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British Intelligence
and the
Causes
of
Unrest
in
Mesopotamia,
1919-21
A. L. MACFIE
In
the autumn
of
1920
Major
N.N.E.
Bray,
a
special intelligence
officer
attached to
the Political
Department
at
the
India
Office,
wrote
(in
one case
in conjunction with the WarOffice) three major reports on the causes of
unrest n
Mesopotamia,
where a rebellion of substantial
proportions,
costing
tens
of
thousands
of
lives,
had
recently
broken
out.
The conclusions
drawn
therein,
based
almost
entirely
on
information
collected
by
British
intelligence,
were from the
British point
of view
disturbing.
For
in
Bray's
view the unrest
n
Mesopotamia
was
the
product
not
only
of local discontent
and
faults
in
the
administration,recently established,
but also of a wide-
ranging conspiracy,
originating
n
Berlin
and Moscow.' With the
publication
of Masayuki Yamauchi's The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver
Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919-22 and other recent studies, it now
becomes
possible
to
check
the evidence
presented by Bray,
in
support
of his
thesis,
and test the
validity
of his
conclusions.2
The
results
are
surprising.
While
much, but by
no
means all, of the material contained
in
Bray's
reports
proves reasonably accurate,
the conclusions drawn, though at
first
sight
valid, must be considered,with the
advantage
of
hindsight,
misleading.
Bray's interest
in
questions
concerning
the
external causes of
sedition
in
the British Empire in Asia appearsto have originatedin remarks made by
Sir Charles
Cleveland,
Head
of
the India
secret
service,
at
a a
meeting,
chaired
by
Field Marshal
Lord
Nicholson,
Chief of Staff
of
the
British
Army, held at the military
headquartersbuilding, Simla, in 1911. At that
meeting, supposedly called to review the question of expenditure
on the
army
in
India,but
in
fact
mainly concerned with the threatposed to
British
authority
in
the
subcontinent
by
the
rising
tide of
nationalism
in
the area,
Cleveland
-
so
Bray,
who
attended the
meeting, later recalled
-
had
remarked hatin India they did not only have to deal with political agitation,
but
also with
sedition, fostered
in
baffling secrecy.
Unrest
was
spreading
like a
hidden fire.
Suppressed
in
one place it immediately broke
out in
another. 'These
outbreaks
are interconnected, highly organised and my
impression
... is
that they
are controlled by one great intellect, but whose?
Middle
EasternStudies, Vol.35,
No.1, January1999, pp.165-177
PUBLISHED
BY FRANK
CASS,
LONDON
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166
MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
So far ... unfortunately
.. with all the
machinery
at our
disposal
... we
have
been unable to discover.'3
Thus inspired by Cleveland's
words,
in
1913
Bray, fully
convinced
of
the urgent need to discover the sources of sedition in Asia, and the identity
of the
'one great intellect',
supposedly controlling
events
there,
obtained
a
year's
leave of absence
from
the
Indian
army,
n
which he was
serving
at
the
time, and made
for
Syria,
where
he had
been led
to
believe German
influence was spreadingrapidly. There he found abundantevidence of the
spread
of
German influence,
and also of
the
rise
of
Arab
nationalism. But
he failed to discover the
identity of the 'one great intellect' supposedly
controlling events. Nevertheless,
as his
later accounts
of the
causes
of
unrest
in Mesopotamia show, he did not abandonthe quest.
In the first of his reports,
entitled 'Mesopotamia. PreliminaryReport on
Causes
of
Unrest',
drawn
up
on the instructions of the
Secretary
to the
Political Department, India
Office,
in
September 1920, Bray fully
acknowledged the important part played
in
the recent uprising
in
Mesopotamia by local
elements, including
in
particular pan-Arabs,
nationalists, 'disgruntled Effendi', tribesmen, 'impatient of their forced
inaction', 'fanatical' priests, and the educated classes, many of whom,
'prolific students of history', had adopted the nationalist cause. Left to
themselves, Bray argued, none of these
groups
and
classes, bitterly
hostile
to
one
another
and
saturated
with
intrigue, would have proved capable of
generating
a
concerted action.
That was
made
possible only by
the existence
of
an 'outside influence',
exercised through
the medium of
Berlin and
Moscow.4
The objectives of this 'outside influence', exercised throughthe medium
of Berlin
and Moscow, were clear:
(a) By every possible means to discreditthe Entente and sow dissension in
its
ranks.
(b)
To
organize
national
forces
in
Anatolia and Thrace, obtaining men,
arms and
money
from the
Bolsheviks or Berlin.
(c)
To
prepare
rebellion
on
a
large
scale
in
Syria
and
Mesopotamia.
(d)
To
organize
all the
parties
concerned so
as to produce simultaneous
action.
