Post on 25-Jul-2018
Conditional Consociationalism: ElectoralSystems and Grand Coalitions∗
Nils-Christian Bormann†
March 25, 2011
Abstract
Consociationalism is a complex set of rules and norms that is sup-posed to enable democratic governance and peaceful coexistence ofdifferent social segments in plural societies. Statistical studies of con-flict often reduce it to either a PR or federalism dummy in a regression.I extract the core definition of consociationalism from Lijphart’s writ-ing and explicitly link its institutional and behavioral dimensions. Ialso address the possible endogeneity of electoral systems and showthat once endogeneity is accounted for PR has a positive effect on eth-nic elite cooperation although historical, socio-structural and interna-tional factors exert a more robust influence. A history of violence ina country seems to antagonize elites and hinder cooperation.
∗Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop on Political Violence andInstitutions from 12-17 April in St. Gallen, Switzerland. I thank Manuel Vogt and JulianWucherpfennig for helpful discussion and comments.†Center of Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Email:
bormann@icr.gess.ethz.ch
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1 Introduction
Was Lijphart (1977, 238) correct in pronouncing that “[f]or many of the
plural societies of the non-Western world (. . . ) the realistic choice is not
between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational
model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all?”
The appraisal of the alleged blessings of consociationalism has been incom-
plete and/or hotly disputed. Most studies focus on the application to single
cases, and large-N studies have only gained systematic insight at the expense
of conceptual clarity. Too often consociationalism is equated with propor-
tional representation and/or federalism. However, consociationalism is more
than institutions. It consists of at least two dimensions: institutions and elite
behavior. The behavioral dimension has been completely ignored by quan-
titative scholars, and it is unclear whether the institutional side, often PR
electoral rules, actually increases the likelihood of elite accommodation in
a grand coalition, the “primary characteristic” of consociationalist arrange-
ments (Lijphart, 2002b, 39).
Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there may be a connection. Up
to 1977, politics in Brazil were not structured along ethnic lines. When the
military regime partially retreated in 1977 the sizable Afro-Brazilian minor-
ity began voicing political demands. Ethnicity became a relevant cleavage in
the political system governed by proportional electoral rules. Afro-Brazilians
remained powerless for 26 years, but in the early 21st century the Lula gov-
ernment implemented anti-discriminatory reforms, appointed multiple Afro-
Brazilians to the cabinet and made some executive power-sharing a reality.
2
In the United States, a far more economically advanced but similarly un-
equal presidential and federal democracy, it took until 2009 before minority
ethnic groups gained access to the highest state offices.1 Halfway around the
globe, in a completely different political environment Zimbabwe and South
Africa emerged out of years of the worst racial discrimination in the early
1980s and 1990s respectively. While South Africa adopted a completely new
constitutional framework, Zimbabwe stuck to its British majoritarian insti-
tutions although it reserved some parliamentary seats for minorities. While
under Mugabe’s rule a majority of Blacks was represented by the govern-
ment, whites basically left the country and the political exclusion of other
linguistically different groups continued and even increased in recent years.
In South Africa, under a system of proportional representation the ANC has
managed to give representation to all ethnic groups within the country. But
did the electoral system really play a decisive role? After all, India has man-
aged to maintain ethnic cooperation among the majority of ethnic groups in
the similar catch-all Congress party under a majoritarian electoral system
since independence in 1948.
As much as these examples refer to the interaction between institutions
and elite behavior within a country they also address a second fundamen-
tal problem of the quantitative literature on institutional effects. To my
knowledge, all studies that investigate the consequences of institutions as-
sume them as given. However, institutions understood as the “rules of the
game” are often the outcome of historical legacies, social structure and dis-
1Although some minority members did serve in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton admin-istration, none of them really made any claims on representing an ethnic group or tried topush minority issues explicitly.
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ruptive events (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). In early writings, Lijphart
(1977, 53-99) himself argued that the success of consociational institutions
depends partly on exogenous conditions among which he listed colonial his-
tory, cleavage structure, or the presence of prior conflicts. Unfortunately,
he later cast aside these considerations and nowadays recommends consen-
sus institutions to all societies irrespective of their social make-up (Lijphart,
1999, 1999). Yet, external constraints need to be taken seriously because PR
systems surely will work differently in the Netherlands than in South Africa.
Put differently, proposing that electoral rules will have the same effects in
all countries irrespective of conditions historical conditions is a daring state-
ment or as Cheibub (2007, 25) puts it: “The language of institutional ‘choice’
must be used carefully, since this choice is usually constrained by historical
circumstances.”
In order to take into account the conditions under which electoral systems
operate in a country I employ conditional recursive mixed-process models, a
generalization of the more widely known bivariate probit regressions. The
models allow me to account for the endogeneity of electoral rules and esti-
mating the endogenous effect on ethnic elite cooperation in all states where
ethnicity is or was politicized from 1946 until 2000. My empirical analysis
still falls short of capturing the complexity of consociational systems. Yet, it
steps beyond equating consociational democracy with the presence or absence
of PR, and makes an explicit link between the institutional and behavioral
components of consociationalism.
The paper is organized in four parts. First, I will superficially review the
long debate on consociationalism and try to dissect from it the core definition
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of consociationalism. Second, I will argue that attempts to measure consoci-
ationalism have been insufficient so far because they have solely focussed on
one institutional aspect of consociational theory but ignored its behavioral
components. Third, I will develop hypotheses on the conditional nature of
consociational institutions and how they influence consociational practices.
Fourth, I will describe my data and method in greater detail, and finally
analyze the effect of electoral systems on ethnic elite cooperation.
2 Confusing Consociationalism
One possible reason for the simplistic equation of consociationalism with PR
electoral rules and the complete disregard for the behavioral pillars may be
Lijphart’s frequent reformulations of consociationalist theory. In this section,
I will give a concise summary of the evolution of consociational theory.
