Post on 08-Jan-2016
description
7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
1/15
Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian EthosAuthor(s): Elaine FanthamSource: Phoenix, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 262-275Published by: Classical Association of CanadaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1088043.
Accessed: 03/11/2014 23:33
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Classical Association of Canadais collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Phoenix.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cachttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1088043?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1088043?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cac7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
2/15
CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE
AND
ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
ELAINE FANTHAM
IN
THE SECOND BOOK
of
De OratoreCicero
analyses
the ratiodicendi
n
terms
of
three functions:
1)
ut
probemus
vera
esse,
quae
defendimus;
(2)
ut conciliemus os
nobis,
qui
audiunt;
(3)
ut
animos
eorum,
d
quem-
cumque
ausa
postulabit
motum,
ocemus
2.115).
This
paper
is
concerned
with the
second
of
these
functions s
presentedby
Cicero,
and
with
the
Aristotelian
heory
of
ranrs
..
&&..
.
70r
-00ovs
(Rhet.
1.2.1356 a
5-13)
from
which he
derived this
second
function.'
shall
try
to
explain
the
modifications
icero
made,
his motives
n
makingthem,
and the
diffi-
culties
arising
fromhis choice of
adaptation.
The
theme
of
conciliare
returns
briefly
n 2.121
among
the
VTrexvOL
riLares,
lla
quae
totaab
oratore
ariuntur.
There are tres es
quae
adfidem
faciendam
olae
valent
..
ut et
concilienturnimi
t
doceantur tmoveantur.
These
receive further
omment
n
128:
tres
sunt
res,
ut
ante
dixi:
una
conciliandorum
hominum,
altera
docendorum,
ertia
concitandorum. arum trium
partium prima
lenitatem
orationis,
secunda
acumen,
tertia
vim
desiderat,
am
hoc necesse
st,
ut
s,
qui
nobiscausam
adiudicaturus
it,
aut
inclinatione
voluntatis propendeat in nos aut defensionis rgumentis dducaturaut animi permotione
cogatur.
From
these
ntroductory
emarks
we derive
the dea that
115)
the
urors
must be
won
over
to
us,
the
advocates2
114
has
parenthetically
ncluded
xThe
association
of
conciliare
with
the
Aristotelian
iaortsb,&
70oi
ovs
is
not
made
explicit
in the
literary
and exoteric
De
Oratore,
which
generally
avoids
Greek
terms.
Antonius
acknowledges
his
debt
to
Aristotlefor
he
analysis
of
ogical proof
n
2.160,
but
does
not
repeat
the
acknowledgment
for
the
"ethical" or
emotive
proofs.
Cicero
explicitly
mentions
'0LKbV,
and
gives
ts
motive as ad
benevolentiam
onciliandam
inOrator128: duo sunt enimquae bene ractata b oratore dmirabilem loquentiamfaciant;
quorum
alterum
est
quod
Graeci
1O0LK6V
ocant,
ad
naturas et
mores
et
ad
omnem
vitae
consuetudinem
accommodatum;
alterum
quod
eidem
iraerTLK6b
nominant, uo
pertur-
bantur
animi et
concitantur,
n
quo
uno
regnat
oratio.
llud
superius
come, iucundum,
ad
benevolentiam conciliandam
paratum.
It should
be
noted that if
OLK6V
nd
7ra7erTLK6P
re
here
used
as
nouns,
rather
than
adjectives,
this
is
a
Hellenistic
extension
of
Aristotle's
practice
(see
below,
note
9).
Cicero here
defines
r07LK6P
s
speech
adapted
to
mores,
the
natural
translation
of
i607.
As
J.
E.
Sandys
comments
on
Orator,
oc.
cit.
[Cambridge
1885]
p.
131),
the
mores are
not
clearly
identified
s
those of
the
speaker,
or
the
audience,
whereas
there can
be
no
doubt
that the
animi
affected
byira07?1LKb6
re
those of
the
audience. We
must
there-
fore
go
back to the earlier
and fuller
ccount
in
De
Oratore
o
see
whereCicero
places
the
emphasis
of
the
genus quod
ad
vitam
t
mores
ccommodatur
De
Orat. 2.213
=
Orator128
above).
This is one of
the
problems
which I
attempt
to
solve in the
following
pages.
2See
now
George
Kennedy,
"The
Rhetoric of
Advocacy
in
Greece
and
Rome,"
A7P
89
(1968)
419-436. In this
broad historical
study
he
traces
the
principal
effects
of
the
262
PHoENIx,
Vol. 27
(1973)
3.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
3/15
CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS 263
both
advocate and
client),
nd
(128)
this
requires
enitas
o
make
the
ury
inclined o favour
us.
There
may
also
be
a contrast
ntended
between
the
conscious inclinatiovoluntatis nd the unwitting r unwillingpermotio
animi.
The
concept
of
lenitas is
important
for Cicero's rhetorical
theory
because
it enables
him to
bridge
he
gap
between he
ethical
and aesthetic
aspects
of
speech;
in
Cicero's
theoretical
writings
t
is
most
often
ssoc-
iated with
style;
compare, .g.,
Leg.
1.11,
n
which
Atticus,
emarking
n
Cicero's
adaptation
of
his
style
to
increasing
ge
and his
reduction
of
contentio,
dds
ut
iam
oratio
tua
non
multum
b
philosophorum
enitate
absit. Historical
writing
s said
in
De
Orat.
2.64
to
require
genus
orationis
fusum tquetractumt cum lenitatequadam aequabiliterprofluens ine
hac
iudiciali
asperitate;
nd
for
he
combinationwith
equabilis,
compare
Orator
3,
elaborant
lii
in
lenitate
et
aequabilitate
et
puro
.
.
et candido
genere
dicendi.
t
is
also
applied
to
delivery
nd
intonation,
s
in
2.184
below
and
Orator
6
(with
Sandys'
note ad
loc.,
p.
65 of
his
edition).
But
at the
moral
evel enitas
s the
quality
of
wise
and merciful
ecision
n
the
judge
or
jury,
defined
by
Cicero in
Part.
Or.
78,
in
relation
to
justice:
ea
(sc.iustitia)
n
moderatione
nimi
advertendienitas
nominatur.
ot
only
does this
correspondclosely
to the
Aristotelian
ccount
of
irLELKEta
n
Rhet.
1.13,
1374
a
30
following;
but
brLELKEL
nd
the
trVLLKr7S
n
a more
general
ense
are
important
lements
n
the deal ethoswhich
Aristotle ets
up
forhis orator
t Rhet.
1.2.
1356
a
7
and
a
13,
and
2.1.1378
a
15.
While
this
wider
sense of
irLEKls-"reasonable,
moderate,
gentlemanly"-
extends
beyond
the
range
of
lenis,
Cicero's
choice of
lenis and
lenitas
enabled
him
to
include,
s
I
will
show,
esthetic nd
stylistic
onnotations
which
-LeLKeLa
acked.
Of the three
functions icero
discusses
first he
varietiesof
ntellectual
proof docere)whichare closest to theorthodox nventio heoryof post-
Aristotelian
hetoric,
nd
leads
up
to
a
catalogue
of
the
Aristotelian
opoi
in
163-173.
