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J U S T I N L E V I TForeword
er i k a w o o
2010 EDITIO
at New York University School of Law
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2010. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivs-
NonCommercial license (see http://creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its
entirety as long as the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link
to the Centers web page is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be
reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without the Centers permission.
Please let the Center know if you reprint.
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ABOUT THEBRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
T B C J N Y U S L
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ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTERSREDISTRICTING PROJECT
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Justin Levitt, L L S L A,
B C J 2005 2008 2009 2010,
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Erika L. Wood D D B C D
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DEDICATION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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A Citizens Guide; ,
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FOREWORD
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 2
I. WHAT IS REDISTRICTING? 6
II. WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER? 10Letting politicians choose their voters 10
Eliminating incumbents 11
Eliminating challengers 11
Packing partisans 12
Diluting minority votes 12
Splitting communities 13
Destorying civility 13
III. WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN? 16
IV. WHO REDRAWS THE LINES? 20
Role o the legislature 24
Role o individual legislators 25
Partisanship 26
Voting rule 27Size 27
Diversity 27
Role o the courts 28
V. HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN? 40
Starting point 40
Timing 40
Transparency 41
Discretion and constraint 42
VI. WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN? 44
Equal population 44
Minority representation 46
Contiguity 50
Compactness 51
Political and geographic boundaries 54
Communities o interest 56
Electoral outcomes 57
(Partisanship, incumbent protection, competition)
Other structural eatures 66
(Nesting, multi-member districts)
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 74
Ideas worth considering, rom existing models 75
Ideas worth considering, not yet implemented statewide 80
The reorm process 82
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Recap o redistricting choices 86
Appendix B: Jurisdictions covered by Section 5 o the Voting Rights Act 94
Appendix C: Additional Resources 95Selected reorm proposals 99
ENDNOTES 104
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RedistRicting matteRs.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING2
INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
D IFFE RE N T RE D IS TRICTIN G PLAN S
District lines group voters into districts, with each district
electing a dierent representative. District lines can be
drawn in many dierent ways.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 3
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RELATED TOPICS: Simulated Redistricting
Ater leang through this owners manual, eel
like an entertaining and inormative redistricting
test drive?
At www.redistrictinggame.org, The Redistricting
Game lets you draw and redraw the districts
o a hypothetical state under several dierent
scenarios, with instant eedback on the con-
sequences. Its a good way to see or yoursel how
some o the parts o the redistricting process
t together.
INTRODUCTION
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WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING6 WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
I. WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
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Apportionment
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Reapportionment is the process o using a
states population to decide how many repre-
sentatives it gets.
Redistricting is the process o redrawing
legislative district lines.
Gerrymandering is the process o redraw-
ing district lines to increase unduly a groups
political power.
EXPECTED SEATS IN THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, 2012
ALABAMA 7
ALASKA 1
ARIZONA 101ARKANSAS 4
CALIFORNIA 53
COLORADO 7
CONNECTICUT 5
DELAWARE 1
FLORIDA 271GEORGIA 141HAWAII 2
IDAHO 2
ILLINOIS 181INDIANA 9
IOWA 4 1KANSAS 4
KENTUCKY 6
LOUISIANA 6 1
MAINE 2
MARYLAND 8
MASSACHUSETTS 9 1MICHIGAN 141MINNESOTA 7 1MISSISSIPPI 4
MISSOURI 9
MONTANA 1
NEBRASKA 3
NEVADA 4 1NEW HAMPSHIRE 2
NEW JERSEY 121NEW MEXICO 3
NEW YORK 281NORTH CAROLINA 13
NORTH DAKOTA 1
OHIO 162OKLAHOMA 5
OREGON 5
PENNSYLVANIA 181RHODE ISLAND 2
SOUTH CAROLINA 7 1SOUTH DAKOTA 1
TENNESSEE 9
TEXAS 364
UTAH 4 1VERMONT 1
VIRGINIA 11
WASHINGTON 101WEST VIRGINIA 3
WISCONSIN 8
WYOMING 1
GAINEDSEATS
LOST SEATS
{ NO CHANGE
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 7WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
I N Y 29
C, 28 30, redistricting
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Partisan gerrymandering
. Incumbent protection gerrymandering, bipartisan sweetheart ,
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RELATED TOPICS: A Vote for DC
Washington, DC is apportioned one ederal
representative sort o. Rep. Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Washingtons at-large delegate in
the House o Representatives, may sit on
committees and participate in debate, but she
is not allowed to vote.
Many Americans have joined the citizens o
the District o Columbia almost 600,000
people in agitating or change, so that the
Districts residents will no longer suer
taxation without representation.
Despite what some believe to be constitutional
uncertainty, there is increasing support or a
ederal bill that would grant the District a vote.
One version o this bill would, in return, grant
an additional representative to the state next in
line or a seat.9
In 2009, that state was Utah. Utah also be-
lieved that it was denied adequate representa-
tion; the State claimed that many o its citizens
were not counted in the 2000 Census because
they were overseas at the time (or example,
on missions on behal o the Mormon church),
and that the States true population would have
merited an additional representative.10
IOWA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
5
14
2
3
1 9 9 2
1
2
5 3
4
2 0 0 2
SOURCE: IOWA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING8 WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
A BRIEF HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING
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In the 1780s, Patrick Henrytried to drawcongressional district lines to keep James
Madison out o oce.