Unfortunately, owing to the impatience of the tribes, the uprising in
Mesopotamia
had
proved
premature;
but efforts
were
evidently continuing
to keep the agitation going and
frustrate
all
attempts
at
conciliation.5
Much evidence was adduced
by Bray
in
supportof
his
contention that a
wide-ranging conspiracy
existed,
aimed at the
Entente Powers in Asia
and
channelled
through
the
medium of Berlin and Moscow. On
or about
15
November
1919,
he
asserts,
a
'very important' meeting
was
held
at
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CAUSES
OF
UNREST
IN
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1919-21
167
Montreux, presided
over
by
Talaat
Passa,
the exiled
Committee
of
Union
and
Progress (CUP) leader
and
Ottoman Grand Vizier in the First
World
War.
At
this
meeting,
which
was also attended
by
a
representative
of
Emir
Faisal,
the leader of
the
Arab
national
forces
in
Syria,proposals
were,
it was
reported,discussed for the
formation
of a
defensive alliance
between
the
Syrian
nationalists,the Turkish
nationalists and
the Arab
sheikhs
of
Arabia.
The
Arab
sheikhs,
in
particular,
might
be
united under
the
leadership
of
Emir
Hussein, Faisal's
father, the so-called
'King
of
the
Hedjaz'.
In
December
1919, at
a similar
meeting held
in
St
Moritz,
attended
on this
occasion also
by
Amir
Shakib
Arslan,
an
influential
Syrian,
who
had
it
seems
by
then
been
instructed
by
Faisal to
agree
to the
proposals
put
forwardby Talaatat Montreux n November,a proposal- so it was reported
-
was
discussed for the
formation of an
alliance between
Enver
Pasha,
the
exiled CUP
leader and
Ottoman Minister of
War
in
the First
World
War,
Mustafa
Kemal, the
leader
of the Turkish
national movement in
Anatolia,
the Arab sheikhs
and the
Bolsheviks. Emir
Shakib
Arslan,
it
was
said,
was
instructed to
go to
Moscow, to
make contact
with the Soviet
government
there. But in
the
event, it seems,
he did
not
do
so. Instead he
is
reportedto
have
sent a letter to
Litvinoff, the
Soviet
representative
in
Copenhagen,
asking him to forwardthe proposalto Moscow. In the meantime letters and
telegrams,
despatched by
the
Ottoman Minister of
War and
others
in
Istanbul
(Constantinople)
to
the
army
commanders
n
Anatolia, intercepted
by British
intelligence,
or
otherwise
obtained, indicated that
the Turkish
nationalist
army
commanders,
in
particular the
commander of
the
Thirteenth
Army
Corps,
stationed
in
Diarbekir,
were
being instructed
to
make
contact with
leading
sheikhs
in
Syria andIraq
and promote
resistance
to the
forces of
the
occupying
powers,
stationed there;
while various
agencies, established in Switzerland and other Europeancountries, were
reported
to be in
constant
touch
with Arab
nationalist and
pan-Islamist
secret
societies,
such as
Nadi-al-Arabi and
El
Ahd,
operating
in
the
Arab
provinces.6
Not
that
it
should be
assumed,
Bray
added,
thatEmir
Faisal
andMustafa
Kemal were
entirely
committed
to an
anti-Ententestance. Emir
Faisal may
well
have
been
forced by
the
extremists
within his
movement to
acquiesce
in
action
distasteful
to himself
personally,
while Mustafa
Kemal clearly
hoped that he would be enabled to negotiate a settlementwith the Entente
Powers,
freeing him
from
his
dependence on
Bolshevik andArab
support.7
The
pro-Turkish
nationalists in
Syria,Bray
concluded,had
been
steadily
organizing since the
conclusion
of the
Armistice of
Mudros (30
October
1918),
but
it
was
only following
the
formationof an
alliance with the
pan-
Arab
movement and
the
Arab tribes,
organized on a
religious
basis, that
they
had
become
capable of
taking
effective
action. Time
and
circumstance
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168
MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDIES
had provided the means for
these arrangements
o
be
made,
and a
certain
degree of co-operation
had been
attained;
but the
combined
action
contemplated had
not
yet taken
place.
Success
in
the future would
depend
largely on the strength of the
pan-Islamist movement. But it should
not be
doubted
that both the
pan-Islamist
movement
and
the
various national
movements concerned derived their inspiration
from
Berlin
-
through
Switzerland and Moscow.
Though quite
where
the
ultimate
controlling
forces of the movement lay remained
in
doubt:
'These
we
have
yet
to find.
Because we find the threads
leading to Berlin and Moscow
it
by no
means
proves that we have reached
the end of our investigations,
we
have
only
commenced
them.'8
In the second of his reports on the causes of unrest in Mesopotamia,
entitled 'Mesopotamia: Causes of Unrest
-
Report No.11', composed
about
the
same time as the first,
Bray
concentrateshis attention on
the
Soviet and
German aspects of
the
affair.
In his
view,
the
Soviets,
intent on
promoting
revolution throughout the
world, were
at
that
time
concentrating
their
efforts on
the
Middle East,
with the
avowed
intent of
'crushing the
British
Empire'.' Their methods of
procedure, which included the training of
emissaries
in
communist
principles,
their
despatch
to
the various countries
concerned, the organization of secret societies, and the organization of
revolution 'from within', were
designed to secure the maximum result with
the
minimum forces.
