Post on 05-Oct-2018
CHAPTER -IV
MATERIALISM AND THF: CONCF:PT OF PF:RSON
In this clwptt:r I would discuss difkrenl views of" lht: concept of pt:rson. It may
be helpful lo discuss I he views of' J{cnt' I ksc:1rlt'S. 1\nll.':lronp. nnd PF Strmv~:on i11
order to explicate tlJe COIH.:epts of person. ·1 have discussed in the previous chapters
Dualism. behaviourism and itkntily tht:ory. The problems or mind ami its relationship
with the body have been carefully considered.
All these theories of mind are in a way theories of person whose mind and
body theorists are talking about but in different ways. Physical events and" mental
events occurred, and we may call these events 'experiences' for short. And truly we
have consciousness of these' experiences. Thus, the questions arise as to what is the
owner of these experience? What is conscious when such experiences occur? When
'there is some event, there is something that is conscious of these happenings. So what
sorts of things have consciousness, What is _t_~~-subject or consciousness? One pretty
indisputable case is that of persons or human beings. But what is a person?
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'lh.:re me various themiL'S concerning the llll'lltalevcnts (consciousness) which
fi.lll into tlm.:e basic categories. There is the view that suth events happen to purely
IJOilllJalerial things. Propom:nls or such a vk~v liSt!aUy mlmil the existence or purely
material things; hence they arc called dualists secondly, there is the view that they
happen to purely material things: we may call this m<Jicrialism. And thirdly, there is
the view that they happen to things which arc neither purely material nor purely non
material, we shall call this the theory of person. Apart from t!wse, there is also a view
that persons arc both mind and body, and we may call this common sense belief.
This chapter can be divided into the following ways:
I. The view that persons me hoth lllind and hody, (conJIIJOII ~;ense hclief).
2. The view that Persons arc mind (Dualist's view of' person).
3. The view that persons arc body (Physicalism).
4. The view that persons are the subjects to which both mental attributes and physical
attributes can equally be ascribcd.(Strawsonian concept of person)
Let me start with the common sense belief that persons are both mind and
body. When a layman thinks about 'what a person he is', he might not think of
anything else but his body and mind and thereby concludes that 'he is both a body and
a mind'. Ordinarily, our every day language includes the talk of someone as, for
example, bodily strong built but without much thought; sometimes as slender but very
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cunning. And we also sometimes talk ot' a bald headed man to he a wise man. so on
and so f(xth. When we make a propositional statement, the subject is predicated in
mental or physical lt:nns. and smnl'!i1nes in hoth tcm1s. Whe11 we talk ahoul a
'person', we ordinarily talk about his mind or his body or both. We hardly make such
u sharp contradistinction bctwccn thc pcrson on th<..: on<..: hand. and his mind and his
body on the other hand. It seems to he that this is done only in the field of' philosophy.
And common pcopk might nev~.:r thought that their 'persons' to be something
different from their minds or bodies. And sometimes when we ask them "who they
are", they might not have anything to say more than their minds and bodies. In this
way, it seems, therefore, that the common sense helicl's hold person to he both mimi
and body.,
The comnwn sense beliefs or the concept or person an; not presented in a form
of philosophical argument, but in the way layman would ordinarily thinks about
himself and others, and it seems this is enough for the common sense view on the
concept of person. In short, a person is both a thinking thing and an extended thing.
But this sort of view is seriously in contradiction with the dunlist's position.
I would disc:.:uss Descartes's position 011 the:.: C:.:OII<..:<.:pt of' pc:.:rson and other like
minded philosophers that 'Persons and minds'. I kscarlcs holds that the subject of'
consciousness is the 111i1H.I ami that th<..: 111i11d is a thi11g or e11tity separate and distin<..:t
from the body. In seems to be:.: that l(lr Descartes the notion ftf person means the same
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us the subject of consciousness. The body is a thing or entity whose essence is
occupying space, that is, having shape. size. and location in ·space. and it is in no sense
conscious. The mind, on the other hands, is compktcly dif'lcrcnt in its natun:. It is
utterly non-spatial, having neither shape. size, nor location. Its essence is simply
consciousness, that is thought, feelings, memories, perceptions, desires, emotions etc.
For Descartes, it is the mind itself which is conscious or the mental event. It follows
that the person may continue to exist even arter his 'body perishes in death.
According to Descartes, person is a mind. The essence of person consists
wholly in his being a thinking thing, that is. mimi. hut not a body. For him, it seems as
though the essence of body is wholly excluded from the essence of person because he
is a thinking thing. Let us sec what he said in hi~; n1editation II. "But what, then Hill I'!
A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that
doubts, understands {conceives), uflirms, denies wills, rcl'uscs, that imagines also, and
perceives".' Again, he also said, "Thinking is another allrihutc of the soul (mind); and
here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I
am - I exist: this is certain as often as I think ... if I should wholly cease to think, that
i should at the same time altogether cease to be. 2 Regarding his body, he said, "I
thought that 1 possl!ss a countcnanct:, hands, arms and all the fabric of members that
1 Descartes, Ml'tlitatin11 II, p.l2 2 Ibid, p. 32.
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upp~ars in th~ cmpsc, and \\hich I call hy the name of body", and "Now it is plain that
I am not the assemblage of 'members called the human body.3
Descartes holds that since the mind and the body me separate entities, each can
exist without the otlu.:r. lie 111aint;1ins ;1 1cnl distinction hctw~.:en 111i11d and hody. Lvcn
though he knows that he possesses ;1 hody, his hody is not im:lud~.:d among the
essential properties of his fJC'rsoll-hood (thinl.;ing thing). Fwn if some parts of his body
are taken away, he is not deprived of" anything. lie taller said in his sixth meditation,
"It is certain that I (that is. my mind, by "vhich I am what I am) is entirely and truly
distinct from my body, and may exist without it. 4 It is obvious and undeniable that
Descartes is at least correct in holding that some material objects do indeed exist
without minds. Ikscartes hil!lsdf" hclieves that anin1als (otl.lcr than nwn) were also
examples of hmlies without mind. Some pcoplc might not agree with him there, ami
there would he even 11101e disagree111e11t with his thesis that n1inds could exist without
bodies. lkscartes bdieved that minds were iniiiHlrlal, that they continue to exist as
disembodied minds even alter the body has jlerishe<.! jn death.
There seems to be an important gap in Descartes' account, a gap which can be
noted in the summary given. From the fact that the essence of the mind is one thing,
having consciousness, and the essence of the body is anotl_1:_r, occupying space, it docs
J /hid. p. 31. 4 /hid, p. 56.
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not however, follow that the mind and the body are two separate entities in the real
world as stone and water. The distinction between mind and body seems to be perhaps
only rational, but not actual. What is to rule out the possihility that one and the same
thing can have both Illest: propt:rlies, he both a thinking thing and at tht: same time an
extended 'thing? The essence or being a husband is heing a married 111an ami the
essence of being a parent is having oiT springs, but <.)ne and the same person can be
h<)th a husband iliHI a parL'Ill (and, ohvioll.•dy, c:111 hl' Olll' witho111 hci11g llll' oilier). lhi~;
gap in Descartes' reasoning was lirst pointed out by Spinoza, who had been a follower
of Descartes. Spinoza realised that "although two attributes may he com.:dved as r~..:ally
distinct'', and here he has in mind thinking and extension, "we cannot nevertheless
thence conclude that they constitute two beings or two different substances.5 Then
breaking decisively with Descartes, Spinoza went on to maintain that in the case or
human beings (and, as a matter of fact, for Spinoza, in everything as well), both
thinking and space occupancy were characteristics or one and the same thing.
Uoing back to I kscartes, thcrt: is a question as to how tht: mani lcstations of
consciousness arc related to the pl1ysical attributes which also belong to persons.
' According to A.J. Ayer, the answer that would still be most acceptable to common
sense, at least when it is made to consider the question in these terms is that the
relation is contingent, not logical, but only factual. In philosophy this view is mainly
associated with Descartes, if he did not originate it, he put it forward in the clearest
5 Spinoza, Ethics, part I, prop x, note (Philosophic Classics). p. 113.
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und wH:umpt·omisitlg way. lh~ vkw is that a person is a combination ol' two separate
et1tities, a body and a n1ind or soul.< lnly the tllind is co11s~ious, till.! physical properties
which a pt:rson h:~:> ;11e properliv:; ol l1i·; body. I he two L'lltities ;n·c sep;11;1te i11 thL·
scnsl..! tha't th~rc is no logical collllL'l'liult hl'IWL'ell then I. i\ccurding to I kscarlL's's
VIL'W, it is concl'iV;Ihk th:1t citlwr siJ,11dd l":ht withnill tilL· other; th:~t is tiiL~re IS 11i1
lhnn anybody at aiL ami equally till eontradil·tion in supposing llwta pcrsotl's body is
animated hy SlllllL' other mind, til' tlol hy :llty tllit1d :tl :ill. This does llol. however,
L'Xt:ltttk !Ill' possibility or tiJLTL' !Jritlg L':tlls:d l'Oillli . .'L'tion hl'l\\'L'l'll tiJctll: So tltat L'\'ell ir
they are separable in prineipll', there m:1v sJ.ill he groumls" l'or holding that they :trc
inscparabk in 1;1el.h
Descartes lli1nsclr prejudged this question hyde lining the mind as a suhst:n1ce,
which implied, in his usage, that its existence was causally as well as logieally
intl!..!pendent or the existencc or the hotly. nut this view that the mind is a suhstanee is
not entailed by the view that mind and body are logically distinct. Now it would he
CO!llpatibk With this sort or duaJislll to rL·jecl the llolioll or llll'lll;tl SllbSI:IIIl'l' ;tltogetlll'r
and cotH.:civc ol' the mind in difll:rcnt ways, hut not as a suhstancc.
Whatever may be the attraction~: or this dualistic view for common sense, the
tendency of some philosophers has been to try to replace it by some form or monism.
1' 1\..1. Ayer, 71w Concl'fJI o{a l'a.wm and Other L1·.1a_rs. pp. 82-83.
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For example, Berkeley, who hold that physical objects wen: collections of sensible
qualities which were dependent I(H· their ex istencc upon hL;ing pnreiwd (to he is to he
perceived), anu lllune who saw no grounds ror holding that anything cxistcd hul
sensory, impressions and the idea which copied them, may both he regarded, in their
different ways, as having tried to cffecl the reduction of body to mind. 7 Now if the
mind is regarded as a substance, the question arises how such a substance could ever
be identified. If it is regarded as a collection of sensory impressiori.s or experiences,
there is the problem, to which llumc himself confessed that he could sec no answer, of
showing how the collection is united. What is it that makes a given experience a
member of one such collection rather than another? With any view of this type, there
is also problem of itkntifying tlw experiences themselves. According to J\..1. J\yl!r. In
the ordinary way, we idcJJiily e.xpL·rienn·:; in ln111~; of' IIIL' pcrson~; who~;c L'Xpericncc
they arc; but clearly this will lead to a vicious cin.:k if' persons themselves arc to h<:
analysed in terms of their experiences. X
Even John Locke holds that person is a mind. llcrc we must understand by the
term 'person' is meant something incorporeal, not physical. lie defined the term
'person' as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and rcllcctiun, ami can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places, which it
docs only by that consciousness which is inseparahk from thinking and essential to
------- ... ·-----··-·-·
7 !IJid., p. 83. K Ibid., p. 84.
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it". Further. "as htr as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action
or thought, so h1r reaches the identity of person".9
llc also writes that. ''I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same
person and the same JlHIIl stand fi11· one and the same thing". Yet he believes that these
two expressions stand for quill' distinct itkas. "Person" having to do with a rational
self and "Man" having to do sintply wit It a L:ertain sort of living organisn1. i\ rational
parrot. he argued, would not he calk:d a man, nor would a non-rational human he
called anything but a man. The fonm:r. hdw"Z:iler. mjght be a person, while the latter,
failing in rationality, might not he. ;\ person. then. is not a rational man. since "man"
has rl'll.·rl'lll"l' to coqH,n·;tl fillltt, illtd tlti·; i~; not ;1~; Itt' .'iit\V il. pml of'lhc lltl'allillg ol'
"Person" at all. But he then inferred that "l'uson" tllllSI dcnolt.: soJIIcthing im:orporcal
and indeed invisible. This deviates from common usage to the extent that accon.ling to
one entry in a standard dictionary "person" means "the bodily form of a human
being". We speak of someone as being "comely of person" and of physical assaults as
"crimes against the person", but neither usage is conveyed in Locke's explication. For
him, identity of person was simply identity of consciousness, so that I remain the same
person if I am conscious of being f>O, even though my body should change drastically
and be diminished through age, disease, or amputation. 10 Thus, according to Locke, it
is logically possible ror SOillCIIIll: to rcllt:till the s:lltll' IWrson l'Vl'll in tlw discnJhodicd
9 John Locke, Essays Conc.:erninR lfuman UnderstandinR. Cambell Fraser (ed.), Oxford, 1894, 1.3ook 2. 10 Paul Edwards, The Enc:vclopaedia ofPhilosophr. Vol. 5-6. pp. I Il-l 12.
