Post on 06-Dec-2021
ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP & EVOLUTION OF ACADEMIC COOPERATION
Shibayama, S., Walsh J.P. & Baba, Y. (2012) Academic Entrepreneurship and Exchange of Scientific Resources: Material Transfer in Life and Materials Sciences in Japanese Universities. American Sociological Review, 77(5), 804-830.
Shibayama, S. (2012) Conflict between entrepreneurship and open science, and the transition of scientific norms. Journal of Technology Transfer, 37(4), 508-531.
Shibayama, S. (2015) Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 25(2): 513-532.
Walsh, J. P., Cohen, W. M. & Cho, C. (2007) Where excludability matters: Material versus intellectual property in academic biomedical research. Research Policy, 36: 1184-1203
BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
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Academic Entrepreneurship (AE) a.k.a. academic commercialism, capitalism
“Global trend in academia emphasizing commercialization, link with industry, protection of intellectual property, etc.” (e.g., Slaughter & Leslie 1997; Etzkowitz 1998)
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Source: 特許行政年次報告書2014年版
University Patenting (Japan)
#Patent %Global patent
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Source: METI 大学発ベンチャーに関する基礎調査
Total number of university startups (Japan)
’89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 14
-08 09 10 11 12 13 14 ??
Why does this occur?
• From policy perspective: – Accountability; pressure from the public (Hackett
1990) – Financial constraint; let universities earn by
themselves
• From academics’ perspective: – Some academics care about practical contribution. – Diversified academic career: Lowered boundary
between academia and industry; Academics can go private in the middle of career (vice versa).
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How does this occur?
• Legal framework – Bayh-Dole Act in USA (1980)
– Similar legislature: Canada (1985), Spain (1986), UK(1998), Japan(1999), France (1999), Belgium (1999), Netherlands (1999), Denmark (2000), Germany(2001), Italy (2001), Australia (20002), Switzerland (2002), Sweden(2003), etc.
• Special organizations – Technology Licensing Offices (TLO)
– Intellectual Property Management Offices (IPMO)
… etc.
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Establishment of Special Organizations (Japan)
Source: Shibayama, S., Saka, A. 2010. Academic entrepreneurship in japanese universities: Effects of university interventions on entrepreneurial and academic activities, NISTEP Working Paper. Tokyo, Japan: NISTEP.
Potential downsides
• Incompatibility between entrepreneurship and academic science
– e.g., Can you both patent and publish?
• YES: mutually reinforcing (Stokes 1997)
• NO: incompatible (Dasgupta 1994, Nelson 2004)
• What is the overall impact to the public?
– Yet to be answered.
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Today’s Subject: Conflict with open science
• Academic entrepreneurship (≈ proprietary rights) – Scientific discoveries may be kept secret or
disseminated with constrained use. • Patenting -> secrecy
• Industry collaboration -> exclusive use
• Open science – Public research must be fully open for the public.
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Examples of Open Science
• Scientific publication – Academics are supposed to publish all their findings. (Merton 1974)
• Open access – Scientific publications should be accessible for free.
• Open methodologies – Methods/protocols should be publicly accessible.
• Open data / resource sharing – Data from publicly funded projects should be deposited in public
database. – Research tools should be stored in central repositories (e.g., Jackson
Lab) and supplied at cost. – “Authors should release data and materials to enable others to verify
or replicate published findings.” (NAS 2003)
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Conflict of AE and Open Science
Deliberate delay of publication or data omission
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Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †:p<0.1 Source: Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al(2006); Vogeli et al (2006)
Genetics (2000)
***
32%
19%
31%
11%
***
Life science (1993)
Commercial activities
YES NO YES NO
27%
17%
Life science (1994)
***
Industry funding
YES NO
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Industry collaboration
11%
8%
**
Life science (2003)
YES NO
Denial to requests for material/data
Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †:p<0.1 Source: Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al(2006); Vogeli et al (2006)
13% 14%
5%
8%
***
Life science (1994)
Genomics (1997)
*
Commercial activities
YES NO YES NO
11%
13%
7% 8%
*
Life science (2003)
Genomics (1997)
†
Industry funding
YES NO YES NO
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Conflict of AE and Open Science
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Objective
• Most studies – Focus on entrepreneurial scientists; – Find them to be non-cooperative, not to share resources, etc. – As long the impact is limited to entrepreneurial individuals, the side
effects are manageable.
• This study – Focus on ordinary scientists; – Examine how they react to the context with increasing entrepreneurial
scientists?
11/3/2015 14 Past Present More entrepreneurial
Ordinary Entrepreneurial
METHODS AND DATA
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Survey of Japanese Scientists
• Population: 12,928 scientists – Active researchers: received national funds in the last
5 years – Full and associate professors – 16 fields in biology, chemistry, agriculture, pharm,
medicine
• Random sample: 1,674 scientists – In top-45 Japanese universities – 698 responses (42% response rate) – Feb-Apr 2009
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Instrument to measure “open science”
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Request
Resources* Donor Recipient
Resource sharing (so-called “Material transfer”)
Description: #Sharing / year
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USA
2.8
3.5
2.9
2.4
Agriculture(2004)
Biomedical(2003)
Life science(1997)
Life science(2007)
JPN
Source: Lei et al (2009); Walsh et al (2007); Campbell et al. (2002); Shibayama et al. (2011)
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Description: %Denial of sharing request (= Deviation from open science)
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USA
18%
12% 10% 9%
7%
11%
Biomedical(2003)
Life science(1997)
Genomics(1997)
Life science(1994)
Medical(1996)
Life science(2007)
JPN
Source: Walsh et al (2007); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2000); Shibayama et al. (2011)
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Instrument to measure “Academic Entrepreneurship”
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Collaboration with industry
Funding from industry
Patenting
Commercial activities
Commercial negotiation
License income
Start-up
Business planning
Average at the community (field) level = AE Context
Survey at Individual level
%Collaboration with industry
%Funding from industry
%Patenting
%Commercial activities
Description: Academic Entrepreneurship
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%Scientists involved in Entrepreneurial Activity (whole sample)
(N/A)
Description: Academic Entrepreneurship
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0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
%Commercial involvement %Industry collaboration %Industry funding
Pharm Agriculture Material Science Biology Medicine
activities
%Scientists involved in Entrepreneurial Activity (field level)
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
RESULTS
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Denial to sharing requests
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10.4%
7.9%
10.1%
7.5%
Industry
funding
Commercialized
material
n.s. n.s.
