Post on 07-Apr-2020
University of Western Sydney
In Conjunction with
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Total Productive Maintenance and
effectiveness of
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems
By
WONG Kam Loi
A report submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements forMaster of Applied Science (Safety Management)
December, 2001
Declaration of Originality
The following work has been completed by the author as coursework research project
report in the Master of Applied Science (Safety Management) at the University of
Western Sydney in conjunction with The Hong Kong Polytechnic University under
the supervision of Mr. Gary Ma.
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, it contains no material that has previously published or written
by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the
award of any other degree or diploma of a University or other institute of higher
learning, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.
Signed ___________________ Date ___________________
WONG Kam Loi
ii
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank my project supervisor, Mr. Gary Ma, for his thoughtful
comments and guidance throughout the last year. He patiently gave me his time and
encouragement, and unselfishly shared with me his experience.
I would also like to thank the companies who participated in the survey for the
research. I thank them for their genuine concern on employee safety.
iii
Abstract
Many manufacturing organizations already have occupational health and safety
(OHS) management systems in place but for most of them, high standards of safety
performance still cannot be assured. The success of an OHS management system
depends on whether the organization has implemented the system proactively, which
in turn is related to the safety culture of the organization.
The project commenced with the identification of safety culture factors that can
improve safety performance and can be enhanced by Total Productive Maintenance
(TPM). TPM is a maintenance system which promotes productive maintenance but it
also contributes to a positive safety culture through management incentive,
management commitment, participation of management and workers, communication,
education and training, working conditions and procedures, morale and job
satisfaction, and attitude and risk perception.
Questionnaires were designed based on the safety culture factors identified. These
were then sent to companies with or without TPM to collect the opinions of workers
on safety culture. T-test method was used to compare the results obtained from the
two different sample groups, to verify the effectiveness of TPM on safety culture.
Finally a framework of TPM activities was developed for manufacturing
organizations to improve safety performance.
iv
Table of Contents
Page
List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
Glossary of Terms xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 The problem addressed 1
1.2 Proposed approach to improve the effectiveness of OHS management 3
systems
1.3 Aim and objectives 4
1.4 Hypothesis 4
Chapter 2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Effects of Safety culture on safety performance 5
2.1.1 Definitions of safety culture and safety climate 5
2.1.2 Relationships among safety culture, climate and management 9
2.1.3 Proactive safety management and safety performance 11
2.2 Factors of a proactive safety culture 14
2.2.1 'Management incentive' is essential for good safety performance 16
2.2.2 'Management commitment' is essential for good safety performance 17
2.2.3 'Participation of management and workers' is essential for 18
good safety performance
2.2.4 'Communication' is essential for good safety performance 20
2.2.5 'Education and training' is essential for good safety performance 21
2.2.6 'Working conditions and procedures' is essential for good safety 22
performance
v
2.2.7 'Morale and job satisfaction' is essential for good safety performance 22
2.2.8 'Attitude and risk perception' is essential for good safety 23
performance
2.3 Introduction to TPM 25
2.3.1 A brief history of maintenance management 26
2.3.2 The development of TPM 28
2.3.3 TPM principles 30
2.3.4 TPM structure 31
2.3.5 Autonomous maintenance 32
2.3.6 Steps in developing a TPM system 34
2.3.7 Obstacles in implementing TPM 36
2.3.8 Factors for success implementation of TPM 37
2.4 Investigate TPM's effectiveness to enhance safety culture 39
2.4.1 Implement TPM is already a good incentive for management 39
2.4.2 Management commitment is important in TPM 41
2.4.3 TPM encourages participation of management and workers 42
2.4.4 TPM enhances communication 42
2.4.5 TPM encourages education and training 43
2.4.6 TPM improves working conditions and procedures 43
2.4.7 TPM improves morale and job satisfaction 45
2.4.8 TPM improves attitude and risk perception 46
2.5 A way to effective OHS management through TPM 48
2.6 Assessing safety culture 50
2.6.1 Criteria for assessing safety culture 50
2.6.2 Methods to assess safety culture 55
2.6.3 Reliability analysis of safety culture survey 57
2.6.4 The t-test 58
2.7 Chapter summary 58
vi
Chapter 3 Research Method 59
Chapter 4 Research questions 61
4.1 Design of questionnaires 61
4.2 The ABC Company 62
4.3 Distribution of questionnaires 63
Chapter 5 Result 65
5.1 Replies received 65
5.2 Average score of questionnaires A & B 65
5.3 Results on each safety culture factor 68
5.3.1 Results on management incentive 69
5.3.2 Results on management commitment 69
5.3.3 Results on participation of management and workers 70
5.3.4 Results on communication 70
5.3.5 Results on education and training 71
5.3.6 Results on improve working conditions and procedures 71
5.3.7 Results on morale and job satisfaction 72
5.3.8 Results on attitude and risk perception 72
5.4 Reliability analysis 73
5.5 Testing of the hypothesis 73
Chapter 6 Discussion 76
6.1 Discussion on the research method and questionnaire design 76
6.2 Discussion on the results of questionnaire B from ABC Company 77
6.2.1 Management incentive (Questions 4 and 16) 78
6.2.2 Management commitment (Questions 5 and 6) 78
vii
6.2.3 Participation of management and workers (Questions 12 and 20) 78
6.2.4 Communication (Questions 13, 14, 18 and 19) 79
6.2.5 Education and training (Questions 7, 8 and 9) 79
6.2.6 Improve working conditions and procedures 79
(Questions 10, 11 and 15)
6.2.7 Morale and job satisfaction (Questions 17 and 21) 80
6.2.8 Attitude and risk perception (Questions 22 and 23) 80
Chapter 7 Develop a framework of TPM activities 81
7.1 Organize to enhance communication 81
7.1.1 Set up a TPM committee 81
7.1.2 Manage small group activities 84
7.1.3 Conduct step audit for training and mutual learning 85
7.2 Make equipment and workplace safe 85
7.2.1 Clean and inspect (step 1 of autonomous maintenance) 85
7.2.2 Eliminate problem sources (step 2 of autonomous maintenance) 86
7.2.3 Draw up cleaning and lubrication standards (step 3 of 86
autonomous maintenance)
7.2.4 Planned maintenance and predict failure 86
7.2.5 Implement 5S 86
7.3 Develop safety conscious people 87
7.3.1 Conduct general inspections (step 4 of autonomous maintenance) 87
7.3.2 Carry out visual workplace management (step 6 of autonomous 87
maintenance)
7.3.3 Link safety education and training to skill training 88
7.3.4 One-point lesson 88
7.3.5 On-the-job coaching to each individual 89
7.3.6 Self audit 89
viii
7.4 Commitment and support of management 89
7.4.1 Address sources of human error 89
7.4.2 Develop an education and training program 90
7.4.3 Draw up a budget for safety 90
7.4.4 Involve senior management in auditing team activities 90
7.4.5 Devise a program of accident prevention training 90
7.4.6 Conduct autonomous inspection (step 6 of autonomous 91
maintenance)
7.4.7 Carry out consistent autonomous management (step 7 of 91
autonomous maintenance)
7.4.8 Develop an early equipment management program 91
7.5 Discussion on the framework of TPM activities developed 92
Chapter 8 Conclusion 93
Chapter 9 Recommendations 95
References 96
ix
Appendices
Appendix A The twelve steps of TPM development 106Appendix B A 12-stage Western approach for TPM development 107Appendix C Calculation of OEE 108Appendix D The 5S System 109Appendix E A sample of one-point lesson 110Appendix F Samples of F-tag for operator and maintenance 111Appendix G Output of Reliability analysis of questionnaire result 112
from ABC Company - All the 20 questionsAppendix H Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 114
from ABC Company- Management IncentiveAppendix I Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 115
from ABC Company- Management CommitmentAppendix J Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 116
from ABC Company - Participation of Managementand Workers
Appendix K Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 117from ABC Company - Communication
Appendix L Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 118from ABC Company - Education and Training
Appendix M Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 119from ABC Company - Improve working conditionsand procedures
Appendix N Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 120from ABC Company - Morale and Job Satisfaction
Appendix O Output of Reliability Analysis of questionnaire result 121from ABC Company - Attitude and Risk Perception
Appendix P Questionnaire set A - for management 122Appendix Q Questionnaire set B - for workers 125Appendix R Questionnaire set B - for worker (Chinese version) 128
x
List of Tables
PageTable 1: Industrial Accidents in Manufacturing Industry (1996-2000) 1Table 2: Definitions of safety culture 7Table 3: Definitions of safety climate 8Table 4: Three levels of safety culture 9Table 5: Themes of conflicting risk judgments of immediate effect 25
injury linked OHS risksTable 6: Pillars of TPM in different generations 29Table 7: The six big losses 31Table 8: The seven steps of Autonomous Maintenance 33Table 9: The twelve steps of TPM development 34Table 10: Development of a TPM system - a case study in China 35Table 11: Factors for assessing safety culture 54Table 12: Questions in eight domains 62Table 13: Numbers of questionnaire sent and received 65Table 14: Average score of questionnaire A 66Table 15: Average score of questionnaire B 67Table 16: Results on Management Incentive 69Table 17: Results on Management Commitment 69Table 18: Results on Participation of Management and Workers 70Table 19: Results on Communication 70Table 20: Results on Education and Training 71Table 21: Results on Working Conditions and Procedures 71Table 22: Results on Morale and Job Satisfaction 72Table 23: Results on Attitude and Risk Perception 72Table 24: Summary of Cronbach's Alpha values for each domain 73Table 25: Output of t-test 74
xi
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1: Accident rate in manufacturing industries (1996-2000) 2
Figure 2: Proposed solution to the problem statement 4
Figure 3: Relationship among safety culture, climate and management 10
Figure 4: A strategic (top-down) approach to safety 12
Figure 5: Berends' (1995) safety culture model 15
Figure 6: Proposed organizational structure of TPM 32
Figure 7: Cause and effect diagram - a generic model of factors 37
affecting successful implementation of TPM
Figure 8: A TPM approach to effective OHS management 49
Figure 9: Methods of assessing employee perceptions 55
Figure 10: Flow Chart of Research Method 59
Figure 11: Average score on all 20 questions 68
Figure 12: Average score on Management Incentive 69
Figure 13: Average score on Management Commitment 69
Figure 14: Average score on Participation of Management and Workers 70
Figure 15: Average score on Communication 70
Figure 16: Average score on Education and Training 71
Figure 17: Average score on Working Condition and procedure 71
Figure 18: Average score on Morale and Job Satisfaction 72
Figure 19: Average score on Attitude and Risk Perception 72
Figure 20: Framework of TPM activities for safety management 82
Figure 21: Proposed organization chart for TPM pilot installation 83in ABC Company
Figure 22: Link safety education and training to skill training 88
xii
Glossary of Terms
Audit: A systematic and whenever possible, independent examination to determine
whether activities and related results conform to planned arrangements and whether
these arrangements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the
organization's policy and objectives. (BS8800:1996, p.4)
Autonomous Maintenance: Autonomous means independent. Autonomous
maintenance refers to activities designed to involve operators in maintaining their own
equipment.
Continuous Improvement: The continuous improvement of processes and systems,
which forms the basis for continuous improvement in cost, quality, safety, schedule,
or flexibility.
Hazard: A source or a situation with a potential for harm in terms of human injury or
ill-health, damage to property, damage to the environment, or a combination of these.
Just-in-time means not just 'zero inventory, but rather all activities which combine to
make just in time to produce the right product at the right time. Just-in-time technique
is a mean to achieve a competitive advantage, through more effective supply chain
management, led to a new perspective in conceiving the relationship between
manufacturers and suppliers.
Risk: The combination of the likelihood and consequence of a specified hazardous
event occurring.
xiii
Risk perception includes both the probability and severity of injury. It influences
how people perceive the risk of a given product or activity.
Total Productive maintenance (TPM) is a system of maintenance covering the entire
life of the equipment in every division, including planning, manufacturing,
maintenance, and all other divisions, involving everyone from the top executives to
the shop floor workers and promoting productive maintenance through morale-
building management and small group activities in an effort to maximize equipment
efficiency (Nakajima 1988).
Total Quality Management highlighted the opportunities offered by the dimension
of quality, not only to reduce production costs but also to improve all outward
oriented performance and mainly that related to the firm's turnover and market share.
Acronyms:
CTPM: The Center for TPM (Australasia)
HKPC: Hong Kong Productivity Council
HKSAR: Hong Kong Special Administration Region
HSE: Health & Safety Executive
JIPE: Japan Institute of Plant Engineers
JIT: Just In Time
OEE: Overall Equipment Effectiveness
OHS: Occupational Health and Safety
TPM: Total Productive Maintenance
TQC: Total Quality Control
TQM: Total Quality management
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The problem addressed
The current approaches to occupational health and safety (OHS) management
including BS 8800:1996, AS/NZS4804:1997, OHSAS 18001:1999 and AS4801:2000
have been introduced into Hong Kong. The government has also put continuous
efforts to reduce industrial accidents. Yet a high accident rate is still a feature of
manufacturing industries, as shown in the last five years statistics compiled by the
Labor Department (2001) of the HKSAR (see Table 1).
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
No. of Accidents 7205 7196 6334 5499 5436
No. of Fatalities 9 4 2 2 3
Employment 335177 306510 263714 247830 232039
Accident rate /
1000 workers 21.50 23.48 24.02 22.19 23.43
Fatality rate /
1000 workers 0.027 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.013
Table 1: Industrial Accidents in Manufacturing Industry (1996-2000)
It can be observed from the accident rate (see Figure 1, data from Table 1) that though
OHS management systems have been introduced, the safety performance of
1
manufacturing industry has not been improved since 1996.
Figure 1: Accident Rate in Manufacturing Industry (1996-2000)
Even though there are OHS management systems in place, however, for many
managers, there are insufficient economic incentives to improve safety. For them,
safety is not and cannot be first. Instead, what is first is profit, mission, productivity or
the strength of growth of their businesses (Michaud 1995). Even if safety does pay, by
reducing the cost of insurance, compensation and man-days loss, employers are often
not aware of this. Indeed they frequently believe that it does not pay. A number of
major UK studies have found that the perception that health and safety improvements
are a "cost" rather than an investment is a significant de-motivating factor amongst
management (HSE 1998). An example is Hopkins (1995) who does not agree that
there are sufficient economic incentives for employers to improve safety. He argues
that emphasizing 'safety pays' is not effective in gaining management attention.
