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Received Apr" 2,2002:Aocepted May 2B, 2002
DESIGN STRATEGY IN HONDA-Case
Study of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEY-
Shin'ya NAGASAWA", Shin'ya IWAKURA'", Masaki IWAIANI'
' Coltege ofBusinessAdministration. Ritsumeikan Univet:sic}L IVoji-higashi. KSatsu, Shiga 525-8577, Japan
#
School ofArt, thmaArt Uhiversic)l }hrimizu, Hachioji, 7bkyo 192-0394. Jopan
Abstract: in this paper we argue the design strategy in Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (Honda) through the case
studies of product develbpment of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEYI ln conclusion, the development
process ofCIVIC yielded the organizational capabilities to Honda: Honda has the mechanism to make a chance
for employee to meet another employee, to reduce the uncertaintyi to investigate the knowledge and ski11 of
employee. The design strategy of the process of product development of 2nd PRELUDE in Honda implies
three design elements: eternality (iinmortality) of design, fashionableness (contemporuneity), and utility
(serviceableness). The design strategy of the process of product development of ODYSSEY in Honda was
based on "the
SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and :freats) Analysis" in the business strategy theoryL
Design management is carried out to make up and direct the organization.
Ktywords: design sn'ateg}l destgn managemen4 ptoduct developmenL Hbndb
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we argue the desigri strategy in Honda
Motor Co,, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Honda)
through the case studies of product development of
CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEY.
CIVIC (1972) brought the basic foundation of
"product
development" to Honda, CIVIC was developed
by "pursuit
of the origin of automobile," 2nd
PRELUDE (1982) wiped out the damage and poor
reputation for Honda caused by lst PRELUDE (1978).ODYSSEY (1994) was produced to compensate the gap
between the users' needs and automobiles in the era of
frozen market after the destruction of "the
bubble
economy" in Japan.
In order to intend to look for the implication of the
domain of desigri management, we examine the
development process of CIVIC focusing its sty1ing
design. We examine that of 2nd PRELUDE focusing the
design elements that overlaid in the product development
in Honda and we also examine that of ODYSSEY
focusing the design process of the product development
in Honda.
2. CASE STUDY OF CIVIC
2.1 BackgrouDd of CIVIC
During the early 1970s, Honda was facing a serious
operating crisis, which rnade it diMcult to continue the
production of four-wheeled cars. CIVIC, which was
developed under these circumstances, provided Honda
with the infrastmcture for "Making Products" guided by
the fo11owing two principles. One was to meet the
buyer's 1ikes and social needs, and the other was to form
a foundation for Honda's core competence,
Iwakura, one of the co-authors and the former
managing director of Honda, oversaw the productdeveloprnent of
"the
first CIVIC, 1973 model" as the
project leader ofexterior design.
The purpose of this case study is to understand the
field of design management by studying the process that
was used to develop CIVIC, the result of the pursuit of
car's basic values, with a particular focus on the design,
2.2 CIVIC's Concept: Utility Minimum
Honda began to make inroads into the four-wheeled
car market in 1963, The monthly compact car sales of
N360, introduced in 1967, exceeded those of SUBARU
360 ofFiiji Heavy Industnes only three rnonths after its
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Photo 2: [[he Second CIVIC (1979 model)
"z・
Photo 1: The First CIVIC (1972 model)
release. N360 embodied the late Mr. Soichiro Honda's
concept of artfu1 design, that is "designing a small
vehicle which looks like a bigger vehicle and large
vehicles which look like a compact."
However, the H1300 series (sedan coupe) introduced
afier the big hit of the cornpact car had low in sales
because too much stress was placed oll performance.
Such sluggish sales made it difficult for Honda to
continue business as a carmaker.
The first CIVIC model introduced in 1972 helped
Honda out of these dilficulties and was already well
under way to record the fust peak sales for the company
[his model was a product in which Honda's philosophMviz., to make cars refiecting the era, was condensed.
in other words, "product
out" was emphasized from
the viewpoint of having a brand-new shape and a unique
concept.
ln those days the motor industry usually designed
compact cars by simply shrinking 1arger cars.
However, Honda thought that smal1 cars should have
unique functions, appearaiioe and shape and approached
product development from this perspective. NamelM
Honda believed that "Utility
Minimum"・, that is
proyiding necessary functions while avoiding waste, was
essentia] for compact cars and tried to express its concept
in a clear shape.
