Post on 30-Jan-2021
Reco
nstru
ctio
n an
d re
gion
al d
iplo
mac
y in
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f
ROOS
HAKG
AMIR
AIIM
ADI
Edite
d by
Ho
osha
ng A
mira
hmad
i an
d Na
der E
ntes
sar
Lon
don
and
New
Yor
k
Part
I
Pers
ian
Gulf
in tu
rmoi
l: po
litic
al a
nd e
cono
mic
di
men
sion
s
Intro
duct
ion
Hoos
hang
Am
irahm
adi a
nd N
ader
Ent
essa
r
The
Pers
ian
Gul
f is
argu
ably
the
mos
t vol
atile
and
mili
tariz
ed
regi
on in
the
Third
Wor
ld. T
he c
ombi
natio
n of
pol
itica
l vol
atili
ty
and
mili
tariz
atio
n ha
s mad
e th
e G
ulf s
usce
ptib
le to
out
side
inte
r-ve
ntio
n an
d re
gion
al p
ower
pla
ys. T
he e
ight
-yea
r war
bet
wee
n Ir
an a
nd Ir
aq, I
raq'
s in
vasi
on a
nd o
ccup
atio
n of
Kuw
ait o
n 2
Aug
ust 1
990
and
the
US-
led
war
aga
inst
Iraq
in d
efen
ce o
f Am
eri-
can
inte
rest
s, th
e Sa
udi m
onar
chy
and
the
al-S
abah
rule
in K
uwai
t ar
e co
ncre
te e
xam
ples
of t
he a
fore
men
tione
d re
ality
. T
he c
risi
s in
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f gen
erat
ed b
y Ir
aqi P
resi
dent
Sa
ddam
Hus
sein
's ga
mbl
e on
Kuw
ait h
as p
rovi
ded
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es w
ith a
win
dow
of o
ppor
tuni
ty to
est
ablis
h, in
the
wor
ds o
f on
e an
alys
t, `s
trate
gic
brid
gehe
ads,
sec
ure
the
Gul
f, an
d en
sure
th
at it
reta
ins
a vi
rtual
mon
opol
y on
glo
bal v
iole
nce'.
' US
troop
de
ploy
men
t in
the
regi
on u
nder
the
rubr
ic o
f Ope
ratio
n D
eser
t Sh
ield
, and
thei
r suc
cess
ful u
se a
gain
st Ir
aq in
Ope
ratio
n D
eser
t St
orm
, will
test
the
prin
cipl
es o
f the
em
ergi
ng B
ush
Doc
trine
. Thi
s do
ctrin
e en
visio
ns a
pos
t-Col
d W
ar g
loba
l arra
ngem
ent d
omin
ated
by
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es, w
ith w
este
rn E
urop
e, Ja
pan
and
the
form
er
Sovi
et U
nion
act
ing
as ju
nior
par
tner
s. A
s sta
ted
mor
e bl
untly
by
Mic
hael
Vla
hos,
dire
ctor
of t
he U
S St
ate
Dep
artm
ent's
Cen
ter f
or
the
Stud
y of
For
eign
Affa
irs:
If w
e m
arch
ed ri
ght i
nto
Bag
hdad
, bro
ught
Sad
dam
Hus
sein
ba
ck in
a c
age
and
para
ded
him
dow
n Pe
nnsy
lvan
ia A
venu
e,
the
wor
ld w
ould
take
not
ice.
We
wou
ld h
ave
grea
t fre
edom
of
actio
n in
the
wor
ld fo
r the
nex
t 10
to 2
0 ye
ars,
... P
eopl
e w
ould
tru
ly re
spec
t us,
and
if w
e sa
id th
at w
e di
dn't
like
wha
t the
y di
d, th
ey'd
sit
up a
nd ta
ke n
otic
e.'
Far f
rom
cre
atin
g a
wor
ld su
bmis
sive
to th
e w
ill o
f Was
hing
ton,
4 Pe
rsia
n G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l In
trod
ucti
on 5
this
hege
mon
ic c
once
ptio
n of
the
USA
's re
-em
ergi
ng g
loba
l rol
e co
uld,
in th
e lo
ng ru
n, le
ad to
law
less
ness
, cha
os a
nd in
stabi
lity.
Th
is is
esp
ecia
lly tr
ue in
the
vola
tile
regi
on o
f the
Mid
dle
East
. Th
eref
ore,
it is
impe
rativ
e th
at th
e lit
tora
l sta
tes o
f the
Per
sian
G
ulf t
ake
serio
us st
eps t
o fo
rm re
gion
al se
curit
y ar
rang
emen
ts to
gu
aran
tee
the
secu
rity
and
terri
toria
l int
egrit
y of
all
state
s in
the
area
, and
to o
bvia
te th
e ne
ed fo
r any
futu
re o
utsi
de m
ilita
ry
inte
rven
tion
whi
ch in
varia
bly
will
lead
to d
isastr
ous c
onsq
uenc
es
for t
he re
gion
. W
hen
Pres
iden
t Geo
rge
Bus
h di
spat
ched
US
troop
s to
Saud
i A
rabi
a in
Aug
ust 1
990,
he
iden
tifie
d fo
ur g
oals
for U
S po
licy
in
the r
egio
n:
1 un
cond
ition
al w
ithdr
awal
of I
raqi
forc
es fr
om K
uwai
t 2
resto
ratio
n of
the
al-S
abah
fam
ily a
s the
legi
timat
e go
vern
men
t of
Kuw
ait
3 pr
otec
tion
of th
e liv
es o
f Am
eric
an c
itize
ns in
Kuw
ait a
nd Ir
aq
4 de
fenc
e of
Sau
di A
rabi
a an
d a
com
mitm
ent t
o th
e se
curit
y an
d sta
bilit
y of
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f reg
ion.
' A
long
with
oth
er U
S of
ficia
ls, h
e al
so sp
oke
of S
adda
m's
dang
er
to w
orld
pea
ce a
nd 'A
mer
ican
way
of l
ife'.
It is
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f sec
urity
obj
ectiv
e th
at m
ay h
ave
far-
reac
hing
and
unp
redi
ctab
le im
plic
atio
ns fo
r reg
iona
l sta
bilit
y. A
s Pr
esid
ent B
ush
has m
ade
it cl
ear,
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es p
lan
to u
se
its m
ilita
ry v
icto
ry in
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f to
just
ify e
stab
lishi
ng a
lo
ng-te
rm a
nd p
erm
anen
t mili
tary
pre
senc
e in
the
regi
on. T
hus,
the
first
am
ong
the
four
obj
ectiv
es h
e ou
tline
d fo
r the
pos
t-war
M
iddl
e Ea
st w
as 't
o cr
eate
shar
ed se
curit
y ar
rang
emen
ts in
the
regi
on', w
hich
in P
resid
ent B
ush's
wor
d m
eans
'Am
eric
an p
artic
i-pa
tion
in jo
int e
xerc
ises i
nvol
ving
bot
h ai
r and
gro
und
forc
es', a
nd
'mai
ntai
ning
a ca
pabl
e US
nava
l pre
senc
e in
the r
egio
n'. T
he o
ther
th
ree o
bjec
tives
incl
uded
`to
cont
rol t
he p
rolif
erat
ion
of w
eapo
ns o
f m
ass d
estru
ctio
n an
d th
e m
issile
s use
d to
del
iver
them
', `to
cre
ate
new
opp
ortu
nitie
s for
pea
ce a
nd st
abili
ty in
the
Mid
dle
East
by
endi
ng th
e A
rab-
Isra
eli c
onfli
ct a
nd so
lvin
g th
e Pa
lesti
nian
pro
b-le
m b
ased
on
the
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
Sec
urity
Cou
ncil
Res
olut
ions
24
2 an
d 33
8 an
d th
e pr
inci
ple
of te
rrito
ry fo
r pea
ce', a
nd to
'fos
ter
econ
omic
dev
elop
men
t for
the
sake
of p
eace
and
pro
gres
s and
ec
onom
ic fr
eedo
m a
nd p
rosp
erity
for a
ll pe
ople
of t
he re
gion
':' W
hate
ver t
he fo
rm an
d co
nten
ts of
the r
egio
nal s
ecur
ity sy
stem
, th
e pl
ayer
s in
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f will
hav
e to
incl
ude
such
cou
ntrie
s
as Ir
an, I
raq
and
the
Gul
f Co-
oper
atio
n C
ounc
il (G
CC
) sta
tes.