Instead, more emphasis is placed on health and safety now by management due to
pressure from regulators, commercial pressure and higher employee expectations.
On the other hand, for many employees, managing safety and health is the
responsibility of the management only. They seldom take an active part in
2
participating in safety and health activities. They have little interest in protecting the
3
property of their employers or in the safety of their fellow employees or in the safety
record of their organizations. Some of them even think that reporting a health and
safety concern will cause them to be regarded as a troublemaker.
Thus, the problem statement of this dissertation is:
Nowadays, many organizations already have OHS management systems in place.
However, high standard of health and safety still cannot be assured.
1.2 Proposed approach to improve the effectiveness of OHS management systems
Companies with OHS management systems in place still seem to have difficulties to
have improvement in safety performance. One of the reasons is the lacking of means
or methods to establish a positive safety culture. This can be supported by Kennedy &
Kirwan (1998, p.250) who said, "Safety management at least in theory, appears to be
competently equipped to handle accident prevention. However, the way that a safety
management system exists on paper is not necessarily the way that it exists in reality,
i.e. actual shop floor or even board room practices may not follow the espoused
policies explicitly and implicitly laid out in official company documents. This is
where the concepts of safety climate and safety culture come into the picture, as they
represent the work environment and underlying perceptions, attitudes, and habitual
practices of the workforce at all its various levels."
The proposed solution to the problem statement in this dissertation is through the
Total Productive Maintenance (TPM, definition refers to section 2.3) activities, both
the management and workers will adapt a proactive approach towards safety. A
positive safety culture and hence high effectiveness of OHS management systems can
4
then be achieved (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Proposed solution to the problem statement
1.3 Aim and objectives
The aim of this dissertation is:
To establish a framework of TPM activities to improve the effectiveness of the OHS
management systems.
The objectives of this dissertation are:
1. To identify factors of safety culture on safety performance
2. To investigate TPM's effectiveness to enhance safety culture
3. To develop a TPM safety framework
1.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this dissertation is:
A manufacturing company with TPM in place has a more positive safety culture than
one not implementing TPM.
Chapter 2
High Effectiveness of OHS Management System
Proactive approach towards safety
TPM activities
Positive safety culture
5
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the academic literature relevant to safety culture, TPM and
effectiveness of OHS management systems. The objectives of the chapter are to
identify factors of safety culture on safety performance and to identify TPM's effect
on safety performance. These are achieved through the below steps:
2.1 to identify the effects of safety culture on safety performance
2.2 to identify factors of a positive safety culture
2.3 to explain and describe TPM
2.4 to identify the relationship between TPM and the safety culture factors identified
2.5 to identify a way to effective OHS management through TPM
2.1 Effects of safety culture on safety performance
2.1.1 Definitions of safety culture and safety climate
Safety culture is the way an organization's norms, beliefs and attitudes to minimize
exposure of employees to conditions considered to be dangerous. The goal is to
develop an organizational norm in which employees are aware of the risks associated
with their job and are continually on the lookout for potential hazards. Safety culture
is a process, not a program; it takes time to develop and requires a collective effort
(Vredenburgh 1998).
Definitions of safety culture and safety climate from different institutions and scholars
are tabulated in Tables 2 and 3. However, all definitions that attempt to capture the
essence of safety culture, as described by Lee & Harrison (2000), are bound to be
6
inadequate because its many manifestations are extensive, complex and intangible.
Nevertheless, two critical attributes may help to fill out the picture. First, in a healthy
culture, the avoidance of accident and injury by all available means is the
responsibility of every person in the organization. Second, the integration of role
behaviors and the consolidation of social norms create a common set of expectations,
a 'way of life' that transcends individual members. A culture is much more than the
sum of its parts.
Confusion between the terms 'culture' and 'climate' means that they have been used
interchangeably. Some researchers (Glendon & Stanton 2000) distinguished between
safety culture and safety climate while attempts had also been made to derive
composite models. It is not the intention of this paper to go into the concepts of safety
climate and culture in depth. However it is worth mentioning them for easy
understanding of the literature review in the paper. Cooper (1998) described that
safety culture was much boarder than safety climate as it referred to the whole,
whereas safety climate referred solely to people's perception of, and attitudes towards,
safety. Gonzalez-Roma, Peiro, Lloret and Zornoza (1999) explained that safety culture
embodied values, beliefs and assumptions while safety climate was a descriptive
measure reflecting the workforce's perceptions of the organizational atmosphere.
Sutherland, Makin & Cox (2000, p.34) also explained that climate was a term that
applied to the sum of individual perceptions of the organization; while culture, on the
other hand was a group phenomenon, the expression of strongly held norms,
consisting of shared beliefs and values. It was possible for organizations did not have
such strong organizational norms. Thus, whilst all organizations had a safety climate,
not all had a safety culture. For simplicity, safety climate could be regarded as the
7
surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce's attitudes and
perceptions at a given point in time (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor & Bryden 2000).
International Safety Advisory Group (1991)
That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance
Ostrom et al. (1993)
The concept that the organization's beliefs and attitudes, manifested in actions, policies, and procedures, affect its safety performance.
Health and Safety Commission (1993)
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety programs.
Pidgeon & O'Leary (1994, p.32)
The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices within an organization which are concerned with minimizing the exposure of individuals both within and outside an organization to conditions which are considered to be danger.
Geller (1994) In a total safety culture, everyone feels responsible for safety pursues it on a daily basis.
Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (1994)
1. Those aspects of culture that affect safety. 2. Shared attitudes, values, beliefs and practices concerning safety
and the necessity for effective controls.3. The product of individual and group values, attitudes,
competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's safety program.
Berends (1996)
The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of organization members
Lee (1996) The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competences, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and organization's health and safety management.
Table 2: Definitions of safety culture
8
Zohar (1980) A summary concept describing the safety ethic in an organization or
workplace which is reflected in employees' beliefs about safety and is
thought to predict the way employees behave with respect to safety in
that workplace. The model of safety climate of Zohar covers workers
perceptions of: the importance of safety training, management
attitudes towards safety, effects of safe conduct on promotion, level of
risk at workplace, effects of work pace on safety, status of safety
officer, effects of safe conduct on social status and status of safety
committee.
Glennon
(1982)
Employees' perception s of the many characteristics of their
organization that have a direct impact upon their behavior to reduce or
eliminate danger.
Brown and
Holmes
(1986)
A set of perceptions or beliefs held by an individual and/or group
about a particular entity
Cooper and
Philips (1994)
Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and beliefs
that workers hold regarding safety in their work place.
Niskanen
(1994)
Safety climate refers to a set of attributes that can be perceived about
particular work organizations and which may be induced by the
policies and practices that those organizations impose upon their
workers and supervisors.
Coyle et al.
(1995)
The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward
occupational health and safety issues.
Cabrera et al.
(1997)
The shared perceptions of organizational members about their work
environment and, more precisely, about their organizational safety
9
policies.
Neal et al.
(2000)
Individual perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment.
Importance components of safety climate include management values,
management and organizational practices, communication, and
employee involvement in workplace health and safety.
Table 3: Definitions of safety climate
2.1.2 Relationship among safety culture, climate and management
Ashby & Diacon (1996) postulate that the primary motivations associated with OHS
management are those of regulatory compliance and avoidance of legal liabilities.
However, Mohamed (1999) argues that zero-accident cannot be guaranteed by
legislation alone. If management is only forced to implement an OHS management
system due to regulatory pressure, it cannot be expected that the management system
will be operated proactively. What is needed, in addition to legislation, is a change in
corporate culture with regard to safety (Butler 1989).
Thus, HSE (1999) classified safety culture into three levels (Table 4).
Compliance
Driven
(Level 1)
Regulatory frameworks are translated into internal procedures and
compliance is assured largely by close supervision. The aim is primarily
to stay out of trouble with the regulator and senior management.
Managed
Safety
(Level 2)
These safety management systems generally include mechanisms for
policy definition, allocating responsibilities, implementing systems and
measuring performance in some way. The organization can thus move
beyond external prescription and set its own targets and standards.
10
Constructive
Intolerance
(Level 3)
Introduced a culture that devolves responsibility to the team level and
here tended to be more emphasis on local ownership of health and safety
issues, and on developing risk awareness. The aim is to encourage
'constructive intolerance' of unsafe or potentially unsafe conditions,
coupled with a commitment to take responsibility for either dealing with
the hazard or ensuring that it is dealt with. Simply speaking, "don't
accept unsafe conditions and don't take no for an answer". This ties in
well with the requirement for continuous improvement.
Table 4: Three levels of safety culture (HSE 1999)
11
Level 1 are those companies whose safety goals are to comply with regulation. Level
2 are those companies having safety management systems in place. Level 3 are those
companies implement systems proactively and strategy for continuous improvement.
Kennedy & Kirwan (1998, p.251) had summarized the relationship among safety
management, climate and culture (see Figure 3). According to their findings, safety
culture was a sub-element of the overall organizational culture. It was an abstract
concept which was underpinned by the amalgamation of individual and group
perceptions, thought processes, feelings and behavior which in turn gave rise to the
particular way of doing things in the organization. The safety climate and the safety
management were at lower levels of abstraction and were considered to be a
manifestation of the overall safety culture. The safety climate was, therefore, a more
tangible expression of the safety culture in the form of symbolic and political aspects
of the organization. These factors in turn would characterize and influence the
deployment and effectiveness of the safety management resources, policies, practices
and procedures.
Environment Safety ManagementPractices
Safety Climate
Safety Culture
OrganizationalCulture
Figure 3: Relationship among safety culture, climate and management
2
Increasingly abstractand intangible concepts
12
2.1.3 Proactive safety culture and safety performance
Covey (1991) identified proactive as one of the seven habits of high effective people.
He explained proactive as the power, freedom, and ability to choose responses to
whatever happened to people, based on their values. According to Covey, when
people are proactive, they tend not to blame people or circumstances for what happens
to them. Proactive and reactive produce different outcomes. Proactive produces
results; reactive produces excuses, or explanations. The strength of proactive is not a
pushy sort of strength. It is internal strength, the strength of integrity, or the simple
commitment to value or principle. This can also be applied to OHS management.
When someone is proactive, he will not budged from his principle. When an accident
occurs, he will not blame others or find excuses. He believes what happens has
resulted from what he has chosen and hence he will develop control measures to
prevent accidents from happening.
HSE (1996a) postulates that the most effective way of preventing accidents and ill
health at work is to manage the business in such a way as to encourage all staff to
develop a positive culture towards health and safety. A good safety culture and an
involvement in safety that goes through the organizational hierarchy, from top down
to the workers, is essential for successful OHS (Seppala 1995).
A strategic (top down) model to safety developed by Gleendon & Stanton (2000,
p.205) clearly pictured the relationship of safety management system and safety
culture described above (see Figure 4):
13
Figure 4: A strategic (top-down) approach to safety (Glendon & Stanton 2000)
The success of an OHS management system depends on whether everyone in the
organization is involved and whether a proactive approach has been adopted (Health
and Safety Factbook 1998). Recent studies by Halme (1992), Seppala (1992) and
Varonen & Mattila (2000) all concluded that the better the safety culture, the lower
was the accident rate. This can be further supported by a case study on the injury rate
of hospital employees done by Vredenburgh (1998). He concluded that while most of
the participating hospitals implemented the reactive practices, what differentiated the
hospitals with low injury rates was that they also employed proactive measures to
prevent accidents.
As described above, effective implementation of an OHS management system
depends on the safety culture of the organization. There are many other studies which
support this argument:
Brabazon, Tipping & Jones (2000) said, "There is general agreement that an
Safety Management System
Performance Measurement
Safety Culture
Risk Assessment and Control
Human Resource Management
Proactive: audits, etc. Reactive:
accidents, etc.
Attitudes Behaviors Norms and Values
Training and Development
Personal Responsibilities
14
effective and proactive safety culture is essential to improve safety."
Saari (1990) suggested, "After a certain point technology cannot achieve further
improvement in safety, rather, organizational and cultural factors may be
important - yet these have not been widely explored."
Kennedy & Kirwan (1998) postulates that safety culture underpins safety
management, which in turn determines work practices and system configuration.
Krause (1993) also argues that employee behavior is a direct result of
management system and is the final common pathway of most incidents.
Management system in turn is influenced by the organization culture which has a
substantial influence on, inter alia, priorities and the allocation of resources to
health and safety effort.
Seppala (1995) concluded in a recent study that a good safety culture and an
involvement in safety that went through the organizational hierarchy, from top
down to the workers, was essential for successful occupational safety and health.
A training program helps the personnel to carry out various preventive activities
effectively. It also helps establish a positive attitude towards safety and integrates
safety with the production and quality goals.
15
2.2 Factors of a proactive safety culture
The above section described the relationship between a proactive safety culture and
effectiveness of OHS management system. In this section, the factors for a proactive
safety culture would be investigated.
A model of safety climate produced by Seppala (1992) consisted of three factors:
organizational responsibility for safety
workers' concern about safety and
workers' indifference towards safety
Grote & Kunzler (2000) also described some examples of indicators used to assess an
organization's safety culture, including:
management commitment to safety
safety training and motivation
safety committees and safety rules
record keeping on accidents
sufficient inspection and communication
adequate operation and maintenance procedures
well-designed and functioning technical equipment, and
good house keeping.
Another model of safety culture model developed by Berends (1995) showed the
factors of norms and beliefs of safety culture, as shown in Figure 5.
16
Figure 5: Berends' (1995) safety culture model
communication
supportinteractionalNORMS
individualpassive
active
causes ofaccidents
results of safeworking
Human nature
evaluation ofsituational
controllability of safety
controllabilityby individual
BELIEFS
design ofenvironment
controllingbehavior
dealing withsafety problems
organizational
17
Among the factors contribute to safety culture, some can be found in TPM. In this
section, the effects of eight safety culture factors, which can be enhanced by TPM (to
be verified in the Section 2.4) were described.
