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International Relations Copyright 2004SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 18(3): 381398
[DOI: 10.1177/0047117804045199]
Conversations in International Relations:
Interview with Bhikhu Parekh
Editors introduction
This is an edited and much shortened version of an interview between Professor
Parekh and, for International Relations, Professor Ken Booth, Dr Toni Erskine
and Dr Nicholas J. Wheeler. It was held in Aberystwyth on 18 June 2003.
Bhikhu Parekh was born in Gujarat, India, in 1935, and graduated from the
University of Bombay. He obtained his PhD from the London School of
Economics, and has taught at the LSE and the University of Glasgow. He was formany years Professor of Political Theory at the University of Hull. He is currently
Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Westminster and Emeritus
Professor of Political Theory at the University of Hull. Bhikhu Parekh has been a
visiting professor at several universities in Europe, North America, and India, and
was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Baroda, India. In addition to his acade-
mic work, Professor Parekh has played an active part in British public life, with
particular interest in such matters as racial equality, social cohesion, and cultural
diversity. He is a regular broadcaster and has written in the national press. He was
Chair of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, whose report waspublished in October 2000. His public and academic honours include: election as
British Asian of the Year in 1992; selection for the BBCs Special Lifetime
Achievement Award in 1999; appointment as a life peer in the House of Lords in
2000; election as a Fellow of the British Academy in 2003; and selection for the
Sir Isaiah Berlin Prize for Lifetime Contribution to Political Studies in 2003. His
publications include books on Hannah Arendt, Marx, contemporary political
philosophy, and Gandhi, an edited four-volume collection of Critical Assessments
of Jeremy Bentham, and Rethinking Multiculturalism. He has published over a
hundred articles in academic journals and anthologies.
IR Critical Theory emphasizes the embeddedness of theorists. Do you agree?
And if so, what made you into the political theorist you are?
BP Like all human beings, theorists grow up within a particular society and are
deeply influenced by its ways of life and thought. Their social environment
structures their personality, gives it a particular colour and orientation, and shapes
their assumptions about the world. Since theorists are trained in the art of criticalself-consciousness, they can outgrow much of the influence of their society if they
are so determined and have the right opportunity. Even then the impact of their
formative experiences, especially those that are traumatic, is bound to persist. We
can later talk about this in relation to me.
ri
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Accidents too play a part in ones life, and they have certainly done so in mine.
I grew up in a family where no one had ever been to school. I was the first in my
family to matriculate. My father was a goldsmith like his father and grandfather
before him while my mother was illiterate. My father was ambitious for me. Hewanted me to go to school, matriculate, and become a bank clerk. So when I
matriculated, I had no ambition beyond it. My headmaster told me that since I was
a reasonably talented young man, I should go on to university. I graduated from
the University of Bombay, but again had no plans beyond the BA. I followed the
advice of several friends and professors and decided to study for the Masters
degree. So at each stage of my life, an ambition developed, but there was no
consistent pattern. It was one thing leading on to another. Every success surprised
me, and its absence would not have disappointed me.
Again, when I was in the Bombay School of Economics doing my Masters, Imet a remarkable woman (she had fought in the 1942 underground independence
movement) who was a close associate of Mahatma Gandhi. She said, Parekh, you
cant stop here, you must go to England. England! Where was I going to get the
money from? And my command of English was not adequate either. I didnt learn
to speak it until I was 11, so even at university I had some difficulty with English-
medium instruction. However, she filled in the form for me. She asked what I
would like to do my doctoral research in. I said that I would very much like to
explore the idea of equality a little further. So this is how I applied to the London
School of Economics and they admitted me. My father was very supportive andgenerously invested his lifes savings in me. I went to the LSE meaning to return
home after three years.
IR But why did this bright young Parekh do political philosophy and not
mathematics or economics?
BP I started with economics because if you want to be a bank clerk you should
do economics. But I never liked economics because it was too heavily mathe-
matical. As I had no mathematics at all, I was completely lost. Economics classeswere oversubscribed, always huge. When I started my postgraduate work at the
Bombay School of Economics, the only subject I could take was either politics or
sociology. Sociology in those days was a soft option mostly taken by girls. So I
opted for politics, not a very demanding option in those days, and socially much
more respectable and congenial. And that was the start of it (laughs). There was
no particular plan.
IR To get away from girls? Is this the explanation for the political theorist?
BP No, to get away from economics. But taking politics was a turning point.
IR When did you decide you werent going to be a bank clerk?
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BP When I did my MA. I think I realized then that I was not going to be a bank
clerk, but would probably be a politics lecturer in a provincial university. And that
was the height of my ambition.
IR Was it the theoretical aspects of politics that always attracted you?
BP Yes. Politics degrees at the Bombay School of Economics were a very
strange collection of courses. There was quite a bit of emphasis on classical
ancient Indian political thought. Now thatI enjoyed, because I had Sanskrit. My
father had been very keen that I should learn Sanskrit. Sanskrit has stood me in
good stead all these years, and was later very helpful in my work on Gandhi. I did
Indian political thought, Western political thought, public administration, inter-
national relations, and other courses the usual combination of eight paperswhich the School had largely inherited from the colonial days. I didnt very much
take to international relations. I didnt like the study of institutions very much and
had little exposure to international history, but felt drawn to political thought and a
little later to political theory.