Since its first formulation in the late 1960s (Lijphart, 1968), the con-
cept of consociational democracy has been a moving target. Lijphart and
his critics altered and redefined the concept multiple times and extended it
far beyond its originally conceived scope (Lijphart, 1977, 1985; van Cranen-
burgh and Kopecky, 2004; Van Cranenburgh, 2006). Lijphart first described
consociational democracy in the Netherlands as seven implicit political rules
governing elite behavior (Lijphart, 1968) – a characterization lacking any
mentioning of institutions and one he never returned to again (Bogaards,
2000, 400). Later consociational democracy was integrated with the pre-
vailing types of democracy: majoritarian, centripetal and centrifugal democ-
racies (Almond, 1956; Lijphart, 1969). It was understood as the type of
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democracy present in the low countries in Europe and juxtaposed with the
Anglo-American majoritarian version as an alternative stable democratic sys-
tem. In these early formulations, the institutional setup was inextricably
linked to the social structure of society. The more homogeneous societies of
the West could sustain the conflictual atmosphere inherent in majoritarian
democracy, while the plural societies of the third world could not. Accord-
ingly, Lijphart moved from case studies of smaller European countries to a
comparison of states around the globe. Here for the first time, consociational
democracy was clearly defined by four pillars: (1) a grand coalition of elites
from different groups, (2) a veto for each group in important policy areas,
(3) proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy
(Lijphart, 1977, 25). The first pillar, the grand coalition, is the “primary
characteristic” of consociational democracy, while the three remaining pillars
are “secondary instruments”. Behavioral components, i.e. elite cooperation,
and institutional rules, e.g. federalist arrangements as an expression of group
autonomy, are both equally important features of consociationalism.
Later, consociational democracy was re-baptized power-sharing democ-
racy (Lijphart, 1985). Now, it was recommended not for plural societies
but for post-conflict environments like Northern Ireland (Nagle and Clancy,
2011), Bosnia (Monteux, 2006), or South Africa (Lijphart, 1998). Over time,
power-sharing took on various meanings and lost its erstwhile consociational
definition. While it could be conceived that power-sharing is a more gen-
eral and more loosely defined collection of conflict-resolution strategies than
consociationalism with its more rigid definition, the two have been too often
conflated in practice. “Starting with Power-sharing in South Africa, Li-
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jphart has used power-sharing as a synonym for consociational democracy”
(Bogaards, 2000, 415) and this has become common practice in academic
writing.2 This had unfortunate consequences, as power-sharing is sometimes
used as a description of any post-conflict solution. Sisk (1996), for example,
subsumes Lijphart’s consociational and Horowitz’ vote pooling suggestions
under the heading of power-sharing, although the two are usually regarded
as rival, or even polar opposite, concepts (Bogaards, 2000, 416). Return-
ing full-circle to the older juxtaposition of majoritarian and consociational
democracy Rothchild and Roeder (2005) have advanced power-dividing insti-
tutions based on the US constitutional model as the best method to resolve
conflict in plural societies. Finally, in a series of statistical studies, Hoddie
and Hartzell have lumped together power-sharing and power-dividing insti-
tutions into one compound measure to assess their effect on post-conflict
peace (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007).
Partly due to the complexity of the consociational package, partly due to
a simple lack of data, Lijphart turned to the more tractable concept of con-
sensus democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1999) that focuses on purely institutional
characteristics of established democracies3. Surprisingly, Lijphart found two
consensus dimensions instead of a simple one dimensional majoritarian-consensus
continuum (Lijphart, 1999, 248). In short, the executive-parties dimensions
assesses the broadness of the government coalition, while the federal-unitary
2In From Power Sharing to Democracy the first chapter is entitled ‘Debating Consoci-ational Politics’ (O’Leary, 2005) and in Consociational Theory the first chapter’s headingis ‘Power shared after the deaths of thousands’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). Subsequentchapters in both books alternate between power-sharing and consociationalism.
3Although note the later addition of corporatism, clearly a more informal, potentiallyeven a behavioral arrangement (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991).
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dimension captures a separation of powers outside the parliament. Interest-
ingly, the only first-dimension component of consensus democracy that can be
directly engineered seems to be a proportional electoral system which, ironi-
cally, has the lowest correlation to the index measuring consensus democracy
(Taagepera, 2003, 7).
Given the confusion of concepts and types in Lijhart’s own writings as
well as in the expansive literature on power sharing, it is little wonder then
that statistical studies trying to measure consociationalism have frequently
resorted to a simple dummy variable indicating the presence of a system
of proportional representation (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Schneider and Wiese-
homeier, 2008; Brancati and Snyder, 2010; Selway and Templeman, forth-
coming). However, using a dummy for proportional electoral system is not
faithful to the concept of consociationalism. It is not even a good proxy for
the pillar of proportionality which Lijphart described as “a method of allo-
cating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of
government subsidies among the different segments” (Lijphart, 1977, 38). If
a credible link could be established between PR electoral rules and the pro-
portionality principle in key state institutions, especially the civil service or
the army, and the proportional distribution of resources, then a PR dummy
would be a partial proxy for a sub-component of consociational democracy.
Yet, civil service representation of ethnic groups may have very different
sources. Two of the countries that are regularly credited with effective ac-
commodation of their diverse population are Botswana (Rothchild, 1997,
78/9) and India (Lijphart, 1996). Neither of these two countries make use of
proportional electoral rules but both have managed to achieve proportional
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outcomes in resource distribution and/or civil service appointments (Jalal,
1995, 20-1). Moreover, countries like Spain or Italy that do have PR electoral
rules are not or at least not any longer considered consociational prototypes
(Bogaards, 2005). This is not to suggest that Arend Lijphart has not regu-
larly argued for the adoption of PR rules in the electoral arena. Quite on the
contrary, he has repeatedly recommended PR in his work (Lijphart, 1985,
1999, 2002b, 2004). However, PR is only a small part of consociationalism, it
has little to do with the proportionality concept in consociational theory, and
does not really differentiate between consociational and non-consociational
cases.
Some authors also assess the difference between parliamentary and presi-
dential systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008) or the presence and absence of
federal arrangements (Selway and Templeman, forthcoming) as operational-
izations for consociationalism. However, as noted above, presidentialism is
not a central feature of consociationalism although Lijphart does seem to
favor parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2004, 101-3). Additionally, introduc-
ing federalism as a consociational indicator confuses more than it explains.
Federalism is only a good measure of group autonomy if it overlaps with
group boundaries, not if it cuts across them. US- or German-style federalism
is clearly different from the arrangements in former Yugoslavia, in India or
in South Africa; the convoluted federal arrangement in Belgium might even
be so different that it escapes any attempt of comparative analysis. Specific
cases aside, a dummy indicating the presence or absence of federalism does
not adequately measure the presence of consociational systems. Moreover,
group autonomy can also be assessed by non-federal solutions like ethnically
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separated legal codes, self-managed educational institutions or the recogni-
tion of other linguistic or religious prerogatives.
In light of the lack of adequate empirical measures of consociational con-
cepts, I will argue for an ideal measurement close to the original definition,
and then introduce a sub-optimal but still much improved proxy for conso-
ciatioal arrangements.