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state. It can, then.:ll.m:, be regarded that the idea of a person losing a part of himscl f as
impossible: Persons arc indivisible. the expression 'partlifa person' being "a manifest
absurdity".
Assuming the possibility !hal persons an: 111inds lh~:n.: an.: so1111: prohkn1s ld"l
with us. lt is dualist theory which gives us to the idea of mental suhst;1nce. By
substance it is l1en.:hy understood as tiling, entity, stu IT. clc, which has an independent
existence <lf its own: lh:1t whil·h does nul dqwnd liH· ils t·xist~·nn· 1111 anylhin).'. l'lsl·. II"
that is so, then how can a mind. which is 1111 independent substance, be the subject of'.
and owner of experiences which also illcludcd the physical events? If the person is a
composition or two integral parts - mind ami hody. he must be the subject or both
mental and physical events, slates and processes. By·du;Jiist's definition, however, the
person being a thinking thing (mind) cannot he a material body and. therefore, cannot
also be the subject or owner of the bodily ewnts, processes ami states. It is for this
reason that the dualist account of person as mind cannot he upheld.
Again, another source of discontent with dualism was that it seemed to commit
us to the existence of a very peculiar kind of entity, a something which persists in
time, has states, undergoes changes, and engages in processes, and yet invisible,
intangible, without size or shape or mass. It is a curious something; it docs not seem
intelligible that there should he such a thing. Nothing can be said about it except that it
is a subject of consciousness! And even that docs not make explicitly clear what it is.
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If-the persons were minds. there are still some diniculties about identification
and individuation. The problems of identilication eom:en1s how we can tell \vhen we
arc in the presence or some other mind 1\ rather than B or even in the presence of any
other mind at all. That is to say. person being a mind. how can we identify Mr. Smith
in the presence of othn pl.'rsons Mr .Iones and Mr. l{oherts? Since, on lhl.' d11alisl
account, another mind is not detectable by any observation we could make, it is
impossible that we should have any reason to think we cnuld ever identify another --- .....
mind as mind 1\ or mind B. There is 110 way or idet1lil"yit1g one person from another
person if they (mind) cannot be dctcckd by any observation. So we could never
justifiably believe we were, for example. talking to someone. "1\ concept or mind
which made it impossible justifiably to apply that concept to any other thing would be
utkrly useless, evc11 if itt1clli!'ihlc". 11 /\11d ll1e S<lllle lu,hl:; l•~r lite co11ccp1 of pnson as
long as person arc thought or as min·.ls.
On the other hand, so n1r as idcntilication is concerned, it does seem to he the
case that we can only tell we arc in the presence or another consciousness and can
only tell whose consciousness it is by observing physical phenomena. We have no
way of getting at the other mind directly. So we must depend upon sense observations
of material bodies, especially human bodies. And that leaves mental things in a weaker
position, at least epistemologically, than material things as l~tr as the concept of person
as mind is com:erncd.
11 Jerome /1.. Shalh:r, '111<' l'hilo.'"l'h1·oj 1\lnlll, 1'1' 38. 5'l
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Till! probklllS or individuation CliiiCLTn what makl!S two minds distinct
assuming there could be two distinct minds. One answer might be that they have
different mental histories, each having had di ITerent mental l!Venls at certain times.
But it seems perfectly intelligible to suppose that at some time we might have two
distinct minds with exactly the same history of mental events (each rhight have grown
up in exactly the same way). And. if this supposition of two exactly similar minds is
intelligible, lht:n what would make thc111 two distinct minds rather than one and the
same mind'! Prohkms n:lating to this sort of individ11;1tion. the dualist docs not SLTIII
Lo have <Ill answer. lie lllllsl say that they :11e distinct. and yet he cannot say how or in
what respect they dilTer. This docs nul m;II\C any sense too. The same goes for the
concept of person as mind.
Let us consider it another way. So far as individuation is concerned, too,
mental entities seem to have a weaker status than matcri:1l cnlitirs. i\s it docs seem
possible for there to be two uil'l'crent persons who have exactly the same mental
history. exactly the same set of mental states and events throughout their I i fe. The only
thing that could distinguish the two would he the existence of different bodies in
different places. This indicates that mental entities depend in part on material entities
for their individuation. 12
12 /hid., pp. 38-39, 59.
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The com:...:pl or p...:rson as mind CillliHll. th...:rl:l'or...:, hi.! ·lllaintaincd <IS till! true
act:Olllll or pnsoll lor thc rcasOIIS gi VCII ahovc. Now it call he condudcd Oil this part or
of person must indude some rcfcn.:nt:c to material bodies, although it may not be
necessary to idcntil'y tlu: person with the ·\Jii1Ty. lndc~~l. there arc grave dif'liudtics in
attempts to defend such an identification because the concept of person is much more
than the t:om.:cpt ol' lllakriaJ hody. llowcvcr, persons Cllll he idcntificd through
llliltniHI hndil·:; t\ d11ali·;J11 \\hil'l1 ind11th·:; llw ('(lJI\'('pt nl' illl illllllilh·lial :;11hit·1·t ol
consciousness utterly independent ol' matcrial hodks is unable to deal with the
problems of identification ami individuation.
Contrary to the concept of person "s mind just discusscd earlier, tlH:re "re some
philosophers who hold that persons arc nothing hut body. They arc called physicalist
or materialist. 1\nd their doctrine is materialism. According to this doctrim; "physical
matter is the basic reality ami that thoughts and e111otions are si111ply results or it, ami
that religious ami supcmatural h~licls arc hasdcss". 1 1
Materialism as such docs not totally reject the internal states or the mental
concepts of our everyday language. To rid mental concepts of our language is just to
impoverish human language. What the doctrine rejects however is the Cartesian notion
of mental substance, a substance that has an independent existence of its own. It was
13 Reader's Digest Reverse Dictionm:l'. p. 375.
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held by Thomas llohhes, in opposition to Descartes, that there was no need to
postulate thc cxistcncc or mimi in additio11 to hodi~:s: conscious stalcs and a~livitks
could he attri hulcd to the body i tsc I r. !\ nd modcrn phi losophcrs, I i kc Ryle and Camap,
have argued that it is a lllistake to think or conscious states <llld processes as ghostly
inhabitants ora p~:rson's priva\1: mental stage. stalt:nlclll about people's mental Iii\: ;1rc
reducible to statements about their physical institution, or their actual and potential
behaviour. 14 Proponents of the materialist theory of mind would say that the mental
states, processes and events arc nothing <.ij1a~t from-lhe state of the central nervous
system or the brain states. 1\nd functionalist account of mind would say that they arc
the functions of the brain. For them. persons Hre nothing morc than matcrial hodics.
J\11 arg11n1enl ill t:lVOlll or tJ1c pJ1y~;ic:11d type oflliiiiiiSIIl is tlJ<ll IIIIlS( of tilL'
difficulties faced by non-makrialists arc avoitkd. 1\t least there 1s then no spcci;ll
problem of personal identity. The criteria ftlr the identity of persons will be the same
as those that determine the identity of their bodies: and these will conform to the
general conditions which govern the identity of all physical object of a solid
macroscopic kind. It is primarily a matter of spatio-tcmporal continuity. Moreover, if
persons can be C<.]Uatcd with their bodies. there will no longer be any need to specify
how minds and bodies arc correlated. Once it is shown how states of consciousness
can be ascribed to bodies, this problem will have hcen solved. But whether this can he
shown is itself very much an open question. It is obvious that any view of this type
14 A.J. Aycr. The Concept o/a l'a.1·on ll/1(1 Other t~·ssavs. p. 84.
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faces very serious diniculties: and it is not at all so clear that they can be satisfactorily
met.
I would discuss now in detail the hypothL\-;is on the concept of a person
proposed by D.M. !\rmstrong1whosc view is hascd o11 scientific ground.
Matcri~alist Approach to the Concept of Per·son
The materialistic theory of' person is, best represented hy I>. M. !\ rmst rong in
his book A Materialist Jhewy of Mind and in his article The Nature ol Afind. I w,nlid
try to work out the lllatcrialistic l'OIICcpt or person along with thl'ir theory or llliiHI. It is
important to present hrielly the m;1krialist's \'icw on thL· comTpl of mind. and
subsequently the conccplol' person.
According to this theory. the mental stales arc identified with purely physical
states of the central nervous system which is perhaps, what Descartes called, a pineal
gland. It is important to take note of the theory that the central state theory does not
deny the existence of inner mental states. On the contrary, it asserts their existence:
they are physical states of brain. 15 The concept of mind. according to him, is primarily
the com.:cpt ol' a stale ol' the person apt l(ll· bringing about a certain sort ul' hehaviour. 11'
"D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory ofMind, p. 75. 16 Ibid., p. 83.
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lf the mind is thought of as that which has mental states, then we can say that, on this
theory, or less accurately hut more epigrammatically, the mind is simply the brain.
Now 1 shall atll:mpt ll l "nrk nut till' matnia list account o I' mind or 111L'ntal
processes within thl' l'r:~nH·wnrk nltlw plty·:icn dt~'lttic:tl ell tlw 111:th'1 i:tli::l vinv of
man.
One of the account of lliCiltal protcsscs that is ol' once attractive to any
philosopher sympathetic to a matcrialist view or man ts 'Behaviourism'. Traditional
philosophy had tended to think or the mind as a rather mysterious illll'lll'd (//'£'//(/ that
lay behind, and is responsible l'or, the outward or physical behaviour of our bodies.
Dcscart~:s thought or this innl'r arcn:1 as a :;pirit11:~l s11hst:111LT, and it is this conception
of the mind as spiritual substance that lkhaviourist, like Gilbert Ryle, strongly attack
as a "dogma ur the ghost in the Machinc". h>r him, thc mind is not somdhing bchind
the behaviour or the body, it is simply that part ol' behaviour. As rur example, my
anger with you is nut some modification or a spiritual substance which somehow
brings about aggressive behaviour, rather it is the aggressive behaviour itself'. My
addressing strong words to you, striking you, tuming my hack on you, and so otl.
Thought is not an inner process that lies behind, and brings about, the words I speak
and write. It is my speaking and writing. So the mind is not an inner arena, it is
outward act. 17
17 Gilbert Rylc, 7'h1! ConCI!JII ofi\1iJl(/, p.
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i\nnslroll):', is titus ultlte view tlt<tl "II is clear llt;ll such a v1ew ollllall lils in
very wdl with a completely lllatcrialist or physicalist view of man. If there is no need
to draw a distinction between mental processes and-their cxpn;ssions in physical
behaviour, but i r i nstcad the mental processes arc idenl i lied with thci r so-cal led
'expressions' then the cxistcm.:e of mind stands in no conflict with the view that Man
. I. h I . I . I I . IIIX IS 11011111g II{{/ fJ I)'SICO-C IC/11/C£1 1/I('C W/1/Sitl.
Since behaviourism is one version of materialism. I shall lake it into account
also in the course of discussing tnakrialisnl. One of th~..: weak point of behaviourism,
that I have just outlined is that our common experiences tell us that there can be
mental processes going on although there is no behaviour occurring that could
possibly he lteated as expre~;~;ioll ol ti1L·~;c ptmT:;:;c:;. l·m L·x;11npk, a tlt<lll 111ay he ""I'.IY
but gives no bodily sign, he may think hut say or do nothing at all. This is quite
enough to prove that 111ind is nul the S<lllle as behaviour, hut rather which stands
behind ami brings about our co1nplcx behaviour. In short, the mimi is the spring of
action or behaviour.