IR Why were you interested in Western political thought rather than Indian or
some other Eastern political thought?
BP Other traditions of Eastern political thought were simply not taught. In India,we were vertically related to the West, not horizontally to other developing
countries. So there was no Chinese, Japanese, Egyptian, or Islamic political
thought. The thinking behind this was that we were going to get nothing out of
studying them as they were just as backward as we were. So Eastern political
thought was never a part of our thinking. This limited my intellectual horizon and
prevented me from comparing the Indian tradition with others of similar
background.
Classical Hindu political thought was philosophically rather poor. I have
written two essays which upset some of my countrymen, namely Some Reflec-tions on the Hindu Tradition of Political Thought and The Poverty of Indian
Political Theory, arguing that in our history there is a rich tradition of meta-
physics, epistemology and moral philosophy, but no tradition really of political
philosophy. This is so because, among other things, politics had not emerged as a
distinct sphere of life and could not be an autonomous subject of investigation.
Indian society has always been socio-centric, a society articulated into a system of
castes, topped up with a ruler. Indian political thought stressed the duties of the
rulers and their subjects, and rarely discussed the nature and sources of political
disagreements and conflicts or articulated bold visions of the good society. It wasintellectually unexciting, and politically it didnt relate to my growing commit-
ment to socialist politics. Given the intellectually radical potential of the Western
tradition of political thought, I was convinced that was the direction in which I
wanted to go.
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IR In your book on Gandhis political philosophy you seem convinced that
Western political thought has been richer than its Eastern equivalent.
BP Yes. From the political philosophy point of view, the Western tradition iscertainly richer than any of the non-Western traditions. I held the view when I
wrote the book, and I hold it even now. It is nothing to do with the Western intellect
being more analytical or more refined, which is nonsense, it simply had to do with
historical experiences. In ancient Greece, the dissolution of tribes as social
institutions marked the birth of the polis. A new social formation had emerged, and
it naturally provoked reflection on its nature, basis, purposes and forms. Given that
historical experience, right from the time of the Greeks the Western tradition has
been asking political questions. In Indian so-called political philosophy, the
questions were always social, because society remained intact and overpowering,except briefly during the Buddhist period when India developed a public realm and
witnessed deep moral and political differences and disputes. For the most part we
had a society made up of castes. Since society was all-comprehensive and all-
encompassing, we had a socio-centric polity in which politics did not emerge as a
distinct and autonomous sphere of life. In the Indian tradition there is a lot of
systematic and profound reflection on the nature of man, the self, society, duty,
family, friendship, and so on, which is equal to anywhere else in the world, but not
much on equality, justice, freedom, social change, resolution of political
differences, forms of government, power, and basis of authority.Political philosophy is new in India. During the colonial period, the British
were remote rulers who left the Indian social structure largely untouched. The
legal system that they introduced was what is sometimes called legal pluralism.
Laws relating to property, family, divorce, marriage, inheritance, etc. varied from
community to community, the criminal law being the only one that was common
to all. Apart from such changes as the limited bourgeois economy and the colonial
state introduced, Indian society remained articulated into a system of castes. It is
only after independence that the state became a dominant and autonomous insti-
tution, active, interventionist, and consciously transforming society. This led togreat ideological debates, the development of an autonomous political realm, the
possibility of restructuring society, and so on, and created the cultural and political
conditions necessary for the emergence of political philosophy. Some of these
questions had begun to be raised during the independence movement, and a
tradition of political philosophy started to emerge from the late 19th century
onwards.
IR What other factors shaped your development as an accidental political
theorist?
BP There is no innate predisposition propelling or determining you to move in a
particular direction; at the same time, the fact that one is socially embedded and
has had certain formative experiences means that certain things worry you greatly,
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even haunt you, give a certain content and direction to your thought, and become
your constant points of reference. In my case the ideas of equality, non-violence,
concern for others, and respect for differences have dominated much of my
intellectual life, and in retrospect I can trace them to various life experiences,some pretty traumatic.
The idyllic description of a rural society and the image of a gentle and non-
violent India hides its ugly underside. Indians have great warmth, remarkable
capacities for friendship, generosity, and self-sacrifice, and commendable virtues
of openness to new ideas, respect for differences, and reverence for life. However,
their weaknesses and vices are just as great and are daily nurtured by the oppres-
sive and hierarchical social structure. My memories of Indian childhood are both
pleasant and deeply painful. I enjoyed enormous warmth and generous advice and
support. But I also saw an enormous amount of violence all around me. There waspatriarchy, and male arrogance. Marriages took place that were not born out of
friendship, and were gross mismatches. Husbands resented their wives for not
being as bright or companionable as they would have liked them to be, and vice
versa, and inevitably there was a lot of aggression, emotional exploitation, and
even physical violence. Although some joint families were wonderful, others were
hierarchical and exploitative. I also saw a good deal of inequality and humiliation
around me. The caste system meant that you had to know your place in the social
hierarchy. Those at the lower rungs felt crushed, were devoid of pride, self-
respect, and a basic sense of dignity. And those at the top exuded arrogance,superciliousness, and contempt. The poor were particularly despised and treated
as an inferior species.