After
conversational
digression
Antonius
proceeds
to con-
sider the
psychological functions,
onciliare
and movere:
182-184 deal
separate
dentities f
advocate
and client
found
ccasionally
n
Athens
nd
almost
universally
n Rome.
He
discusses
e
Orat.
.182-184,
n
pages
34-435, oncluding
hat
"most
especially
he
possibility
f effective
ontrast
etween
atron
nd client
s
not
recognised,"
nd
comments n
the
slowness f
Roman
rhetoricalheory o assimilatethe
mplications
fthe
eparate
ersonalities
f
advocate nd client. he
whole rticle
is
full
f
valuable
comments n
many
spects
of
Ethos,
nd
I offer
my
own
discussion
(written
efore
consulted
ennedy's
work)
n
the
hope
that
this
nalysis
f
the
con-
flicts
enerated
n
Cicero's
daptation
f
Greek
heory
ill
provide
useful
ppendix
o
his
paper.
For
further
iscussion
ee
Kennedy's
he
Art
f
Rhetoric
t
Rome
Princeton
1972)
139
(on
the
treatmentf
Ethos
n
rhetorical
heory),
nd
220-221
(on
De
Orat.
2.182-184).
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
4/15
264 PHOENIX
specifically
with the former. ince 182 is a difficult
ection,
t seems
wise
to set it out in fullbefore
ttempting
n
analysis.
Valet igiturmultum d vincendum robarimoreset instituta tfacta et vitameorum, qui
agent ausas,
et
eorum, ro quibus,
et tem
mprobari
dversariorum,nimosque
eorum,
pud
quos
agetur,
onciliari
quam
maximead benevolentiam
cum
erga
oratorem um
erga
llum,
pro
quo
dicet
orator.Conciliantur
utem nimi
dignitate
ominis,
ebus
gestis,
xistimatione
vitae;
quaefacilius
ornari
possunt,
i
modo
unt,
quamfingi,
i
nulla
sunt.
Sed
haec
adiuvant
in
oratore;
enitas vocis
voltus
pudor[is
significatio],
erborum
omitas;
si
quid persequare
acrius,
ut
invitus
t
coactus
acere
videare.
Facilitatis,
liberalitatis,
mansuetudinis, ietatis,
grati animi,
non
appetentis,
non
avidi
signa
proferre erutile
est;
eaque omnia, quae
proborum,
emissorum,
on
acrium,
non
pertinacium,
on
itigiosorum,
on
acerborum
unt,
valde
benevolentiam
onciliant
balienantque
ab
eis,
in
quibus
haec non
sunt;
itaque
eadem
suntin adversarios x contrario onferenda.
In
the first entence
he
aim
is
given
as
winning
pproval
for he
mores
et
instituta
..
etc. both
of
patrons
(eorum
qui
agent
causas)
and clients
(eorum
pro quibus),
with
a
corresponding
iscrediting
f
the
adversaries.
While the
second sentence
ppears
to be
merely
rephrasing
f
the
first,
it
brings
nto
prominence
he
third
party
concerned,
he
iudices
(apud
quos
agetur)
and the theme verb
conciliare,
which
is
then
expanded by
what
follows;
uch
goodwill
s
won
by
a
man's
prestige, chievements,
nd
reputation,but these may be lacking.What is the next connectionof
thought?
Sed
relates to the
problem
of
the
defendant without
these
merits.
Certain
qualities
in
the
patron
such
as
lenitas
of
delivery'
and
demeanour
can
compensate
for
hese deficiencies.We are now
discussing
the
character
isplayed
by
the
peaker,
nd
thenext
entence,facilitatis...
signa proferre
erutile
est,
appears
to continue
this theme.
"It
is
very
advantageous
to
display
the
marks
of
good
and
amiable
qualities."
Only
with
the commenton
bestowing
he
corresponding
ad
qualities
on
the
adversaries,
do
we
realise
that
signa
proferre
may
refer
o
adducing
evi-
denceof theamiablequalitiesof theclientrather han thespeakerhimself,
as
a
means
of
benevolentiam
onciliare.4
8The
text here
is
damaged.
The
mss
read lenitas
vocis
voltus
pudoris
significatio
verborum omitas.
Wilkins
follows
Kayser
in
bracketing
-is
significatio;
Harnecker
extends
the
brackets
to
pudoris
significatio
erborum
omitas, reading
lenitas
vocis et
voltus.
The
problem
does not affect ur
interpretation
s a
whole,
but I believe
that
the
three elements
of
vox,
voltus,
and verba
are all
necessary,
and would
not
extend the
brackets
beyond
pudoris
significatio.
4Antonius' reference
ere
corresponds
o the
recommendationshe will himself
give
for
the
principium
n
2.320
ff.
imilarlypopuli benevolentiam
ihi conciliaram n
200
relates
to the
captatio
benevolentiae,
ttributed
by
traditional rhetoric
to the
beginning
of
the
speech.
A
comparison
of
Aristotle's
comments
on
the exordium n the
Rhetoricawith
the
Roman
texts
reveals the
tradition
and
its
modifications. he
starting
point
is
Rhet.
3.14
1415
a
35 f.:
MXyerzat
U
raDra
EK
/re
ro
X-yov70OS
(1)
KaL
rov
&KpoarofD
2)
Kal
ro
D
rp&hyparos
3)
Kal
ro
V
avwrtov
4).
Compare
Rhet.
Her.
1.5.8:
Benivolos
auditores
facere
quattuor
modis
possumus;
ab
nostra
(1),
ab
adversariorum
nostrorum
4),
ab
auditorum
persona
(2),
et
ab
rebus
ipsis
(3).
Cic.
Inv.
1.16.22:
Benivolentia
quattuor
x
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
5/15
CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE
AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
265
Section
183
adds
in
parenthesis
that
this
style
of
speaking
is
most
successful
n cases where t is not
possible
to
play
on the audience's
emo-
tions;heregentle nd mild' speech s mostappropriate, nd mostrecom-
mends
client,
nd
a
definition
s
offered
or
heword
reus,
which s the
ink
returning
s
to
the
main
argument
n 184. Horum
igitur
xprimere
mores
oratione
ustos,
ntegros,
eligiosos,
imidos,
erferentis
niuriarum
mirum
quiddam
valet eems to
recapitulate
the last
sentence
of
182
above,
but
relates
to the
client.
Antonius
dds that
f
peakers
do
this,
whether
n the
preamble,
narrative,
r
conclusion,
t
will
often
e
even
more
ffectivehan
the
case
proper.
Further
autem),
from he
feeling
nd nature
f
the
peech
it
can resultthat
quasi
mores
ratoris
ffingat
ratio;
genere
nim
quodam
sententiarumtgenereverborum,dhibitaetiam actione enifacilitatemque
significante,
fficitur
t
probi,
ut
bene
morati,
t
boni
viri
esse
videamur.
n
the
ast
sentencefacilitatemque
ignificante
ppears
to
resumefacilitatis
..
locis
comparatur;
b nostra
(1),
ab adversariorum
4),
ab
iudicum
persona
(2),
ab
ipsa
causa
(3).