THE 1812 GERRYMANDER
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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING10
II. WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 11
ELIMINATING INCUMBENTS
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ELIMINATING CHALLENGERS
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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
ILLIN OIS CON GRE S S ION AL 1 , 2002
BARACKOBAMAS
RESIDENCE
BARACK OBAMAS
RESIDENCE
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING12
PACKING PARTISANS
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DILUTING MINORITY VOTES
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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
TE XAS CON GRE S S ION AL 6
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 13
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SPLITTING COMMUNITIES
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WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING16
III. WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
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.37
WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
Redistricting will ollow the 2010 Census. In
most states, the 2012 elections will be the
rst ones conducted using the newly drawn
districts.
RELATED TOPICS:
Re-redistricting Litigation & Legislation
In 2003, just two years ater a court redrew
Texas congressional district lines, the Texas
legislature redrew the lines again. A challenge
made its way to the Supreme Court, but the
Court reused to strike down the re-redistricting
as unconstitutional.42
In the wake o the Texas
re-drawing, three ederal bills were introduced
that would have prohibited states rom redraw-
ing congressional districts more than once per
decade.43
RELATED TOPICS: Census Count
The ocial Census count determines how
many ederal representatives each state gets,
and is usually essential or allocating state
representatives to dierent parts o the state.
There is evidence, however, that minorities,
children, low-income individuals, and renters
are systematically undercounted, resulting in
underrepresentation in the legislature.38
Moreover, incarcerated people who are
disproportionately minorities and poor are
generally counted where they are imprisoned,
infating representation o prison districts and
diluting the voting power o the prisoners home
communities.39
In 2010, Delaware, Maryland,
and New York passed legislation to count
people in prison at their prior home address
or redistricting purposes.40
Similar bills were
introduced in Congress, and in at least six other
states, during the 2009 or 2010 legislative
sessions.41
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 17
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WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
REDRAWING STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
{ ONCE PER DECADE
{ AT ANY TIME
{ UNCLEAR
{ NO LAW
REDRAWING CONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS
{ ONCE PER DECADE
{ AT ANY TIME
{ UNCLEAR
{ NO LAW
DE
RI
DE
RI
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WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING20
IV. WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
E
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WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
The legislature draws district lines in most
states. Some states have an advisory com-
mission to suggest lines to the legislature;
others use a backup commission in case thelegislature cant come to an agreement. Still
others give all power to a commission either
a politician commission that can include
legislators, or an independent commission
where legislators dont have a vote.
In the gures below, blue and red represent
partisan commissioners; orange represents
commissioners chosen by members o both
parties. Outline circles will not be current
legislators; solid circles may be anyone.
IOWA
MAIN E
NEW YORK
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 21
F backup commission (C-
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S,
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S H R, A G,
C P A, C G
L O .55
InIllinois,thebackupcommissionhaseightmemberschosenbytheleg-
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S, A G.58
InColorado,thecommissionhasfourmemberspickedbythelegisla-
, G, C
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InNewJersey,eachmajorpartysstatechairselectsvecommissioners.
I 10 ,
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60
InMissouri,thelinesforeachhouseofthelegislaturearedrawnbya
. T M
18 ;
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70% .61
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
ILLIN OIS
TE XAS
MISSOURI STATE HOUSE
N E W J E RS E Y
COLORADO
ARKAN S AS
ORE GON
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING22
F, independent
commissions
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H j , C J
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InArizona,thefourlegislativemajorityandminorityleaderseachchoose
25 j. T
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InCalifornia,stateauditorschoose20Democrats,20Republicans,and
20 ,
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( D, R, ). A
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InIdaho,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner,and
, .66
InMontana,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner,
. T -
.67
InWashington,thefourlegislativeleaderseachchooseonecommissioner;
, .