In order to meet this objection. Ryle has made an attempt by introducing the
notion of a disposition to behave, which playsa particularly important role in his
account of the mind. Now it can be said of a disposition to behave in a certain way
under certain circumstances. According to Ryle, 'to say that a person knows
18 D.M. Armstrong, op.cil., p. J;t(,_
231
something, or aspin:s to b~ something. is not to say that h~ is at a particular mom~nt in
process of doing or und~rgoing anything. hut that h~ is able to do c~rtain things, wh~n
the n~cd aris~s. or that ~~~ is pron~ to do allll k~l certain things in situation or Cl:rtain
sorts. 19
How did Rylc use 'the notion of a disposition to behave' to meet the obvious
objection to behaviourism that then: ca11 he mental processes going 011 though th~
subject is engaged in no relevant 11L:haviour'! Ryle's stra!Lgy is to argue that in cas~
when th~ suhj~d is not h~havi11g in <Ill)' ll"kV:IIlt way. he or she is dispos~d (liable) to
behave in som~ rcl~vanl way. /\s th~ glass docs not shatter hut it ;s still brittle. so do~s
not the man behave but he docs have a disposition to behave. llerc is an important
point to take not~ of: th~ hrilllencss or glass is a disposition that the glass rd:tins
throughout its history, but clearly there could also be dispositions that come and go.
The dispositions to behave that arc of special interest to bchaviourist arc, for the most
part, of this temporary character.
To explain th~ breaking or a lightly struck glass on a particular occasion by
saying it is brittle is, on this view of dispositions, simply to say that the glass breaks
because it is the sort of thing that ~asily breaks wh~n lightly struck. The breaking is
the normal behaviour, or not the ahnorn1;1i behaviour of such a thing. Th~ hrilllcn~ss is
not to be conceived of as a cause li.>r th~ hrcakag~. or ~v~n. more vagu~ly, a l~tctor in
19 Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 122.
232
bringing about the breaking. Brittleness is just the fact that things of that sort breaks
easily.
By argumg this way, the objection that mental processes may he gomg on
\\ithout t1tttw:11d t'Xflll'';:;i,•tl 1:111 lw 11wt It ·.,Till:; clt-:11 tl1;1l t11 :;utlll' l'.\ktlt tlw
behaviourists is alright, hut still they did not do enough especially when the first
person m:count is conccmcd. When I think, hut nty thought do not ttccessarily issue in
any action, it s~o.·ems as ohvious :ts :ntythint• .. is ohvinus that tht:rc is something m:tually
going on in me which constitutes my thought. It is not simply that I would speak or act
if some conditions that arc unl'ullillcd arc to he l'uflillcd. Something is curn:ntly going
on, in the strongest sense and most literal sense of "going on". and this something is
my thought. It has been pointed out th:tt Rylcatt behaviourism denies this 'inner goings
on', and so it is not satisfactory as a theory of mind, and a theory of person as well.
Yet there is not hJunJ any other version of" behaviourism that is more satisl~tctory. So,
the moral for those who will take a purely physic:tlistic view of man is that they tnust
look for some other account or the nature ol' mind and or IIICiltaf processes.
It can be seen that behaviourism is a profoundly unnatural account of mental
processes. If somebody speaks and acts in certain way it is natural to speak of these
speech at~d ac.tion as the expression of his thought, but not natural to speak of them as
identical with his thought. It is very natural to think of the thought ~s someth~ng quite
distinct from the speech and action which, under suitable circumstances, hritigs the
speech and action ahuul. That 1s to say. thoughts arc not tu he identilied \\ith
behaviour, we thi11k. they lie hchi11d behaviour. In r0~dity. a nwn's hchaviour
constitutes the rc:tsu11 we have !"or :tttril•utinv L"l'tt:till IIIL"Ilt:d processes to hi111. hut the
behaviour itscllcallltul he idctlli;icd \\itlt tile lltcntal pwccsscs.
Now it seems sollll'\\"hat ck:tr tlt:tl lK·rhaps the hchaviuurists ~Ire \\TOll!_.'- in
idcntif'ying the mind and mental uccunL·nccs with hchaviour. hut pcrhaps they an.:
right in thinking th:tt our notiu11 ul" :1 111itHI :11HI ul" itHlividual llll'llt:d st:tiL's is lo)-'ie:dly
tied to behaviour. The reason is that perhaps what we mean by a mental stale is some
state of the person which. under suitable circumstances. brings about a certain range or
behaviour.
Now Ictus sec what the materialist has said on the concept or tnind. Annstrong
says:
"'J'he concept ofu 111ental slate is tJrinwrily the conceJJI ofu stale l~jthe /)('!"son
apt fiJr hringing ahout a certain runge of helwviour .... A/Jiwugh llli}](/ is not
hchaviour, if is the cause c~f helwl'iour " .. 'o So. according to this ddinition. perhaps
mind can be iJentilied not as hchavio11r. but rather as the inner cause or cert<tin
behaviour. Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances, rather it is something
within the person which. in suitable circumstances brings about speech. And. in l;u:t.
211 I>.M. Armstrong, A 1\lutaia/ist 'J"heol~l' of llf111d, p. X2.
234
Armstrong is of the opinion that this is the true account. or at any rate a first true
account, of what Wl! ml!ant by a mental state. 71
lt is an important question to ask, 'ho\\ docs this line or thou[!,ht linked up with
a purdy physicalist view of man?' The position sccms to he this th:1t while it docs not
make such a physicalist view inevitable but it does make it possible. It docs not entail.
but it is compatible with, a purely physicalist view of man. For if our notion of the
mind and mental slates is nothing hut that or a cause within the pcrson or certain
rangcs of bl!haviour, thcll it beCOllleS a scientific l\lll!Slioll, and llOl a question or
logical an;llysis, what in I~Icl the intrinsic nature or that cause is. There have hcen . .
dilkrcnt argunu:nts on thc nature or this cause. The cause 1night hc, as De-scartes
thought it is, a spiritu:d ~;uh~;taJJce, Wllii<iiiJ' tllllllll'h till· l'inl'lll .':!lint! lo (liiHI!Jce the
complex bodily behaviour of which men arc capable. It might bc breath, or spccially
smooth and mobile atoms dispcnsed throughout the body, it might bc many othcr
things. But in fact, as At·mstrong argues, the verdict of modern science seems to be
that the sole cause of mind - betokening behaviour in man a·nd the higher animals is
the physicochemical workings of the certain nervous system. So by assuming our
concept of a mental state have been correctly characterised as nothing but the cause of
certain sorts of behaviour, then thcsc mcntal statcs can bc idcntilicd with purdy
physical states ofthc ccntral ncrvous systcm.22
21 D.M. Armstrong. 1'l1c Naturc o(Mind, p. Jt17. 12 /hid, p. Jtl7.
235
Armstrong bused his argument on s~:icnce. !lis theoretical set up is in fact very
scientific. He puts the authority of science as to the nature of man above other
disciplines. According to him, if we consider the search fcJr truth, in all its fields, we
find that it is only science that man who have authority in their subject can, after
investigation that is more or less prolonged, and which may in some cases extend
beyond a single human life time, reach substantial agreement about what is the case.
"It is only a ll'~;nll ul :;cil'lllilit· ill\'t".liJ•.:IIit~ll 111:11 \Vl' t'Vl'l :;n·n1 In 1e;1ch ;111 inll'lkt·ln;d
consensus about controvcrsialmatlcrs". 21
This is of the utmost importance. hll· in philosophy, in religion, in such
disciplines as literary criticism, in moral question in so far as they are thought to be
matters of truth and falsity, there has been a notable f~1ilurc to achieve an intellectual
consensus about the disputed questions among the learned, so there is a good reason to .
attach a peculiar authority to the discipline that can achieve a consensus. And if that
discipline that can achieve a consensus, and if that disci pi inc presents us with a certain
vision of the nature of man, then this should be a powerful reason for accepting that
VICW.
Armstrong is or the view that it is the Illl:thmls of' science by which we can
achieve an intellectual consensus about so many controversial matters. And as a result
of scientific investigation, such a consensus has been achieved. It is the scientific view
23 /hid, p. 345.
236
or man, and not the philosophical or n:li)lious or artistic or mor:tl vision ol' man, th:tt is
the best due we have to the ll<tlttlc ol 111<111. /\1HI it is ralional to argue lr<llll lhe best
evidence we have .2·1
There is a dirtl:rence between hehaviourist and materialist with regard to the
notion of disposition. Whereas the behaviourist holds that the brittleness of glass is not
a state of the glass hut is simply the l~tctthat things of that sort behave in the way they
do, materialist hold that it is the state or the glass that gives rise to these manil'cstation
in suitable circu1nstam:es. 7' The disposilion itsdr is distinct lro111 its tllalliksl:tlioll.
The scientists may like to argue that it h:ts been discoven..:d that the hrittklll'SS or glass
is in fact a certain sort or pallcrn in the molecules or the glass. Similarly, a matcrialist
would clai111 that llll'llt:d state~; :Ill' i11 lat·t idt·11tic:d with tlw tTIItr:d nt·rvoll~; ~;y::tt'lll ol'
the brain stale. 1he bruin and its partner, the SJJiral cord, to}!.ether jiJrm the central
control c~lthe body, and this is known as t/1(' "tentralll(~rvous .\ystem (( 'N,\'). ;>r,
Now it can he seen that this way or looking at disposition as a slate which h:1s a
causal power is very dii"!Crent from that of the bchaviourists and Rylc. No need to
mention much about it. the materialists, we can say, are committed to the view that
they are actual states of the object that has the disposition. And Armstrong believes
24 /hid, p. 345. 25 /hid, p. 348. 26 Renshaw Elspath, }'our Amazing /Jud\' p. '1X.
237
that the view of dispositions as st~1tes. which is the view that is natural to science. is
the correct nnc. 27
Thus. I have considered \\\0 Sl'par:lll' but interlocking lines or thought that
push Armstrong in the same Jirel'lion. The first line or thought is that it goes
profoundly against the grain to think of the mind as behaviour. The mind is rather, that
which stands behind and brings about our behaviour. The second line of thought is that
the behaviourist's concert or disposition. prorcrly conceived. arc ready states that
underlie behaviour, ami, under suitable circumstances. bring about behaviour. So hy
putting these two together. II'C' reach the <'llll«'i'fltioll o(lt 111<'1/tu/stutc· us o state· o(tlll'
fil.!l".\'011, llfil for f11'11tlllciiJ.I!, Ct'J ltJ/11 ruJI,I!,t'\ uJ /l('litll'ltJIIr. llw; lolllllda is a very
illuminating way or looking at th<: COIICCpt of' a n1c11\aJ stall: ill a conl<:111por:1ry World
of materialistic philosophy.
By using the Hegelian terms, the Classical Theory of mind saw the mind as an
inner arena, this is the thesis. In reaction. 'bcflaviourts_m saw the mind as nothing else
but outward act, this is the anti-thesis. But Armstrong's Central State Theory saw the
mind as an inner arena identified by ils causal rela!ion lo ou/ward acl, this is the
synthesis. 211 This shows that luunan tholl{'.hl of'tc11 lltov~:s i11 a dialcdi~:al w:1y, f'm111
thesis to anti-thesis and then to the synthesis. From the C'I:Jssic;d Theory and
21 D.M. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, p. 347. 28 Ibid., p. 348.
238
Behaviourism. Armstrong rorged his proposed synthesis · that the mind is propL:rly
conceived us an inner principle. but a principle that is identified in terms or the
outward behaviour, it is :~pi l(,r hrin)'ill!' ahout.
This way or looking at the mimi and mental staks. however, docs not entail
much a materialist or physical \'iew or 11W11, ror nothing is said in this analysis about
the intrinsic nature or these mental staks. But if we have gcncral scientific grounds for
thinking that man is nothing but a physical mechanism. we can go on to argue that the
mental stales arc in fact nothing hut a physical s\ah:s of the central nervous system.