Life was very hard in Indian villages, and led to a great deal of superstition and
blind faith. We were five brothers; before me there were three who had died very
early, one four months, one about eight months old and the other about seven
years. People thought there was something unlucky about our house because
children didnt seem to survive. So when I was born, they called the family priest
(chuckles) who said that my parents must do certain things (chuckles again) if I
was not to go the way of the others. They were advised to make sure that I was fedby a close relative, that the clothes I wore and the toys I played with were given by
others, and so on, for a certain period of time. They did and I survived! This
explains why my name is Bhikhu. It comes from the Sanskrit word bhikshu,
meaning a mendicant, somebody who begs, and by extension someone raised
on begged food and clothes. This name is symbolic, like almost all names given
to people in Hindu India, and these names do unconsciously exercise a certain
power over you. I think unconsciously my name reminds me of four things: three
children before me had died and I could have gone their way; I was very precious
to my parents and they desperately wanted me to live; I had to live the lives offour people, the three who died and my own; and finally, I owed my life to the
kindness of others and it is really their gift. Since I was very precious to my
parents, they doted over me, would never let me out of their sight, and expected
other family members to serve my needs. Not surprisingly the family members
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gave me a nickname shethji, meaning the boss. My younger brother who has
lived in the United States for over forty years still calls me by this name.
IR Did this cause problems with your brothers?
BP No. They would naturally have liked the love I received and were sometimes
jealous. But to their enormous credit they were never resentful or wished or
caused me any harm. They understood the situation, accepted it, even thought that
I deserved what I got especially as I was reasonably bright, and used my
privileged status to get out of my father what they wanted and would not
otherwise get. Thanks to being the eldest child and being special, my father came
to depend on me, and I on him. He and I would go for long walks in the evening
after he had finished the days work. He would be up at about 5.30 a.m. to get hiswork done in the daylight and stop at about 5.00 p.m. When on our walks, I would
hold his hand and he would tell me the story of his life, including his personal
problems, anxieties, and aspirations. While other members found him somewhat
authoritarian, distant, and self-contained, I saw him as tender, insecure, even
vulnerable. I graduated into adulthood without passing through adolescence, and
that inevitably exacted a price.
IR You earlier mentioned your love of equality. When did this idea enter your
moral consciousness?
BP I saw humiliation at two levels. I was very precious, my brothers were not.
Two of them were treated less kindly partly because they had a darker skin than
me. Colour prejudice runs deep in India, and a lighter skin confers privilege. I
understood early on the hidden dynamics of both colonialism and racism.
The second level of humiliation had to do with the caste system. I remember an
experience I had when I was about seven years of age. There were no flush toilets
in those days, nor deep wells. The untouchables collected human dirt. Since they
were supposed to be polluted, we werent allowed to touch them. This also appliedto those who removed and skinned dead animals. Once I was playing outside my
house and accidentally touched an untouchable woman. My mother was very
upset and insisted on my having a bath before I could be ritually pure. There was
also another more traumatic occasion when an untouchable woman stepped out of
my way at a frightening speed lest I should touch her and get her into trouble.
Even now when I think about that woman, I feel intensely uneasy, even numb.
Another equally painful experience occurred a few years later. My father and I
had gone to the house of a local moneylender, a high-caste man of considerable
wealth and power. We were sitting talking when a shoesmith arrived with theshoes he had made for our host. This man tried them on starting with the left shoe.
It was a bit too narrow. Instead of saying that it was narrow and asking him to
adjust it, he threw it at the man, hitting him on the forehead and making him
bleed. I almost fainted. Its experiences of this kind, treating human beings with
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utter contempt, that affected me deeply. This was not just a case of unequal power;
the term inequality is too feeble to capture the encounter. It was a case of
contempt, degradation, humiliation by a man who recognized no constraints on his
conduct.These experiences have long haunted me and given me a deep suspicion of
power and an instinctive horror of humiliation. I have often asked myself what it
means to be humiliated, the kind of experience it is, the conditions in which it
flourishes, the ways in which it damages its perpetrators and victims, and so on.
Not only individuals but groups, societies, and civilizations too can be humiliated
and treated as if they were worthless, devoid of any good quality, worthy to be
annihilated. These ideas inform my writings, including my discussion of multi-
culturalism and Western global hegemony and hubris. As a result of early
experiences I was disposed, sensitized, to questions of equality, violence, andhumiliation. So when I came to England I wanted to understand them. Of course,
Gandhi had been talking about these things since long before I was born. He
campaigned for the dignity of the poor, the untouchables, the Indian civilization,
and the victims of racism, colonialism, and the European civilizing mission. His
ideas had become part of my upbringing, and I wanted to explore further their
sources in Western liberalism and socialism with which I had only a vague
familiarity.
IR How did this general consciousness translate into an interest in the specificpolitical theorists you studied?