In
Anatolia,
in
particular,
a
coup d'etat might
be
attempted, establishing
a
Soviet regime;
and
in
northern
Persia
a
military
occupation.
In
this
way
the
Soviet
Government
would be enabled
to
consolidate and
organize
its
position, and
from
the nuclei thus established
'throw
out
her
sinister tentacles which, groping about in every
direction,
seek
to
fasten
themselves on
local soil, into which their roots will strike,
giving her a fresh grip of organised conspiracy'.
The Germans, in Bray's
view, like the Soviets, saw
substantial
advantage
to
be gained from the
spread
of
unrest
and
revolution
in
the
Middle East; and they too
actively supported he eastern movement in every
way possible,
short of
direct military involvement. In particular,
they
supportedEnver,
Talaat
and the other CUP leaders and their
associates,
in
their
efforts to
create
an
'Asiatic
Islamic Federation', uniting the various
national movements
in
the
east.
The steps which it was believed Enver, Talaatand the other CUPleaders
and
their associates had taken to
create an 'Asiatic Islamic Federation'
and
spread opposition
to the
Entente Powers
throughout
he
east were recorded
by Bray
in his
second
report
in
some detail. In
January-February1920,
so
it
was reported, large sums of
money had been deposited by
associates of
Enver
and Talaat, resident in
Berlin,
in
Swiss banks; and in
March
T?A100,000 ad been sent to Istanbul o help the nationalists.' In
April-May,
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CAUSES OF
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1919-21 169
Talaat,who
had in the
meantime been
appointedhead
of
the
Asiatic Islamic
Federation
branch in Berlin,
had
travelled
to
Italy,
where
he had
met
Emmanuel
Carasso,
the CUP leader and
GrandMaster of
the
Turkish
Lodge
(according to
Bray
the
whole
of
the CUP was in the hands of
the
Freemasons).
In
May-June,
NejmeddinMolla, at
a
meeting
of
Young
Turks,
Arab
nationalists
and Persian
nationalists, held
at
Lugano,
had
informed the
delegates that Mustafa
Kemal and
the
Soviets
had
reached
agreement,
and
that
operations
on
a
large
scale
might
be
commenced
in the
autumn;
and
in
June Talaat had
organized
a conference
in
Berlin,
to
protest
against
the
decisions made
by
the
Entente Powers at the
San
Remo
conference.'2
Finally, in
July-August Talaat
had
held a
meeting
at
Lucerne,
attended
by
Ismail Hakki Pasha, Fuad Selim and Nedjmeddin Molla, at which it had
been
announced that
the CUP
and
the Turkish
nationalists had reached
complete agreement.'3
Meanwhile,
in
May 1920, so
it
was
reported,
Enver
had
signed
an
agreement
with
the
Bolsheviks to the
effect that
Turkey
would
institute the
same
economic
system
as
Russia;
and
the
Soviets
and
the Turkish
nationalists,
who
had
recently established
direct
contact,
had
concluded
a
secret
treaty, providing
for
mutual
support
in
the
struggle
against
the
imperialpowers. Lenin would, it was agreed, despatch a military force to
assist the Turkish
nationalists in
Anatolia
and
supply
arms and
ammunition,
manufactured
in
factories
set up
by Krupp,
the
German steel
firm,
in
Petrograd.'
The conclusions
drawnby Bray from
the
evidence
he had
presented
in
his
second report
were,
from
the Britishpoint
of
view, disturbing:
It would
be a
dangerous
policy to
rely on extraneous
circumstances
relieving
us
of
our
dangers,
unless
we organize
our
resistanceand co-
ordinate
these different
factors
of
hostility
to
Bolshevism;
we
must
remember
that our
opponent
is
working on
a
highly organized
and
single
minded
system;
we have
to
oppose
an
organized resistance.
If
it
is considered
that the
Bolshevist
regime
will
be
destroyed
or that
by
obtaining peace
it
will
confine
itself to its own affairs
it
by
no
means
follows
that our
difficulties will
disappear.The
extremist
section of
Eastern
hought have been
roused
and
organized.
Hundredsof
capable
men have
been
schooled in
the
principles of
Bolshevism,
whilst the
more moderateelements have been instructed n ideals, the fulfilment
of which
must tend to
weaken
Western
Control.
The ball
has
been set
rolling.
