Transcript of Crim 2_first Cases
No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.*
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO
C.
SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Arbitrary Detention; Concept of
and
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.— Arbitrary
Detention is
committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.
The elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender
is a public
officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the
detention is
without legal grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Public officers liable for arbitrary
detention
must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of
persons
accused of a crime.— The public officers liable for Arbitrary
Detention must
be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of
persons accused
of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents
of the
law, the judges or mayors.
Same; Same; Same; Barangay captains recognized as persons
inauthority.— Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed
into law,
barrio lieutenants, (who were later named barrio captains and now
barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various
cases, this
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of
Arbitrary
Detention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One need not be a police officer to
be
chargeable with arbitrary detention; A barrio captain having the
same duty
as the mayor of maintaining peace and order, he can be liable for
arbitrary
detention; Case at bar.— One need not be a police officer to
be chargeable
with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers
like judges
and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of
this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show
that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in
the case of the
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same
duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the
authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even
private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural
police, he
as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner
Valdez. From the
foregoing. there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private
respondent
Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to quash; Courts
in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to
those
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of
the
information because said motion is a hypothetical admission of the
facts
alleged in the information; Exception.— Next, private
respondent Tuvera,
Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and
evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary
Detention;
that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police
Force; and
that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's
personal
safety. Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be
raised as a
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the
Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash,
cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or
which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to
quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
Matters of
defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion,
except where
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal
liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy. In the case of U.S. vs.
Perez, this Court
held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different
but
diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule
admits of
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by
the
prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An order granting a motion to
quash is a final order, not merely interlocutory, and is
immediately
appealable; Double jeopardy cannot be claimed by the accused as
the
dismissal of the case was secured not only with his consent but at
his
instance.— Respondent's contention holds no water. An order
granting a
motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not
merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused
cannot
claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with
his
consent but at his instance.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First
Instance of
Pangasinan, Br. IV.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the
Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case
No. D-529
entitled 'The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et
al.,"
granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan
Tuvera,
Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can
be charged
of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was
filed
against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in
the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as
follows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera,
Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00
o'clock in
the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines
and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan
Tuvera, Sr., a
barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely
Juan
Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one
Armando
Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and
immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to
deprive said
Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio
captain Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members
of
the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan, conspiring, confederating
and
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and
feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the
municipal jail
of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Italics
supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA Assistant Provincial Fiscal"
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were
arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information
on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and
that the
proof s adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support
the filing of
the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S.
Milo filed
an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer
who
can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito
C.
Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25,
1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who,
without
legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime
are the
following:
2.That he detains a person.
_________________
1 Art. 124, Revised Penal Code. 3.That the detention is without
legal
grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion
to
quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is
that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the
facts alleged in
the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary
Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have
conspired
with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police
force
of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about
eleven
(11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the
last two
elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain,
is a
public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention.
authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a
crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law,
the
judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent
Tuvera
as such public officer when the former made this finding in the
questioned
order:
"Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more
than six
(6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same
because he is
not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag,
Pangasinan.
Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it
was not he
who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested
in him
as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan."5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga,
private
respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly
sustained
for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority
to make
arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio
captain;6 (2)
That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That
he was not a
public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the
detention of
petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or
indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio
captains on
April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and
that it
was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that
Barrio
Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who
are
persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal
Detention and
Not Arbitrary Detention.12
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law,
barrio
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now
barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various
cases, this
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of
Arbitrary
Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant,
and Hilario
Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez
while he
was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the
vestry and
afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him
that he
was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two
public
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant,
with the
help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas
with a
rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the
peace. Sixto
was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next
day
when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he
had not
committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary
Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised
Barrio
Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the
following: to
look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to
assist the
municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the
district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after
the general
welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances
which are
operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an
emergency group
whenever the same may be necessary f or the maintenance of peace
and
order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration,
Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned
powers
and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance
of
public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably
people
blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order
or a
threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain
do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may
take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance
and
persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when
necessary, he
may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as
a
person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within
legal limits. "21 (Italics supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with
Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges
and mayors,
perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that
they
are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the
case of the latter,
his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining
peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain
or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent
Tuvera
himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a
barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like
private
respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary
Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to
quash
was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that
there was
no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the
aid and
assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only
accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suf f ice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised
as a
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the
Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash,
cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or
which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to
quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information.28 Matters of
defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion,
except where
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal
liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs.
Perez,30 this
Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged do
not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only
different but
diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule
admits of
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by
the
prosecution.31
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's
granting of
the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor
32 on the
ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without
his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion
to
quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory
and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim
double
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his
consent but at his
instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari
is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case
No.
D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the
appropriate trial
court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted. Case remanded to trial court for further
proceedings.