Accon.ling to Armstrong. a purc matcrialist allows man nothing but physical,
chemical and biological propcrlil's which. in :dl probability. hL· rq•.anls :1s n·ducihk to
physical properties only. The materialist account or the nature or mind is compatible
with the view that man is nothing hut a physico-chcmical mcchanis1n. !king a
materialist, Armstrong said that man is a material substance who has ccrtain cxtra,
non-material attributcs. 29 And this non-material attribute ts what I have already
pointed out carl icr, the inner pri nci pic which is idcnti lied 111 terms or the out ward
behaviour, it is apt for bringing about. And he goes 011 to arguc that mental statcs arc
in fact nothing but physical states or the ccntralncrvous systcm or simply thc brain.
29 D.M. Armstrong. A Afateriali.11 Theorr of!l!ind. pp. 37-38.
239
Thus we have discussed the materialist concept or lll'rSOil Oil the basis or
Armstrong's argument as the physicaL chemical (and. biological) mechanism or
properties. This extra, non-material property is. acrording to him, the internal slate or
the person apt for the production or behaviour. So what is this internal state of the
person according to materialist? This can best he answered hopefully by considering
the objections against it.
Let us begin with the ohviolls ohjn:tion that m;ty arisc·againsl materialist and
then how materialist would react to this ohjcctiotl.
The view or the ( 'cnlr;d Sl;tll' .llw()ry ()IJ I Ill' llllli()IJ or lllilld IJI;ty lw lh()IIJ'.Itl In
share a certain weakness with hchaviouris1;1. rYiodcrn-philosophcrs arc or the view that
although behaviourism may be a salisf~tctory account or mimi from another person
point of view, but it will not do as a lirst person account. In our encounll:r with other
people, all we observe is their behaviour. their speech and action. In other person case,
behaviourism might seem to do full justice to the h1cts. But in our own case, we seem
to be aware of so much more than mere behaviour.
Even the materialist conception of the mind as an inner principle apt f()r the
production or certain sorts or behaviour again fits the other person cases very well.
Bodily behaviour of a very sophisticatt:d sort is observed, quite di lTcrcnt from the
240
behaviour that ordinary physical objects display. It is logically inferred that this
behaviour ·must spring fl·om a very special sort or inner cause in the object that
exhibits the behuviolll'. This inner caus~: cult be named "the Mind", ami those who take
a physicalist view ol' 111~1n argue that it is sintply the central 11crvous sysll:m ol' lilt:
body observed.
Now let liS compan: this with the case or glass. ( 'ertaill characteristic behaviour
is observed. That is the breaking and slwl'::!:iJ.!g or the matdial when m:tcd upon hy
relatively small f(m:e. !\ special inner sl<ltc' or the glass is postulall:J to explain this
behaviour. Those who t:1kc a pmcly physictli~;t vinv ol" l'.lass then ;ugiiL' th:1l this st:lll:
is a natural state or the glass. It is, pnh:tps. (Ill :IITIInJ'.t'nH·nt or its moll'rllks. <lnd nol,
say, the particularly 1nakvolenl di~;po~;ition of till· dt'IIIOIIS thai dwell in l'.las~;.
But when we turn to our own cast:. the p:>silion may seem less plausible. It is
the fact that we are conscious, we have experience. Now can we say that to be
conscious, to have expcrictH.:cs. is simply for something to go on within us apt for the
production or certain sort or behaviour. Such an account docs not seem to do any
justice to the phenomena. And so it seems that our account or the mi nJ wi II also f~ti I to
do justice to the first person case.
The objection may become ckarer il' we consider the following case in which
one can do something without any awareness or what one was doing. Suppose that you
241
have driven a car for a very long distance without break. And then you may have had
experience of a curious state of automatism, which can occur in these conditions. All
of a sudden chance that one "come to" and realised that one has driven for distance
without being aware of any thing. ( )ne has kept the car on the road, used the brake ami
dutch pcrhap~, yet all without any awareness of what one was doing.
In this case, it is obvious that i11 sollll' se11se lllental processes arc still going on
when one is in such an autPmatic state. The only thing is that one is not aware of his
awareness (apperception) of what one was doing. Unless one's will was operating in
some way, and unless one was still perceiving in some way, the car would not still be
on the road. Now it is claimed that on acc(;u_t~t of mind as an. inner principle apt for the
production of certain sorts of hdwviour leaves out consciousness or experiences, what
is claimed to have been omitted is just whatever is missing in the automatic driving
case (apperception). Now it is atllllitted that an account of n1e11tal processes as states of
the person apt l(ll· the production of certain sorts of behaviour m:1y very possibly he
adequate to deal with such cases as that of automatic driving, it may be adequate to
deal wi1h most of the mental processes of animals, who perhaps spend a good deal of
their lives in this state of automatism as well.
However, such an account of the mental processes, it is contended, cannot deal
with the consciousness that we normally enjoy. As it has been considered earlier, it
will seem obvious to some philosophers that the account of mental states given
242
previously is unsatisi~H.:tory because it leaves out consciousness or experiences. Those
philosophers who argue that the central state theory or mental states as unsatisl~1ctory
might protest that the argument has a quite unsatisl;1ctory other-person char;1c~_cr. It is
as though we took the very complex behaviour of other person. a cause which may be
called a mental stale. and then we proceeded to idetltily these postulated n1ental states
with stntrs or thl' hr:lin. In 0111' ll\\'11 l':ISl', at k:tsl. \\'l' ha\'l' :1 dirt'l'l aw:m.·nt·s~; or \llll'
mental states. We arc conscious. we have experiences. In fact. it w;~s this very l~1cl that
leu to the rejection ot' physicalist progr<llllll1C with respect to the mind sponsored by
behaviourism. So, according to them, cuusciousne$~ is something more than the
occurrence of an inner state apt for the production of certain sort of behaviour.
ArmstronJ• .. in his :11tcmpt to rc;tct to thi~; po:;~;ihly, ;nul it ;1ctu;dly i~:. in1pmt;111t
and powerful objection consciousness is something more tlmt physict~list account of
mental states leaves out. suggested lht~l con\'ciousn<'-"·'· is no /IIlii"<' thon tlll'on'll<'ss
(pcrceJJiiom) l~( inna mental shtles hy the fJI!I'.\'IJ/1 whose states they are. 10
Consciousness or experience, then, is simply awareness of our own mental state of
mind. The technical term for such awareness of our own mental state is introspection
or introspective awareness.
So, according to Armstrong, the notion of consciousness is nothing more than
perception or awareness of the mental state. Perception, in general, can he thought of
J() /hid., p. 95.
243
as an inn~:r stales or events apt f(H· the production of certain sort of behaviour towards
our environment. Thus perception is something that goes on within the person within
his mind- although of course, this mental event is normally caused hy the operation
of the environment upon the organism. 31 It seems a very promising view to take of
perceptions that they arc inner slates defined hy a certain sort of behaviours that they
enable the perceiver to exhibit. i r so impelled, as the situation demands.
How is this discussion or perception related to the que~tion of consciousness or
cxpcriencl.!, the sort ol"thing that the driver who is i11 a state of" autolnatism has not got.
sense of" tht: word, is llotl1i11g hut perception or awareness or the stale or our OWII
kind". 32
In the case or a driver who is in such an automatic slate, he perceives, or is
aware of the road. If he did not, the em would he in a ditch. The only thing is that he is
not however CliiTenlly aware or his :1\\':ll'ellL'SS of the road. Jle perceives the road, hut
he does not perceive his perceiving, or any thing else that is going on in his mind. In
other words, he is not. as we normally an:, conscious or what is going on in his mind.
Jl D.M. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, p. 350. 32 Ibid., p. 350.
Thus, according to Armstrong, the concept of consciousness, in this sense of
the words, can be thought or as "pen:eption'' or in other w(lrds, 'inner sense'. It is not
for one to directly observe the minds of others. That is to say, one docs not have direct
access to the mental st;llCS or others. hut each or liS has the. power or capacity to
observe directly our 0\\'ll lllillds. <llld 'pnn·iVL·· what is going Oil there. Ill the case or
driver who is in an ali!OIIlatic state. the driver is cllle whose "inner eyes" is shut, one
who is not currently nw:m: or what is ~:•.oil! I'. on in his lllind.
If the account of' perception is along the right line, why should we 11ol give an
ill'l'OIIIItor illlll"l uh:.t'l \'ill IIIII'• till 11111',1 \1111',111";•,) illllllr till' ',i\1111' IIIII', illll'<idy 1!.1\'1'11 ul
perception? Why should we not conceive or it as an itlllcr slate. a state in this case
directed towards our own mental st:1tes'! We cnn say that one who is nwnre, or
conscious of his thoughts or emotion is one who has the capacity to make
discriminations between his different mental states. I lis capacity might he exhibited in
words. For example. he might say that he is in an angry state of mind when and only
when, he is in an angry state. so on and so forth. I lowever, such verbal behaviour
would he the expression of result of the nwarcncss. I Jere, it seems very obvious that
the awareness itself would be an inner state. The sort of inner state that gives the man
a capacity li>r such hchaviouralcxpressio11s. I hnve 111e11tio11cd how /\nnslro11g reacted
to this sort of dirticulty by saying that CO/ISCi0/1.\'/WSS is /10 1110/'C! than UWll/'l'IWSS of'
inner mental slates hy the person whose mental S/(I{C!S they are. If this so. then
consciousness is simply a further mental state. a state directed towards the original
245
mental account or his further nH:n!<ll st;tk along the same lines that we g1vc of the
mental state towards which it is directed.
Armstrong, however, hclicv~:d what Kanl suggested the correct way of'
thinking ·about introspection when he spoke of' our awareness of' our mental states as
tiH: operation of' iJtncr s~:nsc. llc t;tkcs scnse or perception ~IS the n{udcl li>r
introspection. By sense perception we hccotne aware of' current physicallwppenings in
our environment and om hody. By 'inner sense' we hecontc aware of' current
I . . . I 11 1appenmgs m our own lllJIH.
Now if I pcrcetve a physical sil'.'ation. then we have an inner mental stale
'directed' in a certain way towards a c~:rlain physic;tl situation. In the same w;1y, if' I
am aware, not only or the physical situation, hut also of the fact that I am perceiving
(perceiving Jltent;tl stale) then we h<tvc a f'urlh~:r Jltt:nlal slate 'din.:ctcd' in th~: sante
sort or way towards th<: origin;!l lll<:l!lal slates. And it' this t'urlh<:r mental slat<:, which
qua mental state is simply a slate of the person apt f(>r the production of certain
hchaviour, can he contingently identified with a state of the brain, it will he a process
in which one part of the brain scans another part of the brain. Thus, Armstrong argued
that in f}('/'('('fJtion till' hroi11 scans till' l'lll'il'ni/J/11'1/1 /11 tl\l'(/J'c'll<'SS of till' l}('f'('('t'tioll
33 D.M. Armstrong. A Malerialisl 1'l1eory o(,\/i/1(/, p. 95.
another process in the hrain scans that scmming Thus, fitrther awareness "olthat
awan•m•ss would ulso he /111.\Sih/e · u /itrtll<'r SCC/111/illg of the origi11ul i1111cr scllllllillg. H
Now it can he argued wi I h !\rillS( rong' s poi IllS 0 r view I hal COilSCiOIISill'SS or
our own mental state may be assimilated to perception or our own mental states, and
that, like other perceptions, it may then be conceived or as inner slate or event giving a . ..
capacity for selective behaviour towards our own mct~tal state:15 /\II that is considered
is meant to be simply a logical analysis of consciousness, and none of it entails,
although it docs not rule ouL a purely physicalist account or what these inner states
arc. lloWeVCf, if a purely flhysicalisl aCCOUil[ or lll<ln is accepted (O h<.: the (rUe one Oil
the general scic11tilic grou11d. then there scetns to he no h;tr in our identil'yittg these
inner slitlcs with purely physical sl;tles ot' lite cenlral nervotrs .•;ysll'rn. /\s alrr:tdy
pointed out, s consciousness or our nH:ntal state becomes the scanning or one part or
our central nervous system by another. In brief. consciousness is a sci r scanning
mechanism in the central nervous system.
Thus I have discussed the materialist position on the concept of mind within
the framework of the physico-chemical, or the materialist view of man. Having based
the materialist view or man on science, now it is the task or scientist to decide the truth
or falsity of the materialist theory on the issue of the notion of mind. Now it is clear on
1'1 !hid, p. 95.
J~ IJ.M. Armstrong, '/'lie Nature of !1/nlil, p. J.'i I.