Cic.
De
Orat. 2.321: aut
ex
reo
(1)
aut
ex
adversario
4)
aut
ex
re
(3)
aut
ex
eis
apud quos agetur
2)
sententias uci
licebit.
Rhet.
Her. and
De
Inv.
are
clearly
transcriptions
f
the
same
source,
which
altered the
Aristotelianorder
to
give
greater
prominence
o
the adversarius.
De
Oratore iffersn two
ways: by
postponing
the
referenceto the audience
to
fourth
position
it restores
the
emphasis on their role; also, just as Antonius in 2.80-82 had refused to accept the
limitation
of
captatio
benevolentiae
o the
principium,
o
in 322
he
concludes
his
summary
of
the
sententiae:
ex
eis
autem
apud
quos agetur
ut
benevolos
beneque
existimantes
efficiamus,
uod
agendo
efficitur
elius
quam rogando.
est
id
quidem
in totam
orationem
confundendam
nec minime n
extremam,
ed
tamen
multa
principia
ex
eo genere
ignuntur.
Because
of this belief
n
the
diffusion
f
the
captatio
throughout
he
speech,
Cicero
has
included
his comments
on
this
technique
in the context of
his discussion
of
conciliare
(182-183)
and
movere
200;
cf.
206-209)
rather than under the
heading
of
dispositio.
Aristotle
also,
in
his
section
on
arrangement,
mentions
r76
evovv
rodafcat
s
a
goal
of
the
exordium,
isted,
as
in
De
Oratore,
under
'rp6s
rTv aKpoarCyv.
He
too
refers
back
(3.14.1415 b 29) to his previous discussion, that is to 2.1.1378 a 22-23, on EC-oLa as an
ingredient
n
irtins
v
7r4
Oete
nd
to
2.4,
on
the
7rd06os
f
tXLta.
6In
Dionysius
of
Halicarnassus
(see
Lockwood, CQ
23
[1929]
183-184)
and
in
Quin-
tilian,
6.2,
Ethos and
)0GKL
are
identified
with
a
quieter,
milder evel
of
speech
than
Pathos
and
7rar7rLK'.
Grube,
both
in
The
Greek nd
Roman
Critics
291-292)
and
in his
notes to
Aristotle
n
Poetry
nd
Style 51,
n.
2), suggests
that
Quintilian's
words reflect
the
practice
of
Cicero
and
perhaps
earlier
critics;
even in Aristotlethe
application
of
the
adjective
'OLK6S
o the
Odyssey
n
Poetics
24
may
depend
on
associating
W0os
with
a
quieter
emotional level. This
distinction between Ethos
and
Pathos does not
seem
to
occur in the
Rhetorica;
t
is
however
present,
without
being
used
to
definethe
terms,
n
Cicero as
in
Dionysius. Compare Dionysius De Dem. 8,
in which
IG0KK
s the
last of
a
parallel sequence 1Xap
...
vetLvy...
.EZ6a
contrasted
with
7raOI7tK';
or ib.
43:
r7d
V
da'roTpayvvEL
tE
E
L
TLKpaLvEL
rv
aKO7V,
r
a
rpavbEL
KaL
XEaLvEL,
al
7-t
V
i&
7rOos
KTpo7reL
robs
&KObOVT7s, &
5'
els
'Oos brad'7yera.
From
Cicero,
compare
the
contrast made in
De Oratore
.200:...
generi
orationis
vehementi
tque
atroci
genus
illud
alterum
..
lenitatis t
mansuetudinis,
r
212: in
his
duobus
generibus uorum
lterum
ene,
alterum
vehemens sse volumus ..
,
and
the antithesis of
asperitas
contentioniswith
remissio
enitatis,
r the comments n
Orator
128
(above,
note
1).
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
6/15
266
PHOENIX
signa
proferre
f the end of
182,
and,
at the same
time,
learly
efers o
the
amiable
qualities
of
the
speaker
himself.
There are several confusionsatenthere: is Antoniusdiscussing he art
of
recommending
he
speaker,
or the
client? s he
commenting
n
style,
r
content?
he
end
of
184 s
clear n
tself.
Conciliare
will nvolve
portraying6
by
one's
sentiments,
tyle,
and
delivery,
he
excellenceof the
speaker's
character, straightforward
iece
of
self-dramatisation
y
the orator
as
his
own
playwright
nd
performer.
ore
difficults
the
entence
beginning
horum
gitur xprimere
mores,
oth n its relation
o the end of
182,
and
to
the
placida,
summissa,
enis
oratio ecommended
n 183.
If we take
signa
proferre
n 182 in the
sense first
roposed,
displaying
marksof the
orator's
own good qualities,this is consistentwiththe end of 184, and withthe
emphasis
on
style
and
manner
mpliedby
placida,
summissa,
enis oratio.
This
then
eems
to be the
sense
required.
But how can the
orator
express
the excellent
characterof
his
client
n
his
speech
by placida,
summissa,
lenis... oratio?
That
is,
by
his
style
and
delivery?
This
presupposes
an
amazing
degree
f dentification etween
patron
and
client;
without
t the
orator
can
express
his
client's merits
only
by explicit
statements
bout
them.
In
this
difficulty
oth
the double
meaning
of
lenis,
passing
from
morality
o
style,
and Cicero's
own
intense
faith
n
the
effect f
style,
influencehis
statements;
but it
would seem
that the initial
distinction
betweencommendation
f the
speaker
himself,
nd
of the
client,
has not
been
maintained,
nor
ts
implications
onsistently
xplored.
n
the atter
part
of
this
paper
I
shall
argue
that the
distinction
ailsto
be
maintained
because
it was irrelevant o
Cicero's Aristotelian
ource,
and
has
been
grafted
y
Cicero onto a
presentation
n
quite
different
erms.
More
problems
arise from
the later references o this function
n
Antonius'account
of
his
great
defence f
Norbanus
(200
ff.).
quod
ubi sensi me in
possessionem
udicii
ac
defensionis
meae
constitisse,
uod
et
populi
benevolentiam mihi
conciliaram,...
et
iudicum
animos
totos...
ad
causam nostram
converteram,
um
dmiscere
huic
generi
rationisvehementi
tque
atroci
genus
illud
alterum,
de
quo
ante
disputavi,
lenitatis et
mansuetudinis
coepi.
Paradoxically
n
this
passage
the
conciliaram lause is associated
with
the
violent and emotive
function,
while
the
characteristic
enitas
f technical
conciliare
omes
second,
associated with
Antonius'
vindication
f his own
role
as
defending
ounsel,
and consists
only
of
winning
he
goodwill
f
the
audience forthepatronus.This is confirmed y the later sentence (201)
where
the
antithesis
commendatio: oncitatio
orresponds
o
ut
mansue-
6Exprimere
nd
ejingere
both
belong
to
the
vocabulary
of
the
plastic
arts;
ef. Austin
on
Pro
Caelio
12,
non
expressa
sed adumbrata
igna
virtutum
notes,
p.
