Core-periphery relations in the European migration control system

Ferruccio Pastore (CeSPI, Rome)

IMISCOE Conference on:“(Irregular) Transit Migration in the European

space: Theory, Politics, and Research Methodology”

18-20 April 2008 (Koç University, Istanbul)

The European migration control system and the politics of transit migration

• Migration controls as increasingly central attribute of sovereignty

• BUT failure of migratory unilateralismInternationalization of migration controls as global trend

(although in different forms)• Studied mainly from the point of view of political theory

(externalisation/outsourcing/privatisation literature) and human rights – Less international relations

• Expanding European migration control system (EMCS) as a case study, not one among many, but most structured migration control system worldwide

• Analyse the development of the EMCS focusing on core-periphery relations. Diachronic approach (different stages)

Cores and peripheries in European history, always shifting…

…and always contentious!

The quiet core of the contemporary European migration control system

Perl (Germany))

Schengen (Lux.)

Apach (France)

1995-2008: the third (and less glamorous) European enlargement (beside EU and €)

► Until 1973-4: Only formalControls►1973-1985: Unilateral and competitive closure►1985: Schengen agreement►1990: ImplementingConvention►1995: Entry into force in thegreen core ►Italy, Austria, Greece as red “transit belt”

STAGE I: The making of the core of EMCS

STAGE II: The Southern enlargement of the core

► 1997-8: Full integration of Austria and Italy►2000: Greece is alsoadmitted as part of the core►Eastern Europe emerges as “transitbelt”►Western Balkans, Turkey and North Africastill perceived more as sources

STAGE III: The Northern and Eastern enlargements

► 2001: Scandinavianenlargement (limited impacton irregular migration patterns)►2004: EU-10 accession►2007: EU-2 accession►2007: Schengen Easternenlargement (EU-10 butCyprus) ►Western Balkans, formerCIS, Turkey, N. Africa, etc.in “transit belt” (transit boom)►2005 Ceuta and Melilla; 2006 Lampedusa andCanarias: focus onSub-Saharan A. as source

►July 2006: Rabat EU-Africaconference on M&D►November 2006: TripoliEU-AU+ Conference on M&D►December 2007: Lisbon Africa-EU Summit►Migration Great Gameenlarges to whole Africa:New “candidates” as “transitcountries” (i.e. privileged controlpartners): Senegal, Niger►When transit countries arefailed states, intervention notruled out (Chad)

STAGE IV: The Transit Belt expands further South

Political lessons and policy implications

European integration successful in expanding sphere of freedom of circulation

Now this expansive phase seems to be almost over, but for•Western Balkans visa facilitation and accession•other visa facilitation negotiations (Russia)•Turkish path to accession (?)•freedom of circulation within ENP soon dropped

For all the others, the only chance is to access the Transit Belt and be picked up as privileged control partner

Costs/benefits of becoming “transit country”

COSTS BENEFITS

Altering priorities: Neglecting immigration (Libya) or emigration (Morocco) internally destabilising

EU and bilateral money for migration control (often dual use)

Worsening of political/economic relations with poorer neighbours

More bargaining power in negotiations about own emigration (e.g. quotas)

Worsening of human rights record loss of international popularity

Overall gain in strategic relevance (paradox: irregular flows as asset)

More funds reinforcement of security sector within administration political regression