247
tht: mat~rialisl view that the th~orist do~s not allow forth~ pr~.:scrH.:c of ~onsciousm:ss
which is tlifkn;nt frorn lhL' CL'Iltr:d nervow; systL'IIl. In othL·J' w:1ys. lllerrtal stall's :m: not
capable of independent cxistL·ncc l'nnn thL· hr:rin statL'S. l';1rticul:rr kind ol' rm·nt:d
account may very possibly he adcquall' to deal with lh~ case ol' autornalic driving. It
may also be adequate to deal with the m~ntal processes of most lower animals. But
such account of mind cannot deal with the consciousness that human beings m'rmally
enjoy, hmvevcr, much an attempt has been mad~: by materialist to defend his position.
Um: ol'the rnajor prohlcrns lan·d hy rmtcri;distlh~orists is 011 the idcntilicalion
of consciousness with thL· central nervous systenr. I think this ide11tilic:rtion ol'
consciousness with the hrain (or ( 'NS) i~; very dillicult lo accept li1r the li,!lowirJg
reason. The brain. which is till' plrysiL·;d p;1rl of till' hody. i:; n llrirw lravi111'. :;ll;lpl·, :;i/.l·,
weight and location in space. When we think of the brain. then:I(He .. what col!.le into
our mind is those d i fkrent pro pert ics of l he hra in I ike any other physical object. I ~ul
when we think of 'consciousness' itself, what do come· into our mind? If
consciousness and brain arc identicaL cvc11 though their Gl!H.:cpts and meanings are
difli!rent, why not those physical properties appeared in our mental scenario like a
moving picture on the screen? According to G.E. Moore, The moment we t1y to .fix our
allention upon consciousness and to see what distinN~v it is, it seems to vanish. It
seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the
sensatio11 of' hlue. all we Cllll sec is the hiiH·. tilt' otlwr delllellt is us if it were
248
diaphanous. J(j It can, theref"ore, be argued that consciousness as such cannot perhaps
just be the same as the brain.
Now our position at this stage seems to be this. The materialist theoretical
construction-within which the concept of" mind or internal states and the concept of"
physical states arc discussed. docs not give us much about the clear picture or the
concept of person to whom, hy philosophical assumption, both mind and hody arc
supposed to belong, or to be possessed by this person, except that person is some sort
or unique IJialL:rial object very dillcrent 110111 mdinary object, like slum.~. Wc eannot.
therefore say the Jnatcrialist thcory to hold true lin· thc account ol" the coiJCcpt ol"
p~rsotl.
In our every day lite, we ordinarily talk about mind and body. Sollie lillie we
talk about intelligent people like Plato, and sometime about strong people like
Hercules: When we say that ·Plato was a great philosopher', we arc not referring to his
body but to his mind. And when we say that 'Hercules was a strcing man":· we arc
talking about his body built, but not his mind. This clearly shows that there is some
sort of dualism, but this dualism is not dualism in reality as Descartes proposed, hut in
that "My mind is no/ working". or "A·~)' leg is injurC'd". I krc we can sec that there is a
"thing" which possess hoth ol" thc111 - 1lli11d :1nd hody. In gr;un111ar, the poss~:ssor ol"
36 G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 22.
249
tlwsc mind and body, I have .i ust poi ntcd, is called 'Pronoun' i 11 the posscssi ve case.
There is an occasion in which we also s<ty so1nclhing as the subjective pronoun, for
example, 'I am thinking. calculating <'I c. etc. ". or "/ clo SOII/I! work".
So, what is this subjective pronoun T or possessive pronoun "My"? I have . -. -
considered the view that mental events happens CLi purely immaterial substances
(dualism) and also the view that so-called mental events arc physical events which
happen to purely Material substances (Materialism). These two main views have both
between the conscious, on the OJlC h<tmL 4111d lllallcr 1111 ll'tl.: other h<llld, hut <II the
cxpcnse of introducing th<.: v<.:ry mysterious notion of the pur<.:ly thinking suhstarh.:t:s.
Material ism disp<.:nse with such a not ion, hut at I ht: ex pcnse or ohl i ter:tl i nt•. what we
take to be an ineradicable gulf between the conscious and matter. It is for all these
reasons that there must be a neutral theory in which the subject 'I', or in other word,
'person' finds a place or mention as the owner or mimi and body. I will look at a
recent attempt to lind n compromise between these two theories. We shall call it 'the
person theory'.
I would like to introduce the person theory in brier. According to this theory,
mental events happen neither to purely immaterial substances nor to purely material
substances, but to some thing which is neither purely illllllalcrial nor purdy lll<llcrial;
250
let us call them persons. Mental events happen to persons. and persons arc subject to
both mental and physical happcnings. TilliS. persons arc the subjects or expcricnccs. 17
It is perhaps Spinoza vvho was the historical ancestor of the person theory. I lc
was the I )utch philusophn olllll' :;l'\l'llkt'lllh l'l'lllmy. I k thcrl'ltllt: tksnvl's su111C
little lllt'nlion here hut not in dl'lail lie says "The mind ami the body arc Olll' and th<.:
same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute or thought, now under the
allrihute or extcnsiun. A IIHHk ol t'\ll'llsioll :lltd the itka or th:ll llllltk <Ill' Olll' ollld thL'
same thing. but c.xprt:sscd in two w~1ys. IX line. Spinm.a cntainly st:cms to hold an
identity theory or tht: Mind-Body rt:lations fill· the rt:ason that to lK· Oil!.: and tht: salllt:
thing is, it seems. to bt: numerically idt:ntical.
The person theory can also be said as double-aspect or attributes theory,
although attributes theory of man is the modern version of the double-aspect. The
mental and the physical are both ofthcm simply aspects of something which in itself is
neither purely mental nor purely physical. Thus, a man can equally well lx: considcnxl
as an extcmkd. physical thinv or as a thinkiiiJ'. thilll' .. althotiJ'.h l'ithn ol lhL'Sl'
characterisation only brings out one aspect of the man. There is an analogy of an
undulating line which al a given time may he concave fi·om one angle of view and
convex from the other. The line itself is never completely described by either term.
37 Jerome. Philosophy r~(Mind, pp. 50-51. 38 Michael Della Rocca. Si1ino:a 's ArgumcntfiJJ·/dentill' The(}!y, p. 183.
251
But only by the IISC of both lcllliS. Y cl it is not tiJat tltcrc <trc two tltings, Olll' COIICliVe
and other convex. Then.: is otdy one thitt~·. which is, lmtn one point ol view, conc<tvc,
from another point of view, convex. S<> i~ the case with man. lie is both a thinking
thing and an extended physical thing - not that he is two things hut rather that he is
one thing with two :tspccts.
The view or 111an as given hy Spinll/.a is traditionally known as douhk-aspec!
view. It is like some versions of till· identity theory, hut. al least in Spinoza's case, it
diiTer~ with respect to the COitccptioll or the ll:ittg that has two aspects. Spino/.ll 's view
is that "what h<ts the two aspects is not llltrcly tllatcri;tl nor is it pmely ntental cithn,
hut for the identity theorist what has the two aspects is nwtcrial. 1''
ll must he JH>ted that in a double-aspect theory, there are two issues or crucial
importance- what is the nature of the underlying stuff which has both the aspeds, and
what exactly are "aspects''? As for the nature of the underlying stuff to which both the
mental and physical aspe~.:ts an: allrihull'd, Spin01.a docs no! dearly mention. Frank
Thilly said: "According to Spinoza, there is hut one substance or principle, on which
ull pruccss~:s, both physical and m~nlal tkpeml and rrom which they proceed .... Tht:
mind and the body arc processes or one and the same thing expressed in two diiTcrent
ways.40 Each man, and, in !~let, everything else that exists, is just a particular instance
39 Jerome A.Shaffcr, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 51. 4° Frank Thilly, A 1/istorl' o/Philo.lof>hy, p. 326.
252
' I' I l' . II " I " I I II "( . I" .. N " II Ill' Sjll'l'lllH'II ll \\' 1:11 ''fllllll/;1 1·;1 ~; ::11 1';1:111('1' . :1111 :1 •;o 1':1 •; HI< Ill :1!1111' .
But it is very dirticult to fully understand what this stun· is. And we cannot hope !'or
llllll.:h clarilicatioll :thout thl! IHitiii'C or this lllllkrlying sturr 1'1~1111 Spinot.a's view poi Ill.
The second question. what is an "aspect"? is equally important to answer, since
we do not know what it means to say that the mental and the physical arc "aspects" ol'
the same thing until we know ''lwt an "aspect" is. Fven here also, Spinoz<~'s theory is
not of much help. As ShatTer puts it. in Spinoza's theory. the mental and the physical
or. indeed. how one and the salllL' thin!' could haw surh dif'li.TL'Ilt :tllrihull's.·"'
Again. il' the douhlc-aspcct theory is nc11tral in itsdl' and :1s it h:ts hccn
suggested, the mental events happen neither to purely immaterial substance nor to
purely material substances, but to something which is neither purely immaterial nor
purely material; what dsc \Votdd he the centre or these happenings? In other words,
what is it this unclerlyinK stufT to which we attribute both the mental ami physical
aspects? Borrowing Strawson's word. we can suggest that this underlying stuff or
entity is person.
41 Jerome A. Shaffer, op.cit., p. 51. 42 Ibid., p. 52.
l would like to examme the Strawsonian "t"oncept or person which is also
known as a unitary coJiccpl. 1\ccording lo lli111, !he suhjccl to which we allrihull: the
properties which imply the presence or consciousness is litcr:dly idcJJtical with tlwt to
which we also allrihuk physical properlit·s. i\nd il' we ask what this suhject is, the
only eorrecl answer is just thai it is a pnson. In his huok, lndiJ·iduo/.1, l'v1r. PY.
Stn.twsou attempts to prove that the collccpl ol' a pcrson is a primitive concept, anJ
what he means by this is just that it is not analysable in any or the ways that some
philosophers have tried to Jo so, !'or example, l'er.wn us mind or l'er.wm as hody. In
Strawson's view, it cannot be maintained either that persons are compound; that they
are the product or two separate entities, l)(' sets ol' entities, one the subject or physical
charuclcristh.:s nnd tlw other the subject nl' cnllscitHISill'SS.
The aim or Strawson in his hook lndil'iduuls is "to describe the actual structure
of our thought about the world and to exhibit some gem:ral and structural ft:alures or
the conceptual schemes in terms or which we think about particular things".43 By
'particular things' or 'particulars', Strawson means that the things we talk to each
other about when, for example. we say that 'Thomas the cat is washing his face'.
l'onununicalion is possihk only if' onc person knows what another person is talking
about, i.e., can identify the particular thing in this case Thomas th<.: cal which is lh<.:
subject of the other's remarks. /\lithe things we succeed in talking about can, he says,
be located within a singl<.:, unified, spatio-t<.:mporal system or relations. lJsing that
43 P.F. Starwson, Individuals, pp. 9. 15.
254
systems w~: buill fill· ourselves a unified picture of" the wor!tT i11 which we ourselves
have a place, and in which every ektPellt i~; thou)•.ht ol" directly or indirectly rl·latnl to
every other. By means of identifying rclcrences, we lit other people's reports and
stories, along with our own, into the si nglc story about clllpi rica! n.:al i ty .·''
It is a 1~u;l that sonH.:thing can he idcntilkd directly. il" necessarily ostt.:nsivcly
by pointing to them or touching thclll: Strawson calls. "basic particulars". The basic
particulars arc material bodies and those things that possess material bodies arc called
Person. Material bodies arc 'IInce dimensional objects with some endurance through
time'. It is they. ami only they. which arc therefore able to confer on the spatio-
temporal framework "its own f"und<!JllCIItal cktraclcristics".' 1 ~ W<.: also succeed in
talking about things that arc not basic parlicul:trs. identifying lhl'lll indirn:tly hv means
of' their relation to a Jll<ttni:ll hndy thalc<lll he tdcnlllicd directly. l·or cx<llllpk, we can
talk about what Strawson calls "privalL~ particulars". Such as the pain that. (ill·
example, Caesar felt when stabbed by Brutus because we can identify the pain as that
of Caesar, and Caesar, since he possesses a body. can he directly located within the
spatio-temporal framework.