BP When I went to the LSE, I embarked on a doctorate on the idea of equality in
British political thought. My education in India was quite shallow and I had never
read John Stuart Mill or even Locke. I knew of Tom Paine and Jeremy Bentham,
and concentrated on them, throwing in William Godwin a little later. Life at the
LSE was difficult because I had to do a lot of catching up both in terms of learning
to think philosophically and familiarizing myself with Western classics. But I was
determined to make a success of it. My father had given me his lifes savings and Icouldnt let him down. Self-respect also played a part. And knowing where Id
begun and how far Id travelled gave me the confidence that I should be able to
cross this final hurdle as well. I had close friends with whom I had long discussions
and from whom I learned much. Within a couple of years, I think I was as good as
anybody else and knew that Id complete my research successfully. Once again
luck played a part. For some reason Michael Oakeshott took a personal interest in
me. I saw a lot of him in my third year and spent hours with him, sometimes in his
office and at other times over coffee. I would pester him with all kinds of questions
and he would respond with great kindness. These occasions were immenselyeducative, and of course added to my self-confidence. I like to think he too enjoyed
our one-sided relationship in which a keen, grateful and respectful young man saw
him as a guru and could be shaped in the masters mould.
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IR How important was the influence of Oakeshott on your development as a
political theorist?
BP He was a greatinfluence on me. There are four people who have shaped my
life, three in India and Michael in England, in terms of thinking analytically and
critically and developing a certain sensitivity to the large questions of philosophy
and life. I was free to show him what Id written and he would send me several
pages of handwritten comments. Even after I moved to Hull in 1964, I would call
on him when I was in London. Our friendship sadly was dented when in 1979 the
British Journal of Political Science invited me to write two review articles, one on
Isaiah Berlin and the other on Oakeshott. In both I was critical, but also
sympathetic. When they were published, Berlin wrote back saying that although I
had done an excellent job in understanding and explaining his ideas, Id got him
wrong at a few places, which could only be because he mustnt have expressed
himself clearly. This was a nice way of correcting me. Oakeshotts reaction could
not be more different. He felt angry, even perhaps betrayed, by my criticisms. I
didnt think they were particularly harsh or wholly misconceived, but he took an
understandably different view. I think this was partly because he did not expect me
to be critical, and partly because in those days he had a general feeling of being
misunderstood and under-appreciated by others. After all, his contemporaries did
not discuss his work with the seriousness it deserved, and even the British
Academy didnt elect him a Fellow until just before his retirement. Whatever the
reasons, Michael seemed to have become increasingly allergic to criticism and one
had to be gentle, which I suppose I was not. He wrote back saying that my article
on him was a disaster and questioning several parts of it. I wrote back defending
much of what Id said and apologizing for getting him wrong at some places. He
was not assuaged and I didnt see much of him afterwards. A couple of other
things also happened which increased the distance. I was naturally very sad that I
had lost the friendship of someone who had meant so much to me, been so kind,
and helped me acquire such philosophical acumen as I happened to possess.
IR How did your interests in other Western theorists develop?
BP As I said earlier, I started work on the idea of equality in the writings of Tom
Paine, William Godwin, and Jeremy Bentham. I later concentrated on Bentham.
This was partly because he had some impact on India. Some of our colonial
institutions were based on his ideas, and many of the administrators were
Benthamites. He was also relatively easy intellectually, an important consideration
for me in those early years. The fact that he was an egalitarian and claimed to offer
a good rational, even scientific, justification of equality was also a factor.
IR What about Marx?
BP Although I liked Bentham, he was too bland and dull to engage me emotion-
ally. Increasingly I also found him philosophically shallow. He had no sense of
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history, offered no insight into the dynamics of the modern world, and never
defended his first principles. His view of equality, though radical in its own way,
was morally superficial and took no account of the deep structures of inequality
inherent in capitalist society. So I turned to Marx. As I read him, he influenced medeeply, especially his views on history, the historicity of human nature, the
ideological character of all social thought, the exploitation inherent in the
capitalist society, and the hope of a truly humane and humanly controlled society.
I wrote a two-volume study of him but, for all kinds of personal reasons, pub-
lished only the first volume.
IR When did Arendt come in?
BP I read a paper on herHuman Condition in Elie Kedouries seminar at the LSEin 1961. I found her interesting, but she did not make much impact at the time. It
took some years before I began to appreciate her profound insights into the nature
of political life, and the advantages of her phenomenological approach over the
currently dominant linguistic philosophy, conceptual analysis, and the essentialist
and ahistorical traditional political philosophy. My interest in her was reinforced
when I went to the United States in 1969. She invited me to her home because I
had corresponded with her about the Festschriftwhich I was editing for Michael
Oakeshott (published in 1968). We talked about a lot of things, including Vietnam,
India, Marx, Gandhi, Oakeshott, and the nature of political philosophy. She talkedabout the several papers she had written or was writing about the reasons for her
profound dissatisfaction with the Western tradition of political philosophy. I had
just done a long piece on this for the Oakeshott Festschrift. Arendt enabled me to
appreciate both the strengths and limitations of Marx. After Id done my book on
Marx, which was mainly concerned with a critical assessment of his epistemology
and theory of ideology, Arendt seemed a natural thinker to explore.