How
ever
, the
initi
al p
ropo
sals
for t
he P
ersia
n G
ulf s
ecur
ity sy
stem
di
d no
t env
isio
n an
y ro
le fo
r Ira
n or
Iraq
. Whi
le Ir
aq m
ay n
ot
be an
impo
rtant
pla
yer f
or th
e im
med
iate
futu
re, I
ran
has e
mer
ged
stron
ger f
rom
the
crisi
s as i
ts ol
d ne
mes
is be
cam
e m
ilita
rily
neu-
traliz
ed. A
dditi
onal
ly, I
ran
is a c
ount
ry w
ith si
gnifi
cant
reso
urce
s an
d po
tent
ials,
incl
udin
g a
larg
e po
pula
tion
of 5
7 m
illio
n, a
size
-ab
le m
ilita
ry fo
rce,
the
long
est c
oast
line
with
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f th
an a
ny si
ngle
stat
e in
the
area
and
a u
niqu
e ge
ogra
phic
pos
ition
in
the
stra
tegi
c St
rait
of H
orm
uz. I
f pas
t exp
erie
nce
is o
f any
in
dica
tion,
Iran
will
con
tinue
to p
rese
rve
its n
atio
nal s
ecur
ity
inte
rests
in th
e ar
ea. T
hus,
it is
likel
y th
at Ir
an w
ill re
-em
erge
as
a pi
vota
l cou
ntry
in sh
apin
g th
e co
ntou
rs o
f reg
iona
l pol
itics
in
the
twen
ty-fi
rst c
entu
ry. I
t is f
or th
ese
reas
ons t
hat t
his b
ook
has
an Ir
an-c
entre
d ap
proa
ch to
the
issue
s of r
egio
nal d
iplo
mac
y an
d po
st-w
ar ec
onom
ic re
cove
ry.
The
book
focu
ses o
n fo
ur m
ajor
them
es: I
slam
and
revo
lutio
n,
econ
omic
des
truct
ion
and
reco
nstru
ctio
n, Ir
ania
n-A
rab
rela
tions
an
d th
e su
perp
ower
s and
Iran
. The
con
tribu
tors
hav
e pr
esen
ted
diffe
ring
pers
pect
ives
to an
alys
e the
se is
sues
and
indi
cate
pos
sible
fu
ture
dev
elop
men
ts. T
he fo
llow
ing
conc
lusi
ons e
mer
ge: f
irst,
influ
ence
of t
he Ir
ania
n Re
volu
tion
has g
one
wel
l bey
ond
Iran
to
effe
ct in
tern
al d
evel
opm
ents
in o
ther
nat
ions
in th
e re
gion
; suc
h in
fluen
ce, h
owev
er, h
as n
ot p
rodu
ced
any
signi
fican
t per
man
ent
polit
ical
-eco
nom
ic ch
ange
in th
e reg
ion.
Sec
ond,
des
pite
its e
con-
omic
dec
line i
n th
e pos
t-rev
olut
iona
ry p
erio
d, Ir
an m
ay em
erge
as
a re
gion
al e
cono
mic
pow
er in
the
near
futu
re a
s it c
hang
es it
s po
licie
s tow
ard
a m
ore
outw
ard-
look
ing
strat
egy.
Thi
rd, I
rani
an
postu
re v
is-à-
vis t
he li
ttora
l sta
tes
of th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf h
as h
ad
little
con
siste
ncy
in th
e pa
st; m
ore
rece
ntly
, how
ever
, ele
men
ts of
pr
agm
atis
m h
ave
begu
n to
dom
inat
e Ir
ania
n re
gion
al p
olic
y.
Four
th, t
he Ir
ania
n fo
reig
n po
licy
prin
cipl
e of
'Nei
ther
Eas
t Nor
W
est'
had
the
effe
ct o
f ant
agon
izin
g bo
th su
perp
ower
s, al
thou
gh
in p
ract
ical
term
s it h
ad a
lim
ited
appl
icat
ion.
In sh
ort,
gaps
hav
e ex
iste
d be
twee
n th
e ac
tual
per
form
ance
and
the
pote
ntia
l in
the
real
m o
f eco
nom
ics a
s wel
l as b
etw
een
polic
y pr
onou
ncem
ents
and
the
prac
tice
of re
gion
al d
iplo
mac
y in
the
Isla
mic
Rep
ublic
. The
re
sulti
ng c
ontra
dict
ions
hav
e be
com
e m
ajor
cau
ses f
or th
e re
cent
ch
ange
s in
Iran
tow
ard
mor
e pr
agm
atism
and
con
vent
iona
lism
in
both
econ
omic
and
fore
ign
polic
y ar
enas
. In
Par
t II o
f the
boo
k, th
e ro
le o
f Isla
m a
nd th
e sig
nific
ance
of
6 Pe
rsia
n G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l In
trod
uctio
n 7
Iran
's Is
lam
ic R
evol
utio
n ar
e exa
min
ed. N
ikki
Ked
die i
dent
ifies
hi
storic
al re
ason
s for
the e
mer
genc
e and
cont
inua
tion
of re
volu
tion-
ary
thou
ght a
nd a
ctio
n in
mod
ern
Iran
and
trea
ts Ir
ania
n R
evo-
lutio
n in
hist
oric
al p
ersp
ectiv
e. K
eddi
e's c
hapt
er a
lso p
rovi
des a
su
ccin
ct o
verv
iew
of t
he h
istor
ical
role
of t
he u
lama
(Mus
lim cl
eri-
cal s
chol
ars)
in o
ppos
ing
fore
ign
dom
inat
ion
of th
e cou
ntry
. The
18
90-2
Tob
acco
Rev
olt i
s illu
stra
tive
of h
ow th
e Sh
i'a c
leri
cs
led
a m
ass-
base
d re
belli
on a
gain
st N
asse
r ed-
din
Shah
's to
bacc
o co
nces
sions
to th
e Bri
tish.
The
197
8-9
Isla
mic
Rev
olut
ion
agai
nst
the
Pahl
avi m
onar
chy
shou
ld p
ot b
e in
terp
rete
d as
an
isola
ted
case
but
as t
he lo
gica
l con
tinua
tion
of m
ass-
base
d re
volts
aga
inst
op
pres
sion
and
the
fore
ign
dom
inat
ion
of Ir
an fo
r m
uch
of th
e tw
entie
th ce
ntur
y.
Amon
g th
e pol
itica
l ulam
a in
cont
empo
rary
Iran
, Aya
tolla
h K
ho-
mei
ni o
ccup
ies a
ver
y sp
ecia
l pla
ce: h
e was
not
onl
y th
e lea
der o
f th
e Isla
mic
Rev
olut
ion
in Ir
an b
ut a
lso th
e ide
olog
ue o
f the
Isla
mic
R
epub
lic. G
eorg
e Lin
abur
y's c
hapt
er ex
amin
es A
yato
llah
Kho
m-
eini
's le
gacy
and
the i
mpa
ct o
f his
teac
hing
s on
Isla
mic
resu
rgen
ce
thro
ugho
ut th
e Mid
dle E
ast.
Exte
rnal
ly, K
hom
eini
's le
gacy
con-
tinue
s to
be fe
lt in
the
Isla
mic
wor
ld th
roug
h w
ord
of m
outh
, jo
urna
ls an
d pe
riod
ical
s, an
d Is
lam
ic g
roup
s of d
iver
se p
oliti
cal
mak
e-up
and
ideo
logi
cal o
rien
tatio
n. A
s Lin
abur
y no
tes,
Kho
m-
eini
's Sh
i'ism
did
not
dim
inish
the r
elev
ance
of t
he Ir
ania
n R
evo-
lutio
n fo
r th
e Su
nni A
rabs
. Thi
s was
so b
ecau
se th
e sig
nific
ance
of
Iran
's Is
lam
ic R
evol
utio
n di
d no
t lie
in
Kho
mei
ni's
relig
ious
ex
eges
is bu
t in
the
polit
ical
mes
sage
of t
he R
evol
utio
n co
nvey
ed
to th
e A
rab
mas
ses:
that
Isla
m c
an b
e us
ed a
s an
effe
ctiv
e to
ol
by th
e mo
staza
ftn
(the
opp
ress
ed) a
gain
st th
e mo
stakb
arin
(th
e op
pres
sors
). H
owev
er, t
he p
oten
cy o
f thi
s mes
sage
may
be d
imin
-ish
ing
as h
is su
cces
sors
in Ir
an m
ove i
ncre
asin
gly
away
from
the
ideo
logy
tow
ard
conv
entio
nal p
olic
ies a
nd a
ttem
pt to
rein
tegr
ate
Iran
into
wes
tern
capi
talis
m.
