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M i d d l e E a s t e r n O u t l o o k
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202 .862.5800 www.aei.org
Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, millions of Afghans poured into neighboring
countries. While Pakistan hosted the greatest
number of refugees, Iran had taken in about
3 million Afghans by 1990.1 Many Afghans
returned to Afghanistan following the end of
communist rule, but a second wave of refugees
fled the country with the outbreak of civil war
after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of
Soviet-backed president Mohammad Najibullah’s
government in 1992. More than 5 million
Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan after
the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, but many Afghans
still live abroad.2 According to the Iran Statistical
Center, Afghans constitute the largest group of
legal foreign residents in Iran. By November1996, they numbered eight hundred thousand,
a sum that increased 50 percent over the next
decade. With migrant workers and illegal
immigrants, however, the number of Afghans
living in Iran today may reach 2.5 million.3
Background
Iran and Pakistan treated their Afghan refugees
differently. While Pakistan kept Afghans in
refugee camps, Iran allowed them to live across
the country and took formal responsibility for
them in the 1980s and 1990s, giving only a
Iranian Influence in Afghanistan:
Refugees as Political Instruments
By Ahmad Majidyar and Ali Alfoneh
This is the second in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks documenting Iran’s growing influence in Afghanistan.
As the United States and its allies target the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran is using the forced return of Afghan
refugees to leverage its influence in Afghanistan at the expense of U.S. interests. Waves of refugees cause humani-
tarian crises and are used to shield the movement of foreign terrorists into Afghanistan. This Outlook examines
how the Iranian government systematically uses forced repatriation of Afghans living in Iran both to undermine
U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and to extract concessions from the Afghan government.
Ahmad Majidyar (ahmad.majidyar@aei.org) is a seniorresearch associate at AEI. Ali Alfoneh (ali.alfoneh@aei.org)is a resident fellow at AEI.
No. 5 • November 2010
Key points in this Outlook :
• Iranian influence in Afghanistan is
not benign; the forced repatriation
of Afghans living in Iran destabilizes
western Afghanistan.
• By threatening to flood Afghanistanwith waves of refugees, the Iranian
government forces the Afghan govern-
ment to comply with its demands.
• U.S. aid to Afghanistan must take into
account the millions of refugees living
outside the country.
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limited role to the United Nations refugee agency
and other international humanitarian organizations.
Although Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, it did not grant the Afghans fleeing the
Soviet occupation refugee status ( panahandeh) and
instead classified them as “involuntary religious
migrants” (mohajerin). Indeed, the term mohajerin was
more dignified than panahandeh in postrevolutionary
Iran,4 and Iranian leaders often described helping
Afghan refugees as the country’s Islamic and humani-
tarian duty.
Iran’s Interior Ministry officially coordinates respon-
sibility for refugees, usually under the Secretariat of
the Coordination Council of Alien Affairs, which the
interior minister chairs. The secretariat brings together
the ministers of education, intelligence, foreign affairs,
labor, and health, along with the Administration and
Planning Organization director, the Supreme National
Security Council secretary, the Law Enforcement
Forces chief, and the head of the Red Crescent of Iran.5
Generally, the interior and intelligence ministries treat
alien residents first and foremost as a security issue. The
Revolutionary Guards and the Law Enforcement Forces
provide muscle to any regulation or policy. The Supreme
National Security Council is also involved in domestic
refugee policy as an instrument of foreign policy. While
the Interior Ministry’s Bureau for Alien and Foreign
Immigrant Affairs supervises visas and residency permits,
it coordinates closely with the Revolutionary Guards
and the local branch of the Revolutionary Tribunal
on a provincial level.6
With the fall of the Taliban’s regime and the inaugu-
ration of a Western-backed government in Afghanistan,
the Iranian government took a tough line with the
Afghan refugees. “It is now time for them to return,”said Ahmad Hosseini, the senior Interior Ministry
official dealing in refugee affairs, in March 2002.