Despite all his profound insights, Marx offered neither an adequate theory of
politics nor a coherent account of the nature and role of philosophy, and obviously
therefore no political philosophy. After all, if you see politics as largely epiphe-nomenal and philosophy as intellectual onanism, you are unlikely to offer or
even to have the resources to offer a coherent political philosophy. Not sur-
prisingly, my book on Arendt was calledHannah Arendt and the Search for a New
Political Philosophy.
I do not at all wish to suggest that my interest in each thinker grew logically or
organically, one after another. Intellectual life rarely has this degree of coherence
and continuity. Besides, one is rarely interested in only one thinker or one set of
issues at any given time. While working on Bentham or Marx, I was also thinking
about or writing articles in other areas, such as the nature of political philosophy,the sociology of knowledge, rationality, and racism. I was also beginning to take
an active role in British public life. My move from one thinker or set of issues to
another is therefore a result of continuity of intellectual preoccupation as well as
contingent interests, opportunities, challenges and events in my life. This is how I
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turned to Gandhi after Arendt. After my book on her, I returned to India for three
years as vice-chancellor of a large university, and found myself stimulated by the
Indian nationalist thought, especially Gandhi. In each case I was interested neither
in a thinker and in his historical and philosophical particularity, nor with a view tobuilding on him, but rather in appreciating his world of thought and gaining in-
sights for a coherent view of my own. So after a few years with each of them, I
moved on.
IR Which of the political theorists that youve written about best answers what
you think are the key questions about political philosophy?
BP To be brutally honest, none.
IR Nobody? Theyre all equally inadequate?
BP Inadequate yes, but not equally. They are great minds, but also human, and
have their inevitable biases and limitations. Few of them had intimate exposure to
other cultures and felt the need to uncover and face their ethnocentric assump-
tions. This is as true of Hegel, Marx, Bentham, and Mill as of Oakeshott and
Arendt. Furthermore, many of them thought that, as philosophers, they had to
develop tightly structured systems of thought, and that further limits their appeal.
As they sought to systematize their insights and construct comprehensive systems,
considerations of consistency, logical vigour, neat definitions of central concepts,refuting other thinkers and sharply separating themselves from them, etc. became
dominant. Thinking got distilled into frozen thoughts. Self-doubt and tentativeness
were compromised, and different areas of life were forcibly fitted into a single
system of rigid categories. We have to throw out much to get to the heart of and
retrieve their central vision.
IR This line of thought is where your book on Gandhi ends: a true Gandhian
can never be a Gandhist (just as Marx said he wasnt a Marxist).
BP Yes, creative thinkers inspire others to build on them, to take their ideasfurther and even to go beyond them, rather than remaining simply as followers. I
cannot see how one can wholly subscribe to a single doctrine or follow a single
thinker and define oneself as a Benthamite, a Marxist or even a liberal. To me this
looks like a caste system, remaining confined to a particular world of thought,
making set moves within it, maintaining ones doctrinal purity, refusing to cross
boundaries and borrow from others. No individual or body of thought is perfect
or equally insightful on all areas of life. Marx is profound and persuasive in his
analysis of economic and political power, but disappointing in his political thought,
where Locke and Mill have an advantage, and in his social thought where Burke orDurkheim have an edge. The world around one is also constantly changing, and no
system can hope to cope with all its contingencies. A thinker or a body of ideas that
illuminates it at one stage might be largely irrelevant at another.
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IR So you just refuse to be pigeonholed as a political theorist?
BP Yes. Methodologically as well as substantively, I have always been open,
even eclectic, transgressing boundaries and picking, choosing, and combiningideas drawn from different sources. Each system of ideas has its limits; it will take
you so far, and to hold on to it beyond that point out of misconceived loyalty or
regard for consistency is to sacrifice the possibility of a wider and truer view of
the world. In terms of moral principles, however, I think that some basic commit-
ments have remained central to my view of the world. I call them commitments
because I define my intellectual and moral identity in terms of them and because,
while I can defend and make out a good case for them, I cannot conclusively
prove or justify them to the satisfaction of a radical sceptic.
One is egalitarianism, by which I mean commitment to a kind of society inwhich no one lives in the awe or shadow of another, is subject to their power, feels
cramped and constrained, and flourishes only by conforming to their norms and
expectations. Inequalities of power, wealth, talents, status, etc. are inescapable. But
they can be greatly reduced and those that persist should be so organized and
regulated that they do not damage individuals sense of their equal worth and
dignity and their capacity to control their individual and collective lives. I saw in
India what inequalities can do to human beings, and the moral outrage persists. I
also see the damage inequalities can do in the West, and that reinforces the sense
of outrage.Another thing I feel very strongly about is cultural pluralism. The idea that one
culture, civilization or way of life is the best or represents the last word in human
wisdom is not only logically incoherent but also arrogant and offensive. In
my Rethinking Multiculturalism I gave this belief a philosophical articulation.