It is
inconceivable that
such an
extensive
organizationwith
its
myriads
of
propagandists should
suddenly
or
even
in
a
long period
become
innocuous. We have
therefore two
separate
forces to
contend
against (1)
The
possibility
of
the success
of the
Bolshevik
world
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170 MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDIES
revolution, (2) The possibility of EASTERN
NATIONAL
MOVEMENTS,
strengthened by Bolshevik
organization combining
in
an anti-
European
cause.'5
In a
separate section
of his
second report, entitled 'Appreciation of the
Situation', Bray
noted
that, according
to
the
intelligence reports received,
Djemal Passa, the exiled CUP leader and ruler of
Syria
in
the First World
War,
had been
recently
sent to
Afghanistan,
to
strengthen
he
revolutionary
party there;
and
that,
in
order to
promote
the
spread
of revolution
throughout
the
east,
Talaat had
been
charged
with the direction of the
revolutionary movement in Syria, Egypt and
Arabia; Djavid, the former
CUP leader,with the direction of the movement in Greece, ItalyandFrance;
and Enver with the direction of the movement
in
the Caucasus.'6
In the third study of the causes
of
unrest
in
Mesopotamia, entitled
'Cause of the Outbreak
in
Mesopotamia',
which
though published
as a
General
Staff
paper by the
War
Office,
in
October 1920, bears
the
unmistakable
imprint
of
Bray's
personality
in
its
composition,
the
author,
after
summarizing
the contents of the two
previous papers, completed
his
analysis
of the
situation.
The
outbreak
n
Mesopotamia,
he
concluded,
was
inspired initially by the failure of the Kurds and Arabs to secure the
independencethey had supposedly been promised by the Entente Powers
in
the course of the
First World War.As a
result,
in
south eastern
Kurdistan,
Syria
and
Mesopotamia they
had been
persuaded
to take direct action.
In
south
eastern Kurdistan
he Kurdish
National Committee had called on the
tribes to 'cast off the British
yoke
and declare
independence
under Turkish
sovereignty'.'7
In
Syria
Emir
Faisal
had
allowed
himself
to be declared
king;
and
in
Mesopotamia
the
tribes, encouragedby Syriannationalists,
had
risen.
But the true
origins
of the
uprising lay elsewhere,
in
plans hatched
in
Europe
for a
wide-ranging assault
on
the British
Empire
in
Asia, involving
an alliance of Turkish
nationalists, Syrian nationalists,
Arab Nationalists
and Arab sheikhs.
In
November
1919
Talaat and
a
number of Arab and
Turkish
eaders had attended the Montreux
meeting; and
in
December they
had
attended the St
Moritz meeting.
In
May 1920 Enver, who it was
reported had travelled to Moscow,
'possibly via Switzerland', attended a
meeting
of
the Third
International
n
the
Russian capital, at which Lenin
personally expounded
his
design
for
a
wide-ranging assault on British
imperialismin the east, striking hardestat India; and about the same time a
secret
treaty
was concluded
between
the
Soviet
government
and
a number
of Islamic countries.
Meanwhile,
in
April
Talaat
had travelled
to
Italy
to
meet Emmanuel Carasso.
In
May he had travelled to Switzerland to meet
Djavid; and on
25
May
he
had attendeda pan-Islamistmeeting at St Moritz,
also
attended
by Djemal,
at which a
representativeof the Soviet
government
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CAUSES OF UNREST
IN
MESOPOTAMIA,
1919-21
171
had promised to
guarantee he
independence of Azerbaijanand
send 20,000
men to
help
the Turkish
nationalists
in
Anatolia.
Finally,
in
May-June,
reports were
received of an
Islamic conference held
in
Munich,
at which
plans, supposedly drawn up
by
Mustafa Kemal and the
Bolsheviks, for
'large scale
military
operations'
in
the east, were discussed; and
in
July
reports were
received
of a 'Muslim
Conference', to be held
in
Erzerum.8
Following the May 1920
meeting
of the Third
International,Enver,
it
was reported,
had
departed
for
Baku
where, according
to a Moscow
wireless report, he had
represented
he 'Union of
RevolutionaryPeoples
of
Morocco,
Tunis, Tripoli,
Turkey
and Arabia' at the
Congress
of the
Peoples
of the
East,
held there
in
September.
Meanwhile
Djemal,
it was
reported,
accompaniedby a mixed Turko-Bolshevikmission, had arrivedat Herat,on
his way to
Kabul.'9
'Thus, to
recapitulate,'Bray
or the anonymous authorof the WarOffice
reportconcludes,
'the month of
May
this
year
(1920) (markedby
the close
of
the San Remo
Conference,
abortive
industrial
agitations
in
France,
pronounced aggravation of the Irish
situation, and
the
meeting
of the
representatives
of the
'Third International'at the Moscow
Foreign Office)
found
co-ordinated
plans
on foot for:
(a)
Kurdishand Arab resistance to the
French and British
in
Syria
and
Mesopotamia,
(b) TurkishNationalist
resistance
to
the terms of the
Treaty,assisted
by Italy,
and the
Soviets,
(c)
A
Bolshevik
advance across the
Caspian.
... The above
indicates the inception
of a general
strategic plan
directed, ostensibly from Moscow, against France and England, but
more
particularly he latter.
The Moscow
Direction had a gap in their
line of attack
against the BritishEmpire
which they were
prepared o
fill in
with
a combined movement of
Turks, Arabs
and Kurds ...