“Registered Afghan nationals will be gradually repatri-
ated in a two-year program.” Unregistered Afghans
were given six months to leave Iran.7 In April 2002,
Iran signed a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and
the UN’s High Commission for Refugees to facilitate
repatriation of Afghans.8 By April 2004, 730,000
Afghans had returned to Afghanistan.9
With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ascent to power
in August 2005, the Iranian government stepped up
forcible repatriation of Afghans. On March 12, 2006,
Hosseini announced that 350,000 Afghans had been
forcibly repatriated in 2005 and warned that the Iranian
government would apply “new measures” against
Afghans who resisted.10 Forced evictions continued
over subsequent years, and, in January 2008, Taghi
Ghaemi, Hosseini’s replacement at the Interior Ministry,
threatened the 1.5 million “illegal Afghans” in Iran with
“five years of imprisonment” or “internment in camps”
if they refused repatriation.11
The Ahmadinejad government also imposed stringent
restrictions on Afghans inside Iran. Since May 2007,
Afghans have been banned from living in certain Iranian
provinces and cities, such as border towns in the east.12
They were banned from the southwestern Kohgiluyeh va
Boyerahmad province in July 2007 and the Caspian lit-
toral Gilan province in May 2008.13 The list has contin-
ued to grow through this year such that, at present,
Afghan citizens are entirely prohibited from living in
thirteen provinces, with many cities in other provinces
also off limits.14 The government has also imposed
education and employment restrictions on Afghans.15
Iranian leaders often justify their actions by citing
problems Afghan refugees cause in Iran: unemployment,
drug trade, and related criminal activity in the Iranian
border provinces. Afghan officials, however, allege that
Iran is using the refugees as a destabilizing political tool
against Afghanistan.
Refugees as a Political Tool
The Ahmadinejad government successfully uses the
refugee issue to increase its leverage over Hamid Karzai’s
government in Afghanistan. Whenever Afghanistan’s
policies displease Tehran, the Iranian government
threatens to expel all Afghans living in Iran. Tehran
understands that the fragile Afghan government lacks
the capacity to absorb a large number of returnees undercurrent security and economic conditions. At times, it
has dumped thousands of Afghans into lawless areas in
western Afghanistan without advance coordination
with either Afghan authorities or international organiza-
tions. Such mass deportations trigger humanitarian
crises, undermine security in southern and western
Afghanistan, and cause political turmoil in Kabul.
In 2007, for example, the Afghan parliament
impeached Karzai’s ministers for refugees and foreign
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The number of Afghans living in Iran today
may reach 2.5 million.
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affairs after Iran forcibly repatriated over eighty thousand
Afghans. The impeachments, directed by Iranian sup-
porters within the parliament, sparked a constitutional
crisis in Kabul, as Karzai rejected the parliament’s dis-
missal of Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta. Spanta
said that Iran moved forward with the expulsions to
protest Afghanistan’s acquiescence to a formal NATO
military presence in Afghanistan, to compel Afghanistan
to support Iran’s nuclear program, and to ensure Iran’s
access to Helmand River waters flowing into Iran.16
Only after Karzai made a personal appeal to Ahmadine-
jad did Tehran halt the deportations.17 It is unclear what
concessions Kabul offered Tehran.
Deportations soon resumed, however. In December
2008, under pressure from parliament, Karzai sent a
delegation led by Vice President Karim Khalili to nego-
tiate a settlement over the refugee issue. Iranian leaders
exploited the situation to launch verbal attacks against
the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Iranian
parliament speaker Ali Larijani told the visiting Afghan
delegation, “After seven years, the presence of foreign
forces in Afghanistan has not only failed to bring
security and stability, but has undermined security
and increased extremism.”18 Tehran eventually agreed
to suspend expulsions, but only until spring.
Mass deportations have also undermined security in
southern and western Afghanistan. Nimruz governor
Ghulam Dastagir Azad has complained that Iran expels
hundreds of Afghans daily to Nimruz,19 and provincial
officials acknowledge that they cannot cope with the
influx of returnees. Neither the U.S. Army nor its NATO
allies operate a Provincial Reconstruction Team in
Nimruz, and the province has seen little economicdevelopment in recent years. On May 10, 2010, Amrullah
Sultani, top official for Afghan refugees and returnees in
Nimruz, said the Iranian government had expelled over
sixty thousand Afghan refugees to the province over two
months without coordinating with the provincial
officials.20 Iran also deports thousands of refugees to the
Herat province each month.21 In March and April 2010
alone, Iran deported some thirty thousand Afghans to
Herat through the Islam Qala border crossing.22 In other
words, Iran systematically uses forcible repatriation
of Afghan refugees and migrant workers to spark a
humanitarian and security crisis in the western parts
of Afghanistan. In doing so, the Islamic Republic is
telling Kabul that the key to western Afghanistan’s
security is in Tehran, not in Washington, D.C. This
shows that Iran is positioning itself to have a presence
in the region long after U.S. forces leave.