Different cultures realize different forms of excellence, and their dialogue benefits
all. This is equally true of political doctrines. Liberalism, socialism, conservatism,
and so on embody different insights and are strong in different areas of life, which
is why one cant give exclusive moral allegiance to any one of them.
And the third commitment I have always felt very strongly relates to a deepsense of concern for others. As human beings we are born debtors, with debts to
parents, teachers, the society in which we are born and live, the culture which
gives us the initial resources to make sense of ourselves, the great achievements of
humankind that inspire us and widen our horizons, and so on. This entails a
profound sense of gratitude and certain basic duties and obligations. As I have
argued in some of my writings, an active concern for how others live, the capacity
to feel and be moved by their pain, the wish to see them flourish, is for me one of
the central defining features of both morality and humanity. Rights are certainly
an important part of moral and political life, but so are duties to and responsibilityfor others. A moral and political theory that is based on rights alone gives a highly
flawed account of human life.
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IR You imply a notion of the good life. What might it look like, especially in the
context of global cultural pluralism?
BP I would say that different forms of life represent different visions of the goodlife, nurture human capacities, emotions and sensibilities ignored or marginalized
in others, and that a culturally varied and interactive world is a fundamental
human good. A morally and culturally uniform world would lack a critical inter-
locutor, and hence the space and the resources to conduct an internal dialogue.
Even if someone claimed that a particular form of life was the best or truly human,
he would have no non-circular way of substantiating it. Furthermore, we cannot
discuss the good life in the abstract. It is meant to be lived by human beings who
are constituted in certain ways, are heirs to a particular past, and live under a
particular set of circumstances. Forms of the good life are therefore bound to vary,depending on the character of the people, their cultural traditions and resources,
their geography, their history, and so on. Plurality is an inescapable fact of life,
and pluralism captures a vital moral truth. It would be a great human tragedy if the
whole world were to be dominated by a single way of life or ideology. Current
Western moral narcissism damages both the West and the rest of the world.
IR Are there certain principles which one might say can claim universal value?
BP Yes, there are, but we should be clear about what we are claiming. Universalprinciples need not be, and are not, absolute in the sense of disallowing quali-
fication, accommodation or compromise. If a universal principle were to be
absolute, it would have to be the only one enjoying that status, and I cannot see
how moral life can be reduced to a single principle.
Universal principles, again, are not objective in the sense of existing inde-
pendently of human beings and their beliefs. Morality is a human practice, created
and sustained by humans. It is not a natural fact, and would make no sense if the
human species ceased to exist or transmuted into one without the capacities for
choice and feelings. Morality cannot be subjective, as it is then reduced to desiresand preferences; nor is it objective for reasons I have just given; nor is it inter-
subjective because it is not a transaction between two or more individuals and
episodic in nature. It is a collective human or social achievement over a long
period of time.
Universal principles are those that can be shown to deserve the allegiance of all
human beings. Not all human beings necessarily live by them or even accept them,
but we can give good reasons why they should. Like general statements, universal
principles are not univocal and need to be interpreted. They have to be applied to
and lived within historically existing communities. They conflict and need to beprioritized and traded off. All this means that they are inevitably mediated by the
self-understandings and circumstances of different communities. Universal princi-
ples, therefore, are understood and lived differently in different societies, and give
rise to different practices and institutional structures. Take the principle of the
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sanctity of human life. What is human life? In a society which believes in
reincarnation, the distinction between human and animal life is not easy to draw.
My grandfather used to say that the crow frequently visiting and crowing from the
roof opposite our house was one of our ancestors reincarnated as a crow andasking for attention and food! Again, when does human life begin and end? Does
the duty to respect it include non-interference or also active assistance? What
should we do when this duty conflicts with respect for human dignity or the duty
to fight injustice? Views on each of these rightly differ. In short, while rightly
insisting that some principles or values are universal, we should not take this to
mean that their meanings, internal relations, and modes of articulation must be
universally uniform.
IR How do you arrive at these universal principles?
BP In the history of moral philosophy the question has been answered in several
ways, of which the following are a small sample. First, we can arrive at them by
means of a transcendental or pure practical reason in a manner argued by Kant.
This wont do, because pure reason does not take us beyond such things as con-
sistency and universalizability, and neither gives us substantive principles. Even
such a basic principle as respect for persons cannot be derived from them because
questions concerning who is a person, why humans should be preferred over the
animals, and how to show respect for them call for a detailed philosophicalinquiry. Universalizability presupposes the equality of human beings, and the
latter needs to be substantiated.
Second, we can arrive at universal principles by abstracting away all human
contingencies and asking what human beings would agree to behind a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance. This wont do either. It is not easy to agree on what features of
human life are contingent and should be abstracted away. The whole exercise pre-
supposes moral equality, which is surely not self-evident. And millions in our own
societies and elsewhere, to whom we seek to commend these principles, do not
find this manner of thinking acceptable or even intellectually accessible.Third, some suggest that we should inductively tease out principles that are
common to all societies. This wont do, because either there is no such principle or
those that are, such as sexism, racism and uncritical obedience to authority, are
ones we would want to disapprove of.