3 Getting Consociationalism
Before describing an ideal consociational measurement it is important to
ask what cases should be included in the measurement? A good starting
point is Lijphart’s conjecture that consociational democracy is appropriate
for plural societies (Lijphart, 1977) which are characterized by politically and
socially charged as well as differentiable segments. Of the classical consocia-
tional cases, the Netherlands are not a good example any longer, as Lijphart
admitted himself (Lijphart, 2002a). I suggest to focus instead on societies
where ethnicity is a politically charged category. While other lines of divi-
sion exist within a society, ethnically charged nationalism is among the most
divisive and most consequential of cleavages. Ethnic fragmentation is linked
to a number of vices within societies like a lower provision of public goods
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999), lower economic growth (Alesina and La-
Ferrara, 2005), and a higher probability of ethnic civil wars (Buhaug, 2006).
If ethnicity becomes politically mobilized and the legitimacy of rulers is de-
rived from their ethnic basis, ethno-nationalism can become the grounds for
violent struggles for power (Wimmer, 2002; Wimmer, Cederman and Min,
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2009). Indeed, the pervasive logic of the nation-state makes ethnic cleavages
more often a salient political identity than other types of identities (Wimmer,
1997, 632), and thus more relevant for explaining institutional engineering.4
In order to gauge consociationalism accurately in ethnically diverse so-
cieties, what should be measured? At best, this measure should include an
indicator of a grand coalition in the executive of all relevant ethnic groups,
an indicator of territorial and cultural autonomy regulations, an indicator
assessing proportionality in the bureaucracy, the military, the legislature,
the judiciary and in the distribution of resources, and finally, an indicator of
de facto and de jure veto rights. These individual measures would measure
proportions and deviations from an ideal distribution, and be aggregated
into one scale to assess the degree of consociational practices in a country.
Unfortunately, data for the majority of consociational pillars does not exist.
Existing measures of consensus democracies (Lijphart, 1999) or veto players
(Tsebelis, 2002) are not of much help. Their temporal scope is extremely lim-
ited, they are restricted to economically advanced states, and include cases
independent of the plurality of their societies. Data on proportional repre-
sentation in key institutions is almost non-existent outside of Europe, and
data about cultural autonomy as coded in the Minorities at Risk dataset is
troubled by selection bias.
Given the absence of empirical indicators of consociationalism’s key di-
mensions is there any way to improve upon a dummy for proportional rep-
resentation? I believe that at the very least, an empirical indicator should
4A focus on countries where ethnicity is politically relevant does only exclude a minorityof all countries from the analysis. Examples include Burkina Faso, Germany or Ireland. Inmore than 150 states with more than 500,000 inhabitants, ethnicity is politically relevant.
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represent the institutional as well as the behavioral side of consociational-
ism. As argued above, consociationalism is mostly about elite accommoda-
tion, and the rules to ensure it. At the same time, Ljphart has argued that
proportional representation will lead to this elite accommodation (Lijphart,
2002b, 53). While PR is an imperfect proxy for the proportionality principle
of consociationalism it is hypothesized to be the institution that enables the
grand coalition. This is exactly the causal mechanism which Lijphart’s main
critic Donald Horowitz has challenged by arguing that a simple presence of
ethnic groups in parliament does not incentivize elite cooperation (Horowitz,
2002).
Acknowledging both the behavioral and the institutional dimension of
consociationalism, I suggest to measure the grand coalition as the proportion
of the ethnically relevant population included in the central government.
Data on ethnic inclusion was recently assembled by Cederman, Wimmer and
Min (2010). The data is especially pertinent because it measures de facto
cooperation at the elite level. Not only has Lijphart repeatedly alluded to
the centrality of the grand coalition among consociational features (Lijphart,
2002b, 38-9), he has very much emphasized the elitist nature of the grand
coalition, going so far as to call it an “elite cartell”. On the institutional side,
several measures of proportionality exist but there are important differences
between them. Golder’s classification of electoral systems around the world
is probably the best as it records electoral rules from 1946-2000, and has the
decisive advantage of only counting electoral rules that are actually used but
not those that only exist on paper (Golder, 2005). Looking at the interplay
of institutions and behavior now comes much closer to Lijphart’s original
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formulation of consociationalism and also, for the first time, actually assesses
the hypothesized relationship.
Previous research has already demonstrated that ethnic inclusion or Li-
jhpart’s grand coalition decreases the risk of ethno-nationalist civil war sub-
stantially (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). However, it is not clear what
drives inclusion of different ethnic groups at the center. In the next section
I will address the possible links between electoral rules and the inclusiveness
of government.
4 Conditional Consociationalism
How to arrive at elite cooperation in a grand coalition is probably the most
rigorously debated question in the long debate on consociationalism (Li-
jphart, 1977, 1985; Horowitz, 1991, 2000, 2002; Lijphart, 2002b). Pre-1975
Lebanon and post-1995 Bosnia where elite representation of all ethnic groups
in the executive was/is prescribed by the constitution are grist to the mill of
consociational critics. Both cases vividly exemplify that ethnic elites’ mere
presence in government institutions does not entail cooperation between the
different segments.5 This is why Lijphart and his supporters have later pro-
moted proportional representation as the “liberal consociational” solution
(McGarry and OLeary, 2007, 675/6) in which groups are not pre-determined
but those political forces that are most appealing to the electorate find ex-
pression in parliament. Nonetheless the question remains whether elites opt
5Another disheartening example of the negative effects of the prescribed segmentationof an electorate is colonial India, where Hindus and Muslims voted in different constitu-tencies despite being neighbors. The bloody history of partition in 1947 is interpreted bysome scholars as a result of exactly that segmentation.
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to cooperate only because they are proportionally represented in parliament.
The critics of consociationalism contend that ethnic elites, especially in
polarized environments, have few incentives to cooperate and prefer dead-
lock or coercive control (Lustick, 1979) to accommodation. Research on civil
wars has reinforced the perception of ethnic group representatives as strate-
gic and rational actors (Stedman, 1997; Cunningham, 2006; Metternich and
Wucherpfennig, 2010). From the theoretical vantage point of self-interested
ethnic elites Horowitz and other critics of consociationalism have argued
for vote pooling mechanisms that force ethnic elites to reach across ethnic
boundaries in order to gain parliamentary majorities. They assume a strongly
constructivist view of ethnicity when arguing that appropriate electoral rules
are able to alter ethnic allegiances (Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2005). There are
several problems with the institutional proposal and the underlying assump-
tion. First, Bogaards (2003) shows that the suggested mechanism does not
work in many African states and suggests an alternative electoral system that
he coins ‘constituency pooling’. Second, both Bogaards’ and Horowitz’ sug-
gestions lack any comparable empirical record. Bogaards’ draws his example
from a now defunct electoral mechanism in Uganda and Horowitz’ only cases
are Papua New Guinea from 1964 until 1975 and the short-lived Fiji consti-
tution of 1998. Third, I believe that the absence of AV electoral mechanisms
as well as their inappropriateness for several of the most ethnically divided
countries is due to a lack of appreciation for their endogenous adoption. In
other words, in those societies where ethnicity is a politically charged cate-
gory, it will be very difficult to convince leaders of ethnic segments to agree
to letting go of their powerful positions. AV systems are so rarely found be-
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cause they are not appreciated by ethnic entrepreneurs. On the contrary, PR
systems increase the likelihood that ethnic leaders will keep their powerful
positions even if an ethnic group is not geographically concentrated. Which
factors then influence their adoption?