Notes.—There is no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused
to
the court, where the two days following his arrest, were holidays.
(Medina
vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
A public officer or employee who detains a person without
legal
grounds is guilty of arbitrary detention, but the person so
detained will not
be released if afterwards he is detained under a valid information.
(Medina
vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
——o0o——
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIAS
LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rebellion; By its very nature, rebellion is
essentially
a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action which cannot
be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds .—The gravamen of
the
crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government. By
its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes
involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a
priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission
of
rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by
law, absorbed
in the crime itself because they require a political
character.
Same; Same; In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion,
not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether
or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end .—Divested
of its common
complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a
different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a
lighter
penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime
committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to
ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end.
The
political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
Same; Same; The burden of demonstrating political motive falls
on
the defense.—In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political
motive
falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the
accused, better
than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, this
court stressed
that: Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the
accused’s)
knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the
burden is
on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do
personally
or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance
of the
resistance movement.
Same; Same; It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are
duly
proven.—From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is
not enough that
the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt
acts are
essential components of the crime. With either of these elements
wanting,
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in
cases where the
act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the
course of
the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished
for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been
held that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would
not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.
Same; Same; If no political motive is established and proved,
the
accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion .—It
follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and
proved, the
accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion. In
cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership
in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,
by and of
itself, suffice.
Same; Same; The burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused .—As stated
hereinabove,
the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a
political
motive lies on the Accused. Political motive must be alleged in
the
information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence.
Same; Evidence; Lack or absence of motive for committing a
crime
does not preclude conviction there being a reliable eyewitness who
fully
Against appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the
testimony
of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of
impropriety or
falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. Moreover, neither
may
lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or
absence of
motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there
being a
reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the
perpetrator of the felony.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Br.
1.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricafort Law Office for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St.,
away
from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked
beside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at
the
policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three
other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four
times as
he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the man and
his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters
by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who
claimed
that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot.
Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y
Castro,
his nephew (appellant’s father was his first cousin) and alleged
that he knew
the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of
Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from
multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the
body.2 On
autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of
death as
hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor
of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging
accused-
appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30
o’clock in
the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province
of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the
abovenamed accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is
already
charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3)
others
whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large,
conniving,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire
and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police
Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing
his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of
said
decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court
finds
the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still
at large, of
the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs
of the
deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo,
the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the
civil
indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty
Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to
pay the
said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty-Eight
(P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without
subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the
said
accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is
that portion
of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder
and not
rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal
witness,
Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been
charged
with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that
Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the
New
People’s Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing
of Lucilo
was “a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,”4 (said
killing)
should-have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under
Arts.
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he
did not
fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the
liquidation of Lucilo,
he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant
in the
commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article
135 of
the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only
the
penalty of prision mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the
crime
of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by
appellant
may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had
conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman
was for
“political and subversive ends.”5 Moreover, the Solicitor
General contends
that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even
if the trial
court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a
rebellion,
the proper imposable penalty is not prision
mayor as appellant contends, but
reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as
amended by
Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law, prescribes
reclusion
temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found
guilty as
participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed
was
murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic
Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof,
of any body
of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising
against
the government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially
a crime of
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a
priori within predetermined bounds.8 One aspect
noteworthy in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its
pursuance are, by
law, absorbed in the crime itself because they require a political
character.
This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v.
Hernandez,9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order,
as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
If a crime usually
regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose
of
removing from the allegiance ‘to the Government the territory of
the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof,’ then it becomes stripped
of its
“common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the
crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the
latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however
grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion,
which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In
deciding if the
crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for
our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance
of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls
on the
defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better
than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this Court
stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s)
knowledge and
since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on
them to
prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally
or through
witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the
resistance
movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough
that the overt
acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are
essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the
crime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where
the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course
of the
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been
held that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would
not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person
charged
with a common crime—alleging rebellion in order to lessen the
possible
imposable penalty—could benefit from the law’s relatively benign
attitude
towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case
of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile
with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for allegedly harboring or
concealing in
his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator’s knowledge
that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against
the
prosecution’s contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829
could be
tried separately14 (on the principle that rebellion is based
on the Revised
Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for
which the
senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law,
was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related
to the
acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs.
Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and
92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator
Enrile
and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829
cannot
prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already
been filed
and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain
us to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which
are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court
in Enrile
vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is
not charged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan
simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for
the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or
social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then being punished
separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established
and proved,
the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of
rebellion.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,
by and of
itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People
v.
Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses,
both former
NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias “Commander
Brando,” a
known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the
NPA
in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in
a rebel
infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad
was
merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion
because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed
was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political
motive must be
alleged in the information.17 It must be established by clear
and satisfactory
evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter
of
mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving
clearly and
satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that
his
superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion
that he,
was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that
the
motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant’s
obvious
interest in testifying to that effect.18
carry out rebellion. The
evidence adduced by the
civilian, to order the
killing on account of
private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The
court
attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by
known
members of the Hukbalahap movement.20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to
the instant
case. There, the Court held that “the act of killing a police
officer, knowing
too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a
rebellion.” In
Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who was
charged with
murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also
executed
an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of
an NPA
“sparrow unit,” a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his
brief
therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General’s brief
in Dasig which this
Court favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow
unit is the
argues for a different
result in the case at bench. He states that accusedappellant’s
belated claims
to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also
self
serving,23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of
the
circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA,
clearly
overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that
the
political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact
that Ragaul
was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left
a letter
card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to
follow
his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the
evidence for
the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials
not
substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the
killing of
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three
male person a certain alias ALWIN,
ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told
me to go with them, so I
asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he
stopped/call a passenger jeepney and
told me board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we
alighted on said jeep, so we walk
towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when
the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used
the road near the bakery where
did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion
continue walking, at more or less 4:30
P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol
dialect, to wit: ‘AMO NA
YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS’ (This is the place towards the poblacion),
so, I placed myself
just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions continue
walking towards poblacion, later on a
policeman sporting white T-shirt and a Khaki pant was walking
towards me, while the said
policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman
infront of the small store,
service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the
subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a
hill wherein there is a small
bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me
by them at Pilar, Sorsogon.
(sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your
companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it
radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO.
(sic)
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any?
(sic)
A No more sir.25
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted
in his
extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of
Lucilo as
follows:
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial
confession did
appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s
Army. A
thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest
that the
killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political
purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on
sworn
statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the
involvement of
the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution
eyewitness
Nestor Armenta did not mention that NPA in his sworn statement
of
October 19, 1992.27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an
afterthought,
something which the defense merely picked up and followed through
upon
prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on cross-examination
that he
knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however,
in the
same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was “forced” to
pinpoint
appellant as an NPA member.28 The logical result, of course,
was that the
trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony.
The trial
court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a
witness’
testimony while upholding the rest of it.29 While disbelieving
the portion of
Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s alleged membership in the NPA,
the
trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about
how the
crime was committed.30 Such narration is even corroborated in
its pertinent
portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by the
testimony of the
appellant himself.
In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color
attending
the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its
viability depends
on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the
prodding
of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of
the
organization’s goals.31 He claimed that his two companions
shot Lucilo
because he “had offended our organization,”32 without,
however,
specifying what the “offense” was. Appellant claimed that he had
been a
member of the NPA for five months before the shooting
incident.33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s
contentions
are couched in terms so general and non-specific34 that they
offer no
explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made
towards
the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a
mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his
were
specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant’s
attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color,
the evidence
on record leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations
of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the
penalty
imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA
infested
areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of
mitigating
the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary
crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez,
Jr., Chief Justice
Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of
numerous
bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality
that cannot be
ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of
destruction and
terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated
despite the
best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although
it may be
true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no
longer pose a
genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more
stringent laws
and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a
political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that
the trial
court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.36
It is of no
moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate,
for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and
positive, is
sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant’s claims that he
acted merely as a
look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free
from any
signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the
accused.38
Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate
the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does
not
satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the
felony.39 In the
case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was
furthermore
bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he
and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each
other .40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below.
The
attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of
any
kind.41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the
crime committed
is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence
of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was
correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all
the accessories
provided by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is
hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.
Jr., JJ., concur.
Note.—The qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms
in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
distinct from
the crime of rebellion provided under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994])
VOL.189, SEPTEMBER13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN,
Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO
M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and
Criminal Law; Rebellion; Pres. Decree 1829; Rebellion cannot
be
complexed with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof
either
as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect
of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.— The resolution of the
above issue brings
us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings
of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus
of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,
June 5, 1990).
The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate
the long standing
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion
and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in
the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared: “The
rejection of both
options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of
an activity that constitutes rebellion.” (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is
applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with
the
complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
neither can
he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one
is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Crimes; Political crimes
are
_______________
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
mon crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose.— The
petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with
the fugitive
Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan,
petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
other purpose
but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a
component
thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the
crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez,supra: “In
short,
political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of harboring or concealing
Col.