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2/3
2% .68
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
ARIZON A
COMMISSIONS F OR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
{ INDEPENDENT
{ POLITICIAN
{ ADVISORY
{ BACKUP
DE
RI
COMMISSIONS FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
{ INDEPENDENT
{ POLITICIAN
{ ADVISORY
{ BACKUP
DE
RI
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 23
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commissions .72 S
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WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING24
CHOICES INFLUENCING WHODRAWS THE LINES
B ,
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ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE
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WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
It is useul to consider the ollowing actors in
deciding who draws the lines: Roleofthelegislature
Roleofindividuallegislators
Partisanship
Votingrule
Size
Diversity
Roleofthecourts
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 25
ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING26
PARTISANSHIP
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 27
VOTING RULE
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jority: j .86 I M, 2/3
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WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING28 WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
2000 CYCLE, COURT INVOLVEMENTIN STATE LEGISL ATIVE DISTRICTS
{ COURT DREW
LINES ITSELF
{ COURT OVER-
TURNED PLAN
2000 CYCLE, COURT INVOLVEMENTIN CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
{ COURT DREW
LINES ITSELF
ROLE OF THE COURTS
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 29
COMMISSIONS USE D TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRI CTS1
WHO SELECTS COMMISSIONERS OTHER RESTRICTIONS ONCOMMISSIONERS
STRUCTURE
ak Independent
Commission
1998 5 Governor selects 2 :: Legislative majority leadersselect 1 each :: Chie Justice selects 1
1 commissioner rom each o 4 judicial districts
:: Cannot be public employee or ofcial ::Cannot use party afliation to select commissioner
ar Politician
Commission
1936 3 Governor, Secretary o State, Attorney General are the commissioners
az Independent
Commission
2000 5 Commission on appellate court appointments
nominates 25 (10 rom each major party, 5 rom
neither major party) :: Legislative majority andminority leaders select 1 each :: Those 4 commis-sioners select 1 tiebreaker not registered with party
o any o 4 commissioners
At most 2 commissioners rom the same party
:: At most 2 o frst 4 commissioners rom samecounty :: No public ofce or 3 years beoreappointment :: Cannot have switched party inlast 3 years
ca Independent
Commission
2008 14 State auditor panel nominates 3 pools o 20 (20
rom each major party, 20 rom neither) :: Legisla-tive majority and minority leaders each strike 2
rom each pool :: Randomly choose 8 (3 romeach major party, 2 rom neither) :: Those 8 com-
missioners choose 6 others (2 rom each majorparty, 2 rom neither)
5 commissioners rom each major party, 4 rom
neither; cannot have switched party in last 5 years
:: Must represent geographic, racial, ethnic diver-sity :: Must have voted in 2 o last 3 state elections:: Not ofcial/candidate, party ofcer, employee/
consultant to campaign/party/legislator, lobbyist,or campaign donor > $2,000 in last 10 years :: Notsta, consultants, contractors or state or ederal
government
co Politician
Commission
1974 11 Legislative majority and minority leaders select 1
each :: Governor selects 3 :: Chie Justice selects 4At most 6 commissioners rom the same party
:: At most 4 can be members o state assembly ::At least 1 /at most 4 rom each congressional district
ct Backup
Commission
1976 9 Legislative majority and minority leaders
select 2 each :: Those 8 commissioners select1 tiebreaker
Must be elector o state
hi Politician
Commission
1968 9 Legislative majority and minority leaders select
2 each :: 6 o those 8 commissioners agree on1 tiebreaker
None
ia Advisory
Commission
1980 Bureau Nonpartisan bureau draws lines or legislature to approve
id Independent
Commission
1994 6 Legislative majority and minority leaders select
1 each :: State party chairs o two major partiesselect 1 each
Must be registered voter in state :: Not lobbyistor 1 year beore appointment :: Not ofcial/candi-date or 2 years beore
il Backup
Commission
1980 8 (9 i tie) Legislative majority and minority leaders select
1 legislator and 1 non-legislator each :: Tiebreakerchosen i necessary by random draw rom 2 names
(1 o each party) submitted by Supreme Court
At most 4 commissioners rom the same party
me Advisory
Commission
1975 15 Senate majority and minority leaders select 2 each
:: House majority and minority leaders select3 each :: State chairs o two major parties select 1each :: Those 7 commissioners select 1 each romthe public :: Those 7 public commissioners select
1 tiebreaker
None
mo Politician
Commission
1966 House: 18
Senate: 10
House: each major party nominates 2 per
congressional district :: Governor chooses1 per party per district (or 9 districts)
Senate: each major party nominates 10 ::Governor chooses 5 per party
House: at most 1 nominee rom each state
legislative district within each congressional district
Senate: none
ms Backup
Commission
1977 5 Chie Justice, Attorney General, Secretary o State,
and the legislative majority leaders are the commissioners
1In the other states not represented in the chart, the legislature draws the district lines. In Maryland, if the legislature cannot agree on a plan, the Governor will draw
the lines; in Oregon, the Secretary of State will draw the lines; and the process elsewhere is left to the courts.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING30
COMMISSIONS USED TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (cont d)1
WHO SELECTSCOMMISSIONERS
Legislative majority and minority leaders select 1
each :: Those 4 commissioners select 1 tiebreaker
Each major party chooses 5 :: Tiebreaker choseni necessary by Chie Justice
Legislative majority leaders select 1 legislator,
1 non-legislator each :: Legislative minorityleaders select 1 each
Legislative majority and minority leaders select
1 each :: Those 4 commissioners select 1 tiebreaker
Legislative majority leaders select 3 legislators,
3 non-legislators each :: Legislative minorityleaders select 2 legislators each
Chie Justice selects 1 :: Governor selects 1 romeach major party :: Each major party selects 1
Legislative majority and minority leaders select
1 each :: Those 4 commissioners select1 nonvoting chair
OTHER RESTRICTIONSON COMMISSIONERS