The eight safety culture factors identified were:
1. management incentive
2. management commitment
3. participation of management and worker
4. communication
5. education and training
6. working conditions and procedures
7. morale and job satisfaction
8. attitude and risk perception
In the below sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.8, it would be verified that these 8 safety culture
factors were important for good safety performance.
2.2.1 'Management incentive' is essential for good safety performance
Managers are influenced by a variety of motives, among them economic incentives,
fear of legal consequences, moral commitment and concern for their own reputations.
These are numerous ways in which these motives can lead to action to improve OHS.
But none of this is automatic. These motives will come into play only if management's
attention is drawn to the relevant information (Hopkins 1995).
Management's motive cannot be driven by legislation alone. A recent study (Brabazon
et al. 2000) reported that senior management had not considered the risk of
18
prosecution to be high. The number of regulatory visits carried out was perceived to
be very low and so the likelihood of an inspector finding a non compliance, and this
leading to a successful prosecution was seen as acceptable in some cases.
Furthermore, there was a temptation to introduce more paperwork as evidence to
defend directors against prosecution.
It is perceived that (Brabazon et al. 2000) senior managers do not fully exploit their
potential to improve health and safety. The lack of commitment is due to the poor
understanding of links between good health and safety performance and business
performance. The need for financial efficiencies is the main drive for change.
Thus, management incentive is essential for good safety performance. Lack of
incentives leading to management commitment becomes lip service to improve health
and safety performance, but not a genuine commitment to action (HSE 1997). It is not
surprising that the management commitment is very often low in many organizations
as described in the next section.
2.2.2 'Management commitment' is essential for good safety performance
Management commitment is the key factor of safety culture. Dedobbeleer & Beland
(1998) found evidence for only two core factors in a review of safety climate surveys,
one of which they called management commitment (another was risk perception
mentioned below). Cheyne, Cox, Oliver & Thomas (1998) also reported management
commitment as a prime factor in their predictive model of safety behaviors, giving
some support to the primacy of this factor. In a study to compare plants with high and
low injury rates by Koh (1995), it was noted that the most important workforce factor
19
which accounted for the difference in safety performance was greater management
commitment and involvement in the total safety programme. Management
commitment as the most critical element in a successful safety program can further be
supported by various studies such as Cohen (1997), Zohar (1980) and Isla & Diaz
(1997).
However, in many cases, management commitment is low (Brabazon et al. 2000),
implying a need to convince them of the importance of health and safety performance
to the future prosperity of their company. Brabazon et al. (2000) also argue that there
are thought to be still considerable operational obstacles which cause poor health and
safety performance, most notably a lack of resources.
It can be concluded that management support is crucial to ensure the success of OHS
promotion programs. Furthermore, the commitment of top management to develop the
safety program and joint regulation mechanisms appears to be an effective way for
senior managers to impact indirectly on workers' safety initiatives behavior by
influencing positively supervisory participative management of safety and workgroup
cohesiveness (Simard & Marchand 1995), as discussed in the next section.
2.2.3 'Participation of management and workers' is essential for good safety
performance
Besides making commitment, management participation is also essential. This can be
supported by Wentz (1998) who argues that to promote OHS, management should
encourage and support safety by setting a good safety example; effectively managing
health and safety programmes, attending health and safety meetings, performing
20
inspections, investigating near miss accidents and reviewing safety performance at all
levels.
Participation of workers is important as well. The way forward for successful OHS
management as described by Health and Safety Factbook (1998), is to involve
everyone in the organization, including both the management and workers, using a
proactive approach to identify hazards and to control those risks that are not tolerable.
"Employee's participation is important" can be supported by a research in the
chemical industry carried out by HSE (2001). The study concluded that companies
that were seeking to make their safety management systems more effective regarded
involving their employees as the preferred way of improving safety performance.
They were not driven by regulatory demands alone. They reported a reduction in
adversarial management-employee relations, better morale and an improved image in
the eyes of clients and the general public. They maintained that the benefits of
employee involvement outweighed the costs incurred. These views were shared by
employees, trade unions and management alike.
Worker participation has many advantages. Hopkins (1995) pointed out that a policy
of worker participation, involving workers in decision making about their work, a
policy perhaps of self-directed work groups would make employees feel encourage to
come forward with suggestions, which in turn would eliminate many little
inefficiencies which were built into jobs-prooly-designed tasks, procedures which
were not well connected and so on.
21
Another advantage of worker participation as described by HSE (1997) is that it
supports risk control by encouraging workers' ownership of health and safety policies.
It establishes an understanding that the organization as a whole, and people working
in it, benefit from good health and safety performance. Pooling knowledge and
experience through participation, commitment and involvement means that health and
safety becomes everybody's business.
Brabazon et al. (2000) also pointed out that workforce participation needed an open
environment in which people could offer ideas, including when something had gone
badly, without the possibility of blame. Thus the degree of worker participation was
affected by the effectiveness and means of communication.
In conclusion, good management of health and safety can only be achieved with the
co-operation of the workforce. It is vital that the employees know what is expected of
them and are aware of any risks to their health and safety that may arise at work and
any safe systems of work that are applied (HSE 1995).
2.2.4 'Communication' is essential for good safety performance
The first people to realize something may be going seriously wrong in an organization
are usually those who work there. However, a recent study by HSE (1999) found out
that employees often did not voice such concerns or they voiced them in a wrong way.
Sometimes they thought that because it was only a suspicion they should not bother
anyone about it. Or they might think speaking up would be disloyal to their
colleagues. Often they feared they would lose their job or be victimized. This study
argued that a good safety culture was "one where the mental attitude of both workers
22
and management is such that when a risk to health and safety is perceived, it will be
reported promptly to the designated people. They, in turn, will investigate it and
remove or reduce any unwarranted risk."
Merritt & Helmreich (1996, p.11) also said, "An organization needs to encourage and
reward vigilance and inquiry from all its members, seeking to mend the system rather
than killing the messenger."
Thus the channels for communication are important. Management feedback on the
reports and the manner of feedback so that the employee can understand are also
important; otherwise employees will be discouraged from further reporting of their
concern on OHS. The study by HSE (1999) also pointed out "almost all organizations
using a form acknowledge receipt of a report by means of a tear off slip or something
similar. Feedback is vital, to maintain enthusiasm for a scheme, to disseminate the
lessons learned, to stimulate other reports, and as a quality check. However, where the
output from reporting schemes tended to be high-level statistical analyses aimed
solely at management, employees would quickly lose faith in the procedure."
2.2.5 'Education and training' is essential for good safety performance
The main priority for education and training so far as safety is concerned is the
creation of a safety culture. Training is by definition an ongoing process continually
reviewed and modified to take account of changing conditions, past experience and
new developments. Safety must be inextricably woven into the entire tapestry of
training procedures. Training should and must tighten safety awareness, and the
intelligent understanding of possible hazards; thence how these may be minimized by
23
good practice (HSE 1990). Upon employees are educated and trained to create safety
culture in their organizations, can the safety performance be assured.
2.2.6 'Working conditions and procedures' is essential for good safety
performance
In a recent case study, Varonen & Mattila (2000) found that the safety climate
correlated both with the safety level of the work environment and with the safety
practices of the company, and the correlation between the safety climate and the
safety of the 'work environment' was stronger.
Glennon (1982) also identified 'procedures' as one of the most frequently themes used
by other researchers in his review of safety culture. Flin et al. (2000) suggested that
procedure was an issue that might merit inclusion in safety climate measures.
2.2.7 'Morale and job satisfaction' is essential for good safety performance
'Morale and job satisfaction' is an essential factor for good safety performance can be
supported by a recent HSE funded study based on approximately 1.5 million
observations of people's everyday safety behavior over the course of a year (Cooper
1998, p.82). Cooper concluded that people with higher morale and job satisfaction
would have better safety performance. Cooper believed that it was because autonomy
or job control affected people's experienced responsibility, that was, the extent to
which people felt personally responsible for the outcomes of their performance.
24
2.2.8 'Attitude and risk perception' is essential for good safety performance
'Attitude and risk perception' is an essential factor for good safety performance.
Phelps (1999, p.32) said, "A casual attitude can often result in a casualty." Goetsch
(1998, p.139) also said, "Employee perceptions concerning the state of the work
environment can affect both morale and performance."
Employees' attitude is important for safety can be supported by the study of Marcus
(1988) on 24 nuclear power stations in United State of America. Marcus concluded
that those plants where the attitudes of employees favored control, responsibility and a
generally proactive attitude towards safety had three times fewer 'error events' and a
generally better safety record. In another study by Isla & Diaz (1997), it was found
that those enterprises with higher scores on the climate scale also had a more positive
safety attitude.
Risk perception is important for safety performance. This can be supported by a study
on risk perception and safety on offshore petroleum platforms carried out by Rundmo
(1995, p.1). Rundmo concluded that the higher the perceived risk, the more
dissatisfied with safety status, the more accidents and near accidents they experienced.
According to Rundmo (2000), risk perception might affect risk behavior and also the
probability of accidents and health injuries. Risk perception was composed of a
subjective assessment of the probability of experiencing an accident or a health injury
caused by exposure to a risk source as well as emotions related to the source.
Accordingly, Sjoberg (1993) suggested that an individual's experience of risk could be
separated into one cognitive component and one emotional or affective component.
25
Holmes, Gifford & Triggs (1998) also defined two factors in workers' perceptions of
their safety climate. One was the demonstration of management commitment to OHS
through actions and attitudes. The second factor was workers' involvement in OHS
and the authors speculated that employee perceptions of risk and its control related to
their views about responsibility for risk and its control.
Dedobbeleer & Beland (1998) considered risk perception as a fundamental
component of safety climate and speculated that it was closely linked to the concept
of workers' involvement or responsibility for safety, one of their two identified safety
climate dimensions (another was management commitment mentioned above).
Risk perception is not only related to employees, but also related to managers and
employers. In a case study of perceptions and understandings of risk and its control in
OHS among employers and employees of an Australian small, blue-collar business
industry, carried out by Holmes et al. (1998), the findings showed that accounts of risk
perceptions in the workplace that focused on employees could have limited
implications for the practice of management and promotion of OHS. These accounts
were incomplete without a concurrent examination of employers' and managers' risk
perceptions.
However, in another study by Holmes, Triggs, Gifford & Dawkins (1997), employers
and employees had different themes of risk judgments, as shown in Table 5 below:
26
Categories of themes Themes
1. Employers' themes risk is a function of economic factors
individual attitudes are the source of risk
2. Employees' themes 'part of the job' - acceptance of risk in work
environment
3. Shared themes risk is a function of occurrence frequency
Table 5: Themes of conflicting risk judgments of
immediate effect injury linked OHS risks (Holmes et al. 1997)
The study of Holmes et al. (1997) found that many employers revealed that risk in
OHS meant the effect of occupational injuries on work productivity and business
finances. In contrast, employees regarded occupational injury risk as a normal feature
of the work environment and an acceptable 'part of the job'. They described
occurrence frequency in the context of their own working environment and experience
rather than a statistical aggregate of other people and trades. Thus, the risk perception
of employer and employee affects the safety culture of an organization.
2.3 Introduction to TPM
It is important to present the basic concepts of TPM before attempting to explain how
TPM is related to safety culture. This section provides an introduction to TPM.
In 1971, as described by Nakajima (1988, p.10), the Japan Institute of Plant Engineers
(JIPE) developed the TPM and defined TPM as a system of maintenance covering the
27
entire life of the equipment in every division, including planning, manufacturing,
maintenance, and all other divisions, involving everyone from the top executives to
the shop floor workers and promoting productive maintenance through morale-
building management and small group activities in an effort to maximize equipment
efficiency.
TPM, together with Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just-in-time (JIT) are the
three most important activities surrounding the kaizen approach (Yamashina 2000),
which is a continuous improvement concept and widely recognized as a strategic
weapon to achieve world-class manufacturing (Cigolini & Turco 1997).
In order to achieve world-class performance, more and more companies are replacing
their reactive, fire-fighting strategies for maintenance with proactive strategies like
preventive and predictive maintenance and aggressive strategies like TPM to improve
productivity and quality (Swansion 2001). Another factor in achieving world-class
manufacturing can be said to be its approach to health and safety issues. As TPM
improves machine performance, reduces machine breakdown, improves working
condition and procedures, encourages total participation of management and workers,
requires continuous improvement and commitments to training and resources, TPM is
believed to improve safety as well, as will be verified in the sections below.
2.3.1 A brief history of maintenance management
Traditionally, repairs and maintenance of equipment are the responsibility of the
maintenance departments. The production workers, who usually are the first people to
realize something may be going wrong in machines, are not involved with the care
28
and maintenance of the machines since the performance of the machines is generally
regarded as the responsibility of others.
The objective of maintenance management is to increase equipment availability and
overall effectiveness. Overall there have been four main periods of maintenance
management (Nakajima 1988 & McKone 1996):
1. Reactive (breakdown) maintenance (prior to 1950)
During this phase little attention was placed on defining reliability requirements or
preventing equipment failures. Typically equipment specifications included
requirements for individual parts and failed to consider the reliability or
availability of the entire system.
2. Preventive maintenance (1950s)
During this phase a maintenance system involved an analysis of current equipment
to determine the best methods to prevent failure and to reduce repair time.
Emphasis was placed on the economic efficiency of equipment replacements and
repairs as well as improving the equipment reliability to reduce the mean time
between failures.
3. Productive maintenance (1960s)
When the importance of reliability, maintenance, and economic efficiency in plant
design was recognized, productive maintenance became well established. It
included maintenance prevention pursued during the equipment design stages;
maintainability improvement which modifies equipment to prevent breakdowns
and facilitate ease of maintenance; and preventative maintenance including
29
periodic inspections and repairs of the equipment.
4. Total productive maintenance (1970s)
TPM officially began in the 1970's in Japan and was designed to maximize
equipment effectiveness. Development of TPM is shown in the next section.
2.3.2 The development of TPM
TPM originates from the fact that productivity, cost, inventory, production output,
safety and quality all depend on equipment performance (Ravishankar, Burczak &
DeVore 1992). The goal of TPM is to eliminate equipment breakdowns and defects
caused by the production process (Ravishankar, Burczak & Devore 1992). When this
has been accomplished, operation rates improve, quality and reliability of parts
improve, costs and inventories decrease, and consequently worker productivity
increases. Below is a brief summary for the historical development of TPM (CTPM
2001a, HKPC 2000, Nakajima 1988):
TPM had its genesis in the Japanese car industry in the 1970s. It evolved at Nippon
Denso, a major supplier of the Toyota Car Company, as a necessary element of the
newly developed Toyota Production System.