A se
cond
impo
rtan
t leg
acy
of A
yato
llah
Kho
mei
ni h
as b
een
the
inst
itutio
naliz
atio
n of
vela
yat-e
faqi
h (g
over
nmen
t of j
ust j
urisp
ru-
denc
e). T
his i
nstit
utio
n, ei
ther
in it
s one
-man
dom
inan
t for
mat
or
in a
ny fu
ture
colle
ctiv
e for
mat
, has
till
now
def
ined
the
raiso
n d'êt
re
of th
e Is
lam
ic R
epub
lic. I
ts m
ajor
eff
ect i
s to
subo
rdin
ate
the
wisd
om o
f a w
hole
nat
ion
to th
e w
isdom
of a
sing
le p
erso
n or
a
smal
l col
lect
ive.
Even
whe
n th
e Aya
tolla
h w
as a
live,
som
e rel
igio
us
auth
oriti
es to
ok is
sue
with
the
inst
itutio
n an
d qu
estio
ned
its v
al-
idity
in Is
lam
. Eve
n its
def
ende
rs h
ad a
t tim
es d
efin
ed it
diff
eren
tly
from
the
Aya
tolla
h. W
heth
er th
e in
stitu
tion
will
surv
ive
in it
s pr
esen
t for
m fo
r an
y lo
ng p
erio
d of
tim
e re
mai
ns to
be
seen
; as
the
gove
rnm
ent c
lose
s its
gap
s with
the
wes
t and
the
secu
lar
Iran
ians
, pre
ssur
e for
som
e kin
d of
mod
ifica
tion
in th
e ins
titut
ion
has i
ncre
ased
. Pe
rhap
s no
singl
e A
rab
coun
try
has b
een
mor
e in
fluen
ced
by
Aya
tolla
h K
hom
eini
's te
achi
ng a
nd th
e Isla
mic
Rev
olut
ion
than
Le
bano
n. A
ugus
tus R
icha
rd N
orto
n's c
hapt
er a
naly
ses t
he im
pact
of
Iran
's Is
lam
ic re
viva
l on
the S
hi'a
com
mun
ity o
f Leb
anon
. As
Nor
ton
argu
es, t
he S
hi'a
com
mun
ity, t
he si
ngle
larg
est g
roup
in
Leba
non,
had
bee
n ig
nore
d. b
y m
ost w
este
rn o
bser
vers
of t
hat
coun
try
until
the v
ictor
y of
the I
rani
an R
evol
utio
n. T
he a
wake
ning
of
Leb
anon
's Sh
i'a c
omm
unity
cat
apul
ted
its m
embe
rs fr
om a
n ig
nore
d re
ligio
us a
nd et
hnic
min
ority
into
an
obje
ct o
f sen
satio
nal
repo
rtin
g. In
the
wes
t, th
e Sh
i'a a
lso b
ecam
e sy
nony
mou
s with
te
rror
ism. N
orto
n se
ts ou
t to
rebu
ke a
num
ber o
f myt
hs a
ssoc
iate
d w
ith p
opul
ar r
epor
ting
abou
t and
per
cept
ion
of th
e Sh
i'a in
the
west.
He t
race
s the
dev
elopm
ent o
f the
pol
itica
l ide
olog
y of
Shi
'ism
in
its L
eban
ese c
onte
xt. T
he ro
le of
the t
radi
tiona
l zu
'am
a (p
oliti
cal
boss
es) a
nd th
e su
bseq
uent
dec
line
of th
eir
influ
ence
am
ong
the
Shi'a
mas
ses p
aved
the
way
for
the
esta
blis
hmen
t of t
wo
non-
trad
ition
al S
hi'a
pol
itica
l gro
upin
gs —
AM
AL
and
Hiz
b A
llah
(P
arty
o
f G
od
). •
Both
of t
hese
org
aniz
atio
ns st
arte
d w
ith Ir
ania
n as
sista
nce a
nd
lead
ersh
ip, b
ut H
izb
Alla
h is
toda
y m
ore
clos
ely
alig
ned
than
A
MA
L w
ith Ir
an's
fore
ign
polic
y ob
ject
ives
in th
e M
iddl
e Ea
st.
Alth
ough
the I
rani
an R
evol
utio
n ga
lvan
ized
the S
hi'a
com
mun
ity,
Isra
el's
inva
sion
of L
eban
on in
198
2 ha
d a
grea
t im
pact
on
the
polit
iciz
atio
n an
d ra
dica
lizat
ion
of L
eban
ese S
hi'a
s. Th
is w
as p
ar-
ticul
arly
true
in th
e cas
e of t
he S
hi'a
s of S
outh
ern
Leba
non
whe
re
thei
r liv
elih
ood
and
com
mun
al li
fe w
ere t
otal
ly d
isrup
ted
by th
e Is
rael
i atta
cks a
nd p
erio
dic
raid
s on
the
Shi'a
vill
ages
. Des
pite
sa
crifi
ces,
the L
eban
ese S
hi'a
s are
no
bette
r off
in th
e ear
ly 1
990s
th
an th
ey w
ere
back
in, s
ay, 1
980;
as I
ran
chan
ges i
ts fo
reig
n po
licy
dire
ctio
n, th
ey w
ill b
ecom
e inc
reas
ingl
y iso
late
d in
Leb
anon
an
d in
the
Mid
dle
East
. A
maj
or co
nseq
uenc
e of t
he Is
lam
ic R
evol
utio
n in
Iran
was
the
Iran
-Iraq
War
, whi
ch le
ft a
deva
statin
g im
pact
on
the I
rani
an a
nd
Iraq
i eco
nom
ies.
In P
art I
II Ir
an's
econ
omic
pro
blem
s, im
pact
of
the
Iran
-Ira
q w
ar, a
nd th
e co
untr
y's r
econ
stru
ctio
n pl
an a
re •
exam
ined
. Inc
lusio
n of
sim
ilar c
hapt
ers o
n Ir
aq b
ecam
e und
esir
-
8 Pe
rsia
n G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l
able
as t
he im
pact
of t
he su
bseq
uent
US-
led
war
aga
inst
Iraq
m
akes
the
Iraqi
loss
es fr
om th
e pr
evio
us w
ar lo
ok in
signi
fican
t. A
ccor
ding
to a
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
' rep
ort p
repa
red
by M
artti
A
htisa
ari,
the U
nder
-Sec
reta
ry-G
ener
al:
The
rece
nt c
onfli
ct h
as w
roug
ht n
ear a
poca
lypt
ic re
sults
upo
n th
e ec
onom
ic in
fras
truct
ure
of w
hat h
ad b
een,
unt
il Ja
nuar
y 19
91, a
rath
er u
rban
ized
and
mec
hani
zed
soci
ety.
Now
, mos
t m
eans
of m
oder
n lif
e su
ppor
t hav
e be
en d
estro
yed
or re
nder
ed
tenu
ous.
Iraq
has,
for s
ome
time
to c
ome,
bee
n re
lega
ted
to a
pr
e-in
dustr
ial a
ge, b
ut w
ith 'a
ll th
e disa
bilit
ies o
f pos
t-ind
ustri
al
depe
nden
cy o
n an
inte
nsiv
e use
of e
nerg
y an
d te
chno
logy
. 3
The
Iran
-Ira
q W
ar w
as 'd
emon
stra
bly
diff
eren
t fro
m o
ther
in
tra-T
hird
Wor
ld w
ars i
n te
rms o
f its
des
truct
iven
ess a
nd it
s un
ique
alli
ance
form
atio
ns'.°
Iraq
, sup
porte
d by
the
pro-
wes
tern
A
rab
stat
es, p
artic
ular
ly S
audi
Ara
bia,
Egy
pt a
nd K
uwai
t, po
r-tra
yed
its w
ar a
gain
st Ir
an a
s a 'h
isto
ric d
efen
se o
f Ara
b so
ve-
reig
nty
and
right
s aga
inst
the
mar
audi
ng P
ersia
ns'.?