Enver ...
controlled the
connecting lever
... Thus the true causes of
the
present
outbreak n
Mesopotamia
may
be
summarizedas follows:
(a)
The
terms of the
Sykes-Picot
Agreement which, aggravated by
divergentdepartmental
policy
in
Arabia
and
prematuredevelopments
of the administration in Mesopotamia accompanied by British
demobilization
-
(b)
Drove the Arabs
back into
the arms of the Young
Turks,who were
ready to fit Arab
co-operation into
-
(c)
A
preconceived
Bolshevik plan of attack against
the British
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172
MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
Empire
as soon as it was
clear
that
-
(d)
The terms of the
Turkish
Treaty
were such as to restore
the
Turkish
Nationalists to the Committeeof Union and Progresscontrol.
In these
circumstances
it would
be idle to search for local
causes
otherwise than
to learn
how to avoid
presenting
the
enemy
with
material
for propaganda
or
disproportionate
vaporation
of prestige.20
The conclusions
to
be drawn
from
the
above analysis
of
events taking
place
in Europe and the
Middle East
were evident:
As
long as the Moscow
Direction
survives
to absorb
into
its
organization, thrive on and exploit agencies of local discontent,
Nationalism
will
be the instrument
of Internationalism,
and until the
International
Monster
has been
starved, or severed
at
the neck,
its
variousheads will
have
to be dealt
with
in
detail
when
and wherethey
21
rise.
How far,
it
might
be enquired,
was
the
information,
collected by
British
intelligence,
contained in the
three
studies of the causes
of
unrest
in
Mesopotamia,accurate;andhow far were the
conclusions drawn
valid?
The
material
collected
by Masayuki
Yamauchi
and other students
of
the subject
would
suggest
that, while
the information
collected was
for
the
most part
accurate enough,
the conclusions
drawn
were
dangerously
misleading.
Thereis no
doubt that,
in the periodof their
exile,
Enver,Talaat,
Djemal and
the
other CUP leaders
and their associates
in
Europe had,
from the
beginning
engaged,
in
conjunction
with
elements
within the
German and
Soviet
governments,
in
organizing
a
wide-ranging
conspiracy,
aimed
at the
destruction
of the British
Empire
in
Asia.
But their efforts
had proved
almost
entirely
ineffective.
For
the
movements, groups
and
factions
they
were attempting
to unite proved
to be
riddled with mutual
suspicion,
hostility and distrust.
The
facts,
as
collected
by Masayuki
Yamauchi,
drawn for the most part
from letters written
by the main participants
at the time, tend
to confirm
the
information
collected by
British
intelligence,
used by
Bray and
the War
Office author
n
their three
reports,
though
not
in
all
cases.
In
Berlin,
where
he arrived
n
the early
part of 1919, following
an
abortiveattempt
o join the
Army of Islam in the Caucasusmade following his flight to the Crimeain
November 1918,
Enver,
according
to
Masayuki
Yamauchi,
quickly
made
contact
with Karl
Radek,
the noted communist
agitator
and
publicist,
then
confined
in Moabit
prison.
Persuaded
by
him of the
advantages
to be
gained
from the
formation
of a
Bolshevik-Islamic
alliance, with the
support and
approval
of Hans
von
Seeckt,
a German
general,
who had
held the
post
of
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CAUSES OF
UNREST
IN
MESOPOTAMIA,
1919-21
173
Chief of the
OttomanGeneralStaff in the First
World
War,
he then set
out
to
travel
by
plane
to
Moscow,
where after
an
incredible series of
delays,
involving air
crashes,
emergency
landings
and
periods
of
imprisonment,
he
arrived
in
August
1920.
There (where
it is
evident he could not
have
attended
the
meeting
of the
Third
International
held
in
May)
Enver
made
immediate contact
with a
numberof Bolshevik
leaders,
including
Trotsky,
Chicherin, Karakhan and
Zinoviev,
who
appeared
willing
at
the time
to
support
his
plans for the
formation of a
Turkish-German-Bolshevik
alliance.
Following
his
attendance at the
Congress of the
Peoples
of
the
East, held
in
Baku
in
September,
at which he
was not well
received,
he
returned o
Moscow, and
thence to
Berlin, where
he set about
organizingthe
Union of Islamic RevolutionarySocieties, which he and his colleagues had
already agreed
to set
up.
Representatives
of
various overseas
branches
were
then
appointed,
including
Dr
Fuad
Bey
for
Egypt,
Emir
Shakib Arslan
for
Syria, Djemal
and
BarakatullahEffendi for
India,
and Talaat for
Berlin.
Meanwhile
in
Anatolia
Mustafa Kemal would
be
expected
to
organize
a
'centre',
as
would Halil
Pasha,
Enver's
uncle,
in
east Turkestan
Kashgar)
and
Djemal
in
Afghanistan.22
Whilst
in
Moscow
in the
summer
of 1920
Enver,
according to
Masayuki
Yamauchi, claimed that he had facilitated an agreement between the
Bolsheviks
and
MustafaKemal.