It was not until 1988, with the publication in English of the first of two authoritative
texts on the subject by Seiichi Nakajima, that the western world recognized and
started to understand the importance of TPM. It soon became obvious that TPM was a
critical missing link in successfully achieving not only world class equipment
performance to support Total Quality Control (TQC) and Just In Time (JIT), but was a
30
powerful new means to improving overall company performance.
Since the early 90s, TPM has steadily spread throughout the western world,
significantly improving the performance of manufacturing, and mining companies.
The development of TPM is divided into three stages. The development is in line with
the industrial environment in the world. Society of Manufacturing Engineers (1995)
stated, "Productive is TPM's middle name." In the early stage of TPM, there were
only five pillars, and TPM aimed at improving equipment efficiency and hence
productivity. When quality was becoming a serious concern, the sixth pillar " Process
Quality Management" was added at the 2nd stage of TPM. In 1990s, when the world
progresses from mere growth to development, causing OHS to be mounting concern,
a new element "Safety and Environmental Management" was also added to TPM.
Now there are eight elements in TPM as shown in Table 6 (HKPC 2000) below.
Pillars of TPM Generation
1st 2nd 3rd
1. Equipment and Process Improvement
2. Autonomous Maintenance
3. Planned Maintenance
4. Education and Training
5. Early Management of New Equipment
6. Process Quality Management
7. TPM in administration and support departments
8. Safety and Environmental Management
31
Table 6: Pillars of TPM in different generations
32
The above is the development of the Japanese and Western approach of TPM. In
Australia, the first generation is the same as the Japanese approach. In the third
generation, there are now ten pillars.
1. Macro focused equipment and process improvement
2. Work area management
3. Operator equipment management
4. Maintenance excellence management
5. Education and Training
6. People support systems improvement
7. Administration and support systems improvement
8. New equipment management
9. 9. Safety and environmental management
10. Process quality management
In Hong Kong, and so is this dissertation, the Japanese approached is adopted.
2.3.3 TPM Principles
Blanc (1993) defined six principles for TPM:
1. Improvement of product and process quality through zero mentality
2. Elimination of the six big losses (see Table 7)
3. Development of a clean, safe, well organized, and visually controlled work place.
4. Focus on chronic losses and root cause preventive problem solving.
5. Development of equipment management systems - (predictive maintenance, OEE
tracking, preventive maintenance) which enhance TPM implementation and
development.
33
6. Increase skill levels of operators and maintenance personnel and begin to transfer
more equipment ownership to operators.
1 Breakdown failures Losses due to sporadic and function-reducing
machine failures
2 Setups and adjustments Shutdown losses accompanying setup
changeovers and adjustments
3 Idling and minor stoppages Losses due to idling or stoppage resulting from
transient problems
4 Reduced speed Losses arising from disparities between actual
operating speeds and speeds specified in
equipment design
5 Quality defects and rework Losses due to defects and rework
6 Startup and reduced yield Losses incurred in the interval between
production startup and stable production
Table 7 : The six big losses (Blanc 1993)
2.3.4 TPM structure
Through the use of overlapping teams, everyone participates from top executives to
shop floor employees. To create an effective communication channel, the leader of
one team is a member of another team at the next higher level (see Figure 6). The
result is top down support and resources guided by pillar champions with bottom up
activity and ownership through the use of small group activities (JIPM 2001).
34
President ☺Company wide TPMPromotion Committee
Plant Manager
Plant TPM PromotionManager Committee
Team LeadersSupervisor
Small teams formedFront Line Worker at the production site
Figure 6: Proposed organizational structure of TPM (JIPM 2001)
2.3.5 Autonomous Maintenance
Autonomous Maintenance is the second pillar of TPM (see Table 6). The word
autonomous means independent. Autonomous maintenance refers to activities
designed to involve operators in the maintenance of their own equipment (JIPM 1997,
p.8). Operators learn the maintenance skills they need through a seven-step
autonomous maintenance program (JIPM 1996, p.109) (see Table 8).
Autonomous maintenance can only be achieved via good management practice
(Prickett 1999, p.236). This should include the associated training of machine tool
operators which must be undertaken to ensure their co-operation. Limited changes are
35
needed to existing maintenance engineering practices to support the transfer of certain
responsibilities and actions from maintenance staff to operators. Such actions must be
managed to ensure high levels of staff motivation. Some of the developments
presented in this work were aimed at supporting the operators at the machine tool
level by presenting maintenance related information to them in a form that they could
use.
36
Step Name Activities Related to safetyEliminate unsafe conditions
1 Clean and inspect
Eliminate all dirt and grime on the machine, lubricate, tighten bolts, and find and correct problems.
Identify and correct problems such as exposed moving parts, projecting parts, spattering of harmful substances
2 Eliminate problem sources and inaccessible areas
Correct sources of dirt and grime; prevent spattering and improve accessibility for cleaning and lubrication. Shorten the time it takes to clean and lubricate.
Take steps to correct problems related to covers, guards, etc.
3 Draw up cleaning and lubricating standards
Write standards that will ensure that cleaning, lubricating, and tightening can be done efficiently.(Make a schedule for periodic tasks.)
Establish and review work standards and daily check methods, etc.
4 Conduct general inspections
Conduct skills training with inspection manuals and use general inspections to find and correct slight abnormalities in the equipment.
Check and improve performance of safety and disposal devices.
Eliminate unsafe behavior5 Conduct
autonomous inspections
Prepare standard check sheets for autonomous inspections. Carry out the inspections.
Correct stressful working postures and methods
6 Standardize through visual workplace management
Standardize and visually manage all work processes.Examples of standards needed: cleaning, lubrication, and inspection
standards shop floor materials flow standards data recording method standards tool and die management standards
Assure workplace organization (5S) and maintain a proper working environment
7 Implement Develop company policies and objectives; Encourage everyone
37
autonomous equipment management
make improvement activities part of everyday practice; keep reliable MTBF (mean time between failures) data, analyze it, and use it to improve equipment.
to take care of their own workplaces
Table 8: The seven steps of Autonomous Maintenance
38
2.3.6 Steps in developing a TPM system
Nakajima (1988, p.55) established a 12-step model in developing a TPM system.
When TPM was introduced into the western world, Hartmann (2000) also established
a 12-step Western model in developing a TPM system. The 12-steps of these two
models are summarized in Table 9 below. Details of these two 12-steps models are
shown in Appendices A and B.
Step Japan approach(Nakajima 1988)
Western Approach(Hartmann 2000)
1 Announce top management decision to introduce TPM
Collect information
2 Launch education and campaign to introduce TPM Initial audit and presentation
3 Create organizations to promote TPM In-plant TPM training4 Establish basic TPM policies and goals Study team training5 Formulate master plan for TPM development Feasibility study6 Hold TPM kick-off Feasibility study
presentation7 Improve effectiveness of each piece of equipment Pilot installation8 Develop an autonomous maintenance program Plant-wide installation9 Develop a scheduled maintenance program for the
maintenance departmentIntroduction audit
10 Conduct training to improve operation and maintenance skills
Progress audit
11 Develop early equipment management program Certification12 Perfect TPM implementation and raise TPM levels TPM award
Table 9: The twelve steps of TPM development
In a case study by Tsang & Chan (2000, p.153) to develop a TPM system in China,
the 12 steps of the Japan Approach are divided into three phases as shown in Table 10.
39
Phase Steps Status in the case studyPi
lot p
hase
T1 Announcement The introduction of TPM was announced through internal
correspondence and posters on TPM notice-boards. The
maintenance manager was appointed the champion of
TPM
T5 TPM master plan The master plan was developed by the TPM champion
T3 Organize and promote TPM A TPM committee was formed to steer the
implementation program and monitor progress
T2 Education campaign Training on TPM concepts for supervisory staff was
conducted by the champion. This was followed by
training courses for operators focusing on discipline,
proper use of equipment, cleaning and lubricating
T6 TPM kick off No special event was organized to kick off the program
T7 Improve equipment
effectiveness
This was initially focused on two pilot sites. The
improvements were made by the maintenance department
T8 Develop an autonomous
maintenance program:
A1 Perform initial cleaning
A2 Address sources of
contamination and
inaccessible places
A3 Establish cleaning and
lubricating standards
A4 Set overall inspection
standards
Tasks A1-A3 were performed by the maintenance
department in collaboration with production. Visual
controls such as equipment nameplates and correct
operating range displays on gauges, valve on-off
indicators, etc. were introduced. Photographs were used to
document the desired cleanliness of equipment and the
workplace inspection checklists were prepared by
maintenance
Prom
otio
n an
d T4 Establish basic TPM
policies
The operator is responsible for providing primary care for
his equipment - cleaning, lubricating, adjusting and
inspecting
T2 Education campaign Steps T2 and T8 were extended to all production units
40
Con
solid
atio
n
T8 Develop an autonomous
maintenance program
- steps A1-A4M
atur
ity p
hase
T9 Develop scheduled
maintenance program
This is being done by maintenance
T10 Conduct training to
improve operation and
maintenance skills
There is ongoing effort to prepare operators for the
challenge of autonomous maintenance
T11 Develop an early
management program
Data are being captured to track equipment performance
and optimize maintenance decisions
T8 Develop an autonomous
maintenance program:
A5 Set autonomous
maintenance standards
A6 Assure process quality
A7 Autonomous supervision
Simple PM tasks have been included in autonomous
maintenance.
There is ongoing training to enhance operators' awareness
of the causal relationships between equipment conditions
and output quality, and develop their data analysis and
problem-solving skills for maintenance improvement
T12 Perfect TPM implementation This is the ultimate target to be accomplished
Table 10: Development of a TPM system-a case study in China (Tsang & Chan 2000 )
2.3.7 Obstacles in implementing TPM
Bakerjan (1994) identified three major obstacles in introducing TPM:
1. Lack of management support and understanding
2. Lack of sufficient training
3. Failure to allow sufficient time for its evolution
Davis (1997) outlined ten main reasons for TPM failure within UK manufacturing
organizations:
1. The program is not serious about change.
2. Inexperienced consultants/trainers are used.
41
3. The program is too high level, run by managers for managers.
4. There is a lack of structure and relationship to strategic needs.
5. The program does not implement change on the shop floor and is not managed.
6. A lack of education and training for those expected to take it on board and
provide support.
7. Programs are initiated and run exclusively by engineering and seen by
production as a project that does not involve them.
8. Attempts to apply TPM in the same way it is implemented in Japan using the
standard approach found in Japanese publications.
9. TPM teams lack the necessary mix of skills and experience.
10. Poor structure to support the TPM teams and their activities.
Hartmann (2000) also pointed out the reasons of failure in the installation of TPM,
including:
1. lack of proper understanding of the total effort required
2. lack of management support
3. lack of sufficient TPM staff
4. union resistance
5. not enough training carried out
6. change of priorities
7. lack of persistence
8. failure to develop a good installation strategy
9. choosing the wrong approach
2.3.8 Factors for success implementation of TPM
Bamber, Sharp & Hides (1999, p.171) developed a conceptual framework, which
42
consisted of nine categories, to show the factors that affect successful implementation
of TPM (see Figure 7).
Measures of The involvementPerformance of people
AnAlignment to implementationMission plan
SuccessfulImplementation
of TPM
Knowledge Management The existingand beliefs commitment organization
Time Timeallocation for motivation ofimplementation management and workforce
Figure 7: Cause and effect diagram -a generic model of factors affecting
successful implementation of TPM (Bamber et al. 1999)
CTPM (2001b) also described that the success implementation of TPM required three
key mind-set changes by all employees from the most senior management to shop
floor:
1. Equipment reliability cannot be a dedicated maintenance department
responsibility. All departments including Production, Maintenance, Engineering,
43
Procurement and Planning have a major contributing role in ensuring the cost-
effective reliability of plant and equipment. In fact, the production and operation
departments must take full responsibility for the cost-effective performance of
their plant and equipment. All employees must recognize that there is no place
for the "I operate, you fix" mentality. This is a basic concept on the development
of a proactive safety culture.
2. Early identification and rectification of equipment defects is paramount to
reducing total operating costs especially maintenance costs. All employees,
especially operators must take an active role in this important activity which
must also be supported by a "Defect Avoidance" mentality. This change in mind-
set helps to reduce machine related accident.
3. Hidden costs associated with poor equipment management (the costs generated
by equipment not running effectively such as production inefficiency costs, poor
quality costs, capacity constraint costs etc.), as opposed to just focusing on the
maintenance budget, needs to be understood, measured and managed by all
employees.
44
2.4 Investigate TPM's effectiveness in enhancing safety culture
JIPM (1996, p.103) said, "Safety is a cornerstone of TPM. The basic principle behind
TPM safety activities is to address dangerous conditions and behavior before they
cause accidents." In Section 2.2, eight safety culture factors had been identified to
improve safety performance. In this section, it would be shown that TPM could
promote these eight factors and hence enhanced safety culture.
2.4.1 Implementation of TPM provides a good incentive for management
Manufacturing systems (Blanchard 1997) often operate at less than full capacity,
productivity is low, and the costs of producing products are high. In dealing with the
aspect of cost, experience has indicated that a large percentage of the total cost of
doing business is due to maintenance-related activities in the factory, that is, the costs
associated with maintenance labor and materials and the cost due to production losses.
TPM aims to increase productivity through maximizing equipment effectiveness and
minimizing losses in production (Schmidt 1997). This is a good incentive for
management to implement TPM, which will promote safety together (JIPM 1996).
TPM maximizes equipment effectiveness through reducing machine utilization losses
caused by reduced processing speed, minor machine stoppages and process defects. In
addition, TPM reduces the occurrences of equipment failure and the associated costs
of repeated machine and process set up. Put in its most simple form TPM will
increase the Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE, calculation see Appendix C) of
manufacturing facilities by operating and maintaining machinery at an optimum level
(Prickett 1999, p.236).