Iran
, on
the
othe
r han
d, ju
stifie
d th
e con
tinua
tion
of th
e war
in te
rms o
f def
end-
ing
the
hom
elan
d, p
unis
hing
the
aggr
esso
r, an
d re
plac
ing
the
Ba'a
thi r
egim
e of
Sad
dam
Hus
sein
. Whe
n th
e gu
ns fi
nally
fell
sile
nt, n
eith
er c
ount
ry w
as a
ble
to a
chie
ve it
s st
ated
goa
ls. I
n hu
man
term
s, m
ore
than
600
,000
peo
ple
died
or w
ere
seve
rely
in
jure
d an
d m
aim
ed a
s a re
sult
of th
e w
ar. M
illio
ns w
ere
also
di
spla
ced,
mad
e ho
mel
ess o
r los
t the
ir jo
bs a
nd so
urce
s of l
ivel
i-ho
od. I
n ec
onom
ic te
rms,
dam
age
to e
ach
coun
try's
infra
struc
-tu
res,
plan
ts, an
d ot
her m
eans
of p
rodu
ctio
n ha
ve b
een
stagg
erin
g.8
The
war
, whi
ch st
arte
d w
ith Ir
aq's
sim
ulta
neou
s air
and
land
at
tack
s aga
inst
Irani
an e
cono
mic
and
mili
tary
targ
ets o
n 22
Sep
-te
mbe
r 198
0, e
nded
on
20 A
ugus
t 198
8 w
ith Ir
an's
acce
ptan
ce o
f a
UN
spon
sore
d ce
ase-
fire
(Sec
urity
Cou
ncil
Res
olut
ion
598)
. W
hile
a fo
rmal
pea
ce tr
eaty
has
not
bee
n sig
ned
betw
een
the
two
coun
tries
, ten
sion
betw
een
them
has
dec
lined
des
pite
a re
surg
ence
of
hos
tility
at t
he e
nd o
f the
US-
led
war
aga
inst
Iraq
and
the
subs
eque
nt sh
ort-l
ived
Iraq
i civ
il w
ar. T
hey
esta
blish
ed d
iplo
mat
ic
ties i
n O
ctob
er 1
990
follo
win
g Ira
q's ac
cept
ance
of I
ran's
prin
cipa
l de
man
ds, i
nclu
ding
the
prin
cipl
e of
a
thal
weg
line
for S
hatt
al-A
rab
(mid
-cha
nnel
of t
he ri
ver a
s the
bou
ndar
y de
mar
catio
n be
twee
n th
e tw
o co
untr
ies)
. Thi
s ch
ange
in Ir
aq's
posi
tion
occu
rred
afte
r Sad
dam
inva
ded
and
then
ann
exed
Kuw
ait a
nd
deci
ded
to se
cure
Iraq
's bo
rder
s with
Iran
. 9
Intro
duct
ion
9
Hoo
shan
g A
mira
hmad
i's ch
apte
r on
the I
rani
an ec
onom
y be
gins
w
ith an
anal
ysis
of th
e war
des
truct
ion
whi
ch al
so h
ad fa
r-rea
chin
g im
plic
atio
ns fo
r the
cou
ntry
's oi
l rev
enue
, Ira
n's e
cono
mic
life
bl
ood.
The
offi
cial
ly es
timat
ed to
tal e
cono
mic
dam
age (
dire
ct an
d in
dire
ct) i
s giv
en a
t abo
ut $
870,
000
mill
ion
(at o
ffici
al e
xcha
nge
rate
of R
ls 7
5/U
K fr
ee m
arke
t rat
es fo
r mos
t of t
he p
ost-r
evol
-ut
iona
ry p
erio
d ha
s bee
n ab
ove R
ls 1,
000/
US$
). To
com
pare
, ove
r th
e 19
79-8
9 pe
riod,
Iran
mad
e le
ss th
an $
145,
000
mill
ion
in o
il re
venu
es. A
mira
hmad
i also
pro
vide
s a p
relim
inar
y as
sess
men
t of
the d
amag
e wre
cked
on
the e
cono
my
by th
e Jun
e 199
0 ea
rthqu
ake.
In th
e fin
al p
art h
e foc
uses
on
eigh
t set
s of i
mba
lanc
es fr
om w
hich
th
e ec
onom
y su
ffers
the
mos
t. A
s Am
irahm
adi d
emon
strat
es, t
he
post-
revo
lutio
nary
Iran
ian
econ
omy
has e
xper
ienc
ed si
gnifi
cant
tu
rbul
ence
and
decl
ine a
nd n
eeds
a co
nsid
erab
le in
ject
ion
of m
oney
an
d m
ater
ial t
o re
turn
to n
orm
al a
nd th
en st
art t
o gr
ow a
gain
. In
addi
tion
to th
e war
, he b
lam
es fl
uctu
atio
ns in
oil
reve
nue,
wes
tern
ec
onom
ic em
barg
oes,
the S
hah's
econ
omic
lega
cy, d
omes
tic p
oliti
-ca
l fac
tiona
lism
, and
erra
tic ec
onom
ic p
olic
ies f
or th
e per
form
ance
of
the e
cono
my.
In
Cha
pter
5 A
mira
hmad
i foc
uses
on
the F
irst F
ive-
Yea
r Eco
n-om
ic, S
ocia
l and
Cul
tura
l Dev
elop
men
t Pla
n of
the I
slam
ic R
epub
-lic
of I
ran
(198
9-93
). Th
e pl
an in
tend
s to
stabi
lize
the
econ
omy
and
struc
tura
lly a
djus
t its
imba
lanc
es in
the
hope
of n
orm
aliz
ing
the
war
eco
nom
y an
d th
en le
adin
g it
tow
ard
a gr
owth
pat
h. A
n ac
coun
t of p
olic
y ch
ange
s in
the w
ake o
f the
Per
sian
Gul
f cris
is is
also
giv
en. I
nitia
lly, t
he p
lan
had
envi
sion
ed a
n im
port-
subs
ti-tu
tion
indu
stria
lizat
ion
base
d on
max
imum
util
izat
ion
of th
e exi
st-in
g ca
paci
ties
and
com
plet
ion
of u
nfin
ishe
d pr
ojec
ts. T
his w
as
chan
ged
into
an
expo
rt-pr
omot
ion
indu
stria
lizat
ion
base
d on
ex
tend
ed c
o-op
erat
ion
with
the
wes
t and
the
state
s in
the
regi
on.
The
chap
ter i
s con
clud
ed w
ith a
n as
sess
men
t of p
rosp
ects
for
econ
omic
gro
wth
in Ir
an. W
hile
Iran
is a
reso
urce
-ric
h co
untry
w
ith p
rove
n po
tent
ial f
or g
row
th a
nd e
cono
mic
lead
ersh
ip in
the
Mid
dle
East,
the
succ
ess o
f the
pra
gmat
ists w
ill d
epen
d on
a se
t of
con
ditio
ns in
fore
ign
polic
y, fo
reig
n ex
chan
ge, h
uman
cap
ital,
dom
estic
pol
itics
and
struc
tura
l bot
tlene
cks.
The
Isla
mic
Rev
olut
ion
and
the
Iran
-Ira
q W
ar a
lso
led
to a
co
mpl
ete
rest
ruct
urin
g of
Iran
's re
gion
al d
iplo
mac
y an
d of
its
rela
tions
with
Ara
b co
untri
es.'°
Thu
s, Pa
rt IV
focu
ses o
n re
gion
al
dipl
omac
y an
d ex
plor
es v
ario
us se
curit
y di
men
sions
of I
rani
an-
Ara
b an
d in
ter-A
rab
regi
onal
rela
tions
. Ano
ushi
rava
n Eh
tesh
ami's
10 P
ersi
an G
ulf
in tur
moil
Chap
ter 6
det
ails
Iran's
fore
ign
polic
y to
war
ds th
e Ara
b sta
tes.