What is the most relevant in this account is the central place in our conceptual
scheme given to persons. Persons can be idcntilied directly through their bodies and
44 I hid., p. 29. 45 Ibid., p. 39.
255
arl' thl'rl'IIHL' h:1~;ic p:nlicula1~;~ hulll1cy ;nc IIlli idcJJiiliL·d with IIIL'ir bodies. 1!1 his houk
flllfividual.\:, Strawso11 dl'lilll'S t!J~o: COIICL:pt ol' a illTSOII ill IL'I'IllS or lh~o: sort ol' prcdicall:s
it attracts: '/11<' COIIC<'fJI o( fl f}('/'WJ/1 is the CrJIIC<'f'l o( ll 1_1'/W of <'lllily .\'1/ch thttt hotiJ
predicates ascrihing the state of consciou.,·ness a/Ill fJredicates ascrihing corporeal
characteristics, a physical situatioll. etc., ure ClflWIIy OfJ{Jiicah/e to a single individual
c~( tllat single type of <'lllity.'1r, We can. lhncl'orc, :trguc according In Strawson thai
persons arc neither purely complex physico-chemical bodies as Armstrong holds nor
purely collections of mental CVl~nls or experiences as maintained by Hume. In f~tct, it
is only OCCaUSe We have the COIICepl or a person that Wl' C<lll also spl'ak of' a person's
hody and of' a person's mind.
Thus, thl' Strawsonian line of' tiHIIIJ'ht is th:1t the IIIL'Ilt:d and the physicd arc
both of them attributes of JU.!I'.\0/IS, the p~o:rsOil is lhe Ulllk:rlyillg entity which has both
mental and physical attributes. And it can he said that Strawson' s concept of person is
the attributes-theory of person. The person could be said of as that 'he is six feet tall,
weighs one hundred and seventy five pounds. is moving at the rate of three miles an
hour (all physical allrihull's) and tlu: very same person could also be said of as that 'he
is now thinking about a paper he is writing, feels a pang of anxiety about that paper,
and then wishes it were already over and done with (all mental attribute). As
Strawson's concept of person implies. we have here neither attributions to two
different subjects, a mind and a body (dualism), nor attributions to a body
46 /hid., pp. I 01-102. Sec also l'er.1ons. by the salllc author. pp. 94-9'i.
{lllah.:rialism), nor t:vcn attribution t\l a tllind (idcalislll) hut attribution to a pnsutl. Wt:
and physical attributes arc applicahk to hi111.
Strawsutt illlrudun_·s tltL' IL'Itll f'vl prnlic;llc to tckr lu prcdic;tll's ;t~;nihillj'
corporeal charadcristics and P-prcdic<~\1.: In rl'IL·r lo ptnlic<~l\.:s <~scrihin~ sl<~tc·s or
consciousness. I k saYs: .. , IIIIIs! n11tkc o I'Oif.l~il dil'ision. into f\l'O, o( tiH' kinds o(
pn·clicates fll'riJICrll· llf'J'Iied lo inclil·iduuls oj lhis t\j)(' 'l'!lt' first kind o/;JI'ctlicufc
consists of those ll'hich ore ctl.\o tn·otwrlt· llf'l'liecl to lllctfaiul /)(]dies to ll'!lic/1 lt'c'
ll'o11ld not dream of liJ'f'l.l'ing jJI'Cdicutes tiSc'l'ihing stoles of co/1.\ciousnl'ss. I \t·ill cull
thisfirsl kind A/-fJI't'clicutcs ... lite .\C'('(J/1(/ Aind mnsists ufullthe other prc·clicutcs It'<'
lf/'I'~V to Jlersons '/'he.\<' I shu// cctlll'-fJI'cdic·otn ".17
Struwson s;tid that it is iruporlal\1 lo acknowkdg~.: tlw logical priruitivctH .. 'SS or
th~.: concept of a person. The meaning or s<~ying that th~.: concept or person is p~imitiv~.:
is that it is not to be <~nalys~.:d in a c~.:rtain way ur ways, w~.: do not, l(>r I.:X<111lpk, haw to
think or it as a secondary kind of entity in rcl<~tion to two pri.mary kinds, namely, a
particular consciousness and a particular human body. And at the san11.: tim~.:. this
concept has not to h~.: analysed in terms or either mental properties or physical
· 4S pn)pertles.
17 1'.1-'. Stra\v\oll. l'!'r.\uns. p. '>·1. IK /f>id., Jl. 1)).
257
Now, I would considc:- the I(JIIowing two questions with which Strawson
began his discussion: 1'1
(I) Why arc one's state of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? and
(2) Why arc they <1snihcd to thL· H'IY S<lllle thing as cnt;~in corporc;~l ch;lr<lcteristics. a
certain physical situation. de.'!
I krc it was not to IK· supposed th:tt the answers to these questions arc
indcpcnd~.:nl or each othcr. Rather. they h;IVL' the S(lllll~ answer.
These two questions led him to the rejection of 'the Cartesian dualism' and the
'No-ownership theory'. According to Strawson. the facts in question explain why a
subjccl of cxp~.:riencc should pick out one ho<.ly from others, g1v1.: it, perhaps, a11
honoured oame and ascribe to it whatever characteristics it has; but they do not
explain why the experience should he ascrilx:d to any subjecl at ail: and they do not
explain why, if the experiences arc to he ascribed to something, they and the corporeal
characteristics which might be truly ascrilx:d to the l'avourcd body. shoul<.l be ascribed
to th~.: same thing. So the l'acts in qucstio1i d~ not c;qllain the us~.: that w~.: make of' the
word 'l' or in short, they do not explain the concept we have of a person. 50 A possible
reaction, Strawson said, at this point is to say that the concept we have is wrong or
confused, and this reaction can be f(nmd in two very important types of view about
--------------~9 Ibid., p. 86. 50 P.F. Strawson, f'ersons. p. X7.
these matters. One is Cartesian dualisn• and the other IS "No-ownership" or "no
l . I . ,. I ,, .. ~I Sll )JCd l odrtlll' 0 l h.' Sl' .
The argunt~lll lhal Stra\vsu11 is susp~ckd ot" acc~pling dualism, it" any. wuuld
be a mistake !'or the reason uiscusscd in the !'ollowing. lie rc.iects the view that the
subject of states or consciousness is a wholly immaterial, i10n-physical thing, a thing
to which nothing hut stales of consciousness cnn he ascribed. I I:s argument can he put
in the following ways. Suppose SO!llel)ne has the concept or a subject or
consciousness, then Ill' llltl·;l IlL· will in)-' It• ;tllow ll~ttl lhclc could he other suhjccls. than
himsell'. i.e., that he 111ight he only onesl·ll" anlllllg lll;lll)'. lhc possession olth~.: concept
of another subjects of' consciousness makes one able to distinguish oneself li"om the
others, pick out or identify diiTerenl selves (subjects) and so on.~ 2 In possessing a
conceptual scheme in which the concept or a person is itself a basic particular, persons
recognises both themselves and others as persons, and, therefore, as person living in
community of persons. On the contrary. i r one had no ilka how to distinguish on~.:sel f
from another, th~.:n one would not have the concpd or dif"fl:r~.:nt suhj~.:cts. Now, if other
subjects of consciousness wen .. · wholly inllll:ttnial. then there would lw 11o way ot"
distinguishing 0111: suhj~:cl f"ro111 anotliL·r how could w~: possibly t~.:ll how many
subjects were around us right now or which subject was which? 1\.nd il' there was no
way of distinguishing one subject from another, it would not be possible for one to
51 Ibid., PP: 87-88. 52 P.F. Strawson·. Individuals. pp. 99-104.
have the com:epl or otiH:r subjects. So tile ("artesian concept or the subject as wholly
immaterial is without 111eaning and thnelim:. incomp;ttihle with the Strawsonian
concept or person.
The Cartesian dualism which holds that slate or consciousness are ascribable
only to, and thus ow11ed only hy, tninds. whik lmdily charal'leristics have a similar
relation to something different- the body, is incompatible with Strawson's concept of
person and, therefore, rejected by him.
The view that "state of com:ciousness must be ascribed ~o something, and that
something hus physical charm.:ll:ristics also", leads Struwson to the COilCCpt or person
as son1cthin~·. prcs11pposcd hy hoth phv:>il':d or t·orporc:d ~;l:tll'~: :t11d .·:l:tll':: ol"
consciousness. ·1 he concept of" person is thus, according to Strawson, by no means
reducible (O the concept or mental stales 1101" to the COIJCepl of" physical states since it is
presupposed by both.
It is this position that "State of consciousness must be ascribed to the very
same thing as certain corporeal char;\cteristics. etc., which h:ads Strawson to th...:
rejection of the Cartesian dualism.
Again, Strawson rejects the 'No-ownership' theory on the ground that "States
of consciousness do not belong to any thing although they may be casually dependent
260
on th~ body". 5.1 This rcje<..:tion comes after the vi~w that "Slat~ or consciousness must
be ascribed to anything at all". This No-ownership theory rejects the terms of
reference of the question like "Why are one's state oLconsciousness ascribed to
anything at all?" Strawson's conclusion is that stales of consciousness must he
ascribed to something, and that something has physical clwracteristics also. It is this
conclusion that kads him to the concept of' a person as something pn:suppos~d by both
physical or corporeal stat~s and states of consciousn~ss, it is that sense, 'logically
primitive, i.e., the concept or person is not reducible to something mental or to
something physical since it is presupposed hy hoth.
( j len Langli lrtl COilllllCiltS I hat "i r the basic out! i ncs () r Strawson' s account () r
our conceptual scheme arc correct, it li >I lows that we cannot cl i m i nate rclcn;nc~s to
persons from our talk about the world without also elirninating rekrcnccs to state of
consciousness or mcntal events. :; 4 Both mental evcnts that cause a movement of a
human body and the human body that is caused to move are, in Strawsonian sense,
assumed to belong to the same person whose mind and body they are. Both the mental
attributes and physical attributes belong to, or are owned by, the concept 'person'.
That is why, even "No-owncrship theory" is ruled out.
H Ibid., pp. 95-98. 54 Glen Langford, Human Action, p. 66.
261
/\gain, the 'No-owncr~;hip theory' holds I hal the sl<tlc ol' cottsctollsJJcss or
experiences do not belong to anything at ~.n.-allhoug_l~ they may be causally dcpcmknt
on the body. It is for this reason that this 'No-ownership' view rejects the terms of
reference or the lirst question. Strawson. thcrcl'orc. dismisses that view by nrguing thnt
it is incohcrent. 55
David llume SL'L'tns to be the source or this 'No-ownership' view, even though
he might be unaware of this. llis argument is as follows: ''There arc some
philosophers, who imagine we arc cv~.:ry motiH.:nt intimately conscious or what we
call, 'self'; that we feel its existence: and its continuance in existence; and arc certain,
beyond the evidence ol' a dctnonstratiotl, both or its pcrll~ct identity and sitnplicity"."1'
llumc was of thl: opinion that such philosophl:rs in dlt:ct ignore thl: naturl: ol' thl:
CX))l:ril:IICC which they adduce as c:vidence lur thc:ir view or at least they do it their
he can discover no impressions or the self. or indeed anything apart from particular
impressions or perceptions, each of which may exist separately in such a way that they
'have no need of anything to support their existence'. In the same book he says: "I can
never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything
but perception. Then.: are, therefore, nothing but bundles or collections of perceptions
rmd thl' mind is il hind nf tlwatl"l' Wlli'H' 'WVI'rill j)l'l"l't'ptiow; SIIITI'S';iwly lllill•l' tll1•ir
55 llamlyn, Metapl~vsics, p. 193. 5
b David llume, Treatise on /Iuman Nature, p. I (J I.
·.-\'
262
appcaraJice".\ 1 hn· this reason, m:unding to I h1nlt:, nothing which n1nits the
applicati'on or the notions or silnplicily ami idt:lltity, hmwvn lllllch tht: relations that
exist between the perceptions in a hu11dle ··· those ·or constancy, cohercm:e and
causality make us llllaglnl' lh:11 tiH:rl' is such itkntity ;u1d si111plirity. l'nson<~l
identity is thus a kind or lictioll while, because or the imagillations, we have a natural
propensity to ascribe to oursclws. hut to which nothing corresponds in reality, and the
same applies lo simplicity.
. .....