60);
Ac.
1.27,
e
qua
omnia
expressa
atque
eficta sint;
N.D.
1.47,
cum
artificium
ffingitisabricamque
divinam;
Off.
.69,
solidam
atque
expressam
figiem,
nd
De
Orat.
3.15,
in
quibus
omnibus
fere ocrates
exprimitur,
f
personal
portrayal
through anguage.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
7/15
CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
267
tissimus
viderer nd
ut et
acerrimus
in
Caepionis
invidia
renovanda
(viderer).
hus
in
practice
Antonius'
technique
does not
conform
o
the
theoretical oleofconciliare s presenting he mores fthe defendantn a
favourable
ight,
while the
emotivedefence
f
seditio
s
actually
described
by
a
contradictory,
on-technical se
of
conciliare.
Similarly
nalysis
of
the
emotions o
be
roused eads to
a
conflicting
se
of
conciliare
n
the idiom amorem onciliare
206):
in
the discussion
on
arousing
the
affection
f
the
udges
in
206-208,
the
first ection of
the
catalogue
of
emotions,
Cicero
s
basically
repeating
he
aims
and
methods
included
n
the function f
conciliare
n 182-184.
Confronted
by
this
overlap
Cicero
reveals his embarrassment
n
212.
He has ended theaccount of the emotivefunctionn 206-211with nvidia
(210)
and misericordia
211),
and his demands made
upon
the
speaker
enable him
to reiterate n
211
the
distinctionmade
in 201
between
the
commendatio
robitatis,
hich
hould be
lenis
.
.
atque
ummissa,
nd
the
(pars)
quae
suscipitur
ab
oratore d
commutandos nimos
atque
omni
rationeflectendos,
hich
should
be
intenta c
vehemens. ut he
has
finally
to
admit the
overlap
of
categories.
est
quaedam
in
his duobus
generibus,
uorum
alterum
ene,
alterum
vehemens
sse
volumus,
difficilis d distinguendum imilitudo;nam et ex illa lenitate, qua conciliamur eis, qui
audiunt,
ad
hanc vim
acerrimam,
ua
eosdem
excitamus,
nfluat portet liquid
...
neque
est
ulla
temperatior
ratio
uam
lla,
n
qua
asperitas
ontentionisratoris
psius
humanitate
conditur,
emissio
autem lenitatis
quadam
gravitate
t
contentione
irmatur
212).
The
discussion s
already taking
another
direction,
s the
reference
o
humanitas
shows;
and Cicero
is
leading
off
gradually
towards
Caesar
Strabo's
digression
n
wit,
but
before
he
leaves the
psychological
func-
tions
he
makes
one final
comment
216).
illa autem, quae aut conciliationis causa leniter aut permotionisvehementerguntur,
contrariis
commotionibus
uferenda
sunt,
ut
odio
benevolentia,
ut
misericordij
invidia
tollatur.
Conciliatio
has
here
become
merely
a
label
for
one
section of
movere;
that
part
whose business t is
to stir
up friendly
r
favourable
motions,
and
can be
cancelled
by
arousing
contrary
motions.What
started
as
an
apparently
ndependent
spect
of the
orator's
skill,
with a
differentunc-
tion from he
emotiverole of
movere,
as
been
transformednto
the
gentler
sub-group
ncluded
n
the wider
range
of
movere.
he
descriptive
ole of
conciliare,
ts connectionwith
characterisation
y
style
and
content of
(a)
the
patron
and
(b)
the
client,
has been
blurred
y
the
application
f
the
same
term
o
a
category
f
the more
mportant
motion-rousing
unction
in
the
longer
following
ection.
Why
does Cicero
choose the
term
onciliare o
distinguish
his
eparate
characterising
function?
After
all,
the
verb
clearly
implies
a
form of
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
8/15
268
PHOENIX
acting
upon
the
emotions,
ifferingnly
n
intensity
f
passion
from
ther
forms
f
movere.
e
does
not seem to
rely
on
any
philosophical
istinction,
such
as that conciliare
cts
upon
the
reason,
movere
pon
the
emotions;
the
only
hint
of such a distinction ies in the
phrases
nclinatio
voluntatis
as
opposed
to
permotio
nimi
in
129
above.
If both functions re
emotive,
why keep
them
distinct?
The
only special
quality
of the
conciliare-
function s
its
descriptive
ontent.
The choice of
terminology
ecomes more
meaningful
f
we turn
to
consider
(a)
the classification
of Cicero's ultimate
or direct
source,
Aristotle,
in
his
analysis
of
rhetorical
proofs,
and
(b)
the
different
circumstances nd values
of
oratory
ssumed
by
the Greek
and Roman
critics.
In
his introduction
o
the
Rhetorica,
ristotle
istinguishes
hree
kinds
of
bEXvoL
t1orELS
(1.2.1356
1-4):
a')
al
t
y&p
low
v
$7v
1W0^et
0
XM'ovos,
a(')
it
7T
T6
Tpoa)vKLaOLVtatl
rws,
Y')
C4
Av
brW
o
6yCy,
bd
ro
5ELKVubVaz
aiLveaOa E5KVbva.
e
then
comments
n
the
rLoTeLs
&&& o
0ovys,
describing
hem
s
b0av
oT'r
Xex05
6
X6'yos OTeE
Al6rtTrov
roL7aL
rTv
Xeyovra.
Tots
ydp
erieMLEKEaL
rLaoebOAev
XXOV
Kal
OTTov
... et Kal
roVro
avpalvl
tv
ik&V
X6yov,
&,XX,&
b&d
6
rpobebo?&o0aL
ovbyWta
tva
TbV
XMyovra.
....
&XX& xeb6V
cr
E
reV KvpLWTrr)YV
XEL
rTv
T740os
(1356
a
5-15).7
The
speech
mustbeuttered o as to makethe orator
&dAerutros
compare
Cicero's
adfidemfaciendam,
.121).
This element
n
the
definition
ecurs
in Rhet. 1.9.1366 a
34;
2.1.1378 a 19 f.
There
is
emphasis
on
the
need
for
brLeLtKeLa8
compare
Cicero's use
of
lenis,
lenitas, 2.128, 182,
etc.);
the
problem
is
to make
himself
appear
7rotov
rva;
this recurs
in
Rhet.
1.9.1366
a
30;
2.1.1378
a
22
(roCovrov).
side
referencen 1.8.1366
a
12
f.
ties
up
this
type
of
proof
with the
1j0l
of
states and
constitutions,
making
it clear
that
the orator
should know
the nature and
aims
of a
state,
so
7On
the use of
'0os
in
Aristotle's
Rhetorica,
ee
E.
M.
Cope,
Introduction o
Aristotle's
Rhetoric
London
1867)
110-113. He
distinguishes
hree
applications
of the
word.
