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The Politics of JustificationAuthor(s): Stephen MacedoSource: Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 280-304Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191346.
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2/26
THE
POLITICS
OF
JUSTIFICATION
STEPHENMACEDO
Harvard
University
THE
PRACTICE OF
POLITICALJUSTIFICATION
s
not
just
for
philosophers,and t does not
simply
lie
behind
as
we
may
hope)
our
political
arrangements.Commitments o reasongiving andreasondemandingnform
some
of our most valuable
political
practices.
Judicial
review,
most
obvi-
ously,
helps
ensure that
legislative
and executive acts are
reasonable
in
constitutional
erms:
In
court it is not the
fact
of
power
but the
display
of
reasonsand evidence that
counts. Not
only
the
courts,
but also
Congress
and
the
executive
branch
sometimes
(and
quite
properly)
onscientiously
ustify
their
actions
n
constitutional erms.
Constitution
side,
muchthat akes
place
in
and
around
egislatures,
elections,
and
other
political
fora can be under-
stoodas effortstojustify particular olicies andprograms.1
Liberals
demand,
as
Jeremy
Waldron
puts it, that the
social order
should
in
principle
be
capable
of
explaining
itself at the
tribunal
of
each
person's
understanding. 2
Liberal,
democratic
politics
is not only
about
individual
rightsand
limited
govemment,
it is
also about
ustification,but
not
about
any
kind of
justification
at
all. Liberal
political
ustification,
even
in
its ideal
form,
shouldbe
understood
politically
this
article
considers
why
and how.
Liberalcontractualistsypicallyseekjustifications hatarewidelyaccept-
able to
reasonable
people with
a broad
range of
moral,
philosophical,and
religious
commitments.3
he aim is
reasonable
greement:
o be
both
reason-
able
and
agreeable
n
a
widely
pluralistic
ociety.4The
appropriate
means is
a
processof
reasoning hat
s
publicly
accessible,
but
genuinely
ustificatory.
AUTHOR'S
NOTE: Thanks
to
William
Galston,
Randy
Krozsner,
Charles
Larmore,
Percy
Lehning,
HarveyC.
Mansfield,
Jr.,John
Rawls,
Judith
N. Shklar,
Mark
Tushnet, nd
Leif
Wenar,
for comments on previous drafts. The article was improved by discussions in the Harvard
Government
DepartmentPolitical
Theory
Colloquium,and
at a
symposium t
the
Instituteor
Humane
Studies.
A generous
grant
romthe
Smith
Richardson
Foundation
providedthe time
to
workon
thispiece.
POLITICAL
HEORY,ol.18
No. 2,
May1990
280-304
?
1990
Sage
Publications, nc.
280
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3/26
Macedo POLITICSOF
JUSTIFICATION
281
The
danger s
that reasonswill
be
deployed that ease
people
into
the
liberal
settlementby
masking
the
true nature
of
liberalism
as
a
regime.
In
the quest
for consensus amidst
diversity,
iberals have
a
tendency
to
minimize the
broad and
deep implicationsof liberal
politics.
Reticence
in
spelling out
the
controversial implications
of liberalism could
lead
to
a
conspiracyof
silence and the
embracement
f a
liberal
false
consciousness.
Beginning
from the desire
to
respectreasonable
persons,publicjustification
could
become
liberal
hoodwinking,
and
political
iberalismcould
come
to
reston a
noble
fib.
Liberal
public
ustification
annot
avoid
controversy:
t
engages
and
seeks
to shape
our
deepest and
most
personal values.
Liberals,
I
argue,
should
acknowledge their
partisanship
and the practical
impossibility of
perfect
convergence on
common
principles
of
justice.
A
workable
conception
of
public
justification
must
acknowledge
the
importance
of a
principled
mod-
eration
as a
core
liberal
virtue,
one
that allows
us
reasonably
o
aspire
to
public
justificationwhile
accepting
the infirmitiesof
the human
condition.
LIBERAL
UBLIC
JUSTIFICATION
The
commitment o
public
justification
reflects a desire to
regardcertain
kinds of
reasons
as
authoritativen
politics:moral
reasons
hatcan be
openly
presented
to others,
critically
defended, and
widely
shared by
reasonable
people. The
reasonsmust be
moral:
good reasons
for
others as well
as for
oneself,
not
self- or
narrowly
nterested.
They mustbe
general reasons,
ones
we areprepared o extend to relevantlysimilarcases. The reasonsmust be
public
in
the
sense of
being widely
and
openly
accessible;
appeals to inner
conviction
or
faith, special
insight,secret
nformation, r
very difficult
forms
of
reasoningare
ruledout.
Public
ustificationmust,
finally,
be critical in
that
objections
have been
soughtout
and
reasonable
altematives
confrontedor
anticipated.5
At its most
basic
level, public
justification
has dual
aims:
It seeks
reflec-
tive
justification good
reasons),but
it also
seeks
reasonsthatcan
be
widely
seen
to be
good
by
persons such as
they
are.
These dual
aims
are pursued
together o
that,
politically
speaking
at
least, there s no
independent
tandard
against
which
a
political
theorycan
be
judged.6
Participants
im
at a system
of
principles hatall
can see
to be
reasonable
not one
that
some will
regard
as
true).
Public
justification does
not
work down
from
a
prior, purely
philosophical
standard:
Political
philosophy
must
be concerned,
as
moral
philosophy
neednot be,
with
practicalpolitical
possibilities. 7
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282
POLITICAL
THEORY
MAY
1990
The dual aims of
justification
are
consonant
with the
principled
commit-
ments
of
a
liberaldemocratic
ociety: By
pursuing
both
together,
we
respect
not
only the
goodness
of
good
reasons,
but
also the freedomand
equality
of
citizens whose
capacity
for reason is limited and
who
espouse
widely
divergent
comprehensive
views.8
Indeed,
the
goodness
of
good
reasons,for
a political
heory,
becomes
entirely
a function of
their
capacity
to
gain
widespread
agreement among
reasonable
people
moved
by
a
desire for
reasonable
agreement.9As
ThomasNagel puts it,
we should
not impose
arrangements,
nstitutions,
or
requirements
n
other
people on
grounds hat
hey
could
reasonably eject(where
reasonableness
s
not
simply
a
function
of
the
independent
ightness
or
wrongness
of the
arrangements
n
question,
but
genuinely
dependson the
point
of view
of the
individual
n
question
to
some
extent).'0
Why public
ustification?We
acknowledge,
irst
of
all,
the
permanent
act
of
diversity:
Reasonable
people
disagree
not
only
about
preferences
and
interests,
but also widely
and
deeply about
moral,
philosophical,religious,
and
other
views.