Fourth, some turn to God, the infallible and transcendental source of all values.
This wont do either. Belief in God is not self-evident, and is not shared. Further-
more, God speaks differently in different religions, and we have no means of
deciding which one is most authentic. We could look for their shared values, but I
doubt if there are any. Even human life is not sacred in all religions, nor humandignity and equality.
Fifth, many over the centuries have turned to human nature, teasing out its
basic impulses, capacities, and dispositions, and using them to construct state-
ments of human needs, rights, and values. Although this is a fruitful line of
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inquiry, it has its limits as Ive argued at length in my Rethinking Multi-
culturalism. Human nature is not easy to define. Does it include all that we share
with the animals or only what is unique to us? If the latter, can we avoid
smuggling in a particular normative view of how human beings should live?Again, human nature includes greed, anger, jealousy, and so on. We obviously do
not want to derive our morality from these. Why? Because we disapprove of them,
which we cannot do if all morality is derived from human nature. Again, our
culture shapes us so profoundly that we even call it our second nature. And this
raises the question as to why we should ignore it in deriving our moral values.
Finally, we can arrive at moral principles by means of rational discussion and
critical scrutiny. I find this approach most promising and have argued for it in my
Rethinking Multiculturalism. Basically it involves examining different candidates
for universal values, weighing up the reasons for and against them, and settling onthose that have the strongest consensus behind them and which we can honestly
and confidently require others to respect. This view is not without its difficulties,
but I have shown how they can be overcome.
IR Who decides which reasons are to be accepted? Do you favour a Haber-
masian position?
BP A Habermasian view would require that we should only accept the best
argument in an ideal speech situation. Thats certainly one way in which we canarrive at universal principles, but I dont share it. The idea of an ideal speech
situation is logically incoherent. Speech can never be abstracted from human
beings, human beings can never be abstracted from the society in which they live,
and the languages in which they speak are emotionally charged and never
culturally neutral. In any case we cant wait until all the economic, intellectual and
other conditions required for it are in place. Habermas wants the best argument to
win, and defines it as one that is philosophically most powerful. I find this too
rationalistic. Moral discourse does not take place between rational automata or
pure intelligences, but between historically situated beings with their fears,hopes, emotions, and so on. Arguments therefore are not just intellectual exercises
but engage the participants self-understanding, emotions, pride, identity, and so
on. We seek not only to convince others, which is sometimes but not always pos-
sible, but also to persuade, to win them over. This gives us a very different view of
the best argument, assuming that we want to use this expression at all. Reasons
in a moral discourse are too complex in nature to be reduced to arguments.
Arguments are certainly important but constitute only one type of reasons.
IR Should we argue?
BP Yes, of course, but we should also appreciate its complexity and limits. In
any meaningful moral dialogue, our aim should be to understand each other,
become aware of our own and others biases, and to arrive at a view that
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withstands critical scrutiny and is broadly acceptable to all involved. The dialogue
is not an aggressive and confrontational enterprise, though it does involve
exposing the inaccuracies, incoherences, and biases in each others way of looking
at things. Our concern is not to make the other person look a fool but rather to winhim or her over, to woo his assent as Kant put it. Even when we cant convince
others, we show them that theirs is not the only valid view on the matter, and
create in them a space for self-doubt and self-criticism, and leave them with some
disturbing thoughts to mull over.
We must also remember that all kinds of factors influence the outcome of a
moral dialogue. When the UN Declaration of Human Rights was drafted, several
Muslim countries initially disagreed with it strongly. Over time many of them
came round. They had to give reasons for their views, and these proved flimsy.
Their own people debated the rights, and reached different conclusions to those oftheir governments. The question of international respectability and not seeming
backward also played a part, as did the moral pressure of world opinion. No
moral dialogue is either free of politics or detached from other human goals and
aspirations. We should reason, even argue, but should appreciate that these are not
the only currency of moral discourse.
IR There are elements in your argument of sentimental stories, almost in a
Rorty-esque voice. Do you agree?
BP Yes, at one level, not at another. Sentiments and emotions are integral to our
humanity, in the same way that reason is, and we are moved by both. Reason is
integrally tied up with emotion, a fact captured by the Greek idea of the unity of
logos and eros but ignored by the Cartesian rationalists. Unless others come to
mean something to me become recognized as suffering beings like me my
reason would tend not to admit them as part of my moral universe. For these and
other reasons Rorty is right that human unity or solidarity should become vivid to
us, and should energize and remain as central to our consciousness as the rational
principle of impartiality. He goes wrong in underestimating the role of reason.Sentiments can be of the wrong kind, such as narrow nationalism, and need to be
evaluated. Human solidarity should not be based only on our similarities, as he
insists, but also on our differences, as otherwise it undermines human freedom and
diversity. Contra Rorty, we can also give good reasons for our beliefs. They may
not be knock-down or conclusive reasons, but they can certainly be powerful
enough to withstand challenge.
IR So what happens if the dialogue cant take place and what were left with is a
site of violence. Is there a limit to dialogue? You have written in recent yearsabout humanitarian intervention. Do you think force is sometimes justifiable and
legitimate?