45
TPM minimizes losses in production by eliminating major losses in production
activities (Riis, Luxh & Thorsteinsson 1997). Naguib (1993, p.90) also said, "TPM
enables operating equipment profitably by reducing equipment related losses. The "six
major losses" as described by Swanson (2001), that TPM aims to remove are
equipment failure, set-up and adjustment time, idling and minor stoppages, reduced
speed, defects in process and reduced yield (see Table 7).
Besides maximizing productivity and minimizing losses, TPM is cost effective. It
provides cost effective acquisition of equipment by selecting the correct machine for
the job, with comprehensive documentation, training and spare parts availability
(Naguib 1993, p.90). By decentralizing maintenance activities, such as planning and
supervision, to the operators, the costs and performance of maintenance can
sometimes be improved. A study by Maggard & Rhyne, (1992) showed that 40% of
the traditional maintenance mechanic's work could be done by another employee, with
minimal training, and another 40% could be performed with additional training.
Steudel & Desruelle (1992) also argued that 80-90% of the maintenance work should
be carried out by operators.
Below are three examples showing TPM provides incentives for management to
improve productivity and safety together:
1. Yamato Kogyo, a motorcycle manufacturers, after implementation of TPM for
five years, productivity improved by 150%, accidents dipped by 90%, and
defects reduced by 95% (Turbide 1995).
46
2. Pirelli, a rubber industry in UK, over a 3-year period, showed a 31% reduction in
accidents and near misses, a reduction from 600 hours to 40 hours lost arising
from manual handling accidents (HSE 1996b).
3. Nissan Casting Australia - Dandenong Victoria, after implementation of TPM for
2 years, loss time injury decreased from an average of 60 hours per 1,000,000
hours in 1990-1994 to 3 hours per 1,000,000 hours in 1997-1998 (HKPC 2000,
p.6.7).
2.4.2 Management commitment is important in TPM
For effective implementation of TPM (Roberts 1997), total commitment to the
program by upper level management is required. To begin applying TPM concepts,
the entire work force must first be convinced that upper level management is
committed to the program (Roberts 1997). A case study by Bamber et al. (1999) found
out that lack of management support would lead to failure of the implementation of
TPM.
Management commitment has been identified in section 2.2.2 as a core factor of
safety culture, while TPM requires a culture where there is a commitment to ongoing
improvement, and a commitment to treating each individual as a valued employee
(Society of Manufacturing Engineers 1995). Thus if the management has the incentive
to implement TPM successfully, a high commitment is necessary which will promote
the safety culture eventually.
47
2.4.3 TPM encourages participation of management and workers
It has been identified in section 2.2.3 that 'participation of management and workers'
is essential for a proactive safety culture. TPM program promotes worker involvement
by preparing operators to become active partners with maintenance and engineering
personnel in improving the overall performance and reliability of the equipment
(McKone, Schroeder & Cua 1999, p.126). The word 'Total' means all people are
involved, including management and workers. In the TPM framework, the goals (Riis
et al. 1997) are to develop a maintenance free design and to involve the participation
of all employees to improve maintenance productivity.
2.4.4 TPM enhances communication
It has been identified in section 2.2.4 that communication is essential for a proactive
safety culture. TPM can enhance communication, and hence safety culture. As
described by McKone et al. (2001), TPM helps to improve the organization's
capabilities by enhancing the problem-solving skills of individuals and enabling
learning across various functional areas. Successful change in technology depends on
the deployment of organizational structures (see Figure 1) that enable individuals to
work across functional boundaries to identify problems, develop solutions, and
execute plans. Companies need to build the skills of their workforce and develop
worker participation in order to compete through World Class Manufacturing. TPM
changes the structure of the organization to break down traditional barriers between
maintenance and production, fosters improvement by looking at multiple perspectives
for equipment operation and maintenance, increases technical skills of production
48
personnel, includes maintenance in daily production tasks as well as long-term
maintenance plans, and allows for information sharing among different functional
areas. Therefore, TPM should develop the capability of the organization to identify
and resolve production and OHS problems and subsequently improve manufacturing
practice and OHS.
2.4.5 TPM encourages education and training
It has been identified in section 2.2.5 that 'education and training' is essential to
develop proactive safety culture. TPM encourages education and training through
autonomous maintenance. As described by McKone et al. (1999, p.125), operators
learn to carry out important daily tasks that maintenance people rarely have time to
perform. These housekeeping tasks include cleaning and inspecting, lubricating,
precision checks, and other light maintenance tasks and can be broken down into five
S's (see appendix D). After these tasks are transitioned to operators, maintenance
people can focus on developing and implementing other proactive maintenance plans.
TPM is designed to help operators learn more about how their equipment functions,
what problems can occur and why, and how those problems can be prevented through
early detection and treatment of abnormal conditions. This cross-training allows
operators to maintain equipment and to identify and resolve many basic equipment
problems.
2.4.6 TPM improves working conditions and procedures
Roberts (1995, p.2) said, "Some injuries are preventable through manipulations of the
work environment." A workplace that is easy to work in must first be one where
49
people can work without worrying. TPM can help to create such a workplace by
getting rid of the three evils: difficulty, dirt and danger (JIPM 1996, p.104).
After getting rid of the three evils, serious accidents may be avoided. As illustrated in
the Bird's (1969) accident pyramid, for every major injury there are 10 minor injuries,
30 property damage accidents and 600 near misses. Many factors can cause major
accidents. These factors are hidden in equipment and human work procedures. They
are the problems people overlook every day because they seem too trivial. TPM can
help to break down the pyramid by eliminating these tiny problems (JIPM 1996,
p.106).
Workplace organization and discipline, regular inspections and servicing, and
standardization of work procedures are the three basic principles of safety. All are
essential elements in creating safe workplace, and are also part of the activities of
TPM (JIPM 1996, p.119).
Autonomous maintenance to remove hazards
Autonomous maintenance promotes safety by eliminating breakdowns and
standardizing procedures and responses to equipment situations. It eliminates unsafe
conditions and unsafe behavior from workplace by integrating safety issues into
autonomous maintenance activities. It makes safety check items become part of
equipment inspection check-lists. It plans and coordinates nonrepetitive maintenance
tasks to avoid safety hazards (JIPM 1996, p.119).
50
Autonomous maintenance can prevent sudden equipment breakdown which in turn
will avoid the accidents caused by malfunction of equipment. An empirical study
(Maggard & Rhyne, 1992) showed that 75% of maintenance problems could be
prevented by operators at an early stage, by frequent looking, listening, smelling and
testing. However, these figures are case specified and are impossible to be used as
generally optimum figures. Continuous education and training are necessary to fully
decentralize maintenance to the operators.
2.4.7 TPM improves morale and job satisfaction
In section 2.2.7 it has been identified that 'morale and job satisfaction' is an essential
factor of proactive safety culture. TPM can provide morale and job satisfaction and
hence improve safety culture. This is supported by Roberts (1997) who said that the
goal of TPM was to markedly increase production while, at the same time, increased
employee morale and job satisfaction. Naguib (1993) also said that TPM improved
employee morale and job satisfaction. This was achieved through increased
involvement and autonomy on the job, providing interesting job assignments, and
increased training and knowledge.
In a case study of implementing TPM in mainland China, Tsang & Chan (2000)
concluded that TPM embraced the concept of empowerment such that sufficient
authorities, resources and freedom to contribute were given to equipment operators
for establishing a sense of ownership.
TPM increases employee morale and job satisfaction by providing operators with a
sense of ownership of the equipment. In TPM, operators will do most of the
51
maintenance work on the equipment. Workers will treat their equipment as if it were
their own car or truck. This means paying attention to the funny noises it makes, or
the vibrations, or the leaks, or the smoke coming from the motors. It means keeping it
clean so they can see problems before they become failures (Society of Manufacturing
Engineers, 1995).
Swanson (2001) said, "Under TPM, small groups or teams create a cooperative
relationship between maintenance and production that helps in the accomplishment of
maintenance work. Additionally, production workers become involved in performing
maintenance work allowing them to play a role in equipment monitoring and upkeep.
This raises the skill of production workers and allows them to be more effective in
maintaining equipment in good condition."
CTPM (2001c) also described that by creating a higher degree of employee
participation, TPM increased employee morale and a sense of positive participation,
especially as they saw their daily frustrations with equipment reduced.
2.4.8 TPM improves attitude and risk perception
As identified in section 2.2.8, 'attitude and risk perception' is essential for a proactive
safety culture. TPM can improve workers' attitude and risk perception through the
change of mindset and TPM activities described below.
Maggard & Rhyne (1992) said, "The introduction of TPM means a significant
cultural change, by shifting shop floor personnel from the dualism between
52
production and maintenance to the partnership approach among all organizational
functions." To implement TPM successfully it requires a dramatic shift in an
organization's collective mindset (The Auto Channel 1998).
As described by JIPM (1996), TPM required a shift in attitudes toward equipment
from the traditional "I make it; you fix it" to "we take care of our own machines."
Breakdown and minor stoppages, in particular, impact the activities of operators - the
people who have the most contact with equipment and know it best. In TPM,
eliminating breakdown is not a maintenance department responsibility nor getting rid
of defects is a management's job. Everyone participates in reducing losses to zero -
and everyone benefits. With total participation, TPM can make the "zero loss"
workplace a reality.
Implementation of TPM will have a profound, positive effect on the culture of a
company. It will change the culture. It will change relationships across organizations
of the company. It will distribute decision-making, and disperse the authority base
(Society of Manufacturing Engineers 1995, p.19).
JIPM (1996) has also stressed the importance of hazard awareness training and active
signaling in TPM. Hazard awareness training is a four-round approach that uses
illustrations and photographs to train people to see and deal with potential dangers in
equipment and work methods. Active signaling is used to prevent errors between
people working together on maintenance or other tasks. In signaling, workers may call
out to reach each other or use a visual signal to indicate what they are about to do and
to make sure the other person gets the message.
53
2.5 A way to effective OHS management through TPM
In section 2.1, it has been identified that a proactive safety culture is essential for good
safety performance and three safety culture models have been described:
A strategic top down approach to safety (Gleendon & Stanton 2000)
(see Figure 4).
The Berends' (1995) safety culture model (see Figure 5)
3 levels of safety culture (HSE 1999) (see Table 6)
In Section 2.2, eight factors of safety culture had been identified for a proactive safety
culture. In Section 2.4, it had also been shown that TPM was effective in enhancing
these factors. It would also be verified in Section 2.6.1 that these factors were
effective to assess safety culture. The eight factors identified were:
management incentive
management commitment
participation of management and worker
communication
education and training
improve working conditions and procedures
morale and job satisfaction
attitude and risk perception
By combining the above three models and the eight safety culture factors identified, a
TPM approach to effective OHS management was developed (see Figure 8).
54
Figure 8 : A TPM approach to effective OHS management
Effectiveness increase with higher level of safety culture
Effectiveness of the OHS Management System
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
SafetyCulture
compliance driven
managed safety
constructive intolerance
legislationreactive
approach in management
proactive approach in management
8 safety cultural factors enhanced by TPM
participation ofmanagement &
worker
education and training
morale andjob
satisfaction
management incentive
management commitment
communication working conditions & procedures
attitude and risk
perception
55
2.6 Assessing safety culture
2.6.1 Criteria for assessing safety culture
Lee & Harrison (2000) said, "The proactive stance to safety is now almost universally
accepted, if not always practiced. In consequence, there is an urgent demand for
methods of assessment, for ways of diagnosing weakness; also for benchmarking the
strengths of safety cultures across time and between organizations." Grote & Kunzler
(2000) also said, "Assessing safety culture is not an issue of determining whether an
organization does or does not have a safety culture, but rather an issue of determining
shared as well as conflicting norms within and between groups in an organization and
the relationship between these norms and safe performance."
Different researchers have different criteria in assessing safety culture. Below four
examples (A to D) shows the 35 criteria in assessing safety culture.
(A) In assessing the safety culture of a nuclear plant, Lee & Harrison (2000)
developed questionnaires relevant to eight domains:
confidence in safety (A1)
contractors (A2)
job satisfaction (A3)
participation (A4)
risk (A5)
safety rules (A6)
stress (A7)
training (A8)
(B) The questionnaires developed by Grote & Kunzler (2000) in accessing the safety
56
culture of petrochemical production sites contains three sets of items:
1. Operational safety:
a. Technical, organizational and person related safety measures including:
ergonomic design (B1)
operating procedures (B2)
safety training (B3)
b. Actual safety performance including:
implementation of safety suggestions (B4)
support from co-workers (B5)
2. Safety management and sociotechnical design strategies, including:
ways of handling safety responsibility (B6)
technology use (B7)
distribution of decision authority (B8)
3. Personal job needs, including:
safety measures (B9)
quality of job design (B10)
general training (B11)
(C) In measuring the safety climate of a variety of working populations, Willamson,
Feyer, Cairns & Biancotti (1997) mainly concerned on perceptions and attitudes.
The questionnaire was designed based on 8 factors:
safety awareness (C1)- attitudes to hazards and risks and possibility of
57
personal injury in the workplace
safety responsibility (C2) - attitudes about whose role is ensuring safety in
the workplace
safety priority (C3) - beliefs about the importance of safety in the workplace
management safety commitment (C4) - perceptions of management to safety
issues
safety control (C5) - attitudes to the controllability of accidents
safety motivation (C6) - attitudes and perception relating to the influences
motivating safe or unsafe behavior
safety activity (C7) - perceptions of the individual's own safe behavior
safety evaluation (C8) - perceptions of safety in the individual's own
workplace
(D) Glendon & Stanton (2000) also set up eight safety climate factors to develop
questionnaire:
Work pressure (D1) - degree to which employees feel under pressure to
complete work, amount of time to plan and carry out work, balance of
workload
Incident investigation and development of procedures (D2) - degree to
which staff are involved in development of procedures, extent to which
incident investigations get to underlying causes of accidents, effectiveness of
procedures
Adequacy of procedures (D3) - accuracy, completeness,
comprehensiveness, clarity and appropriateness of procedures, ease of
selection and use of procedures
58
Communication and training (D4) - degree of openness and extent to which
communication reaches all levels in the organization, extent to which
training incorporates all aspects of the job, relevance and effectiveness of
training
Relationships (D5) - degree of trust and support within the organization,
confidence that people have in the organization's future, working
relationships with others and general morale.