As a result, the first model of CIVIC shown in Photo 1
had a front engine and front wheel drive (FF), 2 boxes,
and a trapezoidal shape, This stable style was a message
from Honda. It was also designed to conform to energy
saving and exhaust control regulations that came into
force at that time,
The concept of [[Utility
Minimum" or [[Basic
Car" is
still used for compact cars, but it first manifested itself
when Honda developed CIVIC.
2.3 Parallei Hetero-Development for CIVIC
Tb develop the first model of CIVC, at the outset,
Honda gave two engineering teams working alongside
each other complete freedom to exercise their creative
abilities. Deserving special mention is the fact that the
two teams belonged to different generations. NamelM
both the younger and elder geierations tried to develop a
car that met the needs of the times.
This method not only enabled both teams to inspire
each other and to arouse a sphit of competition which
acted as the prime mover for deyelopment but also was
able to combine the ideas and results generated by both
teams.
This parallel development of the two teams for the first .
CIVIC model resulted in the creation of different
concepts, but they had something in common. Trhis was
that the overall ]ength was shorter than in former
compact cars. This meant that a shorter overall length
was desired by both generations. P}is point became clear
thanks to "Parallel Hetero-DevelopmenL"
AocordinglM the overall length was revealed to be an
important issue. ln those days, five square meters was
defined as the area for a mini or compact car. Iwakura,
who was in charge of design. studied this problem and
the balance between engine design and transmission
width.
By using his integration capabilities, Iwakura, an
industrial desigrier, was able to devise a longer whee1-
base in relation to the overall length and an extremely
short overhang. TIiis layout was employed for the first
CIVIC model. The stable, trapezoidal style of this first
model was neither traditionally good looking nor stylish,
but created a design so that no one felt smal1 even though
it was small. This concept was passed on to "Honda
MONKEY" and "DAX
Honda." [[1iis meant that the first
CIVIC was not ignoTed when it sat next to a high-class
car. Moreover, it had a simple, practical desigri having no
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(a) 3-dcor hatchback
(ej CR-X
(b) 4-door sedan
(d) shuttlePhoto 3: The Third CIVIC (1983 model)
additional embellishments. Ihis point was supported by
domesticbuyers,
AccordinglM this first CIVIC was designed by
pursuing a functional and logica1 style instead of being
intuitively good looking, sornething which was difficult
to realize because of the dimensional limitations. The
style was also admired as an intelligent design and the
car was the first one for Honda to be awarded "Car
of the
Year" in 1973.
The universality of the design was proven by the fact
that the model was not changed for seven years, although
model changes were normally made every four years inJapan.
Moreover, since the car incorporated measures which
addressed environmenta] problems, such as the oil erisis,
pollution, and resouroe depletion, its commercial
marketabi]ity was appreciated not only in Japari but also
in the USA.
For exarnple, CIVIC's ISOOcc CVCC (CompoundVbrtex Controlled Combustion) engine, released in 1973,
was certified as the first eco-friendly car that met the
USA's stringent exhaust standards,
2A. Nature of the Honda Organization
As the times were changing, the "product out" concept
applied for the first CIVIC gradually became out-dated.
Therefore, through a new approach "market
in," many
improvements were adopted for the second CIVIC model
shown in Photo 2 released in 1979. However, the attempt
to satisfy too many market needs resulted in a
conservative car that failed to embody the Honda
philosophy As a result, it was not rated very highly
The third CIVIC mode) released in 1984 and shown inPhoto 3 was designed by using what Honda had learned
from the failure of the second model. Tb be more specific,"product
out" and "market
in" were appropriately
balanoed and resulted in the fojlowing four unique
variations geared to different applications: 3-door
hatcliback, 4-door sedan, CR-X, and shuttle.
The four types of the third CIVIC model were visually
distinguished and collectively referred to as "VVdnder
CIVIC," 1[lte third model became so pepular that it
received not only `CCar
of the Year" in Japan but also the"Car
Desigri Award [brino-Piemonte" in Italy
Because the development of CIVIC had such a big
impact on the organization, Honda had the creative
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energy to overturn preconceived concepts. TIhis energy
was generated by vigorous debate within the company
created when a variety of engineers having a common
purpose met together under the unifying idea of "Parallel
Hetero-Development."