BP Oh yes. I think it is both legitimate and justified, the former if it is lawful and
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authorized, the latter if it is well intentioned and, on balance, beneficial. While
insisting on dialogue and creating the conditions for it, we should not be so naive
as to think that all value it, or are prepared to be guided by its outcome.
IR So youd go against the Arendt argument that it can be legitimate?
BP I dont share Arendts view. If you start with the principle, as I do, that Im in
some sense responsible for and accountable to my fellow human beings, then we
should be concerned about how others live. If they are crying out for help, then I
feel addressed by them, and ought to do whatever I can. At an individual level,
one might send money to Oxfam, or write a letter to a newspaper. At a collective
level, we might bring pressure on the government to act in a certain way. In order
for any form of intervention to be legitimate, it will have to be approved by aninternational body and consistent with international law. This is why I had some
difficulty with the Kosovo war because the matter never went to the UN. The
NATO powers were afraid that the Russians would veto it, and decided to act on
their own. It was not fully legitimate, though it was largely justifiable. This sort of
situation can be avoided by bringing international practices and law into harmony
with our changing notions of international responsibility and redefining the basis
of legitimate intervention. We might also explore ways of overriding the veto in
certain situations and even circumscribing its exercise.
IR Would you look to the General Assembly as the route?
BP It is one route, but it has its limits. We can also think of an international court
of justice playing a role similar to that of the Supreme Court in the United States.
The Security Council today has considerable power but is accountable to none for
the exercise of it. Could we not set up a court which would interpret the suitably
revised international law on humanitarian intervention and pronounce on whether
a particular act of intervention is or is not lawful? If we choose not to give it final
authority, it could at least be asked for an advisory opinion. This would haveavoided the legally dubious and morally unjustified recent war on Iraq.
We might also think of an international advisory body made up of distinguished
individuals of international standing and offering a well-considered and unbiased
analysis of the situation requiring global action. The Secretary General can turn to
it for advice which, although not mandatory, could carry a lot of moral authority.
He could go to the Security Council armed with the advice of the great and the
good, and suggest a particular course of action. The Council may disregard it, but
would have to give compelling reasons.
IR Who would choose the great and the good, this advisory body?
BP The world is not as yet devoid of retired statesmen, such as Nelson Mandela,
Edward Heath, and even Bill Clinton. We could also think of distinguished
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religious leaders, academics, and judges drawn from different countries. We could
also draw on such organizations as the Red Cross, Oxfam, and Amnesty Inter-
national. Such men and women could be appointed by the Secretary General or
elected by the General Assembly from a list prepared by him. In any case, thebasic idea is to create a widely respected and non-manipulable global forum for a
dispassionate discussion of contentious issues to guide world opinion.
IR What about the potential role of academics among the great and the good
in public life?
BP There are academics who find public life corrupting or a distraction, have
nothing to contribute to it, or are caught up in a world of their own. So I wouldnt
say that academics qua academics can or should have a public role. However,there are academics who have the capacity to play the role of public intellectuals
by bringing certain skills to the understanding of public issues. Their skills are of
two kinds: the capacity to undertake a detached and balanced view of the relevant
issue, and the specialist skills derived from their professional disciplines. When
academics become engaged with public life, not only as narrow experts but also as
public intellectuals, both benefit. Important issues neglected by short-sighted
politicians get placed on the public agenda. Relevant facts are carefully scruti-
nized, the quality of arguments is rigorously examined, and the dogmatism of self-
righteous leaders is tempered by scepticism. In these and other ways, the qualityof public life improves. Academics too gain from the experience. They deal with
real not hypothetical issues, are forced to talk in a publicly intelligible language,
are required to defend their conscious and unconscious assumptions and ways of
defining their subject matter, and gain vital insights into how the social world
moves. Speaking personally, my own philosophical work is the richer for my
practical engagement.
IR So, finally, what practically engaged philosophical work are you doing at the
present?
BP I am currently working on a book dealing with three issues that arise out of
my Rethinking Multiculturalism issues which I did not have the energy or the
space to explore fully in that book. First, the question of individual and collective
identity. I explore why the language of identity has become so important in recent
decades, what major moral and political concerns it articulates, whether it does so
adequately, and whether the time has come to dispense with that language
altogether. Second, since identity is closely tied up with difference, I explore the
nature and logic of difference, whether it makes sense without some sharedassumptions and values, and how we communicate across the boundaries created
by differences, and can create a cohesive national and global community at ease
with cultural diversity. This leads me, finally, to analyse the nature of dialogue and
rationality, to examine critically the traditional separation between reason and
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emotion, to explore whether reason is embedded in and operates against the
background of certain basic and untheorized emotions and whether emotions have
a rational core, and how we can develop a richer theory of rationality and thus of
moral and political life. Since I discuss these issues in the context of deep culturaldifferences, my discussion is intended to help us understand and cope with our
globalizing world, and has important implications for a theory of international
relations. I doubt that Ill get very far with my explorations, but at least they keep
me away from boredom and mischief and give a self-assigned and tentative
meaning to the current phase of my life.
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