Personal protective equipment (D6) - degree to which the organization is
concerned with the design, issue, use, and enforcement and monitoring of
personal protective equipment.
Spares and back up equipment (D7)
Safety policy and procedures (D8) - degree to which safety is a priority,
extent to which people are consulted on safety matters, practicality of
implementing safety policy and procedures
The above four examples introduced 35 factors (A1 to D8) for safety culture
assessment, and many of them were overlapped. In this dissertation, the questionnaire
was designed based on the eight safety culture factors identified in Section 2.3. The
reasons for selecting these eight factors were:
1. Literature review showed clearly that TPM could enhance such factors.
2. These eight factors had been adopted by other researchers as criteria to assess
safety culture, as shown in the Table 11.
The 8 safety culture factors Corresponding criteria in assessing safety culture in the
59
identified four examples
management incentive (C3) safety priority
management commitment (C4) management safety commitment
participation of management
and worker
(A4) participation
communication (B5) support from co-workers
(D4) communication and training
education and training (A8) training
(B3) safety training
(D4) communication and training
improve working conditions
and procedures
(A6) safety rules
(B1) ergonomic design
(B2) operating procedures
(D2) incident investigation and development of
procedures
(D3) adequacy of procedures
(D8) safety policy and procedures
morale and job satisfaction (A3) job satisfaction
(C6) safety motivation
attitude and risk perception (C1) safety awareness - attitudes to hazards and risks
and possibility of personal injury in the workplace
(C2) safety responsibility - attitudes about whose role is
ensuring safety in the workplace
(C7) safety activity - perceptions of the individual's
own safe behavior
60
(C8) safety evaluation - perceptions of safety in the
individual's own workplace
Table 11: Factors for assessing safety culture
2.6.2 Methods to assess safety culture
There are several ways, as described by Goetsch (1998, p.141) to assess employee
perceptions, as shown in Figure 9 below:
Figure 9: Methods of assessing employee perceptions (Goetsch 1998)
The four methods described by Goetsch (1998) are:
1. Survey (Internal)
This is the employee survey conducted as an in-house project.
2. Focus groups (Internal)
This is also conducted as an in-house project. With this method, employees
representing all departments and units within the organization are invited to be
members of a focus group. In larger organizations, more than one group may be
Methodsfor AssessingEmployeePerceptions
FocusGroups(Internal)
Survey(Internal)
Survey(External)
FocusGroups(External)
61
required.
62
3. Survey (External)
This approach is the same as the internal survey with one exception: the survey is
conducted and summarized by an outside agent.
4. Focus Groups (External)
This approach is conducted just as the internal focus group, except the focus
groups are conducted by an external consultant.
Goetsch (1998) suggested to record the employee feedback in a quantifiable format.
Each possible response could be assigned a numeric value as in the following
example:
Strongly Disagree 1
Disagree 2
Agree 3
Strongly Agree 4
With all statements in the questionnaire of equally important, the score for an
individual could then be summed up. Similar methods had been used by Lee &
Harrison (2000), Grote & Kunzler (2000), Willamson et al. (1997), Roberts (1995)
and Glendon & Stanton (2000) to assess safety culture. In these studies,
questionnaires were also used as a tool for survey. Five-point or six-point Likert scale
was used to analyze the results quantitatively.
In the study of Lee & Harrison (2000) above, the factors were allocated into domains.
The factors within domains were completely independent. However, the domains
themselves were inter-correlated to varying degrees.
63
In this dissertation, the method similar to that used by Lee & Harrison (2000) was
adopted. Factors were distributed into eight domains.
2.6.3 Reliability analysis of safety culture survey
In section 3.4, it was shown that quantitative questionnaires had been used by
researchers to assess safety culture. The reliability of the results obtained had to be
tested. Reliability is the extent to which a study's operations can be repeated, with the
same results (Yin 1989, p.41). Reynaldo & Santos (1999) said, "Reliability comes to
the forefront when variables developed from summated scales are used as predictor
components in objective models. Since summated scales are an assembly of
interrelated items designed to measure underlying constructs, it is very important to
know whether the same set of items would elicit the same responses if the same
questions are recast and re-administered to the same respondents. Variables derived
from test instruments are declared to be reliable only when they provide stable and
reliable responses over a repeated administration of the test."
Burns (2000, p.339) introduced four methods for reliability measure: test-retest
method, alternate forms method, split-half method and internal consistency method.
In this dissertation, Cronbach's alpha as an internal consistency reliability index was
used for reliability measure. Cronbach's Alpha has been widely used by researchers as
a tool for reliability analysis in the surveys on safety culture, such as Lee& Harrison
(2000), Willamson et al. (1997) and Roberts (1995).
64
2.6.4 The t-test
Howitt & Cramer (1997) said, "T-test compares the means of two related samples of
scores to see whether the means differ significantly." Burns (2000) also said t-test was
used to test whether the difference between the two sample means from independent
groups was a real one or reasonably attributed to chance. In this dissertation, t-test
was used to test the hypothesis.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, factors of proactive safety culture had been identified and from which
eight were selected to assess safety culture of manufacturing organizations. These
eight factors were also criteria of past researchers in assessing safety culture and had
been shown effective. This chapter had also introduced and explained the principles of
TPM. It had been verified that TPM was able to enhance these eight safety culture
factors and hence improved safety performance. A TPM approach to effective OHS
management was developed in this chapter. This was the approach to solve the
problem statement in the dissertation. A framework of TPM activities to improve
safety performance would be developed in Chapter 7.
Survey methods for safety culture had also been reviewed. In this dissertation,
quantitative questionnaires with five-point Likert scale were used for assessing safety
culture. Cronbach's alpha was used for reliability analysis and t-test for hypothesis
testing.
65
Chapter 3
Research Method
It had been reviewed from literature that TPM enhanced proactive safety culture. In
this dissertation, the aim was to develop a framework of TPM activities for
manufacturing organizations to improve the effectiveness of the OHS management
systems. This was achieved through the seven steps below (see figure 10):
Figure 10 : Flow Chart of Research Method
1. Through literature review, identified safety culture factors that affected
effectiveness of OHS management systems and could be enhanced by TPM.
STARTIdentify safety culture factors that can be enhanced by TPM
Design QuestionnairesA - for managementB - for worker
Questionnaire set (B) Safety culture survey to the workers of ABC Company (not implementing TPM)
Questionnaire Set (A)Safety culture survey to management in
different companiesIdentify which companies are
implementing TPM
LiteratureReview
Analyze and compare theresultsTest the
Hypothesis
Develop a framework of TPM activitiesEND
Questionnaire Set (B)Safety culture survey to the workers of the organization implementing TPM
Questionnaire (A) sent to 72 companies
Phone to those implementing TPM and ask for help to distribute Questionnaire (B) to workers
Verify TPM helps to improve safety culture
66
2. Based on the safety culture factors identified, developed questionnaires to
evaluate the safety culture of manufacturing organizations. Two sets of
questionnaires were developed. Questionnaire A was designed for management
people and questionnaire B for workers.
3. 72 sets of questionnaires A were sent to the management of 72 companies to
study the safety culture of the companies. Another purpose of this step was to
find out those companies who were implementing TPM. After receiving the
replies, those companies implementing TPM were asked by telephone whether
they could help to distribute Questionnaire B to their workers.
4. At the same time, evaluated the safety culture in ABC Company, which was
going to implement a TPM system.
5. The result obtained from the ABC Company was then compared with that
obtained from another company which was implementing TPM. This was to
identify whether these two companies had significant different safety culture.
6. From the results obtained, the hypothesis of the paper was tested to show a
company with TPM in place had a more positive safety culture than one not
implementing TPM.
7. After confirming TPM could help to improve safety culture, a framework of
TPM activities would then be developed to improve effectiveness of OHS
management systems in manufacturing industry.
67
Chapter 4
Research questions
4.1 Design of questionnaires
Based on the eight safety culture factors identified in section 2.2, two sets of
questionnaires, set (A) and set (B) were developed (see appendices P and Q). Set (A)
was designed for management people and set (B) for supervisors and workers. A
Chinese version of questionnaire set (B) was also prepared (see appendix R).
The background information of the respondent was collected from questions 1 to 4 in
questionnaire A and questions 1 to 3 in questionnaire B. In each questionnaire, there
were 20 quantifiable questions, with 5-point Likert scale. Each possible response was
assigned a numeric value as below:
Strongly Disagree 1
Disagree 2
Neutral 3
Agree 4
Strongly Agree 5
Thus for a single respondent, the minimum score was 20 while the maximum score
was 100. According to the 'TPM approach to effective OHS management' developed
(see Figure 8), a higher score implied a more proactive orientation towards safety,
reached a higher level of safety culture and finally higher effectiveness of the OHS
68
management system.
As described above, the questionnaire covered the eight factors relevant to safety
performance identified in section 2.2. These factors could be enhanced by TPM. The
questions were allocated into eight domains for analysis, according to the safety
culture factors studied in the questions (see Table 12).
The 8 safety culture factors Question number in Set (A) Question number in Set (B)
management incentive 5, 6 4, 16
management commitment 7, 8, 18 5, 6
participation of
management and worker
9, 10, 11 12, 20
Communication 19, 20, 21 13, 14, 18, 19
training and education 12, 13, 14 7, 8, 9
improve working conditions
and procedures
15, 16 10, 11 15
morale and job satisfaction 24 17, 21
attitude and risk perception 17, 22, 23 22, 23
Table 12: Questions in eight domains
4.2 The ABC Company
The ABC Company was a medium size manufacturing industry. It had around 300
employees. Excluding the management, office staffs, marketing people and the
workers in the warehouse, there were around 120 production workers and
maintenance people. The company had had an OHS management system for almost
69
two years. ABC Company had the intention to implement a TPM system for better
performance in productivity, quality and safety; and planned continuous improvement
to compete successfully and make profit in an environment of international
competition.
4.3 Distribution of questionnaires
In ABC Company, questionnaires were distributed in a meeting in the 'safety
awareness week' held by the company. The aims and background of the study were
explained to all the employees. All respondents were supplied with sealable envelopes
pre-addressed to the writer. Seven sets questionnaire (A) were distributed to the
technical managers, engineers and safety officer. 85 questionnaires set (B) were
distributed to the day-shift workers. Night shift workers (around 20) were not selected
since their operations were much simpler and some of them did not need to operate a
machine. Those workers who did not need to operate machines such as the cleaning
ladies were also not included.
Questionnaires (A) were also mailed to 72 manufacturing industries. All these were
medium size industries (including the few largest manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong) located in the major industrial estates. This had two objectives:
1. Sought companies who had implementing TPM and willing to distribute the
questionnaire (B) to the workers.
2. If there were sufficient replies, the general status of safety culture in the
70
manufacturing industries in Hong Kong could be studied.
There were only few manufacturing industries in Hong Kong implementing TPM.
Question 25 of questionnaire (A) asked the respondents whether their organizations
were implementing TPM. Out of the eleven replies, there were two organizations
implementing TPM. The two companies were then contacted by phone and finally one
(the PQR Company) agreed to distribute the Questionnaire (B) to the workers.
71
Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Replies received
In the safety culture survey of the ABC Company, 7 sets questionnaire (A) were
issued and all were received. 85 sets questionnaire (B) were distributed to the workers
and 78 replies received (Table 13).
72 sets questionnaires (A) were mailed to 72 companies but only 11 replies were
received. Out of these two were implementing TPM. Only one company 'PQR' agreed
to distribute questionnaire B to the workers and finally 21 replies were received. The
other 10 replies of questionnaire (A), other than that of PQR, were not sufficient to
give a clear picture of the general safety culture of manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong and hence they were not studied in the paper.
ABC Company (no TPM) PQR Company (with TPM) Others, include PQR
Set (A) for
Management
Set (B) for
Workers
Set (A) for
Management
Set (B) for
workers
Set (A) for
management
Sent 7 85 1 1 (other copied) 72
Received 7 78 1 21 11
Table 13: Number of questionnaires sent and received
5.2 Average score of questionnaires A & B
The average score of each question in questionnaires A and B of both ABC Company
72
and PQR Company were listed in the Table 14 and 15.
73
No. Description of questions in Questionnaire A AverageScore for ABC(no TPM)
AverageScore for PQR (with TPM)
5 The employer regards safety as an important matter as others like productivity and quality.
3.6 5
6 Safety goals are pursued proactively and on the company's initiative.
3.0 5
7 Management encourages safe behavior. 3.4 5
8 Safety proposals developed are swiftly implemented. 3.1 5
9 Management is involved in safety activities such as risk assessment, accident investigations & promotion programs.
3.7 5
10 Management is well informed about relevant safety issues. 3.3 5
11 Workers are eager to attend safety activities and training. 3.0 3
12 A lot is learnt from near misses. 3.1 4
13 Information needed to work safely is made available to all employees.
3.4 4
14 Workers are qualified to actively enhance operational safety.
3.4 3
15 Workers and supervisors participate in defining safe work practices.
3.1 4
16 Workers and supervisors are actively involved in removing hazards in the working environment.
3.4 4
17 Workers will raise concern on machine problems. 3.4 5
18 Safety problems with machines are swiftly solved. 3.6 4
19 A questioning attitude towards instruction is encouraged. 2.7 5
20 Management listens to workers' recommendations and will provide feedback.
3.6 4
21 The channels for the communication between management and workers are efficient and sufficient.
3.1 4
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22 The managers in your plants really care about safety and try to reduce risk levels as much as possible.