(1)
the
present
reference,
g0os
Cv
7TY
X&yoV'T
(2)
"The
character
of
constitutions
or
formsof
government
and
of
the
different
eriods
of
life,
youth,
manhood..,
.and so
forth;
(these)
are to
be
studied
for
he
purpose
of
accommodating
our
language
to the
tone
and
sentiments
prevailing
under certain
forms of
government,
and
characteristic
of,
or
peculiar
to,
certain
ages
and
conditions
of
life,
and
thereby
conciliating
the
audience,
when
it
happens
to
be
composed
of
members
of
one or
other
of
these
classes."
(3)
i0os
belonging
to
style;
this
appears
only
in
Book 3
(see
pp.
271-272
below).
8Aristotle's discussion of
?brclKeta
in
1.13.1374
a
30
f.
starts from
this
definition:
Tar
8~
rteKrs
T6
rap&
T6V
vyeYpappvZO
V
V61o
V&
LKCatoV
see
Cope,
op.
cit.
[above,
note
7]
190-193).
This
is
very
close
to
his
definition f the
brnKEKIs
n
Eth.Nic.
1137
b
34
f.:
6
ICt)
&KpqfoiKatos~
~a
76
XELpov.
But
the
adjective
(and
noun)
had a
wider
sense
in
general
Greek
usage,
as a
basic word of
social
recommendation,
ike
gentlemanly,
respectable;
so
Socrates in
Apol.
22
a
5,
36
c
1
opposes
it to
caDXos
(see
Burnet
ad
loc.).
In
Aristotle
too,
where
hrLEteK7'
explains
&L6brtLtros
n
Rhet.
1.2.1356 a
7,
it is
genera-
lised.
On
its
range,
and
relationship
with
enis
see
p.
263
above.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
9/15
CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE AND
ARISTOTELIAN ETHOS
269
as
to
be ableto
ssume
imilar
0G
imself:
T6
hv
'p
K&rrTs
30os
ravW7arov
&ddVY4l
r1
s
e&Kar4v7
tvac.
is
analysis
f
virtue
n
1.9. eads
to a
comment
on thevalue of thisanalysis or he
5evrTpa
7rLrTas:
vUCf7ieraL
p
&Jaa
irept
robrvTWXeyovTra K&KEWila 7IXOv 4v
irotoi
r
wes
broXn-Orlb06~E0a aTA
7T
10os,
i
7rep
v bevrTepa
irtrtLs.
TK
r7y
Tbr&v
ydp
Lav rTE&Kal
XXov
d&AtrwTroV
5vvba6;eOa
7rotety
rpbs
ApETr'
1366
a
29-33).
Facts
about
virtue,
asically
seful
or
raising
thers
(Tr
'trawoiVTr,
1366
29),
will nable he rator o
represent
imselfs virtuous. ristotle
subsequently
oncentrates
n
the
ogical roofs,eaving
he
bevrEpa
iLrTLS
until
Book
2.
This
begins
2.1)
by distinguishing
ntellectualrommoral
proofs.
hen
he
repeats
he
mportant
lements
f
his
riginal
efinitionf
the
7rLaTLrs
v
7
Oet:
av&dyKrl
.
.Kal
abrVT6robv
rTa alIv
,V
rpLTV
aratKEV6AEW
roXZ
yap &badpet
7rpbs
7rLTW,
&XATcraAvV ra
ts
at
ovXaZs,
dra
Kal
v
raTs
tKas r6rOSby
tva
6atv'elaua M'XOTra
Kal
r
6rpbs
aCbrobs
V7roXaI3cz'vEU
XEtU
7rws
abrT6
(2.1.1377
24-29).
This
type
f
proof,
hen,
epends
n
two
hings:
he
haracter
hich he
orator
resents
n
his
peech,
nd
the
ttitude owards
he
udiencewith
which
he
represents
imself.
hese
are
elaborated n
2.1.1378a7f.:
r70o
I
.LV abrobStvaL
rtrobs obsMyovras
rpLarL
rdTLrTa..rT.
.
Tapra 6pbV7it
Kat
l ET
Kaltivota.
ollowing
his,
n 1378
19,
Aristotle
refers
he
reader ack to
1.9
for he
means
by
which
rators an make
themselves
ppear
6pbpveo al
rovbatot.
The
question
f
presenting
ne's
eDvota
s
to be
studied
n
the
section
n
7raif0.
his is
generallygreed
o
refer he
readerforward
o the
sectionon
OXla,
n 2.4
(1380
b
43-
1381
b,
end).
The whole
nature f
this
proof
onsists
n
portrayal
r
description;
resenting
he
speaker
n
a
certain
ight;
he
evoLa
t
issue
is
the
speaker's
wn
(real
or
supposed)
goodwill
o the
audience,
not
theirs owards im. pecificoncernwithwinningheir
eivota,
heequi-
valent
fCiceronian
onciliare,
lthough
his
s
the
underlying
otive
f
the
rLrTa
s
Tod0
ovs,
s not
discussed ere.
When
Aristotle
omes
o
discuss
OtXMa
n
2.4.,
he
does
so
analytically,
without
tating
motive
r
application;
t
s
merely
ne
of
he
r6.
which
the
oratormust
knowhow
to
rouse.
n
one
sense sizable
proportion
f
this
hapter
eflectshe
ssue
f
ivoca
nderlying
he econd
roof,
or
is
emphasis
s
repeatedly
n
the
tXla
men
feel
for
hose
whose ttitude o
themselves
nd their
oyalties
s
favourable.
e
has
ncluded
his
hapterto satisfywoneedsoftheorator: a) accordingo itsclassification,o
show
by
what
persons
nd causes
he
r&0o
f
tXta
s roused:hence
how
can
the
speaker
rouse
t
in
the
audience,
owards
thers r
towards
himself?
b)
to
satisfy
he
reference
rom
.1.1378
22-3:
what
s
tXtta
like?
Hence howcan
the
peaker
ortray
imselfo show hat
he
feels t
towards
the
audience? Yet it
should
be
noted that the
words
Evovs,
ivoLa
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
10/15
270
PHOENIX
do not occur even
once.
That
is, although
Aristotle
has referred
he
readers
to
this
section
for
he
technique
of
making
oneself
ppear
edvous,
he has formulated hechapterto illustrate
rdos,
and has notadapted it
to
the
needs
of
the
taTsLu
be
ro
i^0ovs.
The
later sections
2.12-17,
on
the characteristics ssociated with
age,
class,
and
fortune,
re
designed
to
continue he
analysis
of motions
n
the
audience so that the
speaker
may
know how
to
appeal
to
the
type
of
audience he
is
dealing
with.
It
is
a
discussion
of
4,
in
one
sense,
but
is
aimed
at
the
third,
emotive
category
of
proof.
Yet
M6d6ric
Dufour
(Aristote:
Rhitorique
ivre
2
[Paris
1960]
ntroduction
9)
is too
absolute
in
denying
ts
relevanceto
the
rlrn
tLT
roDT
0ovs.Cope
(Introduction
o
Aristotle'sRhetoric, 10) points to the directions n 2.13.1390 a 29-33,
oTe
fre t
t?ldroexovral
rdlres
obs
7T^o
bTerTpqy
Oe
XeyopJEovsO
6
OV
Kal
robs
6Solovs
bK
87Xov
ws
XpCopeV0oOTs
67yos
roLDroT
avodWvra
Oal
TO
Kal
o
X6roL.