Iran has also used mass deportations to facilitate
infiltration of foreign terrorists into western Afghanistan.
Afghan border guards in Islam Qala, the main border
crossing between Iran and Herat, say there are no pro-
cedures to monitor returnees and check their nationality:
“We have caught Arab and Iranian citizens trying to
enter Afghanistan without the proper documentation,
and have turned them over to the National Directorate
of Security. But we cannot check everybody so carefully.
We do not have enough officers, or the right equip-
ment,” said Abdullah Achakzai, a border police officer,
adding that the border police had captured an Iranian
citizen pretending to be an Afghan refugee. “He had
maps with him of Herat airport and other documents
concerning the 207th Zafar [Afghan National Army]
corps.”23 Herat’s police chief Ismatullah Alizai said last
year that over fifty foreigners—among them Iranians,
Pakistanis, and Chechens—had been identified in the
Gozara and Pashtun Zarghon districts of Herat. “Two
Iranian citizens were arrested during a police operation
against anti-government militants in Gozara district,”
he pointed out. “We turned them over to the National
Directorate of Security for further investigation.”24
The number of foreign terrorists intercepted by the
Afghan border-security forces while trying to infiltrate
Afghanistan from the Iranian border may be only the
tip of the iceberg, which suggests Islamic Republic
involvement in a more systematic effort.
There are indeed some indications of this organized
effort. Last September, the independent daily Afghanpaper
reported that eighteen Iranian Kurds, including four
women, had entered the Seyoshaan village near Herat totrain in suicide bombing. The would-be suicide bombers,
according to the paper, were in the residence of Bashir
Ahmad Qena’at, the son-in-law of Ghulam Yahya
Akbari, a local commander aligned with the Taliban
and with alleged links to Iran, whom a U.S. airstrike in
early 2009 reportedly killed.25 Two weeks later, Afghan
police also claimed they had discovered a training base
of suicide bombers in Seyoshaan village run by Iranians,
Pakistanis, and a few Arabs.26
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The Islamic Republic is telling Kabul that
the key to western Afghanistan’s security
is in Tehran, not in Washington, D.C.
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It is not only through forced repatriation of Afghan
refugees and migrant workers that the Islamic Republic
destabilizes western Afghanistan. Sometimes, Tehran
reverses the game. In October 2009, Iran temporarily
opened its border to allow several hundred Afghans to
enter Iran through Herat’s Dogharoon border point
without visas or passports. As soon as it was rumored
that Iran had loosened its border control, thousands of
Afghans from all over western Afghanistan stormed
Herat only to find the border closed. The frustrated
Afghans directed their anger not at Iran, but at Afghan
authorities, whom they blamed for trying to deny them
access to Iran.27
Conclusion
With the security situation in Afghanistan at its nadir
since the fall of the Taliban and economic-development
and job-creation efforts faltering, Iranian leaders cor-
rectly calculate that a fragile Afghanistan cannot
absorb the over 2 million Afghans living in Iran.
Iranian mistreatment and forced repatriation of Afghan
refugees and migrant workers further undermines the
credibility of the Kabul government and increases
Kabul’s dependence on the regime in Tehran. Unless
the international community devises a comprehensive
development strategy for Afghanistan—such as provid-
ing housing, social services, schools, and help with
reintegration into Afghan society—that takes into
account the hundreds of thousands of Afghan returnees,
Tehran will continue to play the refugee card to pressure
Kabul and harm U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
Notes
1. David Turton and Peter Marsden, Taking Refugees for
a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan(Kabul:
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2002), 1.
2. UN Refugee Agency, “2010 UNHCR Country Operations
Profile—Afghanistan,” available at www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6 (accessed October 6,
2010).
3. “Amar-e Eshteghal-e Atba’e Afghan Dar Iran” [Employ-
ment Statistics of Afghan Citizens in Iran], Alef News Agency,
December 19, 2009, available in Persian at http://alef.ir/1388/
content/view/59767 (accessed October 14, 2010).
4. Rhoda Margesson, Afghan Refugees: Current Status and
Future Prospects (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2007), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf
(accessed October 6, 2010).