3.1 5
23 Both management and workers regard safety as everyone's responsibility, and safety officers provide support.
3.3 4
24 Workers are motivated for safety by information and interesting tasks.
2.4 4
Total for the 20 questions: 65.0 87
Table 14: Average Score of Questionnaire A
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No. Description of questions in Questionnaire B AverageScore for ABC(no TPM)
AverageScore for PQR(with TPM)
4 Senior management regards safety as an important matter as others like productivity and quality.
3.0 3.6
5 Management provides enough safety equipment. 3.1 3.5
6 Management can do what they commit. 3.2 3.6
7 Accidents and near misses are studied and used as training materials.
3.3 3.6
8 Workers have been trained properly, including safety precautions as well as operation of the machines
3.2 3.7
9 Workers are always trained for the use of safety equipment.
3.1 3.7
10 Management is willing to improve the safety of the working environment.
3.3 3.6
11 Safety procedures are realistic. 3.4 3.5
12 Management actively participates in safety activities. 3.2 3.4
13 Management listens to workers' recommendations and will provide feedback.
3.2 3.2
14 Workers are encouraged to question instructions from management.
3.2 3.3
15 There are arrangements to check equipment to make sure it is free of faults.
3.4 3.7
16 Which one below is the best to describe the management of your company? (Choices refer to Appendix Q)
3.3 3.5
17 You regard safety as everyone's responsibility, and safety officers provide support.
3.1 3.8
18 You find it easy to communicate with the management. 3.2 3.4
19 Whenever you encounter any safety matters, you will report to the supervisor or safety officer.
3.4 3.4
20 You are willing to join the safety activities and trainings. 3.3 3.5
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21 You take care of the machines which you are operating. 3.2 3.6
22 You believe that accidents are preventable. 3.0 3.6
23 You regard compliance with the safety rules as important. If people are not following the rules, accidents may occur.
3.2 3.8
Total for the 20 questions: 64.1 70.9
Table 15: Average Score of Questionnaire B
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In summary, the average sum of scores for all 20 questions of questionnaire A and B
for ABC Company and PQR Company were shown in the chart below.
Figure 11: Average score of all 20 questions
From Figure 11, it could be observed that the average scores on both questionnaires
(A) and (B) of PQR Company were higher than those obtained from ABC Company.
5.3 Results on each safety culture factor
In this section, the mean score of each question of Questionnaire (B) in different
domains from ABC Company and PQR Company would be described. Reliability of
the results obtained from questionnaire B of ABC Company would also be estimated.
An internal consistency analysis, with Cronbach's alpha as an index, was used to test
the reliability. Questions were allocated into eight domains as shown in Table 12. The
inter-correlation among all the 20 questions together would be estimated. The inter-
correlation among questions within each domain would also be estimated. All alpha
values mentioned in this report referred to the Cronbach' alpha values of the results
from questionnaire (B) of the ABC Company.
Set A Set B
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
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5.3.1 Results on Management Incentive
Mean = 3.1 (ABC) Alpha = 0.7187 (ABC) Mean = 3.5 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
4. Senior management regards safety as an important matters as others like productivity and quality.
ABC 1 16 45 14 2
Rep
liesPQR 1 3 5 7 5
16. Which one below is the best to describe the management of your company? (Choices refer to Appendix Q)
ABC 0 7 46 23 2
PQR 0 4 6 8 3
Table 16: Results on Management Incentive
5.3.2 Results on Management Commitment
Mean = 3.1 (ABC) Alpha = 0.7332 (ABC) Mean = 3.5 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
5. Management provides enough safety equipment. ABC 0 19 35 19 5
Rep
lies
PQR 0 1 10 8 2
6. Management can do what they commit. ABC 0 20 34 15 9
PQR 0 0 11 8 2
Table 17: Results on Management Commitment
Set A Set B
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Figure 12: Average score on Management Incentive
79
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Set A Set B
Figure 13: Average score on Management Commitment
80
5.3.3 Results on Participation of Management and Workers
Mean = 3.3 (ABC) Alpha = 0.5390 (ABC) Mean = 3.5 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
12. Management actively participates in safety activities. ABC 0 14 36 23 5
Rep
lies
PQR 2 10 8 1
20. You are willing to join the safety activities and training.
ABC 0 8 42 24 4
PQR 0 0 11 9 1
Table 18: Results on Participation of Management and Workers
5.3.4 Results on Communication
Mean = 3.3 (ABC) Alpha = 0.7287 (ABC) Mean = 3.3 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
13. Management listens to workers' recommendations and will provide feedback.
ABC 0 12 44 18 4R
eplie
sPQR 0 4 10 6 1
14. Workers are encouraged to question instructions from management.
ABC 0 11 44 19 4
PQR 0 3 8 0 10
18. You find it easy to communicate with the management.
ABC 0 18 31 25 4
PQR 0 1 12 7 1
19.Whenever you encounter any safety matters, you will report to the supervisor or safety officer.
ABC 0 8 36 27 7
PQR 2 1 5 12 1
Table 19: Results on Communication
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Set A Set B
Figure 14: Average score on Participation of Management and Workers
81
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Set A Set B
Figure 15: Average Score on communication
82
5.3.5 Results on Education and Training
Mean = 3.2 (ABC) Alpha = 0.7288 (ABC) Mean = 3.7 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
7. Accidents and near misses are studied and used as training materials.
ABC 0 6 48 18 6
Rep
lies
PQR 0 0 10 9 2
8. Workers have been trained properly, including safety precautions as well as operation of the machines
ABC 1 12 38 25 2
PQR 0 0 8 12 1
9. Workers are always trained for the use of safety equipment.
ABC 0 19 37 19 3
PQR 0 2 5 12 2
Table 20: Results on Education and Training
5.3.6 Results on Working Conditions and Procedures
Mean = 3.4 (ABC) Alpha = 0.5974 (ABC) Mean = 3.6 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
10. Management is willing to improve the safety of working environment.
ABC 1 6 47 20 4
Rep
lies
PQR 0 1 10 7 3
11. Safety procedures are realistic. ABC 0 5 40 29 4
PQR 0 2 7 11 1
15. There are arrangements to check equipment to make sure it is free of faults.
ABC 0 5 42 27 4
PQR 0 0 9 9 3
Table 21: Results on Working Conditions and Procedures
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Set A Set B
Figure 16: Average Score onEducation and Training
83
Set A Set B
Figure 17: Average score on Working Conditions and Procedures
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
84
5.3.7 Results on Morale and Job Satisfaction
Mean = 3.1 (ABC) Alpha = 0.5758 (ABC) Mean= 3.7 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
17. You regard safety as everyone's responsibility, and safety officers provide support.
ABC 1 17 40 13 7
Rep
liesPQR 0 1 6 10 4
21. You take care of the machines which you are operating.
ABC 1 16 36 19 6
PQR 0 2 7 10 2
Table 22: Results on Morale and Job Satisfaction
5.3.8 Results on Attitude and Risk Perception
Mean = 3.1(ABC) Alpha = 0.6798 (ABC) Mean = 3.7 (PQR)
Questionnaire B Score 1 2 3 4 5
22. You believe that accidents are preventable. ABC 1 24 34 15 4
Rep
liesPQR 0 0 11 7 3
23. You regard compliance with the safety rules as important. If people are not following the rules, accidents may occur.
ABC 0 21 29 21 7
PQR 0 1 7 9 4
Table 23: Results on Attitude and Risk perception
ABC PQR ABC PQR (TPM) (TPM)
Set A Set B
Set A Set B
Figure 18: Average score on Morale and Job satisfaction
85
ABC PQR ABC PQR(TPM) (TPM)
Figure 19: Average score on Attitude and Risk Perception
86
5.4 Reliability Analysis
The values of alpha were summarized in Table 24. The SPSS (version 10.0) outputs of
the reliability analysis could refer to the appendices shown in Table 24. Reynaldo &
Santos (1999) said that Cronbach's alpha of 0.70 was the cutoff value for being
acceptable. There were 4 domains shown in the table with alpha values lower than
0.7. The other 4 domains and the 8 factors together had alpha values higher than 0.7
and were considered acceptable.
Safety culture factors Question numbers Cronbach's alpha Appendix
All the 8 factors All 20 questions 0.9041 G
1. management incentive 4, 16 0.7187 H
2. management commitment 5, 6 0.7332 I
3. participation of
management and worker
12, 20 0.5390 J
4. communication 13, 14, 18, 19 0.7287 K
5. education and training 7, 8, 9 0.7288 L
6. improve working
conditions and procedures
10, 11 15 0.5974 M
7. morale and job satisfaction 17, 21 0.5758 N
8. attitude and risk perception 22, 23 0.6798 O
Table 24: Summary of Cronbach's Alpha value for each domain
5.5 Testing of the hypothesis
The hypothesis of the paper, as described in section 1.3 is:
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"A manufacturing company with TPM in place has a more positive safety culture than
one not implementing TPM. "
There were two sets data obtained for questionnaire (B), one from ABC Company and
another from PQR Company. A t-test was conducted to determine whether there was a
significant difference between the means of scores on safety culture from the two
groups. Using the software of SPSS (version 10.0), the below results were obtained
(see Table 25):
Group Statistics
COMPANY N MeanStd.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
SCORE PQR
ABC
21
78
70.90
64.14
9.32
9.52
2.03
1.08
Independent Samples TestLevene's Test
for Equality of
Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower Upper
SCORE Equal
variances
assumed
.171 .681 2.904 97 .005 6.76 2.33 2.14 11.39
Equal
variances
not
assumed
2.940 32.153 .006 6.76 2.30 2.08 11.45
Table 25: Output of t-test analysis
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From the output (see Table 25), t = 2.904
At degree of freedom df = N1 + N2 - 2 = 76 + 21 - 2 = 97,
the significant level (2-tailed) = 0.05
The t value (2.904) is larger than the significant level (0.05).
89
Result of the t-test analysis:
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that 'a
manufacturing company with TPM in place had a more positive safety culture than
one not implementing TPM'. The mean score of safety culture of the PQR Company
(M = 10.90, SD = 9.32) was significantly different from (t = 2.904, df=97, two-tailed
p=0.05) and higher than that of ABC Company (M = 64.14, SD = 9.52). Therefore,
the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Discussion on the research method and questionnaire design
There are two major constraints in the study:
1. ABC Company planned to implement TPM but still has not implemented it. Due
to time constraints of the study, the safety culture of the ABC Company after
implementation of TPM could not be measured and compared with that obtained
before the implementation.
2. There are very few organizations in Hong Kong implementing TPM. The ABC
Company and the PQR Company in the study come from different types of
manufacturing industries. Another major difference between the two companies is
that ABC Company has around 120 workers while PQR has only around 50
workers.
One important common factor between the two companies is that both companies has
had OHS management systems in place for just less than two years at the time of the
survey.
This study established two sets of questionnaires to measure the safety culture of the
ABC Company, one for management and one for workers. This chapter mainly used
the results from questionnaire (B) (for worker) to evaluate the safety culture of the
ABC Company since there were 78 replies but only 7 sets of data of questionnaire set
(A) were available. This appears reasonable since the internal consistency of the
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scores for all the 20 questions in questionnaire (B) is high (Cronbach's alpha equals to
0.9041 as estimated in section 5.4). This also appears reasonable since it is the
workers who face the accidents and their attitude and perception are different from
those management who normally have little hazards in their workplaces.
There were two criteria in selecting the safety culture factors to evaluate the safety
culture of the ABC Company. First, these factors must have been successfully used by
other researchers to measure safety culture. Second, TPM must be able to enhance
such factors. The eight safety culture factors selected can fulfill these two criteria.
The results were used to picture the safety culture of the ABC Company and by
comparing them with those obtained from the PQR Company, to see whether TPM
could enhance the eight safety culture factors identified. From the reliability analysis
of the results of questionnaires (B) of ABC Company (section 5.4), four of the
Cronbach's alphas obtained for the eight domains were acceptable (alpha larger than
0.7) and four were not (alpha smaller than 0.7). Nevertheless, the results were
analyzed by dividing the 20 questions into these eight domains.
6.2 Discussion on the results of questionnaires B from ABC Company
Unless otherwise specified, the data and discussion in this section all referred to the
questionnaire (B) of ABC Company. Since many people did not reply questions 25
and 26, results of these two questions, concerning their attitude to do the maintenance
works, were not discussed.
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6.2.1 Management Incentive (Questions 4 and 16)
In this domain, alpha = 0.7187, internal consistency was acceptable. In question 16,
59% of respondents selected 'management accepts the fact that there are problems but
is unable to solve them because they don't want to know how to attack them'. In
question 4, 58% of respondents gave a neutral response to 'senior management
regards safety as an important matters as productivity and quality'. The results showed
the management incentive to put safety first was not high. A TPM system, which can
improve productivity and safety together, should be a good incentive for the
management to operate.
6.2.2 Management commitment (Questions 5 and 6)
In this domain, alpha = 0.7332, internal consistency was acceptable. In both
questions, around 44% of respondents had neutral response to 'management provides
enough safety equipment' and 'management can do what they commit'. For each
statement, there were around 25% of respondents who answered with disagree. This
implied that the management commitment was not high. When looking at the results
from PQR Company, there was only one respondent who disagreed with the former
statement and none disagreed with the later. Implementing TPM thus able to show the
employee the management's commitment.
6.2.3 Participation of management and workers (Questions 12 and 20)
In this domain, alpha = 0.5390, internal consistency was unacceptable. The
participation of management in question 12 and the participation of workers in
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question 20 were appeared not to be inter-correlated. 18% of the workers considered
the management had not actively participated in the safety activities while 46% had a
neutral response to this question. 10% of the workers were not willing to join the
safety activities while 54% had a neutral response. The results were not strange since
the 'morale and job satisfaction' of the workers were extremely low (as discussed in
6.2.7) and hence many workers had no intention of joining the safety activities.
6.2.4 Communication (Questions 13, 14, 18, 19)
In this domain, alpha = 0.7287, internal consistency was acceptable. The results
(score) in this domain were not bad when compared to the results of the PQR
Company. But there were still 23% of respondents who felt difficulties in
communicating with the management (question 18).
6.2.5 Education and training (Questions 7, 8 and 9)
In this domain, alpha = 0.7288, internal consistency was acceptable. From question 9,
it was noted that around 24% of respondents claimed they had not been trained in the
use of safety equipment. In contrast, a relatively high score was obtained from PQR
Company since 'education and training' is one of the eight pillars in TPM.
6.2.6 Improve working conditions and procedures (Questions 10, 11 and 15)
In this domain, alpha = 0.5974, internal consistency was unacceptable. The three
questions in this domain were appeared not to be inter-correlated. The ABC Company
got the highest score in this domain. 23%, 37% and 35% had positive response to the
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three questions: 'management is willing to improve the safety of working
environment', 'safety procedures are realistic' and 'there are arrangements to check
equipment' respectively; and around 50% of the respondents had a neutral response to
these questions. The negative responses to these questions were 6-9%. PQR Company
still had a higher score in this domain. There is still much room for ABC Company to
improve and TPM can help.