This makes
the
same
connection
with ethical"
proof
s
in
1.8.1366
a
12
(above,
page
268).
Thus when
n
2.18.1391
b
34
Aristotle
tates
rnt
'
W
V
GOLKobs
obs
X6yovs
WxeraL
roteY,
Kai
rept
Trovrwcv
&6opwrat,
t is
reasonable
to take
?70LKobs9
s
covering
oth
he
rtLarets
t
ro4Oovs
and
those
tIv
os
rar0eat;
orhe
has
used the
analytical
material f 2.4.
and
2.12-17 to
equip
the
peaker
withboth
ategories
f
proof.
O90n
he
range
of
meaning
of
710LK6s
n
Aristotle's
Rhetorica,
ee
Lockwood in
CQ
23
(1929)
180-181.He
analyses
hree
passages
ncluded
n this
discussion,
nd
suggests
three
eparate
usages
for
the
word,
which
do
not,
however
orrespond
o
the
three
distinct ses
of
i0os
listed
n
note
7.
(1)
In
3.7.1408 22
f.,
the
adjective
s
applied
to
speech
n
character
morata
ratio
the
third
se
of
80os).
2)
In
2.18.1391
29,
t s
rather
"adapted
to
the
character f
the
audience
o
whom
t is
addressed"
the
second
use
of
~Oos).
He
does
not
discuss
heuse of
OmLKbs
n
2.18.1391
b 34.
(3)
In
2.21.1395
b
17,
t
is
connected
ith
2rpoalpeors,
nd
related
o a
man's
rtXos.
Here
t s
"moral,"
of
moral
value,"or"tomark particular oral haracter."This sequally he ase n3.16.1417
20,
on
7'0LKJL
7,cyfls,
not
considered
by Lockwood,
whereas in
1417
a
27
10LK.d
re
utterancesn
character,
s
at
3.7.1408
22
above.)
Some
additional
omments
re
needed.
Lockwood
ignores
.8.1366
a
12:
brel
6'
ob
pb6o'
at
trLerEtsylouraW
.'
ro6EfrtKKo
6yo
V
XXa
Kal
W&'
076LK0o
r~
y^p
roL
va
a
alveo-Oa&
pXb
Myovra
Lretebopev,
roro
6'
EOr
Wv
&
dyaObs
qathlnra&
depovs
&JAow),
bo&
&
a
d
T
7i1j
,
roXLrecwu
pKaars
xew
~
IES.
Here
the
adjective
s
specifically
pplied
o
the
9Oos
f
the
peaker,
hefirst
sage
of
70os
listed
by
Cope.
This
appears
o
be the
nly
nstancen
the
Rhetorica,
nd
theuse
s
adjectival,
nd
has
not
yet
taken
n
an
independent
ife
s a
noun,
which
may
be the
ase n
Orator
28
(above,
note
1).
Lockwood
oints
ut that
0mLK6bis notrecordednAst, ndapparentlynotused
by
Plato. Aristotleeemsto use
it as
an
innovation, espite
previous
ccur-
rences
n, e.g.,
the
Poetics
ch.
24),
and
s careful o
associate
t
with
ts root
noun
0os.
In
2.21.1359 17
and
3.7.1408 22
f.,
nd
16,
1417
20
and
27, although
ifferent
ses
of
0bLK6s
re
involved,
t
is
supported
by
references o
70os
EXetw,
r
roL~elI.
It
seems
that
whatever
0os
rOLte
makes
speech
770LK6v;
whatever
i0os
9XEL
s itself
7706KbP.
hus in
1.8.1366
12
and
2.18.1391
b 34
O&Kd6s
67os
reflects
he
30os
of
either
peaker
r
audience.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
11/15
CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
271
Unlike
the recommendations
f
Cicero,
Aristotle's ccount
s
entirely
n
terms
f
representation: escription
f the orator'scharacter
nd
attitude.
The Ciceronian mphasison theact ofconciliare, fwinning enevolence,
has converted
the
unstressed
motive
of
Aristotle's
proof
nto
its
actual
method.At the
same
time,
he Aristotelian
iscussion f contenthas
been
largely
displaced by
Cicero's
emphasis
on
style
and
manner
of
delivery.
There is
another
major
difference.
ristotle
enerally peaks
as
though
the orator
s
acting
on
his
own
behalf,
nd excludes
the client
element.
n
deliberative
oratory,
in which as Aristotle
says
(2.1.1356
a
15)
the
speaker's t0os
s
most
mportant,
here
s
no
client,
nd
normally
no
other
party
to
defend
r
support.
n
forensic
ratory
n
Greece,
the
speech
was
normally eliveredbythedefendant, o that fthe oratorwas nothimself
the
defendant
Aristotle's
remarks
would
have to be
applied
to
the
defendant s
speaker
of
the
orator's words.
K.
J.
Dover,
in
Lysias
and
the
CorpusLysiacum
Berkeley
1968),
Chapter
8,
pp.
149-150,
discusses the
circumstances
overning
consultant's
decision whether
o
speak
in his
own
person
for
he
defendant,
r
to write
speech
wholly
r
n
part
for he
client to
perform.
ristotle akes
no
notice
of
this ssue
in
Books
1
and
2
of
the
Rhetorica,
n
connectionwith
90os.
The
sole
references
o a
client-
figure
are
fK
c7v
ar&Pvydp
a^ts
rTE
alc
AXXoprv
lOttrLtT0o
8vvf67Oa0a troseT rpbs
cpEripv
1.9.1366
32),
and
(in
a referenceackto
1.9)
EK
7'Wv 'brTWvp
KAP
Tep6v 7LS
&Y
avrbv
aaaKEvae
Le
r7Lorop
2.1.1378 21-22).
He
does not
regard
he
client,
ither
s
subject
or
performer
f the
speech,
s a
significant
lement
n
his
discussion."'
In
his earlier ook
The
Art
of
Persuasion
n
Greece
Princeton
963),
pp.
91-92,
Kennedy
aw a reference
o
this
ype
f
composition
or
client-speaker
n
Rhet.
.7.
'HOoroda,
he
stylistic
haracterisation
f a
client-speaker,
as
practised yLysias
ong
before
he
omposition
f he
Rhetorica,nd is described y Dionysius fHalicarnassusnLys. 8 ff.
What
Aristotle
says
in
3.7.1408 a
24
is:
r&Oavo
T
7b
rpa-Aa
Kal
7 oIKELa
ts~
...
(6)
Kcl
1OLKU1
LiT
7
EK
rL'v
cfr/ELCEov
EL,
05
&KOXOVOEJL
&pJ6r77ovaa
dtaryq've&L
al
ies,
uchas the
anguage
ppropriate
o a
Spartan,
r
Thessalian,
r
a
woman.He
adds
(1408
30)
MAv
i
Kal
d
ra
v6Para
iLca1a
Xy
7~
e,
roL~
r
b
Oos.
ob
ydp
7rabr7
obby'
raabros
ypoPos
Av
Kai
reraLbev8J.Lvo
Zlretev.