2 commissioners rom west counties, 2 rom
east :: Cannot be public ofcial at the time
Selectors must give due consideration to
representation o geographical areas o state
None
Tiebreaker cannot be current public ofcial
None
Gubernatorial and party appointees must be
resident o state or last 5 years
Must be registered voter :: Not lobbyist or1 year or ofcial/candidate or 2 years beore
appointment
STRUCTURE
mt Independent
Commission
nj Politician
Commission
ny Advisory
Commission
oh Politician
Commission
ok Backup
Commission
pa Politician
Commission
ri Advisory
Commission
tx Backup
Commission
vt Advisory
Commission
wa Independent
Commission
YEAR SIZE
1972 5
1966 10 (11 i tie)
1978 6
1967 5
1964 3
1968 5
2001 16
1948 5
1965 5
1982 5
Governor, State Auditor, Secretary o State are the commissioners ::Each major partys legislative leaders select 1 other commissioner
Attorney General, Superintendent o Public Instruction, State Treasurer are the commissioners
Lt. Governor, Attorney General, Comptroller o Public Accounts, Commissioner o the General Land
Ofce, and the House majority leader are the commissioners
1
In the other states not represented in the chart, the legislature draws the district lines. In Maryland, if the legislature cannot agree on a plan, the Governor will drawthe lines; in Oregon, the Secretary of State will draw the lines; and the process elsewhere is left to the courts.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 31
STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTR ICTS: WHO DR AWS THE LINES
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ak Independent Commission
al Legislature
ar Politician Commission
az Independent Commission
ca Independent Commission
co Politician Commission
ct Backup Commission
de Legislature
fl Legislature
ga Legislature
hi Politician Commission
ia Advisory Commission
id Independent Commission
il Backup Commission
in Legislature
ks Legislature
ky Legislature
la Legislature
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2001 CYCLEPARTISAN CONTROL
1
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democrat2
Democrat
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement, bipartisan
backup commission drew lines*
Democratic Governor,
Democratic Senate,Republican House
Republican
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House ::
no legislative agreement,Democratic backup commission
drew lines*
Democratic Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House
Republican
Democratic Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
STATE SUPREMECOURT REVIEW
I citizen asks
I citizen asks
I registered voter asks
Automatic
I registered voter asks
Automatic
I registered voter asks
I qualifed elector asks
Automatic
1Control by one party or another does not guarantee a partisan result, and bipartisan control does not preclude a result biased in favor of one party or another. This
table lists only the inputs into the process.
2In 2000, the legislature was responsible for drawing Californias state legislative districts. The independent commission (with a partisan balance) was authorized in
2008, and will be active for the first time in the 2011 cycle.
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING32
STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ma Legislature
md Legislature
me Advisory Commission
mi Legislature
mn Legislature
mo Politician Commission
ms Backup Commission
mt Independent Commission
nc Legislature
nd Legislature
ne Legislature
nh Legislature
nj Politician Commission
nm Legislature
nv Legislature
ny Advisory Commission
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
2001 CYCLEPARTISAN CONTROL
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Democrat
Independent Governor,
split Senate, Democratic House ::no legislative agreement on Senate
districts, court drew lines*
Republican
Independence Party Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican House ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Bipartisan :: no commissionagreement, backup judicialcommission drew lines*
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democrat
Republican
Republican Governor,
Nonpartisan Legislature
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature ::
legislative plan vetoed,court drew lines*
Republican3
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature ::legislative plan or House districts
vetoed, court drew lines*
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic Assembly
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic Assembly
STATE SUPREMECOURT REVIEW
I registered voter asks
I citizen asks
I qualifed elector asks
I citizen asks
3Although the commissions tiebreaker, Professor Larry Bartels, was selected by the state supreme courts Republican Chief Justice, Professor Bartels was not
affiliated with either major party, and announced that he would vote based on criteria designed to foster part isan balance. Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels, 1
Election L.J. 7, 9-11 (2002).
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 33
STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
oh Politician Commission
ok Backup Commission
or Legislature
pa Politician Commission
ri Advisory Commission4
sc Legislature
sd Legislature
tn Legislature
tx Backup Commission
ut Legislature
va
Legislature
vt Advisory Commission
wa Independent Commission
wi Legislature
wv Legislature
wy
Legislature
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
2001 CYCLEPARTISAN CONTROL
Republican
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,
Democratic Secretary o
State drew lines*
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature ::
legislative plan vetoed,court drew lines*
Republican
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,
Republican backup commission
drew lines*
Republican
Republican
Democratic Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican House
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican Assembly ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Democrat
Republican
STATE SUPREMECOURT REVIEW
On request
I qualifed elector asks
I qualifed elector asks
I aggrieved person asks
I 5 or more electors ask
Automatic i plan is late,
or i registered voter asks
4In 2001, Rhode Island created an advisory commission to assist with the particularly sensitive task of redistricting an assembly that had been downsized from
50 Senators and 100 Representatives to 38 Senators and 75 Representatives. It is not clear whether this advisory commission will be utilized again in the future.
See 2001 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.315; Parella v. Montalbano, 899A.2d 1226 (R.I. 2006).