Sucli vigorous debate includes three factors, all of
which point to the nature of Honda.
First, each staff member called upon to participate in a
development project has hislher own specialty as well as
unique aspirations and personalitM Therefore, opinions
from one individual wi11 inevitably come into
competitive - and ereative - confiiet with the opinions of
others in the various processes associated with making a
product, such as design, engine, body, and testing.
Next, it is important for all staff members when
entering into an argument or debate to have the sarne
level of awareness. Honda thinks that opposing opinions
provide a chaiice to understand a colleague's viewpoilt.
Participating in debate on areas outside of an individual's
specialized knowledge leads not only to learning about
these fields but also means that Honda produces
designers familiar with engines and erigineers familiarwith design.
FinalIM as the cohesion and morale of the team is high,
they are able to work positively and cheerfu11y This is
the third factor.
1[These factors were the prime mover and the "CIVIC"
was developed by engineers who understood and pursuedthe Honda philosophy ln this process, the best ideas and
solutions distilled through debate and exchange were
found and cornbined in order to make an improvement so
that the value of the final product was maximized.
It was essential to rnake these improvements and
modifications from a design point of viewL Soichiro
Honda never deviated from this belief. in brieC it shows
that a mind focused on design has taken root in the
Honda organization,
2.5 Conclusion
At the time of the development of the first CIVIC,
Honda was the last maker in Japan to join the automobileindustry and had few engineers with experience in
manufacturing cars.
Tl}erefore, late Mr. Soich iro Honda tried to ereate the
knowledge and know-how to make cars by extracting
many ideas from each staff mernber.
"Vigorous
Debate" was the most suitable means of
addressing this point. Engineers having different
backgrounds inspirod each other, which enabled them to
recognize and trigger their potential capabilities.
ln this waM Honda has developed a system where
engineers have many opportunities to meet each other,
unce'rtainty is reduced, and personal acumen is improved.
As a result, the evolution of the first CIVIC has lead to
the creation of superior organizational capabilities.
3. CASE STUDY OF SECOND PRELUDE
3.1 Background of Second PRELUDE
During the first half of the 1980s, Honda overcame the
damage and eriticism received in relation to the first
Prelude model released in 1978 by introducing the
second rpodel released in 1982. The success of this
second model hinged on the design strategy
Iwakura, one of the co-authors and a former managing
director of Honda, oversaw the product development of"the
second PRELUDE" as the manager of productstrategies in the Honda Motor Laboratory Ce. Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the Lab).
This case study describes what product strategies
Honda established for the second PRELUDE in order to
study under}ying design elements.
3.2 Evatuation of the First PRELUDE
During the 1970s, Honda sucoessfu11y manufactured
the first models of CIVIC and ACCORD, which were the
main 1ines of its four-wheeled business.
:Miis gave designers and engineers the extra motivation
they needed to make innovative products. There was a
natural desire to design a sports car having dilferent
qua]ities from a basic family car,
[[he first PRELUDE shown in Photo 4 clearly refiects
the Honda spirit that searches for new designs and
technical directions and it was this spirit that was
rnanifested in the final product. 'IIhe
first PRELUDE
designed employing this approach embodied a lot of new
ideas and desigris. Moreover. VI!iRNO shops were
deployed as one of the sales channels and this was a sign
of Honda's high aspirations,
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Photo 4: Tlie First PRELUDE (1978 model)
However, the US regarded this car as a typical
Japanese vehicle from both a good and bad point of view;
and Europeans called it an American car,
This means that the first PRELUDE was a productwhere the designers and engineers placed too much
emphasis on "product
out."
Japanese car magazines also called this car "Kawagoe
Benz." Kawagoe is an old-fashioned town in Saitama
Prefecture which developed a technique of producingsweet potatoes and which flourished in the past.
Thus, "Kawagoe
Benz" means a potato professingitself to the world's No. 1 or a country bumpkin posingas a sophisticated person,
Kawagoe is also the last stop on the Tbbu-Tbjo line
and farther from the center of Tbkyo than Wako-shi in
Saitama Prefectvre where the rnain factory and
laboratory of Honda are situated. Thus the epi!het"Kawagoe
Benz" contains the derisory attitude that [`both
Wiiko-shi and Kawagoe are rural areas of Saitama
equa]ly far removed from the center of Tk)kyo."