Second,
while
acknowledging
diversity,
we
respect
as
free
andequalmoral
beings
all
those
who pass
certain
hreshold
ests of reason-
ableness:We
respect hose
whose
disagreementwith us does not
impugn
heir
reasonableness.
We try to
distinguish,
finally,
between
intractable
philo-
sophical
and
religious issues and
other
problemsthat
are
both more
urgent
(at
least from
a liberal
perspective)and
easier
to
grapplewith.'2We
urgently
need
agreementon
certain
practical
problems:
securing basic
liberties
and
establishing
air principles
of
distribution.'3
here are,
says
Rawls, reason-
able and
generally
acceptableanswers
or only a
few
questionsof
political
justice; political
wisdom
consists
in
identifying hose
few,
and
among
them
the
most
urgent.
4
Public
justification
embodies a
complex form
of
respect for
persons:It
respects
both our capacity
for a
shared
reasonableness,
ut also
what Rawls
calls the
burdens
of
reason. '5
eople
disagreefor a
variety of
reasonsthat
do not
impugn their
reasonablenessor
undermine heir claim
to
respect.
Public justification
offers,
therefore,a
way of
acceptingthe
infirmities
of
reasonablecitizens and of respectingthem, blemishesand all. Moralargu-
ments are,
after all,
complex and the
relevant
evidence is often
difficult to
assess
and
weigh
appropriately.
he conceptsof
political
moralityare
inher-
ently abstract
and
vague.
Our judgments
are
inevitably
somewhat
subjec-
tive-shaped, that
s, by a
totalityof
personal
experiencesthat are
boundto
differ
from
one person to
another.
Moral values
are
diverse,
and different
ones
often
weigh
in
on
both
sides of moral
issues.
Particular
political
institutions
and
policies cannot
embody
all
values: We must
make
hard
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5/26
Macedo
POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION
283
choices and be
selective.16
Moral evaluation is a
complex
and
difficult
business,
so
convergence
on common
political
principles
is bound to
be
arduous;
t is
only
reasonable o
accept
the fact
of
reasonable
disagreement.
Public
justification
plays
a
representative
ole:
mediating,
n
effect,
be-
tween
philosophyand
the
citizenry
(representing hilosophy
to citizens and
citizens to
philosophy). 7
he
public conception
avoids
excessively subtle
andcomplex
forms
of
reasoning,preferring rguments
hatnot
only
aresound
but
such
that
they
can be
publicly
seen to be
sound. '8
Public
justification
respects the
constraints
of
simplicity and availability
of
information,
moderating he aims of
philosophyso as to ensure
the wide
accessibility
of
the relevant forms of
reasoning
and evidence: These
should be not
too
difficult
and
(if
possible)
not
too deeply at odds
with
firmly
held and not
unreasonable iews. 9With its
significantly public
standard
of
reasonable-
ness, the political conception
fosters trustand
promotescooperation.20
nd
it expressesthe
need to perform
ertainurgent asks
without
waiting
to
settle
deep
and
intractable
disputes.2'
Public
justification embodies the philosophical
impetus toward
critical
reflection in a qualified form.These qualificationsmay strike us at first as
odd,
and
indeed as inconsistent with
certain
liberal institutions.Judicial
review
elevates
the political authority f courts,
authority hat
lows from
the
capacity
to
recognize good reasons and
make
good arguments.And so,
Michael
Walzer charges that
Judicialreview is the
crucial institutional
device
through
which
the
philosophicalconquest
of
politics
takes
effect. 22
Taking
eriously he public
natureof liberal ustification oftens
the supposed
antidemocratic endency of
judicial review,
and allows us to see that the
authority fjudgesis notautomaticna liberaldemocratic ociety: They gain
authorityby
disceming
interpretationsf the fundamentalaw
whose reason-
ableness
can be
widely
seen.23
This
public
conception of justification
construesthe ends
and means of
justification
n
a
way
that
accords
with
ourbroader ommitment
o respecting
the
freedom and
equality of
persons. Having
done so, it honestly acknowl-
edges the
substantive
qualificationsbuilt into the idea of a
public moral
justification
namely,
hat t
does not aim to identifywhat are
simply the best
reasons, where best is a function of only the quality of the reasons as
reasons
eaving
aside the constraints f wide
accessibility).24
Given
a
polity
with a
widespread capacity
for
reasonableness
and a
general
commitment to
liberal
principles, it seems
to
me
right to say that
the
best
political
ustificationswill be public in
the manner
described.25 nd
yet,
the
concessions that
public
justification
makes to accessibility should
not be
confused
with
other,more political and
problematic
oncessions that
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6/26
284
POLITICAL
THEORY
MAY
1990
some
liberals
might
be
disposed
to
make
in
the face
of
disagreement
and
controversy.
POLITICIZING
USTIFICATION?
To
smooth the
way for
a
practical
political settlement
a
convergence
of
reasonable
people
on
common
principles
of
justice
liberals
too often
min-
imize
the
broad
and
deep
ramifications
of
liberalism. The
question
is,
Rawlssays, what s theleast thatmustbe asserted;and f itmustbe asserted,
what is its
least
controversial
orm? 26
his liberal
reticence,
I
shall
suggest,
grows
out of
a
desire
for
widespread
agreement,but also
flirts
with
a kind
of
liberal false
consciousness.
Liberals
should,
I
shall
argue,
be
candid about
their
partisanships,
open
in their
arguments,
and
explicit
on
the need
for
principled
moderation.
By
avoiding claims o
universal
ruth,
r
claims
about he
essential
nature
and
identity of
persons,
Rawls
asserts, the
political
conception
of liberal
justification
extends the
principleof
toleration o
the ultimate
questions
of
philosophy
itself.27
Justice
as
fairness
deliberately
stays
on
the
surface ;
political
justification
seeks
only to
identify the kernel of
overlapping
consensus
likely
to be
affirmed
by
each of
the
opposing
comprehensive
moral
doctrines n
a
reasonably
ust
society.28
The
liberalismof
overlapping
consensus
avoids close
links with
com-
prehensive
moral
deals:
dealsthat
nclude
conceptions f
what is
of
value
in
human
life,
ideals
of
personal
virtue
and
character,
and
the like,
that
are to inform
much
of
our
nonpolitical
conduct
(in the limit
of
our life as a
whole). 29
As
Charles
Larmoreputs
it,
we do
better
to
recognize
that lib-
eralism s
not a
philosophyof
man, but a
philosophy
of
politics. 30
nd
so,
we
adopt
a
conception
of the
person
framed as part
of,
and
restricted
o,
an
explicitly
political
conceptionof
justice....