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING34
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ak
Independent Commission
al Legislature
ar Politician Commission
az Independent Commission
ca Independent Commission
co Politician Commission
ct
Backup Commission
de Legislature
fl Legislature
ga Legislature
hi Politician Commission
ia Advisory Commission
id
Independent Commission
il Backup Commission
in Legislature
ks Legislature
STRUCTURE FORCONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS
1 congressional district
Legislature
Legislature
Independent Commission
Independent Commission
Legislature
Backup Commission
1 congressional district
Legislature
Legislature
Politician Commission
Advisory Commission
Independent Commission
Legislature
Backup Commission
Legislature
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
2001 CYCLE PARTISANCONTROL FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
n/a
Democrat
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Bipartisan
Democrat5
Republican Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican House ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Republican Governor,Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement,
bipartisan backup commission
drew lines*
n/a
Republican
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House
Democratic Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,
Democratic backup commission6
drew lines*
Republican
5In 2000, t he legislature was responsible for drawing Californias congressional districts. The independent commission (with a partisan balance) was introduced in
2010, and will be active for the first time in the 2011 cycle.
6In Indiana, when the legislature cannot agree, congressional lines are drawn by a five-person backup commission composed of the majority leader and the chair of
the apportionment committee in each legislative chamber, and a member of the assembly appointed by the Governor. In 2001, there were three Democrats and two
Republicans on the commission. See Ind. Code 3-3-2-2; Mary Beth Schneider, Panel Adopts New Congressional Maps, Indianapolis Star, May 11, 2001.
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othecases, a court took over.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 35
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ky
Legislature
la Legislature
ma Legislature
md Legislature
me Advisory Commission
mi Legislature
mn Legislature
mo Politician Commission
ms Backup Commission
mt
Independent Commission
nc Legislature
nd Legislature
ne Legislature
nh Legislature
nj Politician Commission
nm Legislature
STRUCTURE FORCONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Advisory Commission
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
1 congressional district
Legislature
1 congressional district
Legislature
Legislature
Politician Commission7
Legislature
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n/a
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
2001 CYCLE PARTISANCONTROL FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
Democratic Governor,Republican Senate,
Democratic House
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
(veto overridden)
Democrat
Independent Governor,
split Senate, Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Republican
Independence Party Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican House ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Democratic Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House
Democrat ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
n/a
Democrat
n/a
Republican Governor,
nonpartisan Legislature
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,
court drew lines*
7New Jersey uses a different politician commission for its congressional districts: the majority and minority leaders and the major state party chairs select 2
commissioners each (none of whom may be a member or employee of Congress), and those 12 commissioners select a tiebreaker by majority vote.
N.J. Const. art. II, 2, 1.
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING36
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: WHO DRAWS THE LINES (contd)
STRUCTURE FOR STATELEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
nv
Legislature
ny Advisory Commission
oh Politician Commission
ok Backup Commission
or Legislature
pa Politician Commission
ri Advisory Commission9
sc Legislature
sd Legislature
tn Legislature
tx Backup Commission
ut Legislature
va Legislature
vt Advisory Commission
wa Independent Commission
wi Legislature
wv Legislature
wy Legislature
STRUCTURE FORCONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS
Legislature
Advisory Commission
Advisory Commission
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Advisory Commission
Legislature
1 congressional district
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
Legislature
1 congressional district
Independent Commission
Legislature
Legislature
1 congressional district
GOVERNOR CANVETO PLAN?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n/a
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n/a
No
Yes
Yes
n/a
2001 CYCLE PARTISANCONTROL FORCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
Republican Governor,Republican Senate,
Democratic Assembly
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic Assembly
Republican8
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature ::
legislative plan vetoed,court drew lines*
Republican
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Democratic Governor,
Republican Legislature ::legislative plan vetoed,
court drew lines*
n/a
Republican Governor,
Democratic Legislature
Republican Governor,
Republican Senate,
Democratic House ::no legislative agreement,
court drew lines*
Republican
Republican
n/a
Bipartisan
Republican Governor,
Democratic Senate,
Republican Assembly
Democrat
n/a
8When Ohios congressional redistricting took longer than expected, the legislature had to pull together a 2/3 majority to pass the plan as an emergency bill,
which would take effect in time to avoid an expensive supplemental primary for congressional seats alone. See Lee Leonard, Redistricting Compromise Reached,
columbus dispatch, Jan. 18, 2002.
9This advisory commission was created to assist with redistricting given a reduction in the overall size of the legislature. It is not clear whether this advisory
commission will be utilized again in the future. See the description above in the table of state legislative redistricting structures.
* In these states, the primary decision maker did not agree on district lines before the states deadline. In some cases, a backup commission drew the lines; in othercases, a court took over.
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HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING40 HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
V. HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
I ,
.
STARTING POINT
A
, , ,
. I ,
. S, ,
,
V R A ( ). O -
, j .101
TIMING
T . T C
A 1 :
1991, 2001, 2011, .102 I ,
; , ,
, ,
: 1992, 2002, 2012, .103
T j
. M
: X, Y, Z, .
S , ,
A.104
I ,
. I ,
.
T
. F ,
,
. I
, ,
, j
.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 41HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
RELATED TOPICS: The Role of Technology
Given more than a ew competing objectives, it
is dicult to program a computer to draw district
lines on its own but in the right hands, computers
are still extremely useul redistricting tools.