As
he n
otes
, tw
o m
ajor
inte
rrela
ted
them
es d
omin
ated
Ara
b-Ira
nian
re
latio
ns d
urin
g th
e Sh
ah's
reig
n: th
e Sh
ah's
de fa
cto r
ecog
nitio
n of
the n
ewly
-cre
ated
stat
e of I
srae
l, an
d th
e int
ense
riva
lry b
etw
een
the P
ahla
vi m
onar
ch an
d Eg
yptia
n Pr
esid
ent G
amal
Abd
ul N
asse
r fo
r inf
luen
ce in
the
Mid
dle
East,
in g
ener
al, a
nd th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf,
in p
artic
ular
." A
crim
onio
us ti
es b
etw
een
Tehr
an a
nd C
airo
gav
e w
ay to
the d
evel
opm
ent o
f clo
ser r
elat
ions
bet
wee
n Ira
n an
d Eg
ypt
afte
r Anw
ar a
l-Sad
at's
acce
ssio
n to
pow
er in
197
0. S
adat
's ab
an-
donm
ent o
f Nas
ser's
pol
icie
s of p
an-A
rabi
sm a
nd n
on-a
lignm
ent
in fa
vour
of a
n A
mer
ican
-Orie
nted
and
acco
mm
odat
ioni
st fo
reig
n po
licy
even
tual
ly le
d to
the
esta
blish
men
t of a
Teh
ran-
Cairo
-Tel
Av
iv ax
is.
The
foun
datio
n of
this
wes
tern
'pill
ar o
f sta
bilit
y' w
as sh
atte
red
whe
n th
e Sh
ah w
as o
verth
row
n in
197
9. N
otw
ithsta
ndin
g th
e str
i-de
nt rh
etor
ic o
f the
Isla
mic
Rep
ublic
's fo
reig
n po
licy,
pos
t-rev
ol-
utio
nary
Iran
ian
fore
ign
polic
y ha
s disp
laye
d bo
th p
ragm
atic
and
id
eolo
gica
l dim
ensi
ons.
For e
xam
ple,
Iran
's ac
com
mod
atio
nist
po
licie
s tow
ards
Tur
key,
Pak
istan
and
the l
ower
Gul
f sta
tes r
efle
ct
Tehr
an's
prag
mat
ism
in d
ealin
g w
ith so
me
of it
s nei
ghbo
urs.
12 However, Iran's opposition to Saudi Arabia and Egypt until re
cent
ly h
ighl
ight
ed th
e id
eolo
gica
l asp
ects
of th
e Is
lam
ic R
epub
-lic
's fo
reig
n po
licy.
Th
e ba
lanc
e be
twee
n th
e pr
agm
atic
and
ideo
logi
cal d
imen
sions
of
Iran
's fo
reig
n po
licy
has b
een
atta
ined
thro
ugh
the
com
plex
in
terp
lay
of ex
tern
al an
d in
tern
al fa
ctor
s tha
t hav
e sha
ped
polit
ical
dy
nam
ics i
n po
st-r
evol
utio
nary
Iran
. With
the
stre
ngth
enin
g of
Pr
esid
ent H
ashe
mi R
afsa
njan
i's c
oalit
ion
and
the
re-e
stabl
ishm
ent
of d
iplo
mat
ic re
latio
ns b
etw
een
Tehr
an a
nd m
any
of it
s ers
twhi
le
enem
ies,
prag
mat
ism
seem
s to
have
bec
ome
a m
ore
impo
rtant
fa
ctor
than
ideo
logi
cal c
onsid
erat
ions
in sh
apin
g th
e co
ntou
rs o
f Ir
an's
emer
ging
fore
ign
polic
y. T
he K
uwai
ti cr
isis
was
with
out
doub
t a m
ajor
turn
ing-
poin
t: as
Am
irahm
adi h
as s
how
n, th
e le
ader
ship
in T
ehra
n us
ed th
e cr
isis
as a
n op
portu
nity
to c
lose
ga
ps n
ot o
nly
with
its A
rab
neig
hbou
rs • b
ut a
lso
with
the
wes
t. Th
is w
as a
ccom
plis
hed
by a
pol
icy
larg
ely
in a
ccor
d w
ith th
at
of th
e an
ti-Ir
aq c
oalit
ion.
In p
artic
ular
, Ira
n su
ppor
ted
all U
N
reso
lutio
ns a
gain
st Ira
q in
clud
ing
the
one
auth
oriz
ing
the
poss
ible
us
e of
mili
tary
forc
e, d
eman
ded
Iraq
's to
tal a
nd u
ncon
ditio
nal
with
draw
al fr
om K
uwai
t and
cont
inue
d to
reco
gniz
e the
legi
timac
y of
the
al-S
abah
fam
ily ru
le in
Kuw
ait.
Iran
also
rem
aine
d ne
utra
l
Intro
duct
ion
11
durin
g th
e w
ar a
nd re
ject
ed th
e ca
ll by
the
radi
cal I
slam
ic m
ove-
men
ts fo
r a 'h
oly
war
'. At t
he e
nd o
f the
war
, Ira
n al
so su
ppor
ted
the
anti-
Sadd
am u
prisi
ngs b
y th
e Ira
qi S
hi'as
and
the
Kur
ds.'
3 M
. E. A
hrar
i's C
hapt
er 7
exa
min
es th
e ro
le o
f the
Gul
f Co-
oper
atio
n Co
unci
l (G
CC) i
n G
ulf s
ecur
ity. T
he G
CC, w
hich
was
es
tabl
ished
in 1
981
by th
e pr
o-w
este
rn c
onse
rvat
ive
regi
mes
of
Saud
i Ara
bia,
Kuw
ait,
the
Uni
ted
Ara
b Em
irate
s, O
man
, Bah
rain
an
d Q
atar
, was
inte
nded
inte
r alia
to sh
ield
its m
embe
r sta
tes f
rom
th
e spi
ll-ov
er ef
fect
s of t
he Ir
an-Ir
aq W
ar."
Beca
use o
f the
GCC
's he
avy
relia
nce
on th
e w
est i
n ge
nera
l and
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es in
pa
rticu
lar,
the
orga
niza
tion
was
vie
wed
by
Tehr
an a
s a sc
hem
e to
is
olat
e an
d co
ntai
n th
e Is
lam
ic R
epub
lic. T
he G
CC
's pr
o-Ir
aqi
post
ure
thro
ugho
ut th
e Ir
an-I
raq
War
furth
er e
nhan
ced
Iran
's su
spic
ion
of t
he u
ltim
ate
polic
y ob
ject
ives
of t
his o
rgan
izat
ion.
Fr
om th
e ou
tset,
Saud
i Ara
bi's
dom
inat
ion
of th
e G
CC a
nd R
iya-
dh's
hege
mon
ic a
mbi
tions
turn
ed th
is or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
n ex
ten-
sion
of S
audi
Ara
bia's
fore
ign
polic
y in
the r
egio
n, th
ereb
y ex
acer
-ba
ting
grow
ing
tens
ions
bet
wee
n Te
hran
and
Riy
adh.
The
GCC
's in
abili
ty to
def
end
the
mem
ber s
tate
s bec
ame
appa
rent
whe
n Ira
q in
vade
d K
uwai
t. W
hile
the
orga
niza
tion
has s
urvi
ved
the
cris
is
beca
use
of th
e A
llied
inte
rven
tion
on it
s beh
alf,
its v
iabi
lity
as a
de
fens
ive
syste
m is
now
uni
vers
ally
que
stion
ed. T
he G
CC n
ow
look
s on
to th
e w
est a
nd Ir
an fo
r a sh
ared
secu
rity
arra
ngem
ent
for t
he P
ersia
n G
ulf,
a de
velo
pmen
t Ira
n ha
s wid
ely
wel
com
ed.
Nad
er E
ntes
sar's
Cha
pter
8 a
naly
ses t
he d
esta
biliz
ing
effe
cts o
f th
e m
ilita
ry a
sym
met
ry b
etw
een
Iran
and
the
Ara
b co
untri
es o
f th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf.
