteiz.Araba.EuskalHerria.Europa.