[Plersons
can
accept
this
conception
of
themselvesas
citizens
and
use it
when
discussing
questions
of
political ustice
withoutbeing
committed
in
other
parts
of
their ife to
comprehensive
moral
dealsoften
associatedwith
liberalism,
forexample,theidealsof autonomyandindividuality.31
It is
true
enough
that,
given
the
differences
amongthe
religious
and
moral
perspectives
adopted
n
a
liberal
society,
citizens
will
have
different
reasons
for
supporting he
liberal
settlement.
And
yet,
while
we
seek
reasons
hat
are
widely
accessible and
acceptable,we
must
acknowledge he
broad
and
deep
implications
of
basic
liberal
principles
and
institutions.32
iberal
political
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7/26
Macedo
POLITICSOF
JUSTIFICATION
285
principles do not stay on
the
surface,
and their
consequences
cannot
be
confined
to a certain
sphere
of our lives.
Let
us examine how
the
various
thrustsof theminimization trategy ail.
TheBreadthand Weightof LiberalPolitical
Principles
The phrase overlapping
consensus might be taken
to underdescribe
what iberalism tands
or.Politics
is
the final recourse
or
people
who cannot
agree. People who
disagree
about
religious
beliefs
or other
commitments
mustregard ommonpoliticalprinciplesasregulativeof all their nteractions
with others. Liberalism
requires,
herefore,not merely
an
overlapping
con-
sensus but a consensus that
practically
overridesall
competing
values.33
The idea of an overlapping
onsensus does correctly
suggest
that
specif-
ically political
values need not do all the work of
supporting
he liberal
settlement or
everyone
or even
most
people.34
he
comprehensive
moral
and
religious views of
liberal citizens
may provide a
variety of values and
interests
hat
support,without forming a partof, the
sharedpolitical frame-
work: religiousconvictionsthatprizefree and openargumentn a pluralistic
environment,for
example, or atheistic man-centered
doctrines
that
prize
human
fulfillment
n
this life. Shared iberalvalues need
not themselves be
strongenough
to overrideall
competing
ones so
long
as the
weight,
as
it
were,
of liberal
and
supporting or proliberal)values
is
enough
to
outweigh
all
competing (or
antiliberal)
values and interests.
The
success and
stability
of
liberal politics depends, therefore,on
people's private
beliefs and commit-
ments
becoming
importantly iberalized becoming, that
s, congruentwith
andsupportiveof liberalpolitics.
Liberalism
provides
wide bounds
within which
people are free to settle
on
their own
religious beliefs,
aesthetic values, and so
on. And yet,
basic
liberal
principles of
respect or persons and theirrights,
for example)
wash
across
the whole
of
our
lives,
not
determining
all our
choices
but
limiting,
structuring,
nd
conditioning
our
lives as a whole.
Illiberal orms of
private
associationare
strictly
ruled
out, and manyother nterestsand
commitments
are
bound to be
discouragedby the
free, open,
pluralistic,progressive,and
(arguably) ommercialisticnatureof a liberalsociety.
Liberals
do
not,
moreover, ust sit
and hope that
personal beliefs will
become
liberalized.
In
John Locke's
Letter
ConcerningToleration, or
example,
the liberal
flag was planted
deep within the bounds of
people's
comprehensive alues.
Although
Locke denies that he
careof men's souls
is committed o civil
authority nd
emphasizes he distinctionbetween
public
and
privaterealms,
he
must appeal,nevertheless, o a
certainkind of
private
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286
POLITICAL
THEORY
MAY
1990
character:
o all Men thathave Souls
largeenough
to
prefer
he true
Interest
of the Publick
before
that
of
a
Party.
Considerthe repertoireof arguments or tolerationsupplied by Locke:
Thatsalvation
depends
on
an
inner
aiththatcannot
be
coerced,
a
distinction
between
the essential
and he nonessential
n
Christian
octrine,
he
suspicion
that
intolerance s a mere cloak for
power,
a
social
compact argument or
political
legitimacy,
and the claim that
oppression
not
liberty
eads
to
vio-
lence andrebellion.
Significantly,
Locke
crosses the
public/private
oundary
in
arguing
or
toleration,
nd
n
this
way directly
engages
and
shapes
he
most
deeply personal
concerns.
Although
such
a
strategy
may
seem
dangerous,
t
is unavoidable.
People's privatecommitments n a liberal
society
do
not
become
liberal
accidentally.
A
liberal
polity
takes
care,
in
shaping
educational
nstitutions
and
in
other ways
(such
as
promotingcommerce),
to
encourage
ts
citizens
to
adopt
a
range
of
commitments hat
support
he
liberal
political
settlement.
What
s distinctiveabouta liberal
society
is
not that
t
wholly
lacks a
tutelary
apparatus,
ut that this
apparatus
peratesgently
and
often
indirectly.35
t
is
easy for us to take the
success
of
liberalismfor
granted,
but
only
because
liberal
nstitutionshave been at work for so long.
The
Depth of
Liberal
Principles
The
notion of anoverlapping
consensus might
also suggest that
political
norms
somehow
stay on the surface,giving rise to
no deep claims
aboutthe
kind of
persons iberalism
akes us to be. Consider
Rawls's remark:
We can, as it were, enter...[the
original] position any
time simply by
reasoning for
principlesof
justice in accordancewith the enumerated
estrictions.When in
this way
we simulate
being in this position,our
reasoningno morecommitsus to a
metaphysical
doctrineaboutthe nature
of the self thanour playing a game
like monopoly
commits us
to
thinking hatwe are
landlords
ngaged in a desperate
ivalry,winner take all.36
Liberal
ustice
requiresus to be a certainsort of
personall the time.37
We do
not
play
at
being just now and
then, as we occasionallyplay
Monopoly.
No
doubt, we can often
distinguishthe public
and private
identities of
liberal
citizens:Politically
speaking,Saul of Tarsus
ettingout for
Damascus
is the
Paul who
arrivesthere.38
Likewise as
citizens,
we might support he
difference
principle (accepting
only those
inequalities that work
to the
advantage
of the
least
well-off)
while eschewing
it in our private affairs.
Nevertheless,
liberalism
presupposesthe widespreadexistence of
certain
deep character
raits.39
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9/26
Macedo POLITICSOF
JUSTIFICATION 287
Liberalism
elevates
impartial tandards
of respect
for all
persons
and
in
doing so
implies
that
people should be
capable
of
reflectively
distancing
themselves
from the
whole range of their
particular
ommitments
friend-
ships,
family ties,
business
associations-although
not on all of them
all
at
once)
for the
sake
of
interposing
mpersonal
tandards
fjustice
and
honoring
the
equal
rights
of others.It
cannotbe right o
say,
as
Rawls
does,
that iberal
citizens may, regard t is
simply
unthinkable o view themselves
apart
rom
certain
religious,
philosophical,
and moralconvictions.