Geographic Inormation Systems (GIS) sot-
ware assigns political and demographic data
to points or regions o maps, and will allow
even less experienced users to draw district
lines on-screen with instant eedback aboutthe composition o the district.
Several packages are commercially available;
some states will make data or these packages
available over the Internet, so that private
parties can plan districts just as the states do.
Moreover, several individuals or organizations
have announced plans to make basic redistrict-
ing sotware reely available to the public in
the 2011 cycle; these packages are currently in
development.
TRANSPARENCY
I ,
. T ,
, .
D , , .
I 2010, .105
S . I
2002, 26 -
, 18 -
.106 M
.107 T .108 T
.
C ,
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.109
C ,
j . T -
,
. T ,
.110
L , . I ,
z -. A
j
,
.
O , , z
. M,
. P
.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING42
Because discretion can be abused, some
have suggested eliminating discretion. But
such tight constraints are rarely neutral,
and oten have predictable, and potentially
undesirable, eects.
HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
DISCRETION AND CONSTRAINT
F, . A ,
.
T , - ,
- .S
. S
,
j.111
T
. A, ,
. V .
M
.112 F ,
1969, H C B S M z ;
A-A
, , J.113
M,
. T
, j
.
F, ,
. T
X
Y. A
who .
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING44
Except or rare cases, congressional districts
must have almost exactly the same popula-
tion. In contrast, the biggest and smallest
state legislative districts can generally havea population dierence o up to 10%.
VI. WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
T
. , C
. I , . A ,
,
. W
.
EQUAL POPULATION
F 18, 19, 20 ,
, .114 A
, ,
, . B
1960, , C (L A C) 422 .115
I ,
, . I
, . T
,
. I C , ,
S. A , z
422 z L A C.
I 1962 one person, one vote ,
S C C. N, , .116
T
. I 1964, S C
,
. 117 I , -
,
j.118
F , S C .
T .119 T
S C
. O , ,
( total deviation) 10%
.120 T : ,
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
States consider some or all o the ollowing
criteria when deciding where the lines should
be drawn:
Equalpopulation Minorityrepresentation
Contiguity
Compactness
Politicalboundaries
Communitiesofinterest
Electoraloutcomes
RELATED TOPICS: Measure of Population
Each congressional districts population is
based on the total number o residents, including
children, noncitizens, and others not eligible
to vote.121
For state legislative districts, however, the
law is less settled: most states count the total
population, but some have proposed using
voting-age population (VAP) or citizen
voting-age population (CVAP).122
These latter measures tend to equalize the
voting power o each ballot, but leave many
taxpaying residents under-represented.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 45WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
CALCULATING EQUAL POPULATION
DISTRICT # POPULATION DEVIATION
1 1,010 + 1.0 %
2 1,035 + 3.5 %
3 980 - 2.0 %
4 940 - 6.0 %
5 1,005 + 0.5 %
6 990 - 1.0 %
7 965 - 3.5 %
8 1,020 + 2.0 %
9 1,050 + 5.0 %
10 995 - 0.5 %
Total population:10,000
Average (ideal) population: 1,000
Average deviation: 2.5 %
Total deviation: 11.0 %
10%
,123 ,
j 10%.124 B 10%
.
A . S , : C,
, 5%
,125 M,
2%.126 I 5% and 1%,
.127
S .
F ,
: 10%
10% , 20%
20% , .128
T ,
.
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. R
.
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O ,
: z,
. R ,
. F,
z
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, z
,
-z .
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING46
MINORITY REPRESENTATION
T -
: ,
, . T S C
C z -
.129 A C
V R A.130
T V R A C P L
J 1965. A , V R A
, j
.
T V R A
A A
. A . T A-A
, 99 A 650 .131 A
, 9,000 A-A ,
5,000 L H , A P
A N A . 132
S V R A ,
. V R A
: S 2 ( )
S 5 ( 2006).133
SECTION 2
S 2
, ,
.134 I 1982, C S 2 , ,
.135 A vote dilution.
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. I ,
j-
; , ,
, z
.136 (S ,
, 57-59).
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
RELATED TOPICS: Race and the Census
In 2000, the Census expanded the way in
which it accounted or identity, by allowing a
respondent to check multiple categories indi-
cating her race or ethnicity.
Beore 2000, redistricting data contained 9
racial and ethnic categories; now, there are 126
distinct categories to consider. In 2001, the
Department o Justice explained that it would
usually consider individuals with a multi-racial
identity as belonging to each indicated minority
group or Voting Rights Act purposes. Thus, a
voter checking both Black and White would be
tallied with the Black population when analyzing
minority voting opportunities; a voter check-
ing both Hispanic and Black would be tallied
with rst Hispanic and then Black populations
when analyzing minority voting opportunities.137
The Act also assesses whether minorities are
politically cohesive, including questions about
whether Hispanic Black voters tend to vote
dierently than other Hispanic or Black voters
in the area.