There
need be no
reference here to
language
as
designed
to
characterise
he
speaker,
as there
was
in
the
account of
X~cts
,raf7O7Ki
in the
preceding
section
(1408
a
20-24).
Instead Aristotle
is
"oCompare
ennedy,
The
Rhetoric
f
Advocacy,"
20-421.He
shows
hat
lthough
Aristotle
wice
n
the
Rhetorica
efers
o
anecdotes n
which
specific
dvocate
poke
himself or
his
client
1.13.1374
36;
2.20.1393
b
22-23)
he
"never
discusses he
varied
possibilities
hich
dvocacymight
pen"
. .
"in
rhetorical
heory
he
itigant
s as-
sumedto
speak
for
himself,
resumably
ecause this
s the basic
situation n
a
Greek
court."
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
12/15
272
PHOENIX
discussing
how to make
language
fitting
o
a
Spartan,
Thessalian,
or
a
woman.
But women and
foreigners
ould
not
plead
their wn
cases,
so
Aristotlecannot be discussinghow to characterise client,but rather
how to
include
narrative
uotations
n
the
style
of
those
quoted.
This is
apparent
in
Kennedy's
second reference
3.16.1417
a
27),
aXX&
7'7LK6d
Tr6peva
&T1rq
0 Oe,
olov
b~
Ita
Xycowv
aLObt?e:
this
technique
of
charac-
terisation
s foruse in
narrative,
when a
third
party
has
to
be
portrayed.
This was
seen
quite
clearly by Cope
(Introduction
o
Aristotle's
hetoric,
112):
"The third
variety
of
0Oos...
belongs
to
style,
and
accordingly
appears
only
n book 3 .... It occurs
usually,
and
is most
appropriate
n
the second
division
of the
speech,
&t?irttEs
r
narrative."
It would seemthen thatin theRhetoricaAristotle oes notdiscuss the
implications
f
the
orator-client
elationship,
either
ssuming
the
client
as
possible
speaker,
nor
giving
more
than
minimal
ttention o the
type
of
oratory
which
nvolvesdefence f
another.The
double role of
depicting
the
character
nd attitudeof both
speaker
and client
would
be
more
rare
in Greek
courts,
nd is
not
thereforen
issue n the
Rhetorica.
Whether r
not his
interests
re
primarily
n
deliberative
ratory,
Aristotle
makes
it
clear
that this
type
of
oratory
s
the
main field
f
the
7rlo~s
Ld
70rov
0ovs,
so
that
the
t0os
to be
represented
s
that
of
one
man,
the
orator.
Comparing
the Ciceronian withthe
Aristotelian
resentation,
we can
see
that Cicero's
difficulties
ave
arisen
for
four
easons.
1)
Since
Cicero
sets
his comments
n the contextof
forensic,
ot
deliberative
ratory,
he
has
to accommodate
them to
Roman
forensic
practice.
Unless the
defendantwas himself n
orator
such
as
Caelius
Rufus,
who
spoke
in
his
own defencede
vi,
56
B.c.),
this
always
entailed
a
distinction
etweenthe
patronus,
speaking
in
his
own
person,
and the
client;
hence
conciliare
involved
a
double
function,
f
creating
credit for the
character
and
attitudes of both parties. (2) Cicero's choice of the verb conciliare,
appropriate
o the
purpose
of
this,
as also
of
other
categories
f
proof,
s
too
general,
nd
prevents
him
from
istinguishing
etween
he
descriptive
role
of
the "ethical"
proof,
with
its
emphasis
on
ror6v
uva
salvea0at
r
XMyovra
Rhet.
2.1.137
b
27)
and
the
emotive
role
of
the
7rior&
ldl
rWVP
eKpoaracv
Rhet.
1.2.1356
a
15).
It
is
probably
awareness of
this
conver-
gence
of
the two
proofs
n
conciliare
enevolentiam
hich
eads him to
put
Amor
first n
his list
of
emotions,
whereasAristotle
had
begun
with
6pyq
(2.2), passing
on
through
,rpapvE0ta
o
OItla,
s the
opposite
2.3
and
4).
NeverthelessheAristotelianescriptiverinciplesbroughtut nthe
phrases
exprimeremores,
nd
ut
quasi
mores
ratoris
Jfingat
ratio
2.184),
and the
expressed
im
ut
probi,
ut
bene
morati,
t
boni
viri
esse
videamur.
Videri is used
again
in
201,
ut
..
mansuetissimus
iderer,
but the real
counterpart
to
rotLb6
va
4alvpeOB
comes in
two
earlier
passages
not
explicitly
ssociated
with
the verb
conciliare,
t
1.89,
ut
et
ipse
eis
apud
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
13/15
CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIANETHOS
273
quos ageret
alis
qualem
se esse
optaret
ideretur,
t ut ei
qui
audirent
ic
adficerentur
nimis
ut
eos
adfici
ellet,
nd
(virtually
epeated)
at
2.176,
in
the transitionfromdocere o the other functions: i vero dsequetur, t
talis videatur
qualem
se videri
velit,
et
nimos
orum
ta
adficiat,
pud
quos
aget,
ut
eos
quocumque
velit
vel trahere
el
rapere
possit,
nihil
profecto
d
dicendum
equiret.
3)
Aristotlehimselfmakes it
difficult
o
discuss the
question
of
qOLK6V
learly,
since
he
uses the same
chapter
(2.4.)
as
raw
material for he
two aims of
(a)
creating
MXLa/eivota
n the audience
and
(b)
representing
he
duvoLa
of
the orator.
This has
a
psychological
ustifica-
tion,
since
edora
in the orator
begets
d5voza
n
the
audience,
but it
may
explain
why
Cicero's
presentation
of
the two aims
in
Antonius' trial
narrative, singthe same key-word,onciliare, orbothiOLuK6vnd partof
7raOnpLK6V,
as become
inextricably
onfused,
and
it
contributes o
the
overlap
of
functions
which
causes
him
evident
difficulty
n
211-212.
(4)
Finally,
Cicero's
professional
ove
of,
and faith
n,
style,
means
that
he
sees
style
and
delivery
s
a
primary
lement
n
the
representation
f
the orator's
enitas
intended
to
translate
irLLKELa).
Now
lenitas of
style
can indeed
effingere
ores
oratoris,
but
barely
exprimere
mores of
the
client,
as
he
seems
to
maintain
in
2.184.
This
difficulty
as
however
nothing
o
do with
7o0roda
to
suit
the
client,
which
as we have seen is
absent
from
Aristotleand
irrelevant o Roman
practice.
Roman
taste
admitted
only
one
form
f Ethos n
this
ense;
that
of
the
wise,
good,
and
benevolent statesman
(Aristotle's
opo6vLwL,
arov&saoL,
nd
edvoL
f
2.1.1378 a
6
f.).
For
Cicero a
mild and
virtuous
tyle
portrayed
he
Ethos
of
the
orator,
and would
reflect ts
excellence
upon
the
client
described
and
defended.