0
Of
course,
critical
self-reflection s not
required
f our
personal
commit-
ments are
already
iberal
but
what guarantees hat?
The
reflective
capaci-
ties of
liberal citizens, alertto
possible conflicts between
personalcommit-
ments and
liberal rights,
should be a
central
mechanism or
preserving
and
advancing
he
cause of
justice
in
a well-ordered
ociety.
The
Dynamics of
LiberalPrinciples
There s
yet
a
thirdway
in
which
it
sometimes
seems that iberalsminimize
the reachof liberalvalues:byoveremphasizing heextent o whichliberalism
settles
basic
moral issues once
and for all. And so Rawls:
a
liberal
conceptionmeets the
urgentpolitical
requirement
o fix, once and for all,
the
contentof
basic rightsand
iberties,
and to assignthem
special priority.
Doing this
takes
those
guarantees
off the
political
agenda....41
The extent to which
liberal
values
constituteus as persons
becomes
clearer
when we considerthe dynamicqualitiesof liberalpublicjustification.
Many
basic
liberal
guaranteesnow
seem pretty
irmly
settled
in
America
(the evil
of
slavery,women's
suffrage,
he right o criticize the
govemment),
and these
might
be takenas
a
hardcore of rights
whose
fixity contributes o
public
trust
and political
stability.It
cannot be claimed,
however,
that
our
Constitution
or any
other)
managed
o
fix, once
and
for
all,
the
content
of
basic
rights and liberties.
The
contours of every one of
our most basic
liberties
remains a
matterof
lively
disagreement
and whole
categories of
rights (of homosexuals,for example)remain argelyunacknowledged.The
Constitution
did
not
so much
settle
as frame an
ongoing
debate about
the
bounds
between
individual
ibertyand government
power.
Public
justification
should be a
never-ending
commitment.It
would be
sheer
hubris o think
hatwe
have, or ever
will have,
the whole political
truth.
We are
always learningand
confronting
new circumstances;
we will
always
have
progress
to make.
Moreover, we
could
have no confidence
in
our
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10/26
288
POLITICAL
THEORY MAY
1990
reasonsfor
committingourselves to what we
understand
ustice
to
be
unless
we keep
debating
t and remain
open
to new and better
nterpretations
f
it.
We
cannothonorour statusas
reasonable
beings
unless
we remain
open
to
a
critical
dialogue
aboutthe
justifiability
of our
deepest political
conceptions,
whatever
they
may be.
Liberalism
establishes,
or
good
reason,
a
process
of
public
debate
about
itself
among other
things. Liberalsneed dissenters rom liberalism
because,
as
Mill
observed,
He
who knows
only
his
own side of the
case,
knows
little
of that. 42Not
surprisingly,
hen, closing public
debate
on basic
political
issues is
incompatiblewith our
deepest
ideals
and our
practice
of
respecting
even subversive
speech (while
drawing
a
sharp
line between
speech
and
action).43
I
do not mean to
say
that the
question
of
slavery,
for
example,
should
be
reopened.
But
the fact
thatrace
remainson our
agenda
meansthat he liberal
understanding
f this basic
issue remainsvivid and has a chance
to
grow
and
deepen.
And
because
public
justification
s
dynamic
and
open,
we can
hope
that iberal
values
will
be
tested,refined,andextendedever more
pervasively
throughoutsociety. All this means, as well, that while certain liberal
guarantees
may become
stable, the overall
patternof
rights
s
likely
to be
in
constant
motion.
Public
justification
s not a
means
only but also an
end
in
itself:
being
a
self-critical
reasongiver s the best
way of
being
a
liberal and a
good
way
(liberalsmust
suppose)of
livinga life.
The
reflective,
self-critical
capacities
we
associatewith public
justificationmust,
therefore,
be
regarded sperma-
nent
and
ever-developing
characteristics
f
liberal
citizens at their
best.
The
Method
of
Avoidance
For the
sake of
facilitating
he public
acceptance
of basic
liberal princi-
ples,
liberals
sometimes
limit the reach
and
consequencesof
liberal
princi-
ples in the
ways
we have seen.
I
have
argued, in effect,
that
liberalism
constitutes
a
regime:
Liberalprinciples
andgoals
shapeour
ives
pervasively,
deeply, and
relentlessly.
To
a
great
extent, the modes
of
limitation hat we
have
examined
so far
are
more
apparent
han
real instances
of
reticencerather han
a real
refusal
to
acknowledge
the full
implicationsof
liberalism.Rawls
finally
admits hat
liberalism
hapes
the lives of
liberal
citizens broadly
and
deeply, nfluencing
people'sdeepest
aspirations. 45 e
insists only
that
iberalism s not
fully
comprehensive
meaning that
the regime
does not
prescribe everything
about
the
lives of its
citizens)
and says that
its
broadinfluences
simply
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11/26
Macedo POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION
289
cannotbe avoided
on
any
view of political justice. 46Rawls defends the
pervasiveand nonneutral onsequencesof liberal ustice by arguing hat its
aim is to be fair to
moral
persons
(as
liberalism
understands
hem),
not to
all
conceptions
of the
good
or all
ways
of
life.47
But deep at the heart of Rawls's understanding
f
justification
lies
the
methodof avoidance, a directstrategy
o avoid
assessing
the truthor
falsity
of
deeply
held
personalviews,
such
as
religious
beliefs or other
aspects
of
people's comprehensive
moralviews:
nor need we say thatpoliticalvalues are intrinsicallymore importanthanother values
and that's
why
the other
values are overridden.
ndeed,saying
that
is
the kind
of
thing
we hope to avoid, and achieving
an
overlapping
onsensusenables us to avoid it.48
Does it
really? Can public justification
avoid making
ultimatejudgments
aboutwhich
religious beliefs,
for
example,
are
justified?
What does
a
liberal
say
about
a
range
of
religious
beliefs that
include
ecumenicalCatholicism,
undamentalist rotestantism,
nd
sects that
require
holy war againstnonbelievers?There are, says Rawls, noresourceswithin
the
political view to judge those
conflicting conceptions.They
are equally
permissible provided they respect
the limits imposed by the principles of
political justice. 49
Underline
provided :
All
religions compatible
with
liberalism will be respected;those not compatible
will
be opposed.50
The
liberal
must
in
this way imply
that religious convictions incompatible
with
liberalismare unsupportable.
In
making the personalchoice
about whetherto support iberal politics,
one wouldweigh liberalandproliberal alues against he strongestcompet-
ing package,as one sees it. (Is the
freedomto debate,choose, and live one's
own
way really
more
mportant
hanstruggling o establisha commonculture
that
supports piety and other-worldlinessand punishes blasphemers?
Is
peaceful pluralismreally more important hanthe ideal of ChristianUnity?)