A few years ago the adoption of PR systems in the established democ-
racies was already investigated by Boix (1999) and Blais, Dobrzynska and
Indridason (2005).6 While developed Western countries are not free of ten-
sions between ethnic segments, most problems occur in the developing coun-
tries. What are then the driving factors behind electoral systems in a ex-
panded sample? Colonial heritage exerts probably the strongest influence
on the adoption of any electoral system. Former Spanish as well as Bel-
gian and Dutch colonies usually employ PR electoral systems, while British
colonies most often run majoritarian systems. Similarly, the majority of for-
mer French colonies inherited the French two round run-off system which is
majoritarian in nature. At the same time several continental European coun-
tries operate PR systems. In Lijphart’s 1999 sample of advanced democracies
three out of four consensus democracies are economically highly developed
while only one in two majoritarian democracies show similar levels of de-
velopment (Muller-Rommel, 2008). More generally, democratic systems are
much more likely to be present in economically highly developed countries.
PR systems are also more likely to be found in smaller countries. The oper-
ation of list-PR systems that only feature one country-wide district is hardly
feasible in countries beyond a certain threshold. In larger countries, local
electoral districts are much more appealing. Finally, the violent history of a
6Also see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006, 79) for a critique of Boix’s findings.
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country should play a role. In the wake of civil wars new electoral systems are
adopted, and more recently these systems have been proportional systems.
Examples include Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iraq, South Africa or Indone-
sia. As about two thirds of all civil wars recur, not taking into account the
possible endogeneity of electoral systems to violence is a possible omission in
estimating their causal effects.
Regarding elite cooperation, Lijphart himself formulated a number of
favorable conditions for consociationalism to work. Conducive to elite coop-
eration are the balance of power among ethnic segments, smaller states, a
developed sense of nationhood, cross-cutting cleavages, and traditions of elite
accommodation (Lijphart, 1977, 53-99). Bogaards (1998, 478) who peruses
all of Lijphart’s publications on the conditions for consociationalism adds
the geographical concentration of segments, the absence of a majority seg-
ment, socioeconomic equality between segments and the moderation of party
systems. Several of this conditions like national loyalties or socio-economic
equality are rather effects or by-products of consociational practices than
causal priors. Other factors, like country size, colonial history, cross-cutting
cleavages or the absence of a majority segment can more safely be assumed
exogenous. Returning to electoral rules it should be noted that a grand coali-
tion can also exist within authoritarian regimes. Indeed some states in Africa
like Cote d’Ivoire under Houphouet-Boigny built up sophisticated clientelist
systems of elite accommodation. On average however, dictatorships like Al-
Assad’s Syria, Indonesia under Suharto, or Guatemala under military rule
should have lower levels of ethnic inclusion than their democratic competi-
tors. Combining the expectations of endogeneity and the inclusiveness of
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democratic regimes I hypothesize:
• H1 Considering historical and sociostructural constraints, PR electoral
rules increase the degree of ethnic inclusion in comparison with non-
democracies.
When evaluating Lijphart’s main argument, it is necessary to note that
he always juxtaposed the British-style majoritarian system with the propor-
tional consociational system. Majoritarian electoral systems would inevitably
lead to tyranny of the majority, especially under plurality regulations: “For
many of the plural societies of the non-Western world, therefore, the realis-
tic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the
consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democ-
racy at all.” This is not difficult to fathom. As soon as an ethnic group
makes up a plurality in the population it is attractive for group leaders to
directly appeal to their own group for votes. Although PR is assumed to lead
to similar dynamics, the distortive nature of first-past-the-post rules severely
aggravates the outcome. Ceteris paribus, in majoritarian systems groups
smaller than 51% can already dominate the center while in PR systems that
should not be possible. Additionally, in PR systems very small groups will be
more likely to gain representation and can become crucial players in coalition
governments – a path closed to them in majoritarian systems.
• H2a Considering historical and sociostructural constraints, PR elec-
toral rules increase the degree of ethnic inclusion in comparison with
majoritarian systems.
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5 Analysis
5.1 Data
My dataset consists of over 5000 country-year observations from 1946 until
2005. The dependent variable is the proportion of the included population
of the politically relevant ethnic population as coded in the Ethnic Power
Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). The included
population is defined as the sum of the relative sizes of those ethnic groups in
a country that have de facto access to executive positions. In non-democratic
states executive power can be vested in a variety of institutions like a royal
family, the top army brass or revolutionary councils. In multiple countries the
ethnically relevant population is not tantamount to the overall population.
Prior to the passing of the voting rights act in 1965, for example, Asians or
Hispanics are not coded as a relevant ethnic categories in the United States.
Taking the proportion of the included population would therefore paint a too
optimistic picture of the actually included population.7 As an alternative
dependent variable I also code the relative number of included groups from
all politically relevant ethnic groups in a given country and year. There are
vast differences between the most ethnically diverse states like Russia – with
up to 60 groups – and less plural societies like those in South America with
only two or three groups.
As my principal independent variable I take Golder’s classification of elec-
toral systems from 1946-2000 (Golder, 2005). Each major family of electoral
7A group is defined as ethnically relevant if representatives of the group make politicalclaims on behalf of the entire group or if the group is discriminated against by the state.
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systems, i.e. PR, mixed and majoritarian rules, takes a value of 1 if it was in
effect in a given year. The base category are non-democratic regimes which
take a value of zero. In alternative specifications I also test the impact of
a less precise classification of electoral systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008)
which is coded from 1946 until 2002.8
The majority of my control variables comes from the Ethnic Power Re-
lations dataset. In order to test the historical influence of elite cooperation,
I include the degree of inclusion in the first year of independence of a state.