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LEGISLATORS
700
500
300
100
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
SIGNING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
SOURCE: YOICHI R. OKAMOTO, LBJ LIBRARY COLL.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 47
Section 2requiresstatestodrawdistricts
where minorities have the opportunity to elect
a candidate o their choice i there is:
1. Large, compact minority population
2.Politicallycohesiveminorityvoting
3. Politicallycohesivemajorityvoting
deeating minority candidates
+
Totality o the circumstances showing
diminished minority voting power
In majority-minoritydistricts,themajorityof
the voters are rom the same minority racial
or ethnic group. Some also include minority
coalition districts in which more than 50%
o the voters are rom two or more dierent
minority groups, particularly i the dierent
groups tend to vote in a similar pattern.
Inminority opportunitydistricts, minoritieshave the opportunity to elect a representative
oftheirchoice.Theseareusuallymajority-
minority districts, but inminority crossoverdistricts, minority voters might comprise less
than 50% o the district, and still elect their
chosen representatives with support rom
some crossover white voters.
In minority infuence districts, minorities
constituteasizableportionofthedistrict,
but cannot control the result o an election.
There is substantial debate about the extent
to which minority voters actually infuencepolicy in such districts.
S 2 . I
, ,
opportunity to elect its candidate o choice,
. W
S 2,
, :
aminoritypopulationissucientlygeographicallycompact(thatis,living
) ;138
theminoritypopulation(usually,thecitizenvoting-ageminoritypopulation)
-z ;139
theminoritypopulationispoliticallycohesivethatis,itwouldusually
;
themajoritypopulationwouldusuallyvoteasablocforadierentcan-
, -
,
.140
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10% 10%
.143 I , ,
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majority-minority districts, -
j . T - ,
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. 144
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING48
SECTION 5
S 5 V R A ,
.145 I covered j
A A
. I , S 5
1964, 1968, 1972.
F S 5, V R A
, D J
W, D.C., .
T
. I
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N (1)
, (2) ,
.146 U S 5,
j ,
,
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S 5, bailout.148
BEYOND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
O S 2 S 5
V R A,
-
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-
,
, ,
149
. T
.150 I, ,
,
, .
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Section 5requiresareaswithhistorically
low registration or voting rates to clear new
districtlineswiththeDepartmentofJusticeor
theWashington,D.C.federalcourt.Thenew
lines must leave minority voters no worse o
than beore.
S E CTION 5 OF THEVOTING RIGHTS ACT
{ COVERED
{ PARTIALLY
COVERED
See Appendix B or more detail.
RELATED TOPICS: Beyond Bartlett
The Supreme Courts 2009 decision in Bartlett
v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009), limited
redistricting protection under Section 2 o the
Voting Rights Act, to minority communities that
are at least 50% o a district-sized population.
However, smaller minority communities may
still be protected under Section 5 o the Act;
also, redistricters may still choose to consider
lines that (among other eects) keep smaller
minority communities together, as long as race
and ethnicity are not the predominant rea-
sons or the districts boundaries. Some states
are considering explicit state protections or
smaller minority communities beyond Bartlett,
which would supplement the protection thatlarger communities get under ederal law.
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 49
RELATED TOPICS: Cumulative Voting
In the most amiliar American elections, voters
make an either/or choice or one representative
per district, and the candidate with the most
total votes (the plurality) is the exclusive winner.
An alternative to this system is cumulative
voting: several representatives are elected
rom the same district, and a voter has multiple
votes, which she may give all to one candidate,
or spread among several candidates.
Cumulative voting is now used in more than
50 local communities, like Peoria, Illinois and
Amarillo, Texas.151
In 2010, Port Chester, New
York, implemented cumulative voting ater a
Voting Rights Act lawsuit, and or the rst time
ever, Latino citizens candidate o choice was
eleced to the towns Board o Trustees.
STATE VOTING RIGHTS ACTS
S ,
, V R A. T
[ ]
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C state voting rights act
.153 A , C
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, (..,
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.
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
EFFECT OF VOTING RIGHTS ACTS,100 MINORITY / 200 MAJORITY VOTERS
AT-LARGE (1 VOTE PER SEAT)
SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3
Majority 200 200 200Minority 100 100 100
DISTRICTS (VRA) (1 VOTE TOTAL)
SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3
Majority 35 80 85
Minority 65 20 15
VOTING RULE (CVRA)(3 VOTES EACH)
SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3
Majority 200 200 200
Minority 300 0 0
CUMULATIVE BALLOT
YOU MAY OFFER UP TO 3 VOTES
1 2 3
R. Engstrom
L. Guinier { {
S. Mulroy
R. Richie {
RESULTS
2 votes or Guinier, 1 vote or Richie
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING50
CONTIGUITY
A C ,156 -
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
WI ASSEMB LY 61
RACINE
WA CONGRESSIONAL 2
NY SENATE 60
N J CON GRE S S ION AL 1 3
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 51
COMPACTNESS
C z ,
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
COMPACT NOT COMPACT
POLSBY-POPPER MEASURE
S OME ME AS URE S OF D IS PE RS ION
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING52
S population
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(
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
FLORIDA CONGRESSIONALD IS TRICT 3, 1 992
SOURCE: ELECTION DATA SERVICES, INC.