To
vindicate
its overridingstatus,
a liberal political moralitywill have to
speak directlyto illiberalcomprehensivepersonal deals, arguing hat
these
are false or
less important hancompeting iberalvalues, or that they
can be
mendedand made compatiblewith liberalism.
The reticent liberal may still
try to avoid issues of truth and ultimate
importanceby excluding fromthe political space, as it were, the comparison
between
the
political conception
and conflicting comprehensiveviews:
Of
course,
citizens
must decide
for
themselves
whether, n light of theircomprehensive
views, and taking into account the
great political values realized by the political
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290 POLITICALTHEORY MAY 1990
conception, they can endorsethatconception
with its
idea
of
society
as a fair
system
of
social cooperation.5'
But can political theory simply be silent
at the crucial
moment
of
deciding
on
the meritsof liberalism?52
Rawls's conception of justification
employs
a
remarkabledivision of
labor.The citizen mustdecide for himself, n light of
his own
comprehen-
sive scheme of values, whether
o
acceptthe political
construction.
The
issue
of
acceptance
s not
within
the
verge
of
political
ustification
for
Rawls,
because acceptance
raises
questions
of ultimate
importance necessarily
situatedwithin the
Apace
of comprehensiveviews, a space that remains
personal
and
publicly opaque
even after
political
theory
has done its work.
Liberalpolitical values must occupy, as
I
have
argued,
much of the same
space
as
personal comprehensive deals, religious
and otherwise.
And
so,
unable to
confine political values to
an autonomous
phere,
Rawls
attempts
to restrict
the scope
of
political justification by
dividing
the
process
of
justification
n
two. First,
here s
the stage
of
construction,
n
which we leave
aside the controversial lements of our
comprehensive
personalperspective
because we
recognize
that
reasonablepeople
with
whom we
wish
to form
a
political association reject them.53The stage of construction
s a search for
reasonable agreement. Only after construction s
complete
do we enter a
second
stage
in which
the
question
of
acceptance
comes
to the fore. At this
second
stage, our controversial eligious and other
personal
convictions
are
reengaged:Can I, as a devout Catholic, really
live with the kinds of ques-
tioning
attitudesandbeliefs
likely to be promotedby
a liberal
framework?54
The problem s thatsegmenting he processof
justificationonly gives the
appearance
of
avoiding
a direct
conflict between
political and personal
values. The conflict is not avoidedbut merely
shiftedoff the political agenda
(and, presumably, ut of political fora) by
bracketing he question
of
theory
acceptance,making t private,and leaving it aside
until the public construc-
tion is
complete. The broaderand deeper
mplicationsof liberalismremain,
however, mattersof public concern that citizens
are bound to raise. Public
justification
should have
something o say abouthow
the interface
between
political and personalvalues is negotiated.Managing hat interface s, in a
sense, the crucialpolitical ssue: an issue we cannot
help addressing n public
fora,
an
issue that in some of its aspectsat least) we
should address n public
fora.
A
more realistic model of justificationwould
allow, in effect, that par-
ticipants' personal moral convictions are
engaged as each feature of the
political
view is
constructed.Theory constructionproperly nvolves not a
rigid segmentationof public and private spaces
of value, but a process of
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13/26
Macedo
POLITICS
OF JUSTIFICATION
291
negotiationbetween shared
public
values and each
person's
set of
compre-
hensive and personal
values. None of us can
entirely
leave behind
the
baggage
of
our personalconvictions
when
thinking
about
political
morality.
At
each stage of the
argument,
we
would seek
principles
hatwe can live
with
in
our public and broader
personal
capacities,
as
beings
at
once
public
and
private.
And here
again, despite his
attempt
o
limit the
space
of
political values,
Rawls
reluctantlyadmitsthat a defenderof liberalismcannot avoid
steering
into
the shoals of religious
controversy
and other matters
of
deep
disagree-
ment and
cannot,crucially,avoid
engaging
and
publicly relyingupon
impor-
tant
featuresof a
comprehensive
et of
moral
values:
in
affirminga political
conception of justice we
may
eventually
have
to
assert
at least
certain
aspects
of our own
comprehensive
by
no means
necessarily
fully comprehen-
sive) religious
or
philosophical
doctrine.This
happens
whenever someone
insists,
for
example,
that
certain
questions
are
so
fundamental hat to
ensure their
being rightly
settled
ustifies
civil strife . . .
[T]hesalvation
of
a whole
people, may
be said to
depend
on
it.
At
this
point
we have no
alternative ut
to
deny
this,
and
to
assert
he
kind of
thing
we had hopedto avoid.55
The
participants
n
theory
constructionhave
recourse o their
comprehensive
views as they
go along.
And so, for example,
liberals
must deny
that the
concern for
salvation
requires
anything
ncompatible
with
equal
liberty
of
conscience. 56
Public
justification s a
process of constructive
negotiation n which
the
moves are
partly
determined
by what we tegard
as reasonable
assertionsand
compromises rom within our comprehensiveview, and not only from a
public perspective.
We
do
not
put
off
comparing he
political construction
with our
personalview until
the construction s
complete.
We do not
really
keep personal
and public spaces of
value
separate.Each of us
carries our
comprehensivemoralviews with
us
in
politics,drawingon
the
resources hey
provide, and
displaying
these resourcesto
others. Our
deepest convictions
and
commitmentsare at risk in
political
controversies,and they are
shaped
by
the
confrontation
with
both
political norms
and the deep
convictions of
otherpeople. Enoughmustbe said to adjudicateat least the most serious
conflicts between
sharedpolitical
principlesand
widely held
comprehensive
views.
The political
construction
nevitably
occupies much of the same
space as
people's personal
comprehensive
values. Political
theory
cannot, hen, avoid
advancing
claims
sufficient to tame
or override
the illiberal
componentsof
comprehensivepersonal
value
schemes. The success of
liberal
public justi-
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14/26
292
POLITICALTHEORY
MAY
1990
fication does not
require
he
common
embrace
of one
comprehensivemoral
doctrine,butneitherdoes it allowtheseparation f publicandprivatespaces
of
value.
JUSTIFICATION
ERSUS
LOYAL
Y?
There could be
a
substantiveand
very political reason
for
wanting
to
segment
the
process
of
justification
n
the
way
that
Rawls,
at times at
least,
suggests.
The
stability
of a liberal
regime requires
hat the
personal
moral
and
religious
views
of
many people
will
(when
illiberal)
be mended
to
support
the liberal settlement.
Ideally,
this transition
will
take
place
via
candid, open
public arguments.This
is
important
n
part
because
the
transi-
tional
stage does not break
sharply
with normal
practice:
Public
ustification
is,
as
I
have argued, he
way liberalsshould live.