Additionally, I control for the size of the largest group as a proxy for the bal-
ance of power between ethnic segments. I expect countries with numerically
dominant groups, to have a lower degree of inclusion as those groups have
less incentives to build alliances with other ethnic groups to attain executive
power.9 To gauge the effect of cleavages, I make use of an ethno-linguistic
fractionalization index calculated from the groups in the EPR dataset. I
also use the linguistic distance measure by Fearon (2003). Higher degrees
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization or cultural distance should decrease the
included population as there are less symbolic ties that bind elites and the
groups they represent together. Additionally, I include a count of previous
ethnic civil wars in a country to assess the hostility of inter-ethnic relations.10
8Gerring & Thacker often backdate their measure of electoral systems even if it wasnot used in practise due to authoritarian rule.
9In alternative specifications I considered the log of the largest group and a quadraticspecification to control for the fact that with increasing size the dependent variable ofinclusion may be growing in direct proportion. It could be that the effect of the largestgroup reaches a maximum at mid-range before inclusion grows because the largest groupis growing. This effect should not play a role in specifications using the proportion ofincluded groups as a dependent variable.
10The conflict data is adopted from the Expanded Armed Conflict Data assembled byCunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009).
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More civil wars should translate into a lower degree of ethnic inclusion. To
gauge the effect of external threats, I include the international rivalry data
from Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). According to Lijphart a greater feeling
of external threats should lead to a higher degree of internal cooperation.
Furthermore, I incorporate data on country size and economic development
from Gleditsch (2002). A larger population should increase the complexity
of ethnic relations and therefore decrease the size of the included population,
while GDP/capita, as an indicator of modernity, should exert a positive effect
on the included population. Finally, I include dummy indicators for world
regions and colonial history from the Quality of Government project (Teorell
et al., 2010). Summary statistics and correlations between the main variables
can be found in tables 3 and 4 in the appendix.
5.2 Method: Conditional Mixed Process Regression
In order to correctly estimate proportions which are continuous between zero
and one, I utilize the Tobit regression model with a lower and upper bound-
ary.11 As argued above the influence of electoral systems on inclusion may
be endogenous to a variety of factors such as colonial heritage or economic
development. Therefore, I estimate the endogeneity of electoral systems with
conditional mixed-process (CMP) models (Roodman, 2008). CMP regression
is a generalization of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models that can
be used with response variables that are not continuous but bounded at an
11I also tried OLS regressions. The results were not substantially or statistically sig-nificant different. Optimally, I would have employed beta regressions but they are notavailable for conditional models. I ran a few one-stage beta and logistic regressions andthey provided similar results as simple tobit or OLS models.
20
arbitrary threshold value and are assumed to have a normally distributed
error. Normally distributed errors are not unique to probit models but are a
characteristic of several Maximum-Likelihood (ML) estimators like multino-
mial probit, ordered probit or tobit regression models. A more widely-known
variant of a CMP model is a bivariate probit regression model which allows
bivariate normal error distributions – from the SUR framework – and the
inclusion of an endogenous indepdendent variable in the second-stage equa-
tion. Essentially, two equations are estimated together and the endogenous
variable y∗1i appears as a predictor in the second equation:
y∗1i = Xβ1j + ε1i
y∗2i = Xβ2j + δ2 ∗ y1i + ε2i
where Xβ is a matrix of j independent variables and their respective
coefficients. y1i is dummy variable indicating the choice of an electoral sys-
tem. It enters the second equation as an endogenous factor estimated by δ.
In a probit regression framework the latent variable y∗1i would theoretically
indicate the utility of choosing one electoral system over another. It is fur-
ther assumed that the assumed outcome is observed whenever the utility of
choosing the alternative is positive:
y1i = g(y∗1i) = (1{y∗1i > 0})
y2i represents the degree of ethnic exclusion at the center. As a proportion
it cannot take values below zero or above one. A tobit regression model with
an upper and lower threshold captures these natural boundaries.
y2i = g(y∗2i) =
c if y∗2i ≤ c
y∗2i if c < y∗2i < c
c if y∗2i ≥ c
21
The linked error distributions consist of a shared part η and the unique
part u:
ε1i = ηi + u1i
ε2i = ηi + u2i
Moreover, the bivariate error variance ε is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variance Σ:
ε = (ε1, ε2) ∼ N (0,Σ)
Σ captures the correlation ρ between the omitted factors explaining the
choice of an electoral system y1i and the degree of ethnic cooperation y2i.
Σ =
1 ρ
ρ 1
Essentially, this means that unidentified factors like elite choices are con-
nected through both equations. As argued above I expect ρ to be negative
since PR should more often be present in those situations when there is
conflict over inclusion, i.e. when inclusion is smaller.
The model can be identified in one of two ways. In the classical simulta-
neous equation model an exclusion restriction needs to be introduced. Put
differently, an appropriate instrument needs to be entered into the first stage
regression. I utilize colonial heritage as a clearly exogenous factor driving
the adoption of electoral rules from a colonial power. However, I admit that
colonial history is not the best instrument since a large number of colonies
were and are authoritarian regimes that do not hold elections. A second
possibility is to identify the model based on the assumption that the error
distributions are truly bivariate normal distributed. Admittedly, this is a
somewhat heroic assumption which is hard to defend. However, an indirect
22
way to assess the viability of the assumption is to try out different error dis-
tributions. Recently, Winkelmann (2009) has developed bivariate ML models
that rely on a number of Coppola distributed errors. If the results hold under
different error distributions, a higher confidence in their reliability would be
achieved.
5.3 Results
In this section I present two regression tables, one cross-sectional analysis
from the 1990s and one time-series cross-section analysis from 1946 until
2000. Table 1 presents the conditional estimates of majoritarian and PR
electoral systems in 1996, and their effect on ethnic inclusion at the center
in 2004.1213 Ethnic inclusion in 2004 is still strongly shaped by the extent of
ethnic cooperation at independence which forcefully underlines a sticky view
of (informal) institutions. Another historical variable, the age of a state, has
virtually no effect on inclusion. It is either a bad proxy of nationalist consol-
idation or its effect is washed out by the history of elite cooperation. Other
influential indicators are the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and
the size of the largest group. Number of wars fought in a given country also
increases the degree of inclusion, showing the endogeneity of ethnic inclu-
sion to actual violence. Surprisingly, neither population size nor economic
development seem to have any effect on the degree of inclusion.
12The year 2004 was chosen as the last year in my dataset for which all independentvariables other than the electoral systems had no missing values. The year 1996 was chosenbecause it is the first year after the democratic transitions in the early nineties in whichthe state system contains the same members as in 2004. I also ran analyses from 1995 and1994 to 2004 which showed no significant differences.
13The upper part of the table displays the second stage equation and the lower partshows the equation explaining the distribution of electoral systems in 1996.
23
Table 1: Cross-section CMP modelVariables Incl.
Pop.Incl.Pop.