He also
claimed that
Trotskyhad
promised
to
support
he
despatch of one or
two
cavalry
divisions,
recruited
n
Muslim
lands, for
service in
Anatolia.23
Meanwhile,
in
Berlin and
other
European
towns and cities,
Talaat
who,
unlike
Enver,
had made
straightfor the
German
capital,
following his
flight
from the
Ottoman
Empire, worked
assiduously to
encourage
and unite the
various
Islamic
groups,
opposed to
the
imperial
powers,
publishing
periodicals in Turkish and Arabic, and despatching TeshkilatiMahsusa
(Special
Organization)agents
to
Iran,
India,Afghanistan
and the
Caucasus
to
promote
revolution
there.
Surprisingly,
no
mention is made
in
Masayuki
Yamauchi's
account
of the
Montreux
conference,
andlittle or no
mention
of
the
Lugano and Munich
conferences.
Though
it
is noted that
Talaatmade
contact
with
members of the
Egyptian national
movement
in
Constance in
July
1920,
and
with
Muhammed
Ali,
the leader of
the
Caliphate
movement,
in
Rome
in
August.24
Djemal, according to Masayuki Yamauchi, like Talaat, made
immediately
for
Berlin,
following his
flight from
the
OttomanEmpire.
In
January
1919
he
informed
Djavid that it was
his
intention to
leave
in
the
very
near
future for
Afghanistan,
where
he hoped to set
up an
anti-British
front.
But
he did not in
fact do
so. Instead, in
July he
moved to
Klosters
Platz
in
Switzerland
where, apart
from a brief
visit to
Munich,
he stayed
until
November.25
Only
then
did he set out
for
Afghanistan,
travelling
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174
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
(according
to
Azade-Ay-e
Rorlich) by way
of
Stettin,
in
the
company
of
500
prisoners
of
war, returning
home.26
Throughout
he remained in close
touch
with the other CUP
leaders,
Mustafa Kemal
and a number
of German
and
Soviet
officers and
officials sympathetic
to his cause.
In
June
1920,
for
instance, he asked
Mustafa Kemal to despatch
competent
officers to
Kabul;
and
in
November
he
was
in
touch
with
General Kress von Kressenstein.
Whereas the information
provided by
British
intelligence
in
the
three
reports
drawnup by Bray and the WarOffice
may
be considered
reasonably
accurate,
the
conclusions derived
from
it,
that there existed
a
wide-ranging
conspiracy, unitingvirtually
all of the enemies of the
Entente
in
Asia,
must
be
considered misleading
in
the extreme. The Union of
Revolutionary
Societies, organizedby Enver,Talaat,Djemaland theirassociates, in Berlin,
Moscow andelsewhere, far from
representing
all
the anti-imperialist
groups
in the
Islamic
world, proved to
be little more than a
skeleton
organization,
incorporatingonly
a handful of
members, mainly CUP.27
German
support
for the
organization, though
significant,proved
in
the end to be
of little
value, for the
Germanswere
simply not
in
a position at
the
time to
mount a
major
campaign; while Soviet
support
proved
unreliable,
for
the
Bolsheviks,
like
their Tsarist
predecessors,
had no
desire
to
encourage
the
spread of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism n Central Asia. Throughout it
would seem that
the
Soviets, while apparently
offering
support,
surreptitiously obstructed
Enver's efforts to
organize
a
force
in
Transcaucasia
made
up
of Muslim
troops; andthey
offered
to
despatch
only
Russian units
to assist
Mustafa Kemal and the
Turkish nationalists in
Anatolia.28t
was the
discovery of the
nature and extent
of Soviet
duplicity
that later
persuaded
Enver
to abandon his
plans for the
organization
of an
alliance
of all
the
anti-imperialist forces
in
Asia and
opt instead for
participation n the Basmachi revolt, then taking place in easternBukhara.'9
Nor
was
there any love
lost between
Mustafa Kemal
and the
Bolsheviks.
Mustafa
Kemal
wished merely to use the
threat of a
Turkish-Bolshevik
alliance
to
force the
Entente Powers
to negotiatea
satisfactorypeace treaty;
and his
negotiations
with
the
Soviets,
in
which, as Masayuki Yamauchi
and
other
scholars have
indicated, Enver
played
little
or
no part, were
designed
to
produce
not
an
anti-imperialist
alliance,
but secure
frontiers
n
the
east for
the new
Turkish
nation-state he and his
colleagues were
in
the
process of
settingup in Anatolia.30As for the Syriannationalists and the Arabsheikhs,
they
remained as
deeply
divided as
ever,
as
later events
in
Syria,
Mesopotamia and
Arabia
showed. The
British,
in
short, in the
period
immediately
following the end
of the FirstWorldWar,
had far more
to fear
from
local
sources
of
instability
and discontent in
the
Middle East thanthey
had
from
any
wide-ranging conspiracy,
controlled
by remote forces,
originating
in
Berlin
and
Moscow.3
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CAUSES OF UNREST IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1919-21
175
The extent of the mutual suspicion,
hostility and distrust
that
divided
many of the
members of the Union of Islamic
Revolutionary
Societies is
best
illustrated
by the struggle
for
power that took place
between Enver and
his supporters,
and
Mustafa
Kemal,
the leader of the Turkish national
movement in
Anatolia. As Masayuki Yamauchi makes
clear,
from Enver's
point
of view the Union of Islamic
Revolutionary
Societies
was
intended
merely as a
'foreign policy
tool
of the
Young
Turks
in
exile',
a means
by
which they
might
retrieve
the
position
of
leadership, supposedly
'usurped'
by Mustafa
Kemal, they
had lost as a
result of the defeat inflicted on
the
Ottoman Empire
by
the
Entente Powers
in
the First World War.32
o
this
end, in
1920-21, Enver had repeatedly requested the
Bolshevik leaders to
set up, finance and supporta Muslim Army in Transcaucasawhich, with
himself at its head, might at the appropriatemoment
enter Anatolia
and re-
establish CUP control
there;
and
in
the autumn of
1920 he
had
actually
dispatched
a
numberof
agents
to eastern
Anatolia,
to
prepare
he
ground
for
his return. But
Mustafa Kemal, well aware of his
rival's
intentions,
had
taken
immediate
steps
to block
any
move he
might
make.