5. Ibid.
6. “Ghanoun Raje’ Be Ta’in-e Vazaef Va Tashkilat-e Showra-ye
Amniat-e Keshvar” [The Law on Division of Duties of the
National Security Council], Hafezeh-ye Ghavanin, available in
Persian at http://tarh.majlis.ir/?ShowRule&Rid=62A58DD9-
F44B-483E-A50E-E71F3FBB649F (accessed October 14, 2010).
7. “Iran Says Time for Afghan Refugees to Go Home,”
Reuters, March 6, 2002.
8. “Violence Halts Afghan Refugee Flow,” BBC, April 9, 2002.
9. “730,000 Mohajer-e Afghan Az Iran Be Keshvar Bazgash-
tand” [730,000 Afghan Refugees Leave Iran for Afghanistan],
Vezarat-e Keshvar, May 23, 2007, available in Persian at
http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&I
D=911cc5cc-4f21-457e-8798-764425fb3cf0&WebPartID=
1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-5108afc82bc&CategoryID=a25b3683-
80cc-48ec-810c-29ca2ea14479 (accessed October 14, 2010).
10. “Emsal 350000 Taba’eh-ye Afghani-ye Gheir-e-Mojaz-e
Saken Dar Iran Be Keshvareshan Bazgardandeh Shodand” [This
Year 350,000 Illegal Afghan Citizens in Iran Were Repatriated],
Vezarat-e Keshvar, May 23, 2007, available in Persian at
http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=
News&ID=df6e808d-a187-48c6-82dd-30438bcc896f&Web
PartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-d5108afc82bc&CategoryID=
a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-29ca2ea14479 (accessed October 14,
2010); and “Siasatha-ye Jadid-e Iran Dar Mored-e Mohajeran-e
Afghan” [Iran’s New Policies towards Afghan Refugees],
BBC Persian, February 19, 2006, available in Persian at
www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/02/060219_mv-
afghans-iran.shtml (accessed October 14, 2010).
11. “Iran Yek Va Nim Million Mohajer-e Afghan Ra Be
Zendan Tahdid Kard” [Iran Threatened One and a Half Million
Afghan Refugees with Imprisonment], BBC Persian, January 2,2008, available in Persian at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/
story/2008/01/080102_s-iran-afghan-refugees.shtml (accessed
October 14, 2010).
12. “Shahr-ha-ye Marzi-ye Shargh-e Keshvar Baraye
Sokounat-e Atba’e Biganeh Mamnoue’ E’lam Shod” [Residence
of Foreign Nationals Declared Prohibited in Border Towns in
Eastern Parts of the Country], Vezarat-e Keshvar, May 23,
2007, available in Persian at http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/
ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=7d0a279d-137e-47e2-
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Whenever Afghanistan’s policies displease
Tehran, the Iranian government threatens to
expel all Afghans living in Iran.
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9aeb-77841df24f4c&WebPartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-
d5108afc82bc&CategoryID=a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-
29ca2ea14479 (accessed October 14, 2010).
13. “Mamnou’iat-e Eghamat-e Avaregan-e Afghan Dar
Ostan-e Kohgilouyeh Va Boyer-Ahmad” [Ban against Residence
of Afghan Refugees in Kohgiluyeh Va Boyerahmad Province],
Vezarat-e Keshvar, July 23, 2007, available at http://bafia.moi.ir/
Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&ID=2e1cc615-3f63-
4707-944e-df50c7c6b039&WebPartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-
b951-d5108afc82bc&CategoryID=a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-29c
a2ea14479 (accessed October 14, 2010); and “Tarradod Va
Sokounat-e Atba’e Afghani Dar Gilan Az Avval-e Tirmah
Mamnou’e Ast” [Prohibition against Afghan Citizens Residing
or Trespassing Gilan from July], Vezarat-e Keshvar, May 17, 2008,
available in Persian at http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage
.aspx?Object=News&ID=9e50aecd-a683-4949-b924-1f6941f9c
4a6&WebPartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-d5108afc82bc&
CategoryID=a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-29ca2ea14479 (accessed
October 14, 2010).
14. “Eghamat-e Afghan-ha Dar Khonj-e Fars Mamnou’e E’lam
Shod” [Residence of Afghans Declared Illegal in Khonj in Fars
Province], Vezarat-e Keshvar, November 15, 2008, available in
Persian at http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?