Inclusion Year 1 0.320(0.108)**
0.356(0.114)**
PR 0.028(0.053)
0.312(0.118)**
Mixed 0.051(0.047)
0.070(0.063)
Major. 0.270(0.116)**
0.086(0.054)
ELF -1.031(0.338)**
-0.846(0.336)*
Stage Age 0.000(0.000)
0.000(0.000)
Max. Group -0.909(0.375)*
-0.375(0.198)*
War Hist. 0.015(0.008).
0.014(0.008).
Log(Pop.) -0.006(0.017)
0.017(0.018)
Log(GDP) 0.020(0.022)
-0.019(0.026)
AIC 92.49 90.26
Electoral System Maj. PR
Civil War History -0.133(0.092)
-0.108(0.099)
Log(Population) 0.236(0.114)*
-0.094(0.107)
Log(GDP/capita) -0.210(0.177)
0.445(0.155)**
Hispanic Colony -1.137(0.463)*
0.375(0.311)
British Colony -0.102(0.398)
-0.160(0.417)
French Colony -0.401(0.540)
-1.391(0.572)**
ρ -0.516(0.236).
-0.805(0.146)**
N 121 121
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses
24
The effect of electoral systems is not straight-forward. If not modeled as
endogenous indicators their effect on grand coalition formation in the exec-
utive of a country is non-existent.14 However, if the endogenous adoption
including of electoral systems is accounted for in terms of colonial history,
economic development, population size and history of violence, both ma-
joritarian and PR electoral systems increase the degree of ethnic inclusion.
Additionally, the correlation ρ between the two equations is negative and sig-
nificant as expected, meaning that PR systems are more often found where
inclusion is difficult to establish. This also seems to be true for majoritarian
systems in the cross-section. It could be that the effect is caused by those
African countries that became democratic in the early 1990s. That view is
supported by the fact that majoritarian systems seem to be found in poorer
countries despite the fact that the base category are authoritarian systems.
Civil war history actually decreases the likelihood of any electoral system
although it is not significant.15
Table 2 includes four conditional time-series cross-section models from
1946 until 2000. The first and second column show the effects of endogenous
PR institutions and the third and fourth column display the consequences
of endogenous mixed and majoritarian systems respectively.16 Again the
strongest predictor of ethnic elite cooperation is the amount of cooperation
14Cf. 5 for time-series results. I do not represent simple cross-section estimations.15It may be that a simple count of small-scale civil wars is not equivalent to disruptive
events and that the number of more intensive or a different operationalization of intensitydoes a better job of accounting for different electoral systems. It may also help to onlylook at a sample of post-war societies only.
16All four equations include controls for time-trends that are not shown in the table.Time, operationalized as the cubic polynomial of state age and age of electoral systemsdoes not exert a sizable influence.
25
in the first year. Mixed and majoritarian electoral systems (unconditional)
have small effects while the conditional estimate of PR systems exerts a pro-
nounced and highly significant influence on inclusion. While none of the con-
trol variables from the cross-sectional comparison undergoes any substantive
changes in signs, the confidence in their statistical accuracy declines despite
an increase in observations. The drop in statistical significance levels of the
ELF index and the war history variable was only to be expected. The ELF
measure is not time varying and cannot account for changes in inclusion. The
war history variable is a count indicator that cannot be high in early years
of a countries existence. Increasing the time frame of the analysis allows the
introduction of international rivalries into the analysis. Against Lijphart’s
expectation external threats do not increase internal cooperation. It is rather
the other way around. One explanation could be that external threats divert
attention from the plight of excluded minorities. An alternative mechanism
could be that international rivalries exist exactly because of internal exclu-
sion as in irredentist conflicts. The size of the largest group does not seem to
influence the level of inclusion over time. This may be due to the fact that in
EPR, ethnicity is coded from a constructivist point of view, i.e., groups can
join or dissolve into subgroups. Indeed the mean of the size of the largest
group is slightly bigger than the sample average in 2004. More importantly,
the long-standing exclusion of large swaths of the population in Liberia and
South Africa had ended in 2004. Regarding the endogeneity of the electoral
system, PR rules are more often to be found in smaller and more economially
advanced countries. Colonial history now also proves to be a reliable predic-
tor of the presence or absence of PR systems. Against Lijphart’s prediction
26
that Belgian or Dutch colonies would inherit consociational institutions these
countries show a strong strain of authoritarianism.
The second hypothesis stated that conditional on the environments in
which electoral systems operate proportional systems should lead to higher
levels of inclusion than majoritarian systems. Running a naive regression
analysis without taking into account the endogeneity of electoral systems as
in table 5 on page 40 in the appendix would lead us to believe otherwise.
PR systems do not seem to have any effect on inclusion while majoritarian
and mixed systems are at least partially successful in increasing the level of
inclusion. Even in the cross-sectional analysis presented above, majoritarian
systems seem to at least be on par with proportional systems although a
direct comparison of effects is difficult if they come from two different equa-
tions.17 In table 2, conditional estimates of majoritarian and mixed models
are presented for the period from 1946 until 2000. While mixed electoral
rules show a similar positive effect on the degree of inclusion as do PR rules,
majoritarian electoral rules lose statistical significance. Although their sub-
stantial effect is still positive, the confidence intervals are too large to be
overlooked. Before drawing too sweeping conclusions one should be wary of
these estimates as the selection equations do not do a good job of predicting
mixed or majoritarian systems.18
17I tried to run a multivariate regression model in which both, majoritarian and PR sys-tems would be introduced as endogenous variables, however, the likelihood was intractablewith the amount of data I have at my disposal and the model did not converge.
18The addition of other control variables in table 6 on page 41 seems to support thereached conclusions but changing the dependent variable to the number of included groupsor using a different operationalization of electoral systems as in table 7 weakens the con-fidence in the results. The different operationalization of electoral systems by Gerringand Thacker (2008) also counts the de jure existence of electoral rules or put differently,authoritarian spells. Therefore, it is not too surprising that both PR and majoritarian
27
Table 2: TSCS CMP models of electoral systems
Variables Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Inclusion at Independence 0.736(0.066)***
0.680(0.067)***
0.685(0.064)***
0.683(0.067)***
PR 0.220(0.046)***
0.244(0.043)***
0.005(0.021)
0.012(0.029)
Mixed 0.042(0.024).
0.050(0.026).
0.293(0.071)**
0.079(0.036)*
Majoritarian 0.040(0.021).
0.041(0.022).
0.047(0.025).
0.165(0.284)
ELF -0.307(0.171).
-0.353(0.178)*
-0.396(0.176)*
Stage Age 0.000(0.000)
0.000(0.000)
0.000(0.000)
International Rivalry -0.034(0.019).