3.3 Enhancing Design Capability
Criticism aimed at the first PRELUDE caused real
damage, particularly to industrial designers, and became
a serious obstacle that had to be overcome. It is not an
exaggeration to say that calling the first mode] "Kawagoe
Benz" resulted in the advent of the second Prelude.
The negative rating of the first PRELUDE had a
severe impaet on Iwakura's thinking and design concepts,
resulting in the determination that "even
a potato can be
beautifu1 if thoroughly cleaned and refined."
Tb make PRELUDE more sophisticated, he decidedthat it was necessary to add
t`deteTgent"
(manpower,information, etc.) to remove the superfiuous features.
By carrying out refinements in this manner, the surface
became beautiful and it became possible to feel "the
wind." The wind was seen as a symbol of world trends,
Pheto 5: [1ie Second PRELUDE (1982 model)
Iwakura had the deep conviction that staff members
can have their talents honed and developed through
focusing on diversity and change,
This means that staff members who focus on change
can develop their expertise and through their desigris can
create better products. lndustrial designers who
developed in this environment and refined their design
capabilities formed the core of product development, and
it was this that became the key factor in the sucoess of
Honda's design strategies.
Unlike the first PRELUDE, the second PRELUDE
shown in Photo 5 fu11y utilized the human resources
available and was consequently rated very highly by the
market.
ln the process of developing the second PRELUDE,
Honda thoroughly investigated the problems of the first
PRELUDE not only to address thern but also to gain aclearer understanding of the expectations held by
potential buyers of Honda's sports cars.
As a result, it ereated an image for the Honda sports
Car comprising "the
smartrless of a sports car;" "the
utility of a passenger car," and t`affOrdable
price" and in
this way Honda made a fresh start in its pursuit of the
"Honda
philosophY"
The resulting second PRELUDE was born out of a
harmonization between "product out" and
"market
in"
and presented simple sophistication (beautifu1 body) as
wel] as appealing new elements.
The second PRELUDE featured a low bonnet,
retractable headlights and reasonable price. Put another
waM the car had the fo11owing attributes.
(1) Simple and good-looking sports car
(2) Cornfortable ride (at least four seats) and utility
(effective air conditioning) of passenger cars
(3) Not high]y prioed considering the above
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3.4 MM (Man-Maximum Meeha-Minimum) Concept
For the second PRELUDE, Honda lowered the height
of the bonnet Cwhere the enghe is) by 100 mm to
accommodate a design goal of ereating a silhouette that wi]1 still allow room to seat four adults.
[Miis made the PRELUDE a very exceptional case in
the history of car development where designers and
engineers ofien seramblejust to make 1 mm differences.
lmplementing such a drastic FF layout was an attempt
to simultaneously attain the silhouette of super cars such
as Ferrari and Lamborghini and the utility of sedans such
as ACCORD. This was because makers needed to be
able to recognize it as a sports car at a glance without
additional deseription and to attraet buyers via its shape,
Design strategies refieeting such a brand-new concept
were ereated by 1earning many things from the failure of
the first PRELUDE.
The success of the second PRELUDE resulted fromthis organizational learning whicii allowed the developersto orientate themselves in the same direction to clarify
the goal of the car.
in the actual deyelopment process, this unMed
awareness enabled the height of the engine to be reduced
by 100 mm to lower the bonnet, and this cliange ailowed
the engine to be positioned "mid-ship"
by tilting itbackwards. Tliis mid-ship engine (lecated in the center of
the body) rnade it easy to give buyers a sports car image.
This is because the engine, the heaviest of car
components, by being Iocated in the center of the body
can balariee the total weight to provide superior steering.
Moreover, lowering the bonnet reduces air resistance and
creates a lower silhouette.
If this silhouette was to be pursued, as anext step, itwas necessary to devise a way of preventing thesuspension from protruding, to determine where all the
devices such as an air conditioner were te be installed,and to create spaces for the passengers' feet.
This process produced both creative conflict and
coordination between designers and engineers.
Methodically solving these conflicts allowed every
component to be lowered and the clay model to becompleted.・
However, in this modeling step, the height of the head-lamps did not meet the safety standards of the Ministry
yollng American women. and elderly European cotiples
who bought it as a second car.