Thcrc is a certain oddity in I lurnc's view, which emerges in its very
expression, since he had to use pnson<1l pronouns <~nd the like in order to speak or the
to his somewhat peculiarly unusual conclusions hy the premises of his argunH.:nt in the
Appendix lo the 'Ji"!'uti.H', the two principks tlwl he ltllllltl hi111sell' unahk to nwkc
c:onsisknt: that all our distinct pc1ccptions an: distinct cxistt:nct: and that tht: mimi
never perceives any real connection <~mong distinct existences. Neither of these
principles is obviously true, to say the least, and the former has the paradoxical
consequence, as Hume admits, that a perception can exist by itself apart from any
bundles and therefore unowned by the self. This is just what Strawson rejects.
So if what has been said above on the Humean view is true, then it should be
no surprise that Strawson's claim that tht.: vit:w is incoht:rcnt. Strawson's own
~ 7 1/m/., p. 161.
263
argument is Jin.:cll'd against an interpretation of tilt: 'No-ownt:rsllip' tht:ory which
takes the theorist to hold, as is indeed likely, that the states of eonst:iousness or
experiences which take place arc causally dependent on the state of the body and that
is all there is to the thought that they arc had or owned by anything. It is likely that the
'No-ownership' theorist will hold this way. although it is less than clear th?t Hume
himself did so. The thesis that all that tht:rt: is to the thought of" states of consciousness
being o\\'tll..'d is thL·ir belonging loa hundk of such things.
I lowt:vcr, questions ahoul lhL· idL'Illilicalion of lilt: hundk art: hound lo aris~.:
and it is natural to call upon physical l~tcls to provide that idcntilication. such as its
-dependence on a gi\"Cn body. It is for thts reason. tl1-ose philosophers who wanted to
defend the I htmcan poinl or vil'\V h:I\'L' l'.t"lll'l':tllv \\':lllll'd to S:l\' thai 11'11111 11'1' 1/lt'l//l/ /Jr ' ' '
'/wvin~ stales (~(conscionmes.\' is !hut such s/al<'s helong to a set which is cau.wl/y
dependent on a certain hotly. )X
In the course or discussing the critique of' No-ownership' theory by Strawson,
it is important to mention the distinction he made between the type or possession or
experiences, or the owners or these experiences as implied by the 'No-ownership'
theory. He calls the individual of the first type "11'', and the supposed individual or the
second type "E". This can be explicated in the following ways.
53 Hamlyn, up.cit., p. 195.
264
(i) Type JJ
One's cxperiem:es can be ascribed to some particular individual thing, can he
said to be possessed by, or owned by, or belong to, that til-ing. This idea, although
misleadingly expressed in terms of ownership. would have some validity, would m:tke
some sort of sense, so long as we thought of this imlivitlual thing, the owner of the
experiences, as the body itself.
(ii) Type 1<.:
One's exp<.:ril:1u.:es 111ay h<.: s;tid to h<.:long to, or he poss<.:ss<.:d or owned hy,
some particular thing, to a wholly inadmissible and empty sense or expression, and
this particular thing which is supposed to possess the experiences is not thought of as a
body, but as something else, say ego. 59
So long as it has been thought that a particular slate of conseiousness is
possessed or owned hy, or they me ascrih~..:d to, this body, then it is sonH.:thing a
contingent matter, something that might be, or might have been false. On the other
hand, it might have been a mis-ascription, for the experience in question might be, or
might have been, causally dependent on the state of some other body, or it might have
belonged to some other individual things.60
59 P.F. Strawson, Persons, pp. 88-89. 60 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
265
The diiTen:nce we mentioned or the types or possession is that whereas it is
genuinely a contingent matter that all my experiences are had r by 'l3', it appears as a
necessary truth that all my experiences arc ha<.h by E. But the belief in E and in having
is an illusion. Only those things whose ownership is logically transterahlc can be
owm:d at all. So cxpcricllccs :11c nul mv1wd hy :Jnytlting except in lite dubious sense ol
relationship to a thing, in that they rnight have stood in it to another thing. Since the
whole rundion or 1·: \VaS to OWn cxpcricncl! in a logically non-transferable sense of
'own', and since experiences arc not owned hy anything in this sense, for th<:1-c is no
such sense of 'own', 'E' must be eliminated from the picture altogether. This idea of
'E' only C:tlllC in hec:tiiSL' of:t collhlsiort.1"
What· the 'No-ownership' theorist would like to say is that by 'having
experiences' is meant that such experiences arc uniquely dependent on a certain body
and that this is a contingent matter (for exegetical reasons he speaks of that
dependence in terms or experiences being had by the body, as opposed to the
relationship which might be taken to hold between the experiences and an ego and
which 'No-ownership' theorist rejects, in that case Strawson speaks or the experiences
being had by the cgo). 62 According to ~tra.wson, when the 'No-ownership' theorist
wants to stale the contingentfitcl of' the relationship between experience and the state
61 /hid., p. 89. 62 Hamlyn, op.cit., p. 19).
266
of a certain body he has to say sonH.:thing like this: ";\II my experiences arc had by
(i.e., uniquely dependent on the state of) hody 'B' .113 Any attempt to eliminate the
pronoun 'My' or any other expression \Vith similar force. would yield something that
was not a contingent f~1ct at all. So. in Strawson's word. it is just f<llsc that all
experiences arc causally dependent on a state or a single hody.M On the other hand, to
say that lhe cxpcriL:Jiccs i11 questions iiiL' IIH•sc 111:11 o11c dcpc11dcul 011 body B renders
the claim that those L'XJWI'kllcL'S :ti'L' dqwndL'llt nn hndy B nnalytic and not the
expn:ssions or a contingc11t li1cl at all.
In other words. I he idcnl i fica! ion or c:-: IKTil'llces depends not on 1 heir
dependence on the state or the body, hut rather on the ident{fication <~{their owner;
experiences must be mvned.65 There are two separate points at issue, one about the
idcntiJication or experiences and the other about the nature of experiences. And
Strawson speaks of experiences owing their identity as particulm to their owner. The
crucial point, however. is about the status or experiences - the presupposition or the
'I' which is f'lll.tdamcntal to the notion of' a self. It is or course possihk to identify
experiences in ways other than by reference to their owner, e.g., by reference to some·
particular quality that they have. According to llamlyn, the question at stake is how
can one state the contingent relationship between certain experiences and a certain
63 P.F. Strawson, Individuals. pp. 96-97. M P.F. Strawson, Persom. p. 89. 63 llamlyn, op.dl., p. IIJ:'i.
267
body in a general way without involving the owner of the experiem.:es. In that sense,
S ' . . II I '"' trawson s potnl IS Wt: la <l!ll.
Strawson's :tnswcr to tlwsc two i1nportant qqucslions consists in lhc li1llowing
vtews. The answer to I he fi rsl lJlll!SI ion "why arc Olll'' s stale or consc iousncss ascri hcd
to anything at all?" is, in df"ccl, hcc:nt:;•:.lllt:Y an.: one's. Stale of" consciousness or
~
experiences cannot go unowned, and they <ire not neutral as regards to whose they arc.
In this respect, Strawson 's refutation of the 'No-ownership' thesis seems strong and
same thing as certain corporeal chmactcristics, a physical situation, etc? Ilcrc the
answct· is not sutislitctmily ch:nr that they must be uscrihable, although we do not
mean by that to suggest that it is in any scm:c necessary that they should he ascribed to
different things, as Cartesian implied. The reason that they arc ascribe<.l to the same
thing is because stales of consciousness arc expressed in behaviour for which a body
with corporeal characteristics, etc., is necessary. It might indeed be argued that, that is
the normal case which provides the criteria of intelligibility for speaking of states of
consciousness at all. It docs not, however, imply that it is necessary th<tl <lilY thing
which has stalL'S of" l'llllSCioliSnl'SS IIIIlS! h;l\'l' asnilll'd lo it corporeal chararlcrislics
etc., nny more than the thesis that the critcri:1 for intelligibility of t;tlking of pain lie in
the fnct that pain is naturally and normally expressed in certain forms of behaviours
implies that wherever there is pain there must he such expression.
66 Ibid., p. 196.
268
So Strawso11's :IIIS\\l'l lo till' St'~'""d tpw~;lioll IS lirsl lo iiHJIIirc ils ll'nw; ol'
rell:rence and then to add that in those cases where stales of consciousness are
ascribed to the very same thing as certain C(lrporeal characteristics etc., the thing that
owns the states or consciousness. the sci r or the 'I' in question. may very well he
embodied and normally is so. It is in \..·fk·ct the 'Kantian point' which entails the
rejection of Cartcsianism. Since the 'I' which is involved iii the 'I think' is not to be
itkntilit·d with the mimi or soul. Rather. \\e asnihnl a mimi or soul to something to
the extent that the "I think" applies to it_~,, llowever. what I haw discussed so 1:1r
about Strawson' s concept or person has 11ot yet mad~.: i I ~.:x pi ici I as to "what is rca II y a
person?" except that it is th~.: 'hasic particular' to which belong hoth mind and hotly.
But if we equate th~: Strawsoni:m concept ol' person with th~: self or' 1', thl'll w~: JlliJ•hl
have a bt..:ttcr idea or it. And this begs I(Jr thc identity or person.
/\gain, as I have nH:ntioned earlier. th~: logical pri111itiveness of the concept of
person has to be ackn(lwkdgl·d. No\\' I \\OIIId lih· to l'lahoratc this point in the
following way. By tht..: concept or person is mt..:ant, according to Strawson, the concept
of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of conscious and predicate
ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a
single individual of that type. The claim that. "This concept is primitive" can he put in
the f(JIJowing number or ways. One way is that the answers to the questions already
put lill·wnnl earl in are not to IJL· ~;11ppo~a·d ;1:; ilHkpt'JHil'lll ol eal·h nlhn. 1\111 lhl·y ;m:
67 Ibid., p. :too. ·
conncch.:d ill this Wily: That a 11\.'\.'\.'SSary \.'\lllditioll or slal~s or conscioliSIICSS hdng
ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very samr things as certain
corporeal charackristics, a certain physic:d situ;1tion. de. That is to say, states or
consciousness could not he ascribed at aiL unless thL:~~ were ascribed to persons. We
are te111ptcd to thi11k ul a pc1so11 as a su11 ol co111puu11d ol two kinds or suhjcd --a
subject of ex p~.:rktlc~.:s (a pun.: consdouslll:ss, an ego). on the one hand, and a subject
of corporeal attri buies on the other. 6x
i
i
Many questions arise when we think iii this way. Hut, in particular, when WL'
ask ourselves how we have to frame the concept or this compound of two subjects, the
picture is apt to chang~.: ho111 the picture ol two suhjt:ct~; to the picture of' o11e subject
and one non-subject. For it becomes impossible to see how we could come by the idea
of diflcrent, distinguishable. identifiable subjects or experiences dirtcrent
consciousness- if this idea is thought of as logically primitive, as a logical ingredients
in the compound idea of a person. the latter being composed of two subjects. For there
could never be any question of assigning an experience, as such, to any subject other
than oneself; and so never any question of assigning it to oneself either, never any
question or ascrihi11g it to a subject at all. So the concept or the pure individual
consciousness- the pure ego-- is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, c<~nnot exist
as a primary concept in terms or which the concept of person can be explained or
--------------------68 P.F. Strawson, l'er.\'OI/.1", pp. 92-lJJ.
270
ana\ys~l\. \t \::Ill 011 \y ~_·xi:;l, i( ;11 all, a:; a :;L'UHHLII y, lltill pi i111itiv~ CUIICL'pl. which ilsL·It
' . (,t)
is to he explained, :lll:tlysl'll, in ll.:rlllS ot' the concept ol a person.