He
prop
oses
thre
e sp
ecifi
c w
ays t
hrou
gh w
hich
re
gion
al st
abili
ty c
an b
e en
hanc
ed:
1 bu
ildin
g a c
ompr
ehen
sive r
egio
nal c
omm
on se
curit
y sy
stem
2
redu
cing
off
ensi
ve c
apab
ilitie
s of t
he c
ount
ries o
f the
regi
on
whi
le en
hanc
ing
thei
r def
ensiv
e cap
abili
ties
3 en
hanc
ing
the
peac
ekee
ping
role
of t
he U
nite
d N
atio
ns
Clea
rly, r
egar
dles
s of w
hich
form
is se
lect
ed an
d fo
llow
ed, r
egio
nal
secu
rity
wou
ld h
ave
to b
e ul
timat
ely
tied
to d
omes
tic c
ondi
tions
in
the
stat
es o
f the
regi
on. O
ften,
regi
onal
con
flict
s hav
e be
en
root
ed in
dom
estic
inad
equa
cies
and
diff
icul
ties o
f the
regi
mes
to
cope
with
them
. Int
ra- a
nd in
ter-
stat
e in
equa
litie
s an
d la
ck o
f po
litic
al d
emoc
racy
hav
e of
ten
play
ed a
maj
or d
esta
biliz
ing
role
in
the
Mid
dle
East
. Su
perp
ower
s an
d ex
tern
al in
terv
entio
ns h
ave
also
pla
yed
12 P
ersia
n G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l In
trod
uctio
n 13
signi
fican
t rol
es in
regi
onal
conf
licts
and
insta
bilit
y. P
art V
disc
usse
s th
e po
licie
s of t
he tw
o su
perp
ower
s tow
ards
Iran
and
exa
min
es
the i
mpa
ct o
f the
se p
olic
ies o
n re
gion
al st
abili
ty. M
ohse
n M
ilani
's C
hapt
er 9
ana
lyse
s the
USA
's co
nfro
ntat
ion
with
Iran
's Is
lam
ic
Revo
lutio
n. A
s Mila
ni c
onte
nds,
activ
e an
imos
ity to
war
ds re
vo-
lutio
ns h
as b
een
one
of th
e m
ost e
ndur
ing
char
acte
ristic
s of U
S fo
reig
n po
licy
in th
e Th
ird W
orld
. Was
hing
ton'
s obs
essio
n w
ith
reve
rsin
g th
e co
urse
of e
vent
s in
Iran
was
in li
ne w
ith th
e an
ti-re
volu
tiona
ry a
nd st
atus
quo
orie
ntat
ion
of U
S fo
reig
n po
licy.
'' Iro
nica
lly, t
his p
olic
y, M
ilani
indi
cate
s, le
d to
insti
tutio
naliz
atio
n of
radi
calis
m in
the
coun
try; a
diff
eren
t cou
rse,
he
impl
ies,
wou
ld
have
bee
n m
ore
help
ful t
o th
e m
oder
ates
and
the
liber
als.
In a
bro
ader
sens
e, W
ashi
ngto
n's s
abre
-rat
tling
and
con
fron
-ta
tiona
l pol
icie
s tow
ards
Iran
refle
cted
a 'n
ew m
ood
of a
larm
and
an
ger'
tow
ards
Thi
rd W
orld
revo
lutio
nary
regi
mes
.' 6 T
he c
oncr
ete
man
ifesta
tion
of th
is be
llico
se m
ood
has b
een
the a
larm
ing
negl
ect
of th
e ar
t of d
iplo
mac
y in
favo
ur o
f 'qu
ick
fix' m
ilita
ry so
lutio
ns
to T
hird
Wor
ld c
rises
. The
USA
's co
mbi
ned
strat
egy
of m
ilita
ry
stren
gth
and
polit
ical
wea
knes
s has
led
to W
ashi
ngto
n's '
regu
lar
need
to re
sort
to v
iole
nce'
whe
n it
inte
rven
es in
Thi
rd W
orld
ar
eas."
As M
ilani
stat
es, s
hort
of m
ilita
ry so
lutio
ns, t
he U
SA's
fore
ign
polic
y in
stitu
tions
hav
e yet
to d
evel
op an
y co
here
nt m
ech-
anism
s for
dea
ling
with
revo
lutio
nary
soci
etie
s. U
S-Ir
ania
n re
latio
ns c
ontin
ue to
be
susp
ende
d at
the
star
t of
1992
. Tw
elve
yea
rs af
ter t
he h
osta
ge cr
isis a
nd th
ree y
ears
afte
r the
`ta
nker
s war
' in
the P
ersia
n G
ulf,
the t
wo
gove
rnm
ents
cont
inue
to
susp
ect e
ach
othe
r. Th
e U
S ho
stag
es in
Leb
anon
(eve
ntua
lly
rele
ased
in D
ecem
ber 1
991)
and
the
Irani
an fr
ozen
ass
ets i
n th
e U
SA w
ere
the
rem
aini
ng st
icky
issu
es. O
n ba
lanc
e, h
owev
er, a
nd
as A
mira
hmad
i writ
es in
Cha
pter
5 o
n re
cons
truct
ion,
'rel
atio
ns
impr
oved
as t
he tw
o go
vern
men
ts' v
iew
s con
verg
ed d
urin
g th
e K
uwai
ti cr
isis'.
Som
e Ira
nian
gov
ernm
ent o
ffici
als h
ave e
ven
calle
d fo
r a 'm
arria
ge o
f con
veni
ence
' bet
wee
n th
e tw
o co
untri
es. 1
9 Whi
le
the
USA
has
rem
aine
d co
ol to
such
invi
tatio
ns, t
he B
ush
adm
inis-
tratio
n is
exp
ecte
d to
be
mor
e re
spon
sive
in th
e fu
ture
as
the
lead
ersh
ip in
Teh
ran
repu
diat
es m
any
of it
s pa
st a
nti-U
nite
d St
ates
pol
icie
s and
dev
elop
s a fr
ee m
arke
t eco
nom
y op
en to
the
capi
talis
t wor
ld m
arke
t. In
the
final
cha
pter
, Moh
iadd
in M
esba
hi e
xam
ines
cha
nge
and
cont
inui
ty in
Sov
iet-I
rani
an re
latio
ns w
ithin
the
cont
ext o
f the
So
viet
Uni
on's
dive
rse
inte
rests
in th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf a
nd th
e In
dian
Oce
an. H
istor
ical
ly, S
ovie
t-Ira
nian
rela
tions
hav
e bee
n in
fluen
ced
by a
set o
f com
plex
fact
ors t
hat h
ave i
nclu
ded
'Rus
sian
prox
imity
to
Iran
, gre
at p
ower
pol
itics
, the
stat
e of
inte
rnat
iona
l pol
itics
, an
d do
mes
tic c
ondi
tions
in b
oth
Russ
ia a
nd Ir
an'.'