The reason for the popularity irrespective of age or sex
arose from the establishment of the concept called "MM"
(Man-Maximum Mechanism-Minimum) during the
development of the second PRELUDE. Ihis was
Honda's fundamental concept of making products"minimizing
mechanical parts maximizes human-used t:spaces,
3.5 Conclusion
Tlie design strategies deployed in the development of
the second PRELUDE included the following three
elements, al1 of which were regarded as essential by
Iwakura.
The first one was universality <stabilityi of design.
This means what it should essentially be (intrinsiccharacteristics) and, in the case of vehicles, it should be
regarded as a tool for moving humans and things.
[[herefore, design work must appeal to the common
elements of taste and good sense shared by all peoplewithout distinction as to nationality or generation, and
must pursue a universal elegance.
Ihe second is advanoernent (in advance of time) indesign. A variety' of values are attached to things, so
design should reflect the preferences of people and
should be in concert with the mood and tastes of the
tirnes. Advanced design needs to matcii not only the
present time but also anticipate the future. 1[he realizationof this dictum will yield totally unique creations never
before seen. Suci] noyelty is essential for design.
The third is service (utility) in design. This means that
design must contribute in a real way to improying thelives of people both materially and culturally Tb do this,
it is necessary to have a certain goal when designing
things that will be used in a practical way For design tobe serviceable, it is necessary to enhance the positiveelements of really necessary functions and to elirninate
the negative elements as far as possible. [[he MMc6ncept reflects this perfectly
The second PRELUDE was a car that had universality
and utility and was in perfect harmony with its time.
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Photo 6: The Fifth ACCORD (1993 model)
4. CASE STUDY OF ODYSSEY
4.1 Background of ODYSSEY
in 1994 during the stagriant market following the
collapse of the Japariese bubble economM Hondaintroduced ODYSSEY to the market in order to bridgethe gap in buyer's needs.
A"he erest of the bubble economy'there was a boom
in ]arge high-class cars headed by CIMA, a Nissan
deluxe car. It was catled the "CIMA
Phenomenon,"
luxurious things went mainstream, and 1arge, deluxe cars
became popular with buyers,
Under such circumstanoes, how did Honda come to
make ODYSSEY? This case study examines the design
strategies deployed in the development of ODYSSEY;
Honda's first reereational yehicle (RV).
4.2 Creating Strategies through SWOT Analysis
Since having no car 1ike CIMA in the middle of the
bubble economM Honda introduced 1arge cars by
widening INSPIRE and VIGOR in order to allow themounting of a 1arger engine (2.5 liters).
However, such unimaginative expedients were not
suthcient to impress buyers.
in the automobile market during and after the bubble
period, instead of sedans, buyers started to focus on one-
box cars based on commercial motor vehicles ]ike
Toyota's HIACE and Mitsubishi's PAJERO as well as
non-passenger cars tieep-like off-road vehicles), s}
called RVs (called mini-vans or SUVs (Sports UtilityVehicle) in the US).
However, Honda had been mainly manufacturing
highly ethcient cars, such as CIVIC and AocORI)
shown in Photo 6, and did not have any vehicles fitting
this new category.
Sinoe the facilities of the production 1ines in Honda's
factories were desigried to elificiently manufacture
passenger cars with a Jow rooC Honda cou]d not make
Photo 7: The First ODYSSEY (1994 rnodel)
of [[ransport because the bonnet was too lo-; resulting in
no oertification for sales.
Therefore, Honda quickly changed to a mechanism
where the headlights popped up when they were turned
on.
As significant as it was, the pop-up function was very
attractive and came into a sort of fashion. Had thisfeature not been made, the seoond PRELUDE would not
have been supported by buyers.
Coming out of these processes, the design of the
second PRELUDE had a significant irnpact on fashionand its cliarm and sophistication cast a spell over a broadrange of buyers. These included young Japanese men,
high-roof cars. 'ln
addition, Honda had neither dieselengines nor commercial motor vehicles which could bethe base for the development of an RVL
in this situation where Honda did not have any productthat met the needs of the .time, the company saw
domestic sales of its four-wheel vehicles decrease. The
worst domestic annual sales recorded fe11 below six
hundred thousand units.