It was a kind or entity corresponding to this illusory primary concept of the
pun: ronsriousm·ss. thL· ego suhst:111n·. li1r \\'hirh llttlllL' w:1s seeking with th~.· I'L'Slllting
Jutility when II~: luok~.:d into hit11sdt. allll eomplain~.:d that h~.: could n~.:vcr discover
himsdt' without a pen.:t:plion and t:ould nt:vcr diseowr anything but the perception. lie
could not find the principle of unity between his self and perceptions, nor the principle
of differentiations. It was this entity to which Kant also accorded a purely formal
unity: the unity of the "l thin:.;:· that accompanies all (my) perceptions and therefore
might just as wt:ll accompany none. And finally it is this, perhaps, of which
Wittgenstcin spoke wh~.·n he said ol tilL' subject, tirst. that there is no such thing, ami,
second, that it is not a p;ut ol till' woild. ln1t it:; lintit'''
So, according to Strawson, then the word "I" never refers to this, the pure
subject. But this dues nut mean, as the no-ownership theorist must think and as
Wittgenstein, at least at one period, seemed to think, that "I" in some cases docs not
refer at all. It refers, because I am a person among others. Ami the predicate would
belong properly to the person to which "I" docs rcfcr. 71 Tints, the concept of a person
is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not
--------69 /hid., p. 93. 70 /hid., p. 93. 71 /hid., p. 94.
271
lu hl' :lll:lly::l'd a:; llt:ll 11 1 :111 :1111111:11i'd hu11\ 111 ul ;llll'lldHHIIl'd :111i111:1. ll11:i i:; IIU[[U :,ily
that th1: t:om:cpt of a pure individu:d 1; •ll~l..'illiiSilt;..'i.'> lliiJ•.ht IIIli h:l\'l' :1 loJ•.iclll~:
s~:comlary ~:xistcncc. it' tlllc thinks. ur linds. it tksirablc. We always speak or a dead
person- a body- and in the secondary way we might at least think or a disembodied
person, retaining the logical bene lit of imlividuality !'rom having been a person.
Before considning some or the criticisms against Strawson's concept of
person, it is important to mention Strawson's view ahoutthe way in which we ascribe
P-Predicate to ourselves and others. lie .say..-: It is o nccc•s.wuy condition o/ one's
ascribing slates of' conscioll.\/less, eXJJerience.\, to one selj, in the way one does, that
one should also ascrihe them (or he fln'l'llr<'d to ltsai/1(' tiiC'nt) to others ll'ho ar<' not
onese/f72 This means. for example, that the ascribing phrases should be used in just
the same sense when the subject is another. as when the subject is olll: s~.:ll. l·or the
common people. the thought. l(>r example. that "in pain" means the same whether one
says "I am in pain" or "lie is in pain". Th~.:rc is no two scts or meaning l(>r every
expression which lkscrihcs a stale of consciousness.
It is crucial in Strawson 's account that P-prcdicatc should be of the same
logical type independently or whether we ascribe them to ourselves or to others, so
that "pain" means the same thing no matter which personal pronoun and which person
or the copulative verb it is preceded hy. ThtiS, a dilfcrcncc in the rcll:rcncc ol' a
72 /hid., p. 9t.
sentem:e us 111g !'-predicate cnt:1ils no dilli.:rcncc 111 the pn.:dicalc itsdl'. N~.:vcrlhclcss
criteria for the applicability of the P-prcdicatc will ordi1iarily vary with diiTcrcncc in
pronominal rclercncc. My criteria li.n sci I' ascription will consist simply in being aware
of the slate I ascribe to mysell'. Hut this cannot he my criterion fi.ll· ascription of the
same P-predicatc to another pcrson, f(>r I (logically) cannot in this sense of"aware'' he
aware of his state. I do not fl:el his anger or his pain. I must accurdiJlgly havc
"logically adequate" criteria. usually cxprcsscd in hchavioural tcrms for ascribing to
another thc same prcdicale I ascribe to mys~lr on thc basis of sheer awareness; and I
do not ascribc thcsc !'-predicates to myself' on the basis of' obscrving my own
behaviour. Strawsun's introduction of' '·((lgically adequall: criteria" is meant to
circumvent the skepticism (that. i r the meaning or an expression is its mode of
verification, "I am in pain'' and "lie is in pain" differ in meaning; and ir we restrict
verification to the having of ccrtain experit..:nce, "lie is in pain" is meaningless if I
cannot experience his pain. Hence, ascriptions of inner states to others arc meaningless
or else neither knowable nor rationally believable). and his insistence that a P
predicate is univocal even if it has dirti.:J'ing criteria of' applicability is mcanl to
counteraCt verificationism. Indeed. he insists that to know the usc of a P-prcdicalc is to
recognise that it has two sorts of criteria: I cannot asu·ihc F to mysL:Ir unlcss i 11111 ahk
or know how to ascribe it to others. lie says "one can ascribe states of consciousness
to oneself only if one can ascribe lhrm to others, one can ascribe lhemlo others only if
one can iucntify other subjects of' cxpcriences, ami onc cannot idenlif'y othcrs if one
273
Cilll identify thcltl 01 lly as ~;uhjcch of c.xpcncnccs, pos~;cssors of slates of
. ,, 7.' COilSCIOIISIICSS .
I'Jow, I will examine SOilll or the arguments levelled against Strawson's
com:cpl () r pn~;ull.
Even though the person theory seems so promising that it gives us many ideas
about the concept of person. yet it is not of course free from criticism. There arc
dirticultics with the person theory which hcgin to emerge when we probe deeper into
the concept of the person which is i It Vol vcd here.
One of the difficulties is tlwt. as llamlyn argues. in his account of persons
Straw:;oJt doc:; 11111 really p•c~;c·ttl a lltc~;i:; al111111 wl1;t1 we 11tc;1111 hy when we talk ol
people. lie says nothing, l(H· example. ahoul something which 11111sl surely he essential
to the notion or person as we ordinarily employ it - the idea or personal relation. The
dclinilion that "the persons is the underlying entity or stuff which has both mental and
physical altributes" docs not make it clear what a "person" is. 7"1 The dclinition of the
concept of person. as given hy Strawson, docs not help us very much. And the picture
of the person theory docs not come out clearly when we ask how it di rrcrs li·mn the
identity theory.
73 /hid., p. 92. 74 llamlyn, op.cit., p. t<Jl.
274
).'or the jdl'lltily lhemist, thl' llll'lllid iillrihtlll'~; illl' atlrihlllcS ol' hodil'S.
Furthermore, most of them wish to say that in some sctise the mental attributes arc
reducible to physical attributes. ;\1\ the proponents of the identity theory do not,
however. hold to this latter thl'sis. I krhl'rt higl. for l'Xample, holds that where
mentalistic terms are appropriate the basic and underlying reality is mental and
physicalistic terms refer to this mental reality_?'' Thus 1-'cigl seems to admit a dualism
of attributes, mental and physical. Y ct this theory is an identity theory both in the
I
sense tlwt the basic subjects or con~;ciotl';nn•:s are hodies and in the sense that certain
mentalistic and physic;dislic klll\S have <liH: itll<l lh<..· S:tnll.' refCrents (althOU[•.h SOIIIC or
this terms will haw a 111ental rclcrl'nts).
Strawson should not, however, in any way accept the claim that mental
attributes are reducible in any sense to physical attributes. But would he reject the
claim that they arc nttributes of bodies? Docs he wish to say that persons arc bodies of
a certain sort, namely bodies which have mental attributes as well?
I lowever, Strawson holds that persons are things to which bodily attributes arc
ascribed. But this docs not 111<1ke them bodies <~ny more than the fact that something
has red in it make it red. for, unlike ordinary bodies, persons are things which have
mental attributes <ls well. Furthermore, for Strawson, it is not the cnsc that persons arc
things which just happen to have bodily attributes (but might not have them), nor is it
75 Herbert Feigl, The '111e11ta/' and '!'hysical', pp. 474-475
275
the case that they an; things which just happen to have mental attributes (hut might not
have had them). As Strawson's definition of them impiies, it is essential to persons
that they be entities which necessarily have both mental and bodily <-tllributes. Thus,
Strawson's conception of persons makes it clear that they arc things which differ
essentially from bodies which have bodily :1ttrihutcs necessarily. They arc dillercnt
types or sturr or substances or entities. ;\I HI therd(>n:, Str;lwson 's person theory is I i
fundamentally different from materialism of any sort. The theory is dualistic in I
holding that there arc two different type1 of subjects in the natur;d world, physical
I
bodies and persons. Physical bodies have solely the physical dimensions; persons
necessarily have two dimensions. a physical and a mental dimension.
The prohkn1 arises when the question of 'body' comes into the picture. If it is
not possible, on the person theory, to say that a person is a body, perhaps it is possible
to say that a person is, in part, a body in the way that something which has red in it
may be in part reel. But this will not help us very much. for it inevitably raises the
question what the rest of it is. That is, it suggests that a person is some sort of an
amalgam, a compound of a body and something else (perhaps a soul?). such
suggestions, however, arc precisely what the person theory attempts to combat.
If 'person is a body' is on the person theory rejected, then can we even say that
a person has a body? This seems to be what Strawson would want to be able to say so.
What would it mean then? Certainly it means that persons have bodily attributes. Is
276
there anything else that it can mean? Is it to say anythi11g about a relation between a
person and a body'? It seems not on th~: p~:rson th~:or·y. h>r a body, as always
mentioned carl icr, is some\ hi ng which ncccssari l y has solei y hodi l y attri butcs and such
a thing has nothing to do with persons, \:vhich, as we saw, arc things which necessarily
have both bodily and mental attributes.
1t seems that there is a good deal hanging on this question of the relation (on
the pcrson theory) hctwccn pcrsons ;md hodics. For cxnmplc, consider the laws or
nature which hold for bodies, the laws of physics, chemistry, biology. We would
surely want to be able to say that these laws also hold f'or human bodies as well as
other bodies. If it is true in its Newtonian formulation, that "a body continues its state
of rest or steady motion unless ... ", we would want this to hold for persons as well as
for all other hod ies. Yet if we cannot say that a person's "body" is a body in the same
sense that rocks and trees are bodies, then these laws of nature, which apply to bodies,
cannot he applied to the "bodies" of' person. ;\nd that would he so great an
inconvenience, to say nothing of its kind, as to count against the person theory.
To be sure, the terms, "body" is used in many ways besides the Newtonian one
mentioned above, some of which come closer to the person theory. I will consider
only one that comes very close to the Strawsonian conception of a body. According to
Jerome, if someone said "they found a body in the lake today", we would be very
surprised if he meant a rock, or a tree trunk, or an old sunkcn boat, or a fish, although
277
all or these arc, in the Newtonian sense. bodies. llere, "body" means "corpse", i.e., a
dead human being. A corpse or "body" is left when a person dies, although it is not a
part of living person or something which he has while he was alive (he docs have the
right to say what is to be done with it after he dies). This concept of the body becomes
gruesomely explicit when we rel"cr to it <ls "the !Tll1<lins".7r'
It is this com:cption or the body which comes closest to that found in the
person theory. For, in that theory, as we have seen, a hody is not a person, nor is it a
part of a person, nor is it something a person has. At most it is the person in so far as
he is thought of as the subject of bodily attributt.:s. It is then an abstraction, an
intellectual construction, rather than a reality. But it becomes a reality at death. It
materialises into that thing we call a corpse. On the person theory, a human body is
what would be the person's corpse if he died; the only way we can talk about a
person's body is if we consider him as if he were dead. 77
Again, Jerome concluded that it is one of the paradoxical implication of the
person theory that the body which has a person cannot he conceived of as a physical
object subject to the law of nature. In its attempt to establish the unity of the person
(contra dualism) without sacrilicing the thesis that persons arc conscious (contra
76 Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy of !lfind p. 56. 17 Ibid., p. 57.
278
materialism), the person's theory seems to end with the absurdity that a person's body
. I . I I . ?x IS not a p 1ys1ca t 1111g.
Moreover, the notion ol'"scll" is not well discussed in the Strawsonian concept
of person. This makes it incomplete. A person can be a person by the capacity of his
"self' perhaps alone and not otherwise. The states and acts of mind, and that of the
hody arc oill' thill)'.: th:tt which h:ts lhl'lll is it \Vottld sn·n1 quite <lllother. Om lll<lin
concern in this chapter is about the nature of' the subject of mental phenomena - the
entity to which we ascribe sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires (all mental states),
and actions (bodily states). According to Colin McGinn, "The question as to the nature
of the self is best put by asking what am!?"; the self is just what is referred to when
the word 'I" is used". 79 As I have mentioned earlier, this notion "self' or "I" is what
seems to be what Strawson, if not incorrect. called a 'person'. It is this "self' or "I"
which is the essence of person, and it cannot just be left out of the account of person.
78 Ibid., p. 57. 79 Colin McGinn, The Character ofMind, p. 103.