Object=News&ID=64eb968f-4d2c-4337-a93e-65fa897d18f2&
WebPartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-d5108afc82bc&
CategoryID=a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-29ca2ea14479 (accessed
October 14, 2010); “Eghamat Va Tarradod-e Atba’e Afghan
Dar 23 Shahr-e Golestan Mamnou’e Shod” [Residence and
Trespassing of Afghan Citizens Prohibited in 23 Cities of
Golestan Province], Vezarat-e Keshvar, January 16, 2010, avail-
able in Persian at http://bafia.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?
Object=News&ID=3bbdf712-e760-4f6f-ad7e-06a46d42d50d
&WebPartID=1ccb27ea-dce7-45b5-b951-d5108afc82bc&
CategoryID=a25b3683-80cc-48ec-810c-29ca2ea14479 (accessed
October 14, 2010); “Tarh-e Jame’-e Samandehi-ye Afghan-ha-ye
Gheir-e-Mojaz Aghaz Shod” [The Expansive Improvement
Scheme of Illegal Afghan Citizens Begins], Iranian Students
News Agency, July 24, 2010, available in Persian at http://isna.ir/
ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1579944&Lang=P (accessed
October 14, 2010); and “Manategh-e Mamnoueh-ye Iran Bara-yeEghamat-e Atba’e Khareji” [Prohibited Areas in Iran for Foreign
Nationals], E’temad, October 20, 2008, available in Persian
at www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID=1725170 (accessed
October 14, 2010).
15. “Manategh-e Mamnoueh-ye Eghamat Va Tahsil Bara-ye
Atba’e-e Khareji” [Prohibited Areas for Education and Residence
of Foreign Nationals], Sazeman-e Bakhsh-e Amouzesh-e Keshvar,
April 24, 2010, available in Persian at http://noet.ir/noet/
FullStory.aspx?gid=6&id=161 (accessed October 14, 2010).
16. Amin Tarzi, “Iran: Poker-Faced amid Allegations of
Interference in Afghanistan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
June 12, 2007.
17. Brian Bennet: “Iran Raises the Heat in Afghanistan,”
Time, February 22, 2008, available at www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1716579,00.html (accessed October 14, 2010).
18. “Larijani: Hozour-e Khareji Amel-e Roshd-e Efratgarayi
Dar Afghanestan Ast” [Larijani: Foreign Presence Is the Reason
behind Extremism in Afghanistan], BBC Persian, December 22,
2008, available in Persian at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/
2008/12/081222_he-kalili_larijani.shtml (accessed Septem-
ber 1, 2010).
19. “Afghan Refugees Complain about Harassment by
Pakistan, Iranian Police,” Tolo TV, April 23, 2009.
20. “Afghan Official Accuses Iran of Expelling 60,000 Afghan
Refugees,” Afghan Islamic Press, May 10, 2010; and “Iran Deports
Over 50,000 Afghan Refugees,” Arzu TV, May 10, 2010.
21. “Afghan Refugees Complain about Harassment by
Pakistan, Iranian Police.”
22. “Iran Bish Az Hashtad Hezar Panahjou-ye Afghan Ra
Ekhraj Kard” [Iran Repatriates More Than Eighty Thousand
Afghan Refugees], 8 Sobh, April 28, 2010, available in Persian at
www.8am.af/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
11616:1389-02-21-18-08-55&catid=42:2008-10-31-09-36-
17&Itemid=469 (accessed September 1, 2010).
23. Zia Ahmadi and Mustafa Saber, “Afghans Fear Infiltra-
tion from Iran,” Asia Times, November 13, 2009, available at
www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK13Df03.html (accessed
September 1, 2010).
24. Zia Ahmadi and Mustafa Saber, “Afghans Fear Insurgent
Infiltration across Iran Border,” Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, November 11, 2009.
25. “18 Kord-e Irani Bara-ye Amouzesh-e Hamelat-e Entehari
Vared-e Herat Shodeh-and” [Eighteen Iranian Kurds Have
Entered Herat for Suicide Training], Afghanpaper, September 27,
2009, available at http://afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=3770
(accesed September 1, 2010).
26. “18 Kord-e Irani Bara-ye Amouzesh-e Hamelat-e EntehariVared-e Herat Shodeh-and” [Eighteen Iranian Kurds Have
Entered Herat for Suicide Training].
27. “Khabar-e Fori: Bedoun-e Viza Be Iran Beravid?!”
[Immediate Release: Travel to Iran without Visa?!] Afghan-
paper, October 4, 2009, available in Persian at http://afghan
paper.com/nbody.php?id=3949&reason=0 (accessed Octo-
ber 20, 2010).
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