In
April
1921
he
had had several of Enver's
agents arrested
or
otherwise dealt with, and
in
May he had issued strict
instructions that
should
Enver
appear
in
eastern
Anatolia he should be at once arrestedand sent, under armed guard, to
Ankara.
Officers and troops loyal to Envershould be dismissed or
posted to
the
western front. As a result Enver's
plans for
an imminent
return
to
Anatolia, and
by extension
his
plans for the creation
of a
Bolshevik-pan-
Turkish-pan-Islamist ront, were frustrated.33
The
conclusions drawn by Bray
in
the
three reports
on
the causes
of
unrest
in
Mesopotamia
show all too
clearly
the
dangers
involved
in
interpreting
nformation collected by the intelligence services. For if
acted
upon, without further consideration, they may well have led British
officials,
involved
in
policy making
in
the Middle
East,
to make a series of
false
moves. But
fortunately, from the point of view of future
British
influence
in
the
area, many British
officials, such as Sir Horace Rumbold,
High
Commissioner
in
Istanbul, and Sir
Percy Cox, High Commissionerin
Baghdad, remained
generally persuaded of
the primacy of local factors in
the
determination of
events.34
As
a
result
fears
of
a Bolshevik-pan-
Turkish-pan-Islamistalliance, originating
in Berlin and Moscow, were
not
allowed to dominate Britishpolicy-making in the Middle East, and a series
of
local
settlements
were
arrived
at,
negotiated for the most part on a case
by
case basis.
Yet until at
least the end of
the Turkish
war of
independence
the
British intelligence services, heavily
influenced by Bray's
analysis of
events,
remained
generally convinced of the existence and
importance of
some
such all
embracing conspiracy.35
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176
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
NOTES
1.
British Public
Record
Office,
FO 371 5230
E12339
Mesopotamia.
PreliminaryReport
on
Causes
of Unrest
by Major
N.N.E.
Bray,
M.C.
Special Intelligence
Officer attached
to
Political
Department, ndia Office; FO
371
5231 7765
Mesopotamia.
Causes of the Unrest
ReportNo.11;WO
33 969
Cause
of
the Outbreak
n
Mesopotamia.
2.
MasayukiYamauchi,TheGreen Crescent
under
the Red
Star:
EnverPasha in Soviet
Russia,
1919-1922 (Institutefor the
Study of Languages and Cultures
of
Asia and
Africa, Tokyo,
1991). See also
Azade-Ayse
Rorlich,
'Fellow Travellers:
Enver
Pasha and the Bolshevik
Government,1918-1920',
Asian
Affairs,
new
series,
Vol.13
(October 1982);
and
Salahi
R.
Sonyel,
'Mustafa Kemal and
Enver in
Conflict,
1919-22',
Middle
Eastern
Studies, Vol.25,
No.4
(October1989).
3.
N.N.E. Bray,ShiftingSands (Unicorn
Press,
1934), pp.8-15.
See also H.V.F.
Winstone,
The
Illicit Adventure
JonathanCape,
1982), pp.60-1.
4. Mesopotamia,
PreliminaryReport
on
Causes of Unrest, p.3.
5.
Ibid., p.4.
6.
Ibid., pp.4-7.
7. Ibid.
8.
Ibid., p.7.
9.
Mesopotamia,
Causes of Unrest
-
ReportNo.11,p.4.
10.
Ibid., p.5.
11.
Ibid., p.8. The precise nature
of
these
payments
remains
n
doubt.
They may
well
have come
from
accounts,
held
by
the
exiled CUP leaders in
European banks.
Masayuki
Yamauchi
argues that the
claim,
made
by
Falih
Rifki, that
the CUP leaders had
distributed3 million
gold
liras
among
themselves
towards he end
of
the
First
World
War acks
credibility,
but
he
admits that Talaat in particularmay well have deposited considered sums of money in
Europe.Djemalcertainly
believed
so,
and
Enver claimed that he was indebted o
Talaat.