Public
justification s not
the only means of
getting
people to be liberals.
Some people will become liberalwithoutparticipatingn or being directly
influenced
by anythinglike a
public
argument.
Indeed, one
might
even
suppose
that
some
people
are
more
likely
to be liberals
f
they
are not
pro-
voked to
reflection
by
a
public moral
argument.There
might,
n
other
words,
be a
trade-offbetween
candid
public
argument nd liberalsocialization.
Many
people's
comprehensive
moral
views are, Rawls
asserts, rather
loosely formulatedand
only
partially
hought hrough.57
ome who
go along
with
liberalismonly as a
modus
vivendior
who might oppose it
altogether
will often fail to be fully conscious of the relationbetween liberalpolitical
principles
and their
broader personal
values.
As a
consequence, liberal
principles
are
more
likely
to win
an
initialallegiance
that is
independentof our
comprehensive
views
and prior to conflict
with them.
Thus when conflicts do
arise, the
political
conception has a better
chance of
sustaining tself and
shapingthose views to
accord
with
its
requirements.We do not
say, of
course, thatthe stronger
he initial
allegiance
the
better;but it
is
desirable,
politically speaking,that
it be strong
enough to make an
overlapping onsensus
stable.58
People
may go
along without
understanding
nd
eventuallydevelop liberal
convictions
out
of
habitrather han
from
anything ike a reasoned
argument:
many
if
not
most
citizens come to affirm
their
common politicalconception
without
seeing any
particularonnection,
one way or
the other,
between t and heirother
views.59
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Macedo
POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION
293
Unconscious
socialization,
the
result of living in an open,
pluralistic
environment,
can contribute o
a liberal settlement
(admittedly,
a
nonideal
settlement).' As a practicalmatter, ne mightpinone's hopesonunreflective
acceptance,especially
if
one were disposed
to see
self-criticalreflectionand
open justification as politically disruptive
and largely beside the point
of
liberalpolitics. And
Rawls, in his reticentmoments,
sometimesseems to
be
deploying
an
exoteric
ersion of liberalism,one
thatsacrifices full
disclo-
sure to avoid confrontation nd contention
and smooth
the
way
to
a
liberal
settlement.6'
Widespread,unreflective heory acceptance
might be jeopardizedby
the
open and candiddefense
of liberalismas a regime.
Sacrificingphilosophical
candor and
open argument
o smooth the transition o
liberal
peace might
well be justified if there
really is a tensionbetween
candorand allegiance,
and the need
for
allegiance
to liberalismreally is more urgent
han the
need
for full
disclosure
and
open publicjustification.
Under
some
circumstances,
in other words, public
justificationmay be a luxury,and promoting iberal
false
consciousness
a moral
mperative.
Mustliberals,to generateallegiance,exercise caution
n
spelling
out
and
defending
the full
implications
of liberalism?Should philosophical types
keep theirbig mouths
shut?
LIBERAL
USTIFICATION: UBLIC
AND CANDID
Compromising
n the full
disclosure
of what liberalism tands
or entails
high costs. First of all, while public justificationis a form of respect for
persons, failing
to be
candid is
a
form
of
disrespect.
The
search for widely
accessible
reasons is motivatedby a desire
to
respect
the limits of reason-
ableness of common citizens. The embraceof
liberal false consciousness
is
moved not
by respect
but by fear of conflict and despairat the incapacity or
reasonableness.
Many practicalproblems
cannot be settled without confronting
he
deep
and
divisive
implications
of
a liberal public morality.
Constitutional ases
involvingthe FirstAmendment's ree exercise of religion clause is (depend-
ing
on
how you
look at it) a minefield or a gold mine of hard and deeply
revealingquestionsat
the tense interfaceof religion and politics.62Even so,
one could
try
to
paper
over and avoid
problemsby paying lip
service to
the
public/private
istinctionand a
simplistic
dea
of liberal
neutrality,deas that
have
a
certainamount
of
currencyandthatdo, even
when sincerelydeployed,
obfuscatewhat
is at stake
in
practicalpolitical
issues.63
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16/26
294
POLMCAL THEORY
MAY
1990
Thereare otherbenefitsof
public ustification
hat
a lack
of
candor
would
threaten:Althougha publicconceptionof justification,by avoidingoverly
complex
and esoteric
arguments
osters
trust,any
lack of
candor,
should
it
become
publicly
known,
would undermine hat rust.And
although
avoiding
problems
might seem
justified as a
temporary
measure,
critical reflection
might be hard
o
revive,
especially
under
conditions
of real
popular
consen-
sus, and after
philosophical
and
popular
culture
have
diverged.
Besides the
costs
of
theoretical
reticence,
there are
positive
benefits
of
stirringup
a little conflict.
My
sense is that
Mill
was
right
in
thinking
that
someintemalopposition o a society'spoliticalmorality s a goodthing.(As
Yogi
Berra put
it;
If
the world
were
perfect,
it
wouldn't
be. )
Liberals
n
particular re
apt
to
forget
what it
is
they
stand
for. Liberal heorists end
to
systematically
minimizewhat
liberalism
ntails
(as
we have
seen).
One
must
be
troubled
by
the
slow and
limp response
of Western
ntellectuals
to the
Ayatollah'scall for
Salman
Rushdie's
death.
Confronting
anatics
and
grap-
pling
with divisiveness
remindsus of
what we
stand
for
as
liberals,
and
that
we
live
in
a
world
in
which liberal
values are
neither
uncontroversial
nor
foregoneconclusions.
Timidity and
a too
ready
willingness
to
compromise
can be as
danger-
ous as
intransigence
and
dogmatism.
It is
not
obvious
to me that
divisive-
ness is
now a
greater
dangerthan
timidity.
Draining
iberalism
of its self-
consciousnessand
partisanship
elps
cultivatean
allegiancethat s
blind
and
bland.
We
should
pick our
fights
carefully
but
preserve
our
ability to
recognize
and
fight the
good
fight.
As
things
stand,
Americans
are
not
especially
reflective
about
what
our
regime
stands or. A
certain
boldness in
thedefense of liberalismmaynowbe a publicservice.
Of
course,
domestic
peace and
tranquility
nd the
many
political
goods
that
have
nothing o do with
being
self-critical,
reason-giving
iberal
citizens
all
might counsel in
favor
of
papering
over divisive
questions.
And let
me
add
one
additional
onsideration
n
favor
of
reticence:
Liberalism s an
export
commodity
andnot
only
a
good for
domestic
consumption.64
hereare
places
in
the
world
where liberal
values are
decidedly
on
the
defensive. To
encour-
age
the
exportof
liberalism,
we
mightwant
to
keep
the price
downby
playing
along withthosewho wouldminimizewhat it standsfor.