9 Fur
ther
mor
e,
Russ
ian
fore
ign
polic
y be
havi
our t
owar
ds Ir
an h
as d
ispla
yed
two
char
acte
ristic
s, th
e `m
axim
'alist
goa
l of d
omin
atin
g Ira
n an
d th
e m
inim
alist
goa
l of p
reve
ntin
g its
dom
inat
ion
by a
riva
l pow
er, o
r at
leas
t sec
urin
g a
shar
e fo
r itse
lf'.2
0 Ira
q's a
ttack
on
Iran
in S
epte
mbe
r 198
0 an
d th
e re
sulti
ng e
ight
-ye
ar w
ar b
etw
een
thes
e tw
o co
untri
es g
reat
ly c
ompl
icat
ed S
ovie
t po
licie
s in
the
regi
on a
s ref
lect
ed in
Mos
cow
's sh
iftin
g be
havi
our
durin
g th
e Gul
f War
. As M
esba
hi o
bser
ves,
the p
erio
d 19
80-2
was
m
arke
d by
'stri
ct n
eutra
lity'
in S
ovie
t beh
avio
ur to
war
ds th
e tw
o be
llige
rent
stat
es. M
osco
w h
ad h
oped
that
Iran
's su
cces
s in
repe
l-lin
g th
e Ir
aqis
from
Iran
ian
terr
itory
wou
ld le
ad to
a p
eace
ful
polit
ical
settl
emen
t of t
he c
onfli
ct. W
hen
Iran
refu
sed
to a
ccep
t Ir
aq's
peac
e of
fers
, the
Sov
iet's
stan
ce sh
ifted
to o
ne o
f 'ac
tive
neut
ralit
y'. F
rom
198
2 to
198
6 th
e So
viet
Uni
on u
rged
bot
h sid
es
to te
rmin
ate
hosti
litie
s whi
le a
t the
sam
e tim
e M
osco
w e
mba
rked
up
on a
pol
icy
of st
reng
then
ing
Iraq's
mili
tary
cap
abili
ties t
o pr
e-ve
nt it
s col
laps
e. F
rom
198
6 to
198
8 th
e So
viet
s tilt
ed h
eavi
ly
tow
ards
Iraq
3s M
osco
w b
ecam
e con
vinc
ed th
at o
nly
Iraqi
vic
tor-
ies o
n th
e ba
ttlef
ield
wou
ld fo
rce
Iran
to a
ccep
t a c
ease
-fire
.' In
the
post-
ceas
e-fir
e pe
riod,
the
Sovi
ets s
ough
t, al
beit
unsu
c-ce
ssfu
lly, t
o m
edia
te b
etw
een
Iran
and
Iraq
and
offe
r the
ir go
od
offic
es. T
he S
ovie
t Uni
on's
polic
y w
as p
redi
cate
d on
the
prem
ise
that
Iran
wou
ld h
elp
Gor
bach
ev ex
trica
te h
imse
lf fro
m th
e Afg
han-
ista
n qu
agm
ire. M
oreo
ver,
Mos
cow
had
toye
d w
ith th
e id
ea o
f cr
eatin
g a
`com
mon
Cen
tral A
sian
hom
e' w
here
by th
e So
viet
U
nion
wou
ld st
reng
then
its p
oliti
cal a
nd e
cono
mic
link
s with
the
Gul
f cou
ntrie
s. Th
is id
ea se
ems t
o ha
ve b
een
drop
ped
for t
he ti
me
bein
g as
Mos
cow
stru
ggle
s with
its m
yria
d of
dom
estic
uph
eava
ls an
d as
the
Gul
f reg
ion
tries
to a
djus
t to
the
vaga
ries o
f the
Gul
f cr
isis. The
incr
easi
ng ro
le o
f Isl
am a
nd Is
lam
ic re
viva
lism
, cou
pled
w
ith se
cess
ioni
st m
ovem
ents
in C
entra
l Asi
a an
d th
e C
auca
sus
also
had
an u
nset
tling
impa
ct o
n lo
ng-ra
nge S
ovie
t pol
icie
s tow
ards
th
e G
ulf r
egio
n. A
s the
upr
isin
gs in
Sov
iet A
zerb
aija
n de
mon
-str
ated
, Mos
cow
bec
ame e
xtre
mel
y un
easy
abou
t the
pro
spec
ts .o
f su
stai
ned
cont
acts
bet
wee
n So
viet
and
Iran
ian
Aze
ris. W
hile
it
was
true
that
bot
h Te
hran
and
Mos
cow
shar
ed c
omm
on a
ims i
n
14 P
ersia
n G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l
mai
ntai
ning
stab
ility
alo
ng th
eir s
hare
d bo
rder
s, th
e se
cess
ioni
st
tend
enci
es a
mon
g th
e So
viet
Aze
ris w
ere
subs
tant
ially
stro
nger
th
an th
ey w
ere
amon
g th
eir I
rani
an c
ount
erpa
rts. C
onse
quen
tly,
the
Sovi
ets w
ere
relu
ctan
t to
allo
w u
nhin
dere
d co
ntac
ts b
etw
een
the
Iran
ian
and
Sovi
et A
zeris
. Afte
r tw
o m
onth
s of
neg
otia
tions
w
ith Ir
ania
n au
thor
ities
, in
Nov
embe
r 199
0 M
osco
w s
igne
d an
ag
reem
ent a
llow
ing
the
esta
blis
hmen
t of p
erm
anen
t bor
der o
pen-
ings
nea
r Ast
ara
city
in n
orth
-wes
t Ira
n an
d pe
rmitt
ing
visi
ts
last
ing
no m
ore
than
fifte
en d
ays b
etw
een
Iran
and
Sov
iet A
zer-
baija
n."
Fina
lly, t
he re
perc
ussio
ns o
f Ira
q's i
nvas
ion
of K
uwai
t, th
e ch
an-
ging
regi
onal
bal
ance
of p
ower
, the
pre
senc
e of
US
troop
s so
clos
e to
Sov
iet b
orde
rs, a
nd th
e st
ill-e
volv
ing
post
-Col
d W
ar in
ter-
natio
nal o
rder
will
con
tinue
to s
hape
the
cont
ours
of M
osco
w's
Gul
f pol
icie
s. A
lthou
gh th
e So
viet
Uni
on s
uppo
rted
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es' p
ostu
re to
war
ds S
adda
m H
usse
in, m
any
Sovi
et o
ffic
ials
ex
pres
sed
grav
e.. c
once
rn a
bout
the
ultim
ate
aim
of U
S m
ilita
ry
obje
ctiv
es in
the
regi
on."
How
the
Rus
sian
s m
anag
e to
bal
ance
th
eir d
esir
e to
mai
ntai
n go
od re
latio
ns w
ith th
e U
nite
d St
ates
w
hile
max
imiz
ing
thei
r lon
g-te
rm in
tere
sts i
n th
e G
ulf w
ill la
rgel
y de
term
ine
Mos
cow
's fo
reig
n po
licy
post
ure
in th
e re
gion
. To
sum
up,
this
boo
k de
mop
stra
tes
the
com
plex
intri
caci
es o
f Ir
an's
dom
estic
pro
blem
s an
d po
licie
s as
wel
l as
its e
xter
nal
rela
tions
. The
pos
t-rev
olut
iona
ry p
erio
d in
Iran
has
witn
esse
d an
ex
traor
dina
ry tu
rn o
f eve
nts,
mos
t of t
hem
unf
avou
rabl
e fo
r Ira
n's
long
-term
dev
elop
men
t and
sta
ndin
g am
ong
the
com
mun
ity o
f na
tions
. The
Rev
olut
ion
has
also
had
sig
nific
ant i
mpa
ct o
n th
e ne
ighb
ourin
g st
ates
but
suc
h in
fluen
ces
have
not
pro
duce
d an
y la
sting
pos
itive
resu
lts in
the
regi
on. T
he m
ove
away
from
ideo
logy
an
d ra
dica
lism
and
tow
ards
a m
ore
prag
mat
ic a
nd c
onve
ntio
nal
dom
estic
and
fore
ign
polic
y is
hop
ed to
reve
rse
thes
e un
favo
urab
le
resu
lts fo
r bet
ter.
Iran
is a
reso
urce
-ric
h na
tion
with
gre
at p
ros-
pect
s for
eco
nom
ic g
row
th a
nd p
oten
tial f
or p
oliti
cal l
eade
rshi
p in
th
e M
iddl
e Ea
st. W
heth
er th
e na
tion
will
be
able
to fu
lly m
ater
ial-
ize
its p
oten
tial u
nder
the
pres
ent p
ragm
atis
t lea
ders
hip
will
la
rgel
y de
pend
on
a co
mpl
ex o
f fac
tors
that
orig
inat
e fro
m d
omes
tic
and
inte
rnat
iona
l pol
itics
and
the
econ
omic
reco
nstru
ctio
n pl
an.
Mea
ning
ful r
efor
ms i
n bo
th o
f the
se a
reas
are
pre
cond
ition
s for
a
bette
r fut
ure
for I
ran
and,
by
exte
nsio
n, it
s ne
ighb
ours
.
Intr
oduc
tion
15
NO
TE
S
1 M
. Wal
ker,
'The
U.S
. and
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f Cris
is',
Wor
ld P
olicy
Jour
nal
7 (4
) Fal
l 199
0: 7
96.
2 Q
uote
d in
Insig
ht 2
4 D
ecem
ber 1
990-
7 Ja
nuar
y 19
91: 1
4.