-0.044(0.021)*
-0.046(0.023)*
Largest Group -0.292(0.202)
-0.351(0.202).
-0.375(0.198).
Civil War Historty -0.005(0.011)
-0.007(0.011)
-0.004(0.011)
Log(Population) 0.013(0.010)
0.005(0.009)
-0.002(0.018)
Log(GDP/capita) -0.015(0.015)
0.008(0.012)
0.001(0.025)
AIC 476.81 589.96 -1424.71 994.90
Electoral System PR PR Mix. Maj.
Civil War History -0.022(0.119)
0.028(0.104)
0.056(0.092)
-0.062(0.080)
Log(Population) -0.148(0.071)*
-0.169(0.081)*
-0.036(0.062)
0.275(0.125)*
Log(GDP/capita) 0.482(0.109)***
0.541(0.115)***
-0.040(0.104)
0.358(0.177)*
Hispanic Colony 0.482(0.201)*
0.442(0.190)*
-0.121(0.226)
-0.651(0.402)
British Col. -1.309(0.462)**
-1.193(0.433)**
-0.450(0.634)
0.372(0.639)
French Col. -1.726(0.610)**
-1.598(0.563)**
-1.008(0.607).
0.057(0.586)
Belgium or Dutch Col. -1.981(0.658)**
-2.000(0.591)***
N/A N/A
ρ -0.767(0.112)***
-0.796(0.091)***
-0.585(0.245).
-0.354(0.784)
N 5246 5001 5001 5001
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1 ’ ’ 1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country
28
Why do majoritarian systems have such varying effects in a cross-sectional
analysis, in a naive regression and in a conditional TSCS regression? As men-
tioned above several African countries that do have majoritarian traditions
democratized in the early 1990s (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). At the
same time international activism by the international community led to peace
missions that introduced power sharing agreements in the wake of civil wars.
Both democratization and these power-sharing effects increased the level of
elite inclusion in Africa as can also be seen in figure 1 in the appendix. During
the Cold War period majoritarian regimes were rather sparse and often they
would exclude at least a small part of their population from de facto access
to executive power. The UK excluded the Northern Irish for longer peri-
ods of time, Australia even discriminated against the Aborigines, India while
more inclusive toward a vast variety of linguistically diverse groups, never-
theless excluded non-Hindu minorities and the US, the oldest democracy in
the world has struggled to incorporate much bigger segments of Blacks and
Hispanics.
6 Conclusion
Going back to the examples at the beginning of this paper, do electoral sys-
tems really make a difference? Is the PR system in Brazil responsible for
the faster inclusion of minorities? Is PR also responsible for the greater sta-
bility of ethnic elite cooperation in South Africa? The preceding analysis
electoral systems have a negative influence on inclusion since they are now conflated withauthoritarian regimes. However, this does not explain the catastrophic performance of PRsystems when tested in relation to the proportion of included groups.
29
provided some evidence that PR systems may be more successful at enabling
ethnic inclusion into the government executive. As Lijphart claimed over
forty years ago, majoritarian electoral systems have more difficulties incor-
porating minorities, simply because they do not even help minorities over
the first political hurdle, getting representation in parliament. This is not to
say that PR systems are really the inevitable causal factor leading to a grand
coalition but under the right circumstances they do increase the chances of
elite cooperation.
In this paper I have explicitly linked consociational institutions to conso-
ciational behavior and pointed to an important gap in the existing quantita-
tive literature that tries to link consociational institutions directly to conflict.
Yet, this is only a first go at the problem. Consociationalism is a complex
concept and the data we have do not allow us to measure it accurately.
Moreover, it seems to depend on multiple factors that cannot be influenced.
Historical patterns of elite cooperation have by far the strongest impact on
contemporary grand coalitions. Additionally, cultural distances, the struc-
ture of group relations or international dynamics all have an impact. Among
these powerful historical and socio-structural factors, the electoral system
is one of the few screws that “constitutional engineers” can turn. But we
should be careful to simply throw any electoral system at a society. Ex-
isting institutions are often interlinked with longstanding informal practices
and we should at least take into account how a new electoral system will
work given the existing social circumstances. While the presented analysis
lends some credence to the assertion that simple majoritarian systems are not
the best solution for ethnically divided societies if not coupled with explicit
30
power-sharing deals, the alternatives need to be analysed more carefully.
One important step forward is to further disaggregate electoral systems,
and possibly come up with an index of proportionality. The strong perfor-
mance of mixed electoral systems should be scrutinized more carefully and
the role of electoral quotas or party bans should be considered. Figuring out
how proportional or majoritarian, mixed systems were A second important
factor that needs to be taken into account is geography. Are ethnic groups
concentrated in a specific area or are they dispersed throughout a country?
Do they have ethnic kin in neighboring countries? And how does the geo-
graphic distribution of electoral systems influence their possible adoption in
other countries? On the methodological side, more carefully analyzing com-
parable cases after conflicts or in culturally homogeneous regions may help
us to disentangle the effect of electoral systems from the influence of political
leaders. Matching regression techniques may bring us closer to actual causal
pathways. As elite cooperation in a grand coalition is one of the strongest
determinants of peace in plural societies, investing the levers that enable elite
cooperation is a worthwhile undertaking.
31
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7 Appendix
Table 3: Summary of Variables
Variables N Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max.
Included Pop. 5860 .771 .9 .278 0 1
Included Pop.Year 1
5860 .772 .895 .282 0 1
Included Groups 5860 .501 .5 .289 0 1
Included GroupsYear 1
5860 .509 .5 .283 0 1
PR 5246 .176 0 .381 0 1
Mixed 5246 .0255 0 .158 0 1
Majoritarian 5246 .132 0 .338 0 1
ELF 5860 .495 .504 .27 .0238 1
Log Population 5488 9.3 9.2 1.42 5.78 14.1
Log GDP/capita 5488 8.07 8.03 1.06 5.79 11.1
Civil War History 5860 .519 0 1.39 0 13
Int. Rivalry 5860 .339 0 .473 0 1
State Age 5860 80.4 59 62 0 189
Largest Group 5860 .638 .649 .239 .16 .988
38
Tab
le4:
Corr
ela
tion
matr
ixof
main
vari
ab
les
Incl
.P
op.
Incl
.G
rps.
Gol
der
ES
CW
His
t.E
LF
Pop
.G
DP
Riv
alry
Max.
Grp
.S
tate
Age
Incl
.P
op.
1.00
Incl
.G
rps.
0.52
***
1.00
Gold
erE
S0.
22***
0.06
***
1.00
CW
His
t.-0
.11*
**
-0.2
2***
-0.1
1***
1.00
EL
F-0
.41*
**
0.03
*-0
.29*
**0.
21**
*1.