My
own
disposition
would
be to adopt
the
public
conceptionof
justifica-
tion
and to
deploy
it
candidly.
We should
seek,
in other
words,
justifications
that
are
not
only
reasonable
but
that
can be
widely
seen to
be
reasonable.
Once
justification
has
gone
public,
a
good
deal has
been
conceded
to
pluralism
and
the
burdens
of
reason.
We should
be
extremely
reluctant o
go
further
and
avoid
articulating
what
appearto be
inescapablebut
possibly
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Macedo POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION
295
divisive implications
of
liberalism.65
o do so would
be to strikeat the
heart
of
the
liberal
aspiration
o
public
justificationby driving
a
wedge
between
critical reflectionand political practice.
FOR
A
PRINCIPLEDLIBERALMODERATION
Lest my defense
of
open ustifications
openly arrived
at
should
appear
naive, let me introduce
a
final
consideration.Public justification
accepts,
even
invites, open
moral
disagreement
on a wide
range
of
political
contro-
versies. And yet we know thatbecause
even the most conscientiousarguers
often start
from
markedlydifferent
positions, consensus
can
be
difficult
to
achieve.
On
certain
especially
difficult ssues,
liberal
public ustification
has
room for a kind of moderation.
The aim of liberalpublic ustification
s to
respectdiversity
while
forging
a
framework
f common moral
principles
hatall
can
understand,
ccept,
and
openly
affirmbeforeone another.The aim is
a
transparent, emystified
ocial
order,one capable,as Waldronputs it, ofexplaining tself atthe tribunalof
each
person'sunderstanding.
nd so, Rawls'spoliticalconception
of
justice
aims at a
publicly recognized
point of
view
from which all citizens
can
examine before
one
anotherwhether
or not
their
political
and social
institu-
tions
are ust. 66 chieving
a
commonmoral ramework
llows us to express
our common reasonableness
publicly;
it allows
us,
in
effect,
to
mutually
recognize
one another
as equally
reasonablemoralbeings.
The only way that we can achieve a public moral framework
while
accepting the deep and permanent act of diversityis by puttingaside not
only the personal nterestsandreligiousbeliefs, but also the manyphilosoph-
ical andmoral
convictions that
reasonable ellow citizens
will
disagree
with.
Participantsmust share
an
overriding
desire to affirmprinciples hat
are not
simplyjustified (or true)
n
any sense,
but ratherare capableof being
widely
seen to
be justified (or reasonable).The goal of a public moralframework
s
a noble
one,
but
just
how
adamantly
hould we pursue t?
We
do not, Rawls insists, strike
balancesamongthe differentcomprehen-
sive moraldoctrines religiousand philosophical) hatexist in society:To do
so would be to abandon he
hope
of appearing efore one anotheras free and
equal,
or
fully
autonomous,
itizens.67
We
must abstract
away
from
or
leave
behind
grounds
hatwe
cannotshare
with reasonable ellow citizens.
We seek
a common
ground
of
publicly
reasonable consensus; we do not accept,
moderate,
and
balance enduringand ineliminabledifferences of belief
and
perspective.
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18/26
296
POLITICAL
THEORY MAY
1990
It is
unrealistic to
hope
for
perfect
convergence
on
a
common
moral
standpoint:
Thatwould
require
a
very
strong
and
sustaineddesire
for
public
moral
agreement.
Given the
range
of
nonpolitical
nterests hat
people
quite
properly
have
in
a
liberal
society,
it
would be hard o
imagine
thatthe
desire
for
public
moralconsensus
could
be
sufficiently
strong
or
sustained
o
make
convergence a
realistic
possibility.
The
kind of common moral
standpoint
represented
y the veil of
ignorance
and the
original
position
may
be
ideals
to
be
aspired
or,
but,
practically
peaking,
we cannot
hope
really
to
converge
on
a
common
understanding
f
basic
political
principles.68
eople
will
be
moved to
peek, as it
were, out
frombehind theveil of ignorancenotonly by
self-interest
or
impatience,
but
also
by
the
variety
of moral
beliefs
excluded
by the drive for
principles
hat
all
reasonable
people
can
accept.
Moderation
s
a virtue that
comes to the
fore when
we
acknowledge
that
afterpublic
reasonableness
as done
its work
(or
as muchwork as
reasonable
people
are
prepared
o
allow it
to
do), our
perspectives
will
inevitably
remain
plural
and
divergent.
Moderation
llows us to
accept
the
fact thata
large
and
diverse
group
of
reasonable
people can never
really
stand within
the
same
moral framework.69Even the best possible liberal settlement will have
something
of
the
character f
a
composite of
irreduciblydissimilar
parts.
It
would
be
nice
to think
that all of
us
-rich and
poor;
libertarian
nd
socialist;
Catholic,
Jew,
Amish,
and
Jehovah's
Witness
could
stand
before
one
another
imply
in
our
moral
capacity.
And,
indeed,
we
should
aspire
to
do
so.
But
at the end
of
the
political
day
we
must
simply
accept
the
fact
of
reasonable
disagreement
nda
reasonable
divergenceof
moral
perspective.70
At
that
point,
the most
reasonable
hing
may well
be to
moderate
our
claims
mutually n the face of thereasonableclaims of others,to balance,andsplit
at
least
some of
our
differences.
Respect
s
called
for
in
the
face of
persons
whom
we
regard
as
reasonable.
Even when
we
cannot
really
respect
a
particular
iew
(antisemitism,
acism,
and other
views
based on
sheer
prejudice),
we
may still
tolerate its
expres-
sion,
partly
because
it
is
being
expressed
by a
person:We
wish
to
respect
hat
person
as a
being
capable
of
reasonand
we
wish to
respect
peech
(the
vehicle
of
reason)
as
such.
And
so we
tolerate
the
antisemiteby
allowing him
to
expresshisviews, but we concede no ground o him,we do notcompromise
with
him,
we do
not
approach
him
with
moderation.
Moderation
oes
beyond
toleration.
Thereare,
or
example,
many
reason-
able
arguments
on
both
sides
of the
abortion
debate.
The
abortion
question
is
so
vexing,
in a
sense,
precisely
because there
are
weighty
reasonson
both
sides, and it
is
easy to
see
how
reasonable
people
can
come
down
on
either
side.