POPULATION CENTER OF GRAVITY
GEOGRAPHIC
CENTER
POPULATION
CENTER
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 53
O ,
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Compactnessrequirementscaneither embrace
or carve up communities, depending on how
spread out the particular voters are.
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING54
POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES
I , S C
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
TOWNSHIPS IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, OH
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 55
O , .
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING56
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
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nities o interest.A
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 57
ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Everyset o district lines has a predictable
electoral impact.
CRACKIN G
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING58
Packing j
. I ,
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R -. T
100 D , D
40 D ( 60 R)
. T D ,
.
acking
( ) . I
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46 D 44 R. I R
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
TACKING
HYPOTHETICALSTATE
PACKING
District 1 14 D 6 R
District 2 14 D 6 R
District 3 12 D 8 R
District 4 0 D 20 R
DEMOCRATIC GERRYMANDER
RE PUBLICAN GE RRYMAN D E R
District 1 8 D 12 R
District 2 20 D 0 R
District 3 6 D 14 R
District 4 6 D 14 R
District 1 9 D 11 R
District 2 15 D 5 R
District 3 8 D 12 R
District 4 8 D 12 R
RE PUBLICAN GE RRYMAN D E R
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 59
S - any , . I
,
,
. A ,
, ,
.
B ,
.
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partisan bias.192 S
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R 10%, ,
D 10%. A-
, -
.194
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
RELATED TOPICS:
Proportional Representation
In a system o winner take all districts, one
party or another will usually win more legislative
seats than its overall statewide support (or
example, winning 57% o the seats with 51%
o the vote).
Some other countries (and some local American
jurisdictions) orego districts, and instead use
a system o proportional representation
where 51% support translates as nearly as
possible to 51% o the legislative seats. Critics
express concern that such systems give undue
power to party insiders at the expense o voters,
and to ringe parties at the expense o main-
stream ones. Several variants o proportional
representation, with slightly dierent rules,
may mitigate these concerns.
Still other places mix the two systems, electing
some representatives rom districts and others
rom jurisdiction-wide lists, in a manner designed
to approach proportional representation in
the legislature as a whole. In America, the
Democratic Partys presidential primary system
is such a mix: some delegates allocated in the
primary process are elected proportionally
across an entire state, and some are elected
(also by proportional representation) within a
multi-member district (see the multi-member
discussion on p.65 below).
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING60
Mz ,
. I ,
.195 I ,
,
V R A,
. A ,
D.
O .
I , D
R. R
, .
T , , - . B
. I,
,
, R
P.196 F , V R A, ,
, D A-A
D , D
. T -
D . A , D
D ,
R .197 S
.198 I
D R
,
D . T
D ,
R .
W
,
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, .199 O ,
S C
C,200 J
. S
,
.
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Mostredistrictingprinciples,eveniftheyseem
unrelated to partisanship, have the potential
to lead to skewed partisan results.
MIN ORITY D IS TRICT
District 1 14 D 6 R
District 2 10 D 10 R
District 3 16 D 4 R
District 4 0 D 20 R
MAXIMUM COMPACTNESS
District 1 12 D 8 R
District 2 12 D 8 R
District 3 12 D 8 R
District 4 4 D 16 R
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 61
BIPARTISAN GERRYMANDERS AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION
J
,
-. T bipartisan gerrymanders ,
( ,
). I ,
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j .
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protection gerrymander
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R. B , R
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90% R . M
R ,
- . H, R
, jz . I
;
90% R , 70%
R
. A R
R .
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
When neither party dominates a state
legislature, the sitting politicians can create
a bipartisan gerrymanderby packing
districts with their own supporters.
D IFFE RE N T GE RRYMAND E RS
before redistricting
incumbent protection
safe partisan gerrymander
riskier gerrymander
30 - 70 45 - 55 55 - 45 62 - 38
10 - 90 10 - 90 85 - 15 87 - 13
30 - 70 30 - 70 40 - 60 92 - 8
48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING62
COMPETITION
T
. A ,
are, .203
I 2006, , 38%
j ; , 38%
, D R .204
A , 86% H R
10% ,
.205 T j
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competition.
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;
80%
.
M,
,
.207 A
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; 208
median voter theorem,
. A
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 63
,
z . F,
,
turnout
.
W
j,
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, .210
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opposing .212
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.214 F ,
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WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Because o campaign nance rules, term
limits, the natural advantages o incumbency,
andthequalityofaspeciccampaign,among
other actors, competitive districts may not
actually produce competitive elections.
MAXIMUM COMPE TITION
District 1 10 D 10 R
District 2 10 D 10 R
District 3 10 D 10 R
District 4 10 D 10 R
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A CITIZENS GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING64
. I ,
D S F B B
C.
I , j: , ,
, , . A
z each , z j, ,
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V R A.217 C -
- -
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Rather than ostering competitive districts
directly, some proposals ocus on thwarting
deliberate attempts to make districts
uncompetitive.
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
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BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 65
POLITICIANS HOMES
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