Honasan is a mere component of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of
the rebellion, it cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge.—
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a
vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People
v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed
in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo,
100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People
v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72
[1969]). In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge. The
case of People v. Prieto (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is
instructive: “In the nature
of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished
by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical
activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or
physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under
another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject
of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase
the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just
as one can
not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking
the
identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to
a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and
force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so
may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime
or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is
averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; All crimes, whether punishable under
a
special law or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes
in
themselves.— The prosecution tries to distinguish by
contending that
harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special
law while
the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution
under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This
argument is
specious in rebellion cases. In the light of the
Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All
crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are
mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and
charged as
separate crimes in themselves. Thus: “This does not detract,
however, from
the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either
separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528) The
Hernandez and other
related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.
These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder,
arson,
robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The
attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us
to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which
are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional
Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, Br. 135 and 134.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law
Offices for
petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan
Ponce
Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder1
with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City,
576
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
government prosecutors filed another information charging him
for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial
Court of
Makati. The second information reads:
“That on or about the lst day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas
Village,
Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or
suspect
that Ex-Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan has committed a crime, did
then
and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
“Gringo”
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.”
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to
hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination
by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and
expunge the
information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as
pairing
judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile’s
Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that “there (was) probable cause
to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No.
1829.”
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
3. (a)The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
4. (b)The respondent court’s finding of probable cause was devoid
of factual
and legal basis; and
5. (c)The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated
murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on
prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel
on the
same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the
motion
for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator
Enrile’s
arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on Certiorari imputing grave
abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris-
577
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
diction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/
dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:
1. I.The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. II.The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Honasan in a
supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component
element of, the “complexed” rebellion presently charged against
Sen. Enrile
as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same
meeting
on 1 December 1989;
3. III.The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be
only one
prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
4. IV.There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for
alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
5. V.No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged
violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held
only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial
of due
process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the
respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90-
777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner
could be
separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding
the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD
No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the
petitioner on the
theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is
based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of
People
v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were
recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge
Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).
The Enrile case gave
this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription
against
splitting the componentoffenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate
prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court
recently declared:
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
“The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of
the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission
or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
(Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not
be charged
with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be
applied,
neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses
where
one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of
rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No.
1829
particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
“SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum
period, or
a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates
or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution
and conviction.”
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner
entertained
and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort
on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a
fugitive
from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the
petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan’s arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c)
of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City
were
based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the
Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio
“Gringo”
Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday
party
held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December
1, 1989.
579
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
The information (Annex “C”, p. 3) particularly reads that on “or
about 6:30
p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan conferred
with
accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully
armed
rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches”. The prosecution
thereby
concluded that:
“In such a situation, Sen. Enrile’s talking with rebel leader Col.
Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100
uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were
co-
conspirators in the failed December coup.” (Annex A, Rollo,
p. 65;
Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the
rebellion
charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to
the charge
of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department
of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one
crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but
there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for “harboring
and
concealing” Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829.
The
splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy
with the
fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy
with
Honasan, petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was
for no
other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constituting a
component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez,
supra:
“In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive.” (p. 535)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a
vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People
v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed
in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo,
100
Phil. 90 [1956];
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107
Phil. 659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act
of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component
or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case
of People
v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only
be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v.
U.S., ante)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the
deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the
latter crime
and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in
a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be
held
guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery,
and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable
for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense
where, as
in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of
treason.”
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring
or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the
rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under
one law
will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in
rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s
theory must
fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether
punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion
and can not be
_______________
2 The doctrine relied upon was set down in treason cases but
is
applicable to rebellion cases. As Justice McDonough opined,
rebellion is
treason of less magnitude (U.S. v. Lagnoasan, 3 Phil. 472, 484,
1904).
581
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
“This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients
of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the
same and
cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the
application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx (People v. Hernandez,
supra, at
p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common
crimes as
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to
all acts of
violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as
provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case,
however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in
rebellion cases
must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator
Ponce
Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his
allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to
form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing
which
was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed
in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be
deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion
punished
in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
“Thus, national, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character
as
“common” offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main
crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot
be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same,
to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.” (People v. Hernandez,
supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the
accused, after
having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion,
faced an
independent prosecution for illegal posses-
582
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
sion of firearms. The Court ruled:
“An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime
with
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of
illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a
necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same
accused
is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he
pleaded
guilty and was convicted.” (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
“xxx [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which
the
accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the
rebellion
case and so to press it further now would be to place him in
double
jeopardy.” (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga,
(G.R. No. 83341,
similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged
member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of
firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD
1866.
In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his
arguments
on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of
common crimes in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to
wit:
“x x x in the present case, petitioner is being charged
specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under PD
1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME
OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find
no application in this case.”
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal
possession of
firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for
subversion or
rebellion had been filed.3 The prosecution must make up its mind
whether
to charge Senator
_______________
3 Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abraham F. Sarmiento believe that
PD
1866 is unconstitutional and should be struck down as illegal
583
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and
charge
him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation
of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City
and
violation of P.D 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is
in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional
Trial
Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution
under PD
1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive
factor.