On
policy
issues
such as
abortion,
which
seems, as
things
stand, o
come
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Macedo POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION
297
down to a fairly close
call between two
well-reasonedsets of
arguments,
he
best
thing
for reasonable
people
to do
might
be to
acknowledge
he
difficulty
of the argumentand the burdensof reason,to respecttheiropponentsandto
compromise
with
them,
to find some
middle
ground
hat
gives
something
to
each side while the argument
oes forward.7'
he
right
kindof middle
ground
on
abortionwould
acknowledge
both the
great weight
due to the
judgment
of the motherandthe
fact that his choice concerns
he
continuance f another
life. It would, perhaps,honor a
woman's choice
up
to
a
certain
point
in
the
pregnancy and also countenancea variety of
measures that would
not
be
permittedwere abortion
imply
a
matter
of an individual's
right
to choose:
measures o ensure at least that the choice is reflectiveand informed.72
Moderation s a liberal virtuejustified by the difficulty
of
occupying
a
common
moralstandpoint,
r of exercising
ourcommon
capacity
or reason-
ableness
in
the
same
way. Taking
moderation
seriously
would lead
us to
qualify
Dworkin's nsistence hat he party
with the
strongest
ase on balance
(no matter how close a call)
has a right to win. The best solution may
sometimes
be
to give
something
o
each side. Moderation
n
the face of
very
strongcompeting
cases
offers a
way
of
honoring
not
simply
the best case but
also the case that is
very strong.
There
is an
argument
o be
developed
here
for
judicial prudence
and statesmanship,not (I hope) for pragmatismor a
blanket
deferenceto legislatures.73
To acceptmoderation s to admit hata mutually ransparent
oliticalorder
is unrealistic.Explicitly embracing
he value of moderation
means that we
representcitizens
in
public justification
with some measureof
their differ-
ences and
disagreements some measureof partialityof perspective)
ntact.
It is a way of coming directly to gripswith the residual and realistically
ineliminablemoraldiversity hat
on my analysis) eads to Rawls's reticence.
I
am not, I should emphasize, arguing that we should
celebrate our
inability o abstract way from
some of our differences;we should
acknowl-
edge
but
not idealize our incapacity o achieve a common moral
perspective.
We should, rather, accept this
limitation as an infirmity of
the human
condition and adoptan attitude hat allows us to deal with it constructively.
CONCLUSION
Even
where citizens share a desire to establish and support
political
institutions that can be commonly
affirmed as reasonable, fully public
justificationson controversial
ssues (ones that all reasonablepeople really
do
accept)
will
often be
impossible
o come by
-
we mustreconcileourselves
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20/26
298
POLITICAL
THEORY MAY
1990
to that.
Although it
may
fail
to
achieve a
construction
hat
all
reasonable
people can
agree
upon, public
reflection can
help
us narrowthe
gaps and
negotiate
thetensions
among
public and personal
values.74
Because it
respects
reasonable
persons
and
the limits of
reason
as
located
in
persons,
public
justification s
distinctly
liberal
and
democratic,
ubstan-
tive
and
partisan.Where
iberals
see
respect
or free and
equal
persons,
some
religious
people
aregoing
to see
secularhumanism
nd the
hegemony
of
a
way of
thinking hat
owes a lot to
science and
the
enlightenment
but
that
is
deeply at
odds with
some
forms of
religion.75This cannot be
avoided.
Liberalsoffer
true
believers, like
everyone else,
a
sphere
of
privacy
and
the
opportunity
o
continue
arguing.The liberal
must,
in
the
end,
defend
his
partisanship
nd
not
evade it.
If
liberalism s
justified,
that must
be,
in
part
at
least,
because of the
superiorityof
justificationsbased on
widely accept-
able
reasons
and
public
arguments, ndbecause reasonable
people
really
are
worthy of liberal
respect.
The
public conception
of
justification
may seem to embrace he
concerns
of
those
postmodernist
hilosophers
who
deny
the
availability
of
objective
standards f truth, tandardswhose justificationdoes notdependon thesocial
practices of
particular
ocieties.76But
while
acknowledging the practical
limits
of
reason,
public
justification does
not
embrace
conventionalismor
localism. Reason
establishes he
contoursand
substanceof
moderation: t is
reasonable o
want to
live
in
accordancenot only
with
reasonableprinciples
but also
with
principles that all
can
see to be
reasonable.
We have
good
reasons for
tempering
our
expectations
about the
public
efficacy of
reason,
not for
abandoning ur
aspiration
o
govern
ourselves
reasonably.
Public justification is a core liberal goal, one that informs practical
aspirations nd
political
nstitutions like
judicial
review) that
iberalscan
be
proud
of.
But public
justification
s not our
only
political
goal. We
want the
freedom
to live
our own
lives,
and so a
release
from
political
argument.
We
want
peace, and
more
thanthat,
we
want
comity or
concord.
Comity
is a
political good
that
is not
quite the same as
moral
consensus,
as
Richard
Hofstadter
describes:
Comityexists in societyto thedegreethatthoseenlisted n its contendingnterestshave
a
basic
minimal
regard
for
each
other....
The basic
humanityof
the opposition
is not
forgotten;
ivility is not
abandoned;he
sense thata
community ife must
be
carriedon
after
the
acerbic ssues of
the
moment
havebeen
fought
over andwon is
seldom
far out
77
of
mind....
And
in the
first
Federalist,
Publius
urged
moderation
as a
means to
comity
even
more
forcefully:
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21/26
Macedo POLITICSOF
JUSTIFICATION 299
So numerous ndeed andso powerful
are
the
causes which serve
to
give
a
false bias to
judgment,thatwe, upon manyoccasions, see wise and good men on the
wrong
as well
as on therightside of questionsof the firstmagnitude o society.Thiscircumstance, f
duly
attended o, would furnisha lesson of moderation o those who
are ever so much
persuaded
f their
being
in
the right
n
any controversy.
Comity,
or
concord, requires
a
gift
for conciliation and a
willingness to
compromise.
There
may, of course, be
grounds or various forms of moderation for a
prudentmoderation, or example,
in the face of rancorous
disagreement nd
imminentviolence). We do well, however, to makeroom for a principled
moderationat the most basic
level, in our understanding f publicjustifica-
tion. To
do so
allows us to define
and defend a form of moderationwhose
justificationgrows out
of
the commitment
o reasonableness
tself, and so to
extend
moderationon
grounds
hat hold out the promise
of drawingpeople
into the
process of public reason.
Principledmoderationdrawssupport, hen,
from the
hope of an ever-more-reasonable olitical order.
NOTES
1. I will
refer to the
United
States as an
exampleof
a liberalsociety
because it is familiar
and in
manyways
liberal.
I
do not
mean
to identify iberalismwith
American
politics,
although
certain
nstitutions
specially
suited to
liberalreason
giving
are
well
developed
n
America.
For
a more extended
treatmentof liberalism n
general
and as
manifested
n
American
national
institutions, ee my
Liberal
VirtuesOxford:
Oxford
University
Press,1990).
2. JeremyWaldron, Theoretical oundations f Liberalism, hilosophical
Quarterly,
7
(1987