**
23.8%
7.5%
Commercial
activities
Ordinary Entrepreneurial Note: χ2-test. **: p<0.01
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Result 1
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• Involvement in entrepreneurial activities at individual level shows negative (but weak/insignificant) effect on “behavior” of open science.
• The effect, if any, is not as clear as in the US.
Question:
How has the entrepreneurial context affected ordinary
scientists?
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Norm of Open Science
• Norm of “Communism” – Scientific findings are possessions of the
community and the individual’s ownership right is limited to recognition and esteem (Barber 1952; Merton 1973).
• Guideline for sharing – “An author’s obligation is not only to release data
and materials to enable others to verify or replicate published findings…” (NAS 2003).
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Norm of Open Science
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22%
33%
36%
6%
3%
Agree
Slightly agree
No opinion
Slightly disagree
Disagree
Scientists should cooperate even with their competitors for the advancement of science (5: Agree – 3: No opinion – 1: Disagree)
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Norm of Open Science
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Scientists should comply with a cooperation request
even if it does not benefit themselves at all. (5: Agree – 3: No opinion – 1: Disagree)
13%
32%
36%
13%
6%
Agree
Slightly agree
No opinion
Slightly disagree
Disagree
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Norms by Fields
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0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
BasicBiology(N=52)
Clinicalmedicine
(N=96)
MaterialScience(N=63)
Agree
Slightly agree
No opinion
Slightly disagree
Disagree
Scientists should comply with a cooperation request
even if it does not benefit themselves at all.
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Norm and AE Context
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2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Qu
est
ion
nai
re S
core
%Field-level Commercial Involvement
Pro
- O
pen
Science
P
ro-
Pro
prietary
Scientists should comply with a cooperation request
even if it does not benefit themselves at all.
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Result 2
• Norm of open science varies across scientific fields; it is negatively associated with the degree of AE (field level).
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Question:
How has the AE context actually changed the behavior of
ordinary scientists?
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Prediction of Game Theory (1)
• Existence of free riders (entrepreneurial scientists) should discourage other players (ordinary scientists) from sharing.
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0.2
.4.6
.8
%D
efe
ct
0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM
Result 3-1: ↑ %Denial
33
% Entrepreneurial scientists
Average of ordinary scientists in each field
%D
enia
l to
sh
arin
g re
qu
est
s
0 20 40 60 80 (%)
0
20
4
0
60
8
0
(%)
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Prediction of Game Theory (2) Option for donors
– Demand direct return from recipients
– What can be the return? • Money rarely used. authorship; future cooperation
Resources
Donor Recipient
Gratis Sharing (Open Science)
Donor Recipient
Direct Exchange Resources
Return
Result 3-2: ↑ %Cooperation with direct return
(as opposed to gratis sharing)
35
.2.3
.4.5
.6.7
%P
aid
0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM
% Entrepreneurial scientists
%Sh
arin
g w
ith
exp
ect
ed
coau
tho
rsh
ip
0 20 40 60 80 (%)
20
30
40
50
60
70
(%
)
Prediction of Game Theory (3)
Option for recipients
– Requesting a cooperation incurs cost (e.g., revealing research ideas, negotiation, making contracts).
– May be reasonable to concentrate on independent work
→ No deal
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0.5
11
.5
#R
equ
est
0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM
Result 3-3: ↓ #Requests
37
% Entrepreneurial scientists
#Req
ue
sts
mad
e
0 20 40 60 80 (%)
0
0.5
1
1
.5
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
Result 3
• In fields of higher degree of AE, scientists are less willing to engage in non-rewarded cooperation
• Instead, they are more willing to engage in direct (paid) exchange.
• Moreover, scientists are less willing to engage in cooperation and the number of cooperation (#requests and #fulfilled) declines.
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Summary
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Low AE
Co
mp
lied
D
en
ied
w/o return w/ return C
om
plie
d
De
nie
d
High AE
w/o return w/ return
Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
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Norm of Open Science vs. Practical Contribution
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Source: Shibayama, S., Saka, A. 2010. Academic entrepreneurship in japanese universities: Effects of university interventions on entrepreneurial and academic activities, NISTEP Working Paper. Tokyo, Japan: NISTEP.
Regulation & Guideline of Universities
CONCLUSIONS
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Summary
• Broad impact of academic entrepreneurship (AE) – Not only entrepreneurial scientists but also ordinary
scientists – Weakening norm of Open Science – Shift in cooperation forms:
NON-rewarded exchange ⇒ Direct exchange – Decrease in total transaction possibly due to limitations of
direct exchange
• The trend of AE may have facilitated practical application, but the fundamental basis of academic science may have been weakened.
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