Iwakura, one of the corauthors and a former managing
director of Honda, was a planning director at that time
and organized a working team to study the causes of the
slump, devise realistic countermeasures, and set goals.
The working team analyzed h(rw Honda responded to
both sucoess and failure in order to cornpile a reservoir of
hints and ideas to assist the advanoement of the company
Tliis means that Honda tried to find a way out by lookingback over the past.
in the field of business strategy this is called "SWOT
Analysis." This rnethod allows a company to identify its
strengths and weaknesses, to understand in-house core
competencies, and to recognize opportunities and threatshidden in the external enyironrnent in order to establish
strategies. This approach can coordinate or adapt a
company's capabilities and potential so that these may
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manifest themselves in the market.
Strategies developed in this fashion resulted in the
development of ODYSSEY shown in Photo 7.
ODYSSEY was a product born out of Honda learning
about their own history of prodllct development by
employing SWOT analysis.
4.3 Destroying the Commercial One-Box Concept
When developing ODYSSEY; Honda focused on
meeting the buyer's realistic needs in order to identify
any opportunities that may have remained hidden in the
market, The source of these needs was to be found in the
US that was looking at the mini-van markeL As typified
by Chrysler, American・mini-vans had a big bodM V6
engine, and seven to eight seats.
Honda then had ACCORD whose price was around
that of the vehicles referred to above (22 to 23 thousand
dollars). However, it was a sedan having a four-cylinder
engine and four to five seats.
Therefore, Honda started to study how to design a
seven-seat car with the same price as ACCORD. FinalIM
Honda tried to make an American-sized car based on
ACCORD, using the V6 engine of LEGEND.
[[his was product development that tapped inio the
company's existing strengths. ln this development
process, to evaluate this heavier car, Honda used the
ACCORD wagon with an additional weight of about 100
kg to conduct a driving test on a variety of roads around
bos Angeles.
The results of the test in the US showed that the test
car was better thari American V6 cars in terms of driving
performarlce.
The next problem was whether or not mini-van-sized
cars could be manufactured using the existing productionlines of the factories. Among all the factories across the
world, Honda looked fOr a factory where the height of
the production 1ines (particularly the painting 1ine) could
be changed.
FinaliM the answer was the Sayama factory in Saitama
where it seemed that the height problem could be
addressed.
in this waM ODYSSEY was designed through adding
a variety of practical features to the ACCORD wagon.
Meanwhile, the sales departments had the fol]owing
requirements: (1) diesej engine, (2) sliding door, (3)rotating face-to-face seats, and (4) high roof However, the development team reviewed the
functionality of each requirement and arrived at the
following a]ternative solutions.
(1) A diesel engine was common for the one-box cars of
other carmakers and had the advantages of costs and fuel
efficiency On the other hand, there were problems of
vibration and black exhaust. As a result, Honda decided
to employ a gasoline engine.
(2) instead of a sliding door, Honda adopted four swing
doors which were more stable and easy to handle.
(3) lnstead of rotating face-t"face seats, Honda
employed a center aisle and walk through seats which
allowed passengers to move and third-row built-in seats
which could be folded away into thcrfieor.
(4) Concerning the height, Honda pursued driving
stability and handling comfort in the selection of a design
which allowed passengers to rnove inside the car even
though the roof was lowL
As mentioned above, ail the elements that were not
met demands ofthe sales departments were improved.
AccordinglM ODYSSEY was a car that creatively
destroyed the prevailing concept of cornmercial one-box
cars. Compared with mini-vans in the US and one-box
cars in Japan, ODYSSEY had a two-rank smaller size
and lower roofi
4.4 How to Sell Multiple-Passenger Cars
Just as the preparation for selling ODYSSET in the US
was about to be completed, the yen increased in strength.
AccordinglM Honda searched for a market in Japan.
However, a survey carried out by the company
indicated that sales might be low in the Japanese market
because all the common-sense points of commercial one-
box cars hag been changed.
However, assuming that the scope for one-box cars
was wider than that for commercial one-box cars
generally defined in Japan, and provided that the one-box
cars were defined as a multiple-passenger car like a
wagon or mini-van and as a little fun car, there was stil] a
possibility for suocessfu1 sales.