00
Pop
.0.
06***
-0.3
3***
0.0
00.
40**
*0.
011.
00
GD
P0.
27***
0.00
0.47
***
-0.2
0***
-0.3
3***
0.03
*1.
00
Riv
alry
-0.0
1-0
.12*
**
0.0
10.
19**
*0.
05**
*0.
25**
*-0
.03*
1.00
L.
Gro
up
0.34
***
-0.1
2***
0.2
6***
-0.1
8***
-0.9
5***
0.02
0.35*
**-0
.04**
1.0
0
Sta
teA
ge0.
10***
-0.2
1***
0.3
3***
0.08
***
-0.3
2***
0.36
***
0.35*
**0.1
7**
*0.
32*
**1.
00
39
Table 5: Naive ML Regressions
Models Tobit Logit w/ FE
Variables Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Incl.Grps.
Incl.Pop.
Incl.Grps.
Inclusion Year 1 0.808(0.067)***
0.785(0.075)***
0.926(0.065)***
109.655(10.358)***
36.881(2.583)***
PR 0.044(0.032)
0.013(0.029)
0.002(0.027)
0.150(0.139)
0.149(0.103)
Mixed 0.075(0.031)*
0.013(0.029)*
0.041(0.071)
0.799(0.340)*
0.206(0.372)
Major. 0.050(0.030).
0.050(0.031)
0.025(0.028)
0.375(0.232)
0.125(0.171)
ELF -0.357(0.195).
-0.201(0.158)
1.503(2.465)
-2.851(0.990)**
State Age 0.000(0.000)
0.000(0.000)
0.013(0.010)
-0.001(0.008)
Int. Rivalry -0.057(0.024)*
-0.043(0.021)*
-0.044(0.104)
-0.003(0.068)
Largest Group -0.396(0.221).
-0.318(0.184).
-2.078(2.312)
-3.804(0.882)***
Civil War History -0.007(0.012)
-0.011(0.009)
0.050(0.093)
0.016(0.050)
Log(Pop.) -0.006(0.010)
-0.019(0.009)*
-0.746(0.403)
-0.177(0.308)
Log(GDP) 0.003(0.016)
-0.010(0.014)
0.095(0.237)
0.074(0.173)
AIC 725.37 668.49 -245.71 2668.09 3738.43
N 5246 5001 5001 5001 5001
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country
40
Table 6: Additional Control VariablesVariables Incl.
Pop.Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Incl.Groups
Inclusion at Independence 0.659(0.063)***
0.629(0.071)***
0.623(0.076)***
0.778(0.049)***
PR 0.213(0.036)***
-0.030(0.026)
-0.047(0.030)
-0.184(0.053)**
Mixed -0.009(0.024)
-0.298(0.074)
-0.005(0.029)
0.020(0.052)
Majoritarian -0.009(0.026)
-0.016(0.030)***
-0.250(0.079)**
0.004(0.029)
ELF -0.404(0.158)**
-0.307(0.171).
-0.494(0.168)
-0.294(0.144)*
International Rivalry -0.014(0.014)
-0.014(0.015)
-0.013(0.015)
-0.028(0.016).
Largest Group -0.422(0.186)*
-0.524(0.193) **
-0.525(0.184)**
-0.391(0.165)*
Civil War Historty -0.009(0.010)
-0.007(0.009)
-0.007(0.008)
-0.010(0.007)
Log(Population) 0.003(0.009)
-0.002(0.009)
0.011(0.010)
-0.020(0.009)*
Log(GDP/capita) -0.006(0.017)
0.026(0.015)
0.040(0.017)*
0.025(0.017)
Democracy 0.072(0.033)*
0.069(0.036).
0.077(0.037)*
0.023(0.028)
Eastern Europe 0.072(0.025)**
0.034(0.024)
0.023(0.027)
-0.012(0.035)
Latin America -0.025(0.030)
-0.012(0.028)
-0.029(0.034)
0.020(0.039)
SSA 0.010(0.054)
-0.037(0.054)
-0.027(0.052)
0.010(0.053)
Asia 0.112(0.040)**
0.076(0.038)*
0.069(0.042)
0.009(0.043)
Middle East -0.035(0.052)
-0.084(0.052)
-0.080(0.051)
-0.039(0.039)
AIC 296.43 -1502.8 639.73 -467.21
Electoral System PR Mix. Maj. PR
Log(Population) -0.135(0.070).
0.015(0.079)
0.220(0.095)*
-0.175(0.085)*
Log(GDP/capita) 0.575(0.108)***
0.429(0.168)**
0.372(0.110)**
0.650(0.124)***
Hispanic Colony 0.650(0.224)**
-0.070(0.294)
-0.451(0.367)
0.744(0.235)**
British Col. -0.996(0.395)*
-0.787(0.723)
0.350(0.301)
-1.350(0.475)**
French Col. -1.401(0.578)*
-1.265(0.498)*
-0.096(0.290)
-1.163(0.635).
Belgium or Dutch Col. -1.690(0.611)**
N/A N/A -0.223(0.350)
ρ -0.802(0.079)***
0.753(0.130)***
0.671(0.148)***
0.634(0.145)**
N 5001 5001 5001 5001
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country
41
Table 7: CMP model - Gerring & Thacker electoral systems
Variables Incl.Pop.
Incl.Pop.
Inclusion Year 1 0.635(0.071)***
0.652(0.070)***
PR 0.004(0.028)
-0.208(0.067)**
Mixed 0.010(0.034)
0.043(0.036)
Major. -0.243(0.050)***
0.034(0.023)
ELF -0.427(0.179)*
-0.475(0.199)*
Stage Age 0.000(0.000)
0.000(0.000)
Rivalry -0.025(0.017)
-0.037(0.018)*
Max. Group -0.419(0.206)*
-0.433(0.227).
War Hist. -0.010(0.011)
-0.001(0.011)
Log(Pop.) 0.022(0.012).
-0.003(0.010)
Log(GDP) 0.040(0.017)*
0.031(0.016).
AIC 2802.66 1505.36
Electoral System Maj. PR
War Hist. -0.084(0.064)
-0.072(0.098)
Log(Pop.) 0.177(0.071)*
-0.146(0.098)
Log(GDP) 0.350(0.093)***
0.397(0.112)***
Hisp. Col. 0.067(0.190)
0.643(0.240)**
Brit. Col. 0.678(0.236)**
-1.132(0.420)**
Fren. Col. 0.148(0.214)
-0.472(0.331)
BeNe. Col -0.819(0.519)
0.845(0.392)*
ρ -0.802(0.079)***
0.753(0.130)***
N 5244 5244
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered bycountry
42