The last two
points require
further
omment
n
the
light
of
Cicero's
later
practice.
He
obviously
valued
the
implications
of
the
verb con-
ciliarewhenhe chose it to represent heAristotelian se ofEthos. Yet he
uses
it
only
once"
afterDe
Oratore
n
connection
with
this
theme of the
three functions.
n
Brutus,
delectare12
erforms
his role in
185,
187-188,
197,
276
(and
compare
322,
where
t
is
associated
with the
conciliatory
effect
f
humour).
Combined
with
delectare
refidemfacere,
87, 197,
and
animos
a
severitate
raducere,
97
(cf.
322
again),
animos
devincire
olup-
"At
Orator
128,
quoted
in
note
1
above. The
index
to Cicero's
Rhetorica
ists
seven
uses
of the verb
subsequent
to De
Oratore;
of
these three are in
the idiom
conciliare
benevolen-
tiam:
Part. Or. 15.2; 28.7; Orator128.7 above. Add Part. Or. 53.2, c.fidem;Brut. 156.11,
c.
gratiam
social,
not
rhetorical);
Orator
22.7,
c.
auditorem
in
the
exordium);
and
162.10,
c.
voluptatem
urium
(on
compositio).
The noun
conciliatio
ccurs
only
n De
Oratore:
.216
and
2.292
allude
to this use of
Ethos
and mark
the end of the
topic
of
psychological
proofs (216)
and Antonius'
recapitulation
after
the
digression
on
humour;
3.205 is
general,
in
a
long
list
of
emotional
devices.
1sA.
E.
Douglas,
Cicero: Brutus
(Oxford
1968)
Intr.
xxxv,
no.
28,
is
misleading;
conciliare occurs in
none of
these
passages.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
14/15
274 PHOENIX
tate,
276.
The different
mphasis
in the
set-piece
describing
Crassus'
famous
speech
in the civil causa Curiana
at 197
f.,
the
counterpart
f
Antonius'greatspeech forNorbanus described n De Orat.2.197 f.,may
account
for
the choice of
delectare,
ince the issue
in court
was
more
academic,
and less
provocative;
conciliare was
not
an
urgent
need.
However,
the absence
of the
verb
from he
other
references
o
the
three
functions oes
suggest
deliberate
avoidance
of
conciliare s a
term.
n
De
Optimo
Genere nd
in Orator
lso,
when Cicero
distinguishes
he
three
functions,
e
uses
delectare
or he
second,
most
explicitly
nd
repeatedly
at
Orator
69,
wherehe elaborates
this in the
process
of
reconciling
he
three functions
with
the three
genera:
subtile
n
probando,
modicum
n
delectando,vehemensnflectendo."1onciliareremainsabsent fromthe
ensuing
discussion,
lthough
t occurs
casually
in 122 as
one
of
the
three
requirements
f
the
exordium.
The
exception
associated
with
Ethos is a
brief
llusion in
128,
where
one
paragraph
covers
Aristotle's
econd and
third
proofs
n a
summary
f
miscellaneous
heory
121-128),
opening
the
transition rom
he first heme fOrator
othe
econd
ection n
compositio.
This is
already
the
pattern
n
the earlier
Partitiones
Oratoriae.When
Cicero
discusses the element
of
Ethos in
oratory
n
22,
the
key
word
is
delectat... oratio .quae significatratoris psius amabilismores.Con-
ciliare s
reserved
for
he
specific
enevolentiam
onciliare f
the
exordium
(15,
28)
and
for
the
amplificatio
n
the
peroration
which
(53)
motu
animorum
onciliet n
dicendo
idem-surely
a
case of
movere,
he
third
function
hus this
special
use
of
conciliare
apses
after
De
Oratore,
which
would
suggest
that
Cicero
became
dissatisfied
with
the
term
ome
time
beforehe took
the further
tep
of
modifying
he
three
functions
o
fit he
three
tyles
n
Orator.We
may
then
be
ustified
n
explaining
he
substitu-
tion
of
delectare
with or
without
idem
acere
by
the
difficulties
e ex-
perienced n the application of conciliare n De Oratore, s at 211-212
above.
Certainly
andys
is
right
o
note on
Orator 9
that
delectare
as
no
connection
with
the
Aristotelian
riors
td
roD
fliovs
nd "in
Aristotle's
view is
strictly
speaking
superfluous,"
but
mistaken in
denying
an
original
connection
between
the
Ciceronian
functions
nd
Aristotelian
Pisteis;
the
original
term
onciliare,
s
used
in
De
Oratore,
was
chosen to
laSee
A.
E.
Douglas,
"A
Ciceronian
ontribution
o
Rhetorical
heory,"
ranos
55
(1957) 18-26,
whose
account I follow n the chronologyof Cicero's changing approach
to
the three
functions.
He
does
not,
however,
comment
on
the
replacement
of
conciliare
by
delectare;
s in
the
reference
uoted
in
note
12,
he
treats
the
two
verbs
as
equivalent.
This
article
seems
to
have been
neglected
by
recent
scholarship
e.g.,
Kennedy,
The Art
of
Rhetoric t
Rome,
255,
sees no
change
in
the
three
functions
rom
De
Oratore o
Orator),
and
is
a
valuable
corrective
to the
scepticism
which
explains
all
discrepancies
between
one work
of
Cicero
and the
next in
terms
of
his
acquiescence
in
the
structure
and
principles
of
his
different
ources.
This content downloaded from 200.45.170.30 on Mon, 3 Nov 2014 23:33:24 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/17/2019 Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
15/15
CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE
AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
275
reflect
n
aspect
f
Aristotle's
resentation
f
Ethos;
t
was
n
discarding
it,
nd
dopting
electare,
hat
Cicero
evered
he
onnection.
ToreturnoCicero's igh aluationf tyle;nthis edidnot hange.
In
Orator
0
f.he
prefaces
is iscussion
ith
categorical
ssertion
f
ts
primacy
nddomination
f he ourt
ituation:
um utemt
uid
t
uo
locodicat
nvenerit,
llud
st
onge
maximum,
idere
uonam
modo.
f
this
s
true
even
in
philosophy,
how
much more so
in
causis...
quibus
totis
moderatur
ratio? ts
importance
ay
in
its
power
to
persuade,
which
Cicero saw as
equal
to,
f not
greater
han,
that
of
truth r
logic,
because
it
appealed
like music
to
the uncritical
enses,
and
persuaded,
as
it
were,
subliminally.
his
emerges
from
he
major digression
t
Brutus
187-200,
ending n the portrayalof the perfect rator n absolute controlof his
audience
like
a
virtuoso nstrumentalist-it
has
become
his instrument.
If
Cicero claimed
for
tyle
more
than
Aristotlewould have
thought
ither
possible
or
desirable,
his
too
may
explain
why
he
moved
from
he
partial
representation
f
Aristotle's
econd
proof
by
conciliare,
o a
termwhich
had
nothing
n
common with
Aristotle,
ut
carried richer
esthetic and
stylistic
ssociations.
TRINITY
COLLEGE,
TORONTO