If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and
former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if
the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance
of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of
rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried
separately
under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion
case.
With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the
other issues
raised by the petitioner.
Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in
Criminal
Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding
the
arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting
further
proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cort é s,
Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), On official leave.
Paras, J., On leave.
_______________
per se. Justice Sarmiento stated in his separate dissent that PD
1866 is
a bill of attainder, vague and violative of the double jeopardy
clause, and an
instrument of repression.
Medialdea, J., No part.
Petition granted.
Note.—The criminal liability of an accessory under Art. 19, Par. 3
is
directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal.
(Vino vs.
People: dissenting opinion, 178 SCRA 626.)
Enrile vs. Salazar
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
(Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/
OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY
OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990.*
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EU-
_______________
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch
103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.—The rejection of
both
options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of
an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of report
and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor, sufficient to
determine
probable cause.—It is also contended that the respondent
Judge issued the
warrant for petitioner’s arrest without first
personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of
the
Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not
the
unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination,
it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
Petitioner
claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the
latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records
of the
preliminary investigation. Merely because said respondent had what
some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so
complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the
legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has
jurisdiction
to deny or grant bail to petitioner.—The criminal case before
the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s
right
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of
the weakness
of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial
court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and
even then, not without first apply-
219
Enrile vs. Salazar
ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to whom no
bail is recommended, to claim the right to bail hearing to prove
the reason
or weakness of evidence against him.—There was and is no reason
to
assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability
or competence of the respondent Judge—indeed such an assumption
would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
to hold
them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to
disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short
that
would justify bypassing established judicial processes designed to
orderly
move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthetically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the
grant of
bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus
be
precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail and, if it
erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error.
It makes no
difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of
arrest fixing
no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor’s
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the
better
course for the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where
a capital
offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused
as to whom
no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing
and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against
him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to change,
but
only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time. —It is
enough to give
anyone pause—and the Court is no exception—that not even the
crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence
that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national
economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion,
either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and
delimit the other
offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot
be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal
activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such
change, for it
can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what
is needed
lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the
need for
promptly the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
220
Enrile vs. Salazar
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not
be
interpreted as an all embracing authority; Reasons.—To my mind,
the
Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing
authority
for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or
in
furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by
the latter.
To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant
case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The rules
on
habeas corpus are to be liberally construed. —While litigants,
should, as a
rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop
this Court
from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising
urgent
constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The
rules on
805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental
instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all
manner of
illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural
mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts
and
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA
420)
[italics ours].
to statutes principally; Expost facto law.—The non-retroactivity
rule
applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the
abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given
them by
judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial
decisions construing
statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In
time, the
statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them
by the
courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex
v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory,
judicial
interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date
that the law
was originally
Enrile vs. Salazar
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling
a previous
existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most
specially not
where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new
doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal,
55 SCRA 607 [19741; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon
v.
Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the
non-retroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions
has
constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal
or enhances the
severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable
to
constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post
facto laws and
the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 12
L. Ed.
2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977];
Devine
v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339
[1989]).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts;
Case at
bar.—The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of
one
bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither
should the
dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine
gun
bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of
life and
property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate
penalties
depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—punishment for
the
killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The
prosecution
also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in
rebellion the
killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the
massacre of
innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other
acts of
terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should
not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act
unless the act is
plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of
the
Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation. The
killing of
civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and
is part of the rebellion.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
—Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was “ground-
breaking” on
222
Enrile vs. Salazar
the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder,
arson,
robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the
prosecution and the
lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as
case law), but
Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5
June
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition
that the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder
does
not exist.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a
nullity
and plainly void ab initio.—And yet, notwithstanding these
unmistakable
and controlling beacon lights—absent when this Court laid
down the
Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has insisted in
filing, and the lower
court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the
petitioners with
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder.
That
information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio.
Its head should
not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law,
it charges
nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest
issued pursuant
thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are
anchored.
And, since the entire question of the information’s validity is
before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the
information is
fatally defective, even under procedural law, because
it charges more than
one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the
proper
remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.—I submit that
the
proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the
purpose
of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as
charging
simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently,
habeas corpus
is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had
been
charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been
denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of the
petitioner’s
constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility
of fixing the
amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us,
if
complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant
proceedings.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful
purpose
to have the trial court hear the incident again when the Supreme
Court has
been satisfied that petitioner is entitled to temporary
223
Enrile vs. Salazar
freedom.—I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders
the remand of
the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in
our
Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner “provisional
liberty”
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The
fact that
we gave him “