See
Masayuki
Yamauchi,
The
Green Crescentunder the Red
Star:
EnverPasha in
Soviet
Russia,
1919-1922, pp.20-3.
Enver is said to
have received
500,000
marks from
Karakhan,
n
January1921, to help pay
for
his activities.
12.
At the San
Remo
Conference
he Entente
Powers
completed
theirwork on the
drafting
of
the
Turkishpeace
treaty and allocated
mandates or a numberof the states
they
intended o set
up
in
the Middle East.
13.
Mesopotamia,Causes of
Unrest
-
ReportNo.11,pp.6-9.
14.
Ibid., pp.10-
11.
15.
Ibid., p.12.
16. Ibid., pp.14-15.
17.
Cause of the Outbreakn
Mesopotamia,p.5.
18.
Ibid., pp.5-1
1.
19.
Ibid., p.13.
20.
Ibid., pp.11-12.
21.
Ibid., p.12.
22.
Masayuki
Yamauchi,
The
Green
Crescentunder
the
Red
Star:
EnverPasha in Soviet Russia,
1919-1922, Chs.1-3.
MasayukiYamauchishows
that for much
of the period 1919-20 the
British
had little or no idea where Enver
was;
though of course they knew
that he was in
Berlin in
January-February 920, when he made
contact with
MajorIvorHedley, a member
of the
British
military
mission
there,
and
in
Baku
in
September
1920, when he attended he
great Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in the city. In July 1920 British military
intelligence
in
Istanbul
suggested
that
he had gone to
Azerbaijan;and for a time British
agents
in
Meshed believed him to
be
in
Turkestan.Nor had they
any idea how
Enver got to
Moscow.
In
fact, as
MasayukiYamauchiand
Azade-Ayae
Rorlich have shown, in 1919-20,
disguised at times
as
a
delegate
of the
Turkish Red
Crescent
and as a
Jewish German
communist,
he
made as
manyas four
attempts o reach the
Soviet capital, the
first three by
plane. He
eventually arrived n August 1920
travelling by train
and ship, by way of Stettin
and
Konigsberg.
23.
Ibid.,
pp.26, 29,
38. A
treaty was
concluded by
the Soviets andthe Turkish
nationalists n
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CAUSES OF UNREST IN MESOPOTAMIA,
1919-21
177
March 1921, the contents of which had been largely agreed
in
the autumnof 1920.
24. Ibid., p.38.
25. Ibid., pp.l1-12, 28, 30.
26. Azade-AyaeRorlich, 'Fellow Travellers:EnverPasha and the Soviet
Govemment,
1918-20',
p.291. Djemal
was
reported by British intelligence
to have lived in
Berlin, Geneva
and
Milan,and even to have travelledto Moscow and Istanbul.His plans to promote revolution
in India were, it seems, highly ambitious, nvolving the creationof a great state or federation
of states in CentralAsia which, acting in conjunctionwith the Soviets, might provide the
jumping off groundfor an assault on the British Empire in Asia.
27. Ali Fuat Cebesoy,MustafaKemal's ambassadornMoscow,wrote that theLeagueof Islamic
Revolutionary Societies was simply another title
for the exiled
remnants
of
the CUP. See
MasayukiYamauchi,The Green Crescent
under the Red Star:
Enver
Pasha
in
Soviet
Russia,
1919-22,
p.35.
28.
Ibid.,,
pp.35-6, 61-2.
29. On Enver's part n the Basmachirevolt see Salahi R. Sonyel, 'Enver Pashaandthe Basmaji
Movement in CentralAsia', andMarthaB. Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freemen'sRevolt
in
Turkestan,1918-24', Soviet Studies, Vol.33 (July 1981).
30. For an account of Mustafa Kemal's dealings with the Soviets see Hikmet Bayur, 'Genel
Savaatan Sonra Antlaamalarimiz',Belleten,
Vol.30
(1966);
and A.L.
Macfie,
The Straits
Question (Institute or Balkan Studies, Salonica, 1993), pp.122-4.
31. It
is evident of course that
the
ideologies of Marxism,socialism
and
anti-imperialismwould
in due course pose a serious threat o the survival of the British Empire in Asia.
32. MasayukiYamauchi,
The Green
Crescentunder
the Red Star: Enver
Pasha
in
Soviet Russia.
1919-1922, p.46.
3 3. Ibid., pp.46-60.
34. In October 1922, for example, Sir Horace Rumbold, n a letter despatchedto Lord Curzon,
the British foreign secretary,wTote: I have always maintained hat Mustafa Kemal adjusted
the closeness of his relationswith Russia to the necessities of his immediatesituation,never
going further
n
that direction han
it
was absolutely necessary
to
do,
and
that Russia has at
no time acquiredsuch influence as to be able to dictate the foreign policy of Angora.' See
FO 371 7906 6468 Rumbold o Curzon, 17 October 1922.
35. See B.N.
$im?ir
(ed.),
British Documentson Atatairk
Ankara,
Turk Tarih
Kurumu),Vol.IV,
No.12,
Enclosure.