3 Se
e 'A
mer
ica'
s St
ake
in th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf',
U
S D
epar
tmen
t of S
tate
Di
spat
ch
I (2)
10
Sept
embe
r 199
0: 7
0.
4 Q
uote
d in
New
Yor
k Ti
mes
, 7
Mar
ch 1
991:
A8.
5
Repo
rt to
the S
ecre
tary
-Gen
eral
on
Hum
anita
rian
Need
s in
Kuwa
it an
d Ir
aq in
th
e Im
med
iate
Pos
t-Cris
is En
viro
nmen
t by a
Miss
ion
to th
e Are
a le
d by
Mr.
Mar
tti A
htisa
ari,
Unde
r-Sec
reta
ry-G
ener
al fo
r Adm
inist
ratio
n an
d Man
agem
ent,
date
d 20
Mar
ch 1
991
(New
Yor
k: U
nite
d N
atio
ns S
ecur
ity C
ounc
il S/
22
366,
20
Mar
ch 1
991)
. 6
N. E
ntes
sar,
'Ext
erna
l Inv
olve
men
t in
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f Con
flic
t',
Conf
lict Q
uarte
rly 4
(4) F
all 1
984:
41.
. 7
G. S
ick,
'Tria
l by
Erro
r: R
efle
ctio
ns o
n th
e Ir
an-I
raq
War
', in
R. K
. Ra
maz
ani (
ed.)
Iran
's Re
volu
tion:
The
Sea
rch
for C
onse
nsus
, (B
loom
ingt
on,
Ind:
Indi
ana
Uni
vers
ity P
ress
, 199
0), p
. 105
. 8
See
the
follo
win
g pu
blic
atio
ns o
n th
e ec
onom
ic im
pact
of t
he Ir
an-I
raq
War
: on
Iraq
and
Iran
see
A. A
l-Nas
raw
i, 'E
cono
mic
Con
sequ
ence
s of
the
Iran
-Ira
q W
ar',
Third
Wor
ld Q
uarte
rly
8 (3
) Jul
y 19
86: 8
69-9
4; o
n Ir
aq s
ee K
. Mof
id, '
Econ
omic
Rec
onst
ruct
ion
of Ir
aq: F
inan
cing
the
Peac
e', T
hird
Wor
ld Q
uarte
rly
12 (1
) Jan
uary
199
0: 4
8-59
; on
Iran
(for
ea
rlier
dam
age
estim
ates
and
exp
erie
nces
with
reco
nstru
ctio
n) se
e H
. A
mira
hmad
i, 'E
cono
mic
Rec
onst
ruct
ion
of Ir
an: C
ostin
g th
e W
ar
Dam
age',
Thi
rd W
orld
Qua
rterly
12
(1) J
anua
ry 1
990:
26-
47; H
. Am
ir-ah
mad
i, 'D
estru
ctio
n an
d R
econ
stru
ctio
n: A
Stra
tegy
for t
he W
ar-
Dam
aged
Are
a of
Iran
', D
isaste
rs: T
he In
tern
atio
nal j
ourn
al o
f Disa
ster
Stud
ies a
nd P
ract
ice 1
1 (2
) 198
7: 1
34-4
7; a
nd H
. Am
irahm
adi,
'War
D
amag
e an
d R
econ
stru
ctio
n in
the
Isla
mic
Rep
ublic
of I
ran'
, in
H.
Am
irah
mad
i and
M. P
arvi
n (e
ds)
Post-
Revo
lutio
nary
Iran
(B
ould
er,
Col
o: W
estv
iew
Pre
ss, 1
988)
, pp.
126
-49.
9
H. A
mira
hmad
i, 'Ir
an a
nd th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf C
risis
', in
H. A
mira
hmad
i an
d N
. Ent
essa
r (ed
s) I
ran
and
the A
rab
Wor
ld
(New
Yor
k: S
t Mar
tin's
Pres
s, 19
92.
10 F
or a
n an
alys
is o
f rec
ent t
rend
s in
Iran
ian
fore
ign
polic
y, s
ee th
e ex
celle
nt c
olle
ctio
n of
arti
cles
in N
. R. K
eddi
e an
d M
. J. G
asio
row
ski
(eds
) N
eith
er E
ast N
or W
est:
Iran
, the
Sov
iet U
nion
, and
the U
nite
d St
ates
(N
ew H
aven
, Con
n: Y
ale
Uni
vers
ity P
ress
, 199
0). S
ee a
lso
R. K
. R
amaz
ani,
'Iran
's Fo
reig
n Po
licy:
Con
tend
ing
Orie
ntat
ions
', in
R. K
. R
amaz
ani (
ed.)
Iran
's Re
volu
tion:
The
Sea
rch
for C
onse
nsus
(B
loom
ingt
on,
Ind:
Indi
ana
Uni
vers
ity P
ress
, 199
0), p
p. 4
8-68
. 11
For
a d
etai
led
stud
y of
Isra
el's
rela
tions
with
the
Shah
's re
gim
e, s
ee
S. S
obha
ni,
The P
ragm
atic
Ent
ente
: Isr
aeli-
Iran
ian
Rela
tions
, 194
8-19
88
(New
Yor
k: P
raeg
er, 1
989)
, pp.
1-1
39.
12 S
ee A
. Kap
ur, 'R
elat
ions
with
Pak
istan
and
Indi
a', in
M. R
ezun
(ed.
) Ir
an a
t the
Cro
ssro
ads:
Glo
bal R
elat
ions
in a
Tur
bule
nt D
ecad
e (B
ould
er,
Colo:
Wes
tvie
w P
ress
, 199
0), p
p. 7
1-9;
F. B
orov
ali,
'Iran
and
Tur
key:
16 P
ersi
an G
ulf i
n tu
rmoi
l
Perm
anen
t Rev
olut
ion
or Is
lam
ism
in O
ne C
ount
ry',
in R
eam
(ed.
), pp
. 81-
93.
13 H
. Am
irahm
adi,
'Iran
and
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f Cris
is'.
14 F
or a
revi
ew o
f var
ious
pol
icy
stat
emen
ts o
f the
GC
C, s
ee R
.K.
Ram
azan
i, Th
e Gul
f Coo
pera
tion
Coun
cil: R
ecor
d an
d An
alys
is (C
harlo
ttes-
ville
, Va:
Uni
vers
ity P
ress
of V
irgin
ia, 1
988)
. 15
H. A
mira
hmad
i, Re
volu
tion
and E
cono
mic
Tran
sitio
n: T
he Ir
ania
n Ex
perie
nce
(Alb
any,
NY
: Sta
te U
nive
rsity
of N
ew Y
ork
Pres
s, 19
90),
pp. 2
8-42
. 16
F. H
allid
ay,
Beyo
nd Ir
anga
te: T
he R
eaga
n D
octri
ne a
nd th
e Thi
rd
f l'or
ld (A
mst
erda
m: T
rans
natio
nal I
nstit
ute,
198
7), p
. 12.
17
N. C
hom
sky,
The
Cul
ture
of T
erro
rism
(B
osto
n, M
ass:
Sou
th E
nd P
ress
, 19
88),
p. 1
31.
18 H
. Am
irahm
adi,
'Iran
and
the
Pers
ian
Gul
f Cris
is'.
19 S
. T. H
unte
r, Ir
an a
nd th
e Wor
ld: C
ontin
uity
in a
Rev
olut
iona
ry D
ecad
e (B
loom
ingt
on, I
nd: I
ndia
na U
nive
rsity
Pre
ss, 1
990)
, p. 7
9.
20 Ib
id.
21 F
or a
suc
cinc
t rev
iew
of G
orba
chev
's po
licie
s to
war
ds th
e G
ulf W
ar,
see
R. 0
. Fre
edm
an, '
Gor
bach
ev, I
ran,
and
the
Iran
-Ira
q W
ar',
in
Ked
die
and
Gas
ioro
wsk
i (ed
s), p
p. 1
15-4
1.
22 I
ran
Tim
es,
16 N
ovem
ber 1
990,
p. 1
6.
23 S
ee, f
or e
xam
ple.
, A. G
resh
, 'C
ontin
uity
and
Cha
nge
in S
ovie
t Pol
icy'
, M
iddl
e Eas
t Rep
ort
20 (6
) Nov
embe
r/Dec
embe
r 199
0: 5
.