Based of this surveM Honda reviewed the appeal of
ODYSSEY as a mu]tiple-passenger sedan, compared to
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ACCORD. ODYSSEY had two more seats than
ACCORD but both were designed for famiJies and the
prices were almost the same,
Moreover, the approach to selling ODYSSEY was
changed drastically Prior to this time, Honda had
ernployed a sales strategy which classified their products on the basis of characteristics, that is, the Honda outlets
were divided into the CLIO shop (conservalive), the
PRIMO shop (casual), and the VERNO shop (sporty).This system resulted in a sales monopoly situation and
ethciency was not high as a consequence.
Tb address this problem, Honda decided to sell
ODYSSEY through the three sales channe]s. One reason
why this cliange was accepted at that time was thatODYSSEY was the only new car ayailable, so naturally
all three channels wanted it However. three-channel
sales raised the danger of different prices, inconsistent
service, and a drop in qllality [[herefore, Honda issued an
ordeT to prohibit the CLIO shop invested mostly frem
makingdiscounts.
This policy also affected the PRIMO and VERNO
shops, resulting in no channel making discounts.
AccordinglM the three channels competed with each
other through the provision of services such as night and
ho]iday main' tenance, courtesy cars, free tune-up of cars
being used, etc. rather than through discounts.
4.5 Conclusion
The development of ODYSSEY fo]lowed definite
strategies based on the SWOT analysis. The important
elements are to formulate such strategies through a
process of compromise and reconciling internal and
external evaluations, to assess them througli the vision
and values of the executive body, and to select an
appropriatedirection.
Strategies chosen through the process above must be
implemented, This is because corporate strategies are
very creative activities and only through harmony
between internal and external parties can they berealized.
Tlte key factors are to be sensitive to g]obal trends and
human psychologM and for companies, products, and
designers to measure up to the expectations set by society
and customers.
THE
Tb do this, every person in an organization must have
a mind focused on design, which means that individua]s
must understand what good products and corporate
actiyities are.
Tb establish such an organization and to successfully
direct it to a realizable goal are the essenoe of design
management.
5 CONCLVDING REMARKS
ln thjs paper we argue the design strategy in Honda
Motor Co., I;td. (Honda) through the case studies of
product development of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and
ODYSSEYL
ln order to intend to Jook for the implication of the
domain of design management, we examined the
development process of CIVIC 'focusing
its styling
design. in conclusion, we found out that the development
process of CrVIC yielded the organizational capabilities
to Honda; Honda has the mechanism to make a chance
for employee to meet another employee, to reduce the
unceriaintM to investigate the knowiedge and skill of
employee. As a result, the evolution of CIVIC has 1ead tothe creation of superior organizational capabilities.
VVe examined the developrnent prooess of 2nd
PRELUDE focusing the design elements that overlaid in
the product development in Honda. We understood that
the design strategy of the prcrcess of. produetdevelopment of 2nd PEUiLUDE in Honda implies three
design elements: eternality (immortalit" of design,
fashionableness (contemporaneity), and utility
(seryiceableness). We also examined the deyelopment process of
ODYSSEY focusing the design process of the productdevelopment in Honda. We pointed out that the design
strategy of the process of product development of
ODYSSEY in Honda was based on "the
SWOT
(Strength, VVeakness, Opportunities, and Tteats)
Analysis" in the business strategy theoryL The important
elements are to formulate sucli strategies through a
process of cornpromise and reconciling internal and
external evaluations.
in Honda, design management is carried out to make
up and direct the organ ization.
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Acknowledgment
All of photos are presented by Honda Motor Co., Ltd..
Ilie authors would 1ike to show their deep appreciation to
Honda Motor Co., I:td. for the courtesy
REFERENCES
1. S. Nagasawa, S. Iwakura, M. Iwatani, Design Strategy
in Honda (1) -Case Study of CIVIC-, Ihoceedings of
48th Cotijlerence ctfJ4panese Society for the SZience ctf
Design, pp.176-177, 2001
2. M, Iwatani, S. Nagasawa, S. Iwakura, Design Strategy
in Honda (2) -Case Study of 2nd PRELUDE -, ibid.,
pp.178-179.20013. S. Iwakura, S. Nagasawa, M. Iwatani, Design Strategy
in Honda (3) -Case Study of ODYSSEY-, ibid.,
pp.180-181, 2001
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