6.2.7 Morale and job satisfaction (Questions 17 and 21)
In this domain, alpha = 0.5758, internal consistency was unacceptable. The two
questions in this domain were appeared not to be inter-correlated. 22% of respondents
did not agree that safety was everyone's responsibility (question 17). 21% of
respondents did not take care of their machines (question 21). This was one of the two
domains in which ABC Company had the lowest score while PQR Company had the
highest score. A TPM system is believed able to improve this safety culture factor.
6.2.8 Attitude and risk perception (Questions 22 and 23)
In this domain, alpha = 0.6798, internal consistency was only just unacceptable. It
was critical to learn from the results that 31% of the respondents did not believe
accidents were preventable (Question 22) and 27% of respondents did not regard
complying with safety rules was important (Question 23). This was also one of the
two domains in which ABC Company had the lowest score while PQR Company had
the highest score. A TPM system is believed able to improve this safety culture factor.
95
Chapter 7
Develop a framework of TPM activities
It had been shown in Chapter 5 that the PQR Company with TPM in place had a more
positive safety culture than that of the ABC Company, which had not implemented
TPM. The next step was then to develop a framework of TPM activities based on the
literature and findings from the safety culture surveys. This framework was intended
to be useful for most manufacturing companies to improve their safety performance.
TPM places an emphasis on people and machine. Management's support and
participation are also important for successful implementation of TPM. A framework
of TPM activities, based on the 'People', 'Management', 'Machine and Environment'
was developed (see Figure 20).
7.1 Organize to enhance communication
7.1.1 Set up a TPM committee
Hartmann (2000) recommended to have a pilot installation, covering 10 to 25% of a
plant's equipment, before plant-wide installation of TPM. An example of a TPM
committee for pilot installation of TPM was designed for ABC Company (see Figure
21), based on the proposal of HKPC (2000, p.17.6), which was specially designed for
medium size organizations in Hong Kong. A Steering Committee had to be set up
first. Two production lines were proposed for the pilot installation and implementation
of TPM system. Other companies can have similar set up, depending on their own
organization structure.
96
7.3.1. Conduct general
inspection2. Carry out visual
workplace management
3. Link safety education and training to skill training
4. Present the one point lesson
5. On-the-job coaching to each individual
7. Self audit
7.11. Set up a TPM
committee2. Manage small group
activities3. Conduct step audit
for training and mutual learning
7.41. Address sources of
human error2. Develop education
and training program
3. Draw up a budget for safety
4. Involve senior management in auditing team activities
5. Devise a program of accident prevent training
6. Conduct autonomous inspection
7. Carry out consistent autonomous management
8. Develop an early equipment management program
7.2.1. Clean and inspect2. Eliminate problem
sources and inaccessible areas
3. Draw up cleaning and lubricating standards
4. Planned maintenance and predict failure
5. Implement 5S
Equipment and Environment
ManagementPerson
The 7th pillar of TPM: Safety Management
Develop safety conscious people
Make equipment and workplace safe
Show commitmentand provide support
Measures to prevent behavior originated
accidents
Measures to prevent equipment / workplace
originated accidents
Operate management
system reliably
Communication
Organize to enhance
communication
Figure 20: Framework of TPM activities to improve safety performance[Strategies are further discussed in the below sections, refer to the section number]
Zero Accident
Highest level of Safety Culture
Strategies Strategies
97
Figure 21 : Proposed organization chart for TPM pilot installation in ABC Company
As shown in the organization chart, two TPM teams were proposed in two production
lines for TPM pilot tests. Responsibilities of different groups / people for the
implementation of the TPM system were shown below, based on the
recommendations of HKPC (2000):
Responsibility of the TPM Steering Committee:
Select the TPM teams and defining their responsibilities
Monitor the progress of the TPM teams
Allocate adequate resources to the TPM teams
Discuss issues raised by the TPM teams
Measure the performance of each TPM team
Ensure adequate training is provided and all employees participated
TPM Steering Committee
Technical Director (Sponsor)Production Manager (Champion)Maintenance ManagerProject Engineering ManagerQA ManagerHR Manager
Maintenance Engineer(TPM Coordinator)
TPM Team II
SupervisorOperatorsMechanical Technician (1 no)Electrical Technician (1 no)Project Engineering Manager (from steering committee)TPM coordinator
TPM Team I
SupervisorOperatorsMechanical Technician (1 no)Electrical Technician (1 no)Maintenance Manager (from steering committee)TPM coordinator
98
Responsibility of the Champion in the TPM Steering Committee
Report direct to the Technical Director (Sponsor)
Ensure the problems and concerns raised by the TPM coordinator immediately
raised and solved.
Introduce TPM to all employees
Ensure all employees receive sufficient training and support
Promote TPM and motivate employees to join
Gather and distribute the information for TPM
Responsibility of the TPM Coordinator
Direct report to Technical Director, TPM Champion and TPM Steering
Committee
Organize all TPM activities
Co-ordinate all TPM teams
Leading TPM monitoring and planning teams
Support the supervisor of each TPM teams
Co-ordinate and assist to solve the problems encountered by the TPM teams
Encourage all employee participation
Gather and distribute TPM information
7.1.2 Manage small group activities
Nakajima (1988, p.109) said, "A small group promotes itself and satisfies company
goals as well as individual employee needs through concrete activities." Teams or
groups should set goals compatible with the larger goals of the company and achieve
them through group cooperation or teamwork. The basic steps to manage small group
activities as described by JIPM (1995) are:
99
1. Choose a team leader
2. Select a project
3. Set targets
4. Schedule activities and assign roles
5. Study current conditions
6. Establish plans
7. Implement
8. Analyze results and prevent backsliding
7.1.3 Conduct step audit for training and mutual learning
Step audits are audits conducted by shop floor managers to see how the teams are
doing. These are chances for people on the shop floor to learn what the boss thinks
and expects - and for the boss to recognize the hard work shop floor people have done
and to gain a better understanding of current problems. (JIPM 1996, p.75)
7.2 Make equipment and workplace safe
7.2.1 Clean and inspect (Step 1 of Autonomous Maintenance):
In TPM, cleaning is inspection (HKPC 2000). Cleaning does not simply mean
polishing the outside of a machine; it means getting rid of the years of grime coating
on every part of the machine. As part of initial cleaning, detect and correct any
problems such as exposed moving parts, projecting parts, spattering of harmful
substances, loosen and missing screws.
7.2.2 Eliminate problem sources (Step 2 of Autonomous Maintenance)
100
Very often machines get dirty soon after cleaning. It is necessary to eliminate sources
of leaks, spills and dust. Deal with major contamination sources through focused
improvement. Modify equipment to make cleaning and lubrication easier. Improve
cleaning and lubrication standards where necessary. Apply tags to equipment to label
the problems found (see Appendix F) and remove tags only when problems solved.
7.2.3 Draw up cleaning and lubrication standards (Step 3 of Autonomous
Maintenance)
Team members decide what standards they need to follow to prevent deterioration of
their equipment. Establish and review work standards and daily check method.
Looking at suppliers' standards for lubrication to ensure warranty on equipment.
Include key safety procedures in provisional cleaning and checking standards.
7.2.4 Planned maintenance and predict failure
Carry out planned and preventive maintenance on equipment. Prevent recurrence of
chronic failures. Perform regular equipment diagnoses such as checking for corrosion,
cracking, wear and brittle.
7.2.5 Implement 5S (definition refers to Appendix D)
Use 'Seiri - organization' to eliminate unnecessary items.
Use 'Seiton - neatness' to establish a permanent place for everything essential.
Use 'Seiso - Cleaning' to find ways to keep things clean and eliminate contamination.
Use 'Seiketsu - Standardization' for easy inspection.
Use 'Shitsuke - Discipline' to ensure proper methods of handling production activities.
101
7.3 Develop safety conscious people
7.3.1 Conduct general inspections (Step 4 of Autonomous Maintenance)
Operators participate in general inspections and become more familiar with their
equipment (JIPM 1997, p.31). Safety check that addresses the following types of
issues (JIPM 1996, p.110):
Leaks and spattering
Heat
Equipment load
Reduced performance
Vibration and excessive noise
Electrical leakage and static electricity
Problems during operation
Problems during processing or execution
7.3.2 Carry out visual workplace management (step 6 of Autonomous
maintenance)
Develop workers' safety awareness through visual workplace management. This is to
assure workplace organization (done by 5S) and maintain a proper working
environment by:
sorting out and arranging objects in the workplace properly
defining procedures that need to be followed
performing equipment precision checks
facilitating operator tasks
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7.3.3 Link safety education and training to skill training
Through the use of accident case studies and the findings in safety audits, link safety
education and training to skill training. A model (see Figure 22) to link safety
education and training to skill training has been developed by HKPC (2000, p.15.4).
Aware to safety will become a habit after education, training and practice.
Figure 22: Link safety education and training to skill training
7.3.4 Present the One-point Lesson
This is a 5-10 minutes self study lesson drawn up by team members and covering a
single quality or safety issue; or a single aspect of machine structure, functioning or
method of inspection. A one-point lesson provides a way for team leaders and
members who have special training or knowledge about equipment to share their
knowledge with their teammates (JIPM 1997, p.105). A standard form of one-point
lesson is shown in Appendix E.
Aware to safety,Not skill competent
Aware to safety,Skill comptent
Not aware to safety,Not skill comptent
Habit,Skill comptent
Education
Training
Practice
103
7.3.5 On-the-job coaching to each individual
The more people know about their equipment and processes, the more safely they can
work. Collect examples of near misses and compile them into on-point lesson sheets
are some examples of on-the-job coaching to each individual.
7.3.6 Self audit
Identify and record near misses. Use checklists to check safety of equipment. Self
audits promote effective monitoring and evaluation of progress. (Suzuki 1994, p.143)
7.4 Commitment and support of management
7.4.1 Address sources of human error
While it is impossible to train people never to make mistakes, they can learn to be
safety-conscious. Management plays an important role in addressing sources of
human error and has the responsibility to train everyone addresses safety issues.
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7.4.2 Develop an education and training program
Establish a detailed education and training program (Suzuki 1994, p.293) that
covers all specializations and grades
sets standards for acquiring the necessary knowledge and skills, and
devises effective training curricula
7.4.3 Draw up a budget for safety
A budget in place is the easiest way to show employee the management's
commitment.
7.4.4 Involve senior management in auditing team activities
The person in charge of TPM programs in the company serves as a coach for the
shopfloor teams and keeps team activities energized and on track. In addition,
managers are asked to conduct periodic reviews of team activities. Having managers
guide team activities through the audits or check clarifies management policies and
priorities, boosts team member motivation, and helps ensure satisfying activities
(JIPM 1996, p.90).
7.4.5 Devise a program of accident prevention training
Devise a program of accident prevention training using illustrations, and practice
safety procedures on the actual equipment during autonomous maintenance activities.
105
7.4.6 Conduct autonomous inspection (step 5 of autonomous maintenance)
This is to revise the cleaning inspection, and lubrication standards developed. The
inspection can help to streamline those tasks and correct stressful working postures
and methods.
7.4.7 Carry out consistent autonomous management (step 7 of Autonomous
Maintenance)
This is to confirm the activities of autonomous maintenance continue, so as to ensure
everyone takes care of his own equipment and workplace.
7.4.8 Develop an early equipment management program
This is the eleventh step of the 12-step model developed by Nakajima (1988) as
shown in Appendix A. This program includes the establishment of assessment criteria
for safety of new products and machines. Suzuki (1994) said, "Poor design is a major
cause of reduced profitability, impaired production efficiency, and low OEE". A good
planned new installation or process at the development design stage can minimize
wastage and equipment breakdown as well as enhance safety operation. Even though
a new setup has been smoothly designed, problems may come out during test-running,
commissioning and start-up. An early equipment management program includes
improvement activities at various stages: the equipment investment planning stage,
design, fabrication, installation and test running, as well as commissioning.
106
7.5 Discussion on the framework of TPM activities developed
This dissertation developed a framework of TPM safety activities for the
manufacturing industry to improve safety performance. The framework is important
since most literature and studies on TPM were mainly concerned with productivity,
but not safety. The figures of improvement in safety performance due to
implementation of TPM can be found in literature, but these were very often by-
products of the figures in productivity improvement. There is a gap on how to
implement safety management within the TPM environment. The framework
developed is a start to fill the gap.
Environment, equipment and people are very often regarded as components of system
safety. The framework developed also started with these three components, with the
addition of a new component, management. Equipment and environment were
combined to a single component since TPM very often tackles these two problems
together. People and management are linked by 'communication'. Thus the four
components of the framework are 'people', 'communication', 'management', and
'equipment and working environment'. The targets of these components are to prevent
behavior originated accidents, enhance communication, operate management systems
reliably and prevent equipment / workplace originated accidents. A lot of TPM
activities were allocated into the framework to achieve the targets.
The TPM committee was specially designed for the ABC Company. Upon
implementing TPM, the safety culture of ABC Company can then be enhanced. Other
companies can have similar set up, depending on their existing organization structure
and size of the plants.
107
Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this study, it had been shown that a manufacturing company with TPM in place had
a more positive safety culture than one not implementing TPM. Notwithstanding the
limitations of this study, the results provide strong empirical support for the proposed
solution, namely to establish a TPM system (see Figure 7 for the TPM approach to
effective OHS management) to tackle the problem 'high standards of health and safety
still cannot be assured even though OSH management systems have already been in
place."
The study demonstrates that effectiveness of an OSH management system depends on
the safety culture of the organization, and that the safety culture is a result of whether
the organization has adopted a proactive or reactive approach towards safety. TPM
can enhance eight safety culture factors that can influence the 'proactivity' of an
organization. The eight factors identified are management incentive, management
commitment, participation of management and worker, communication, education and
training, improve working conditions and procedures, morale and job satisfaction, and
finally the attitude and risk perception.
This dissertation evaluated the safety culture of the ABC Company based on the eight
safety culture factors identified. These eight factors have been used by researchers to
evaluate safety culture and have been shown effective. The results showed that there
is much room for the company to improve. It is critical to learn from the results that in
ABC Company many respondents did not believe accidents are preventable and did
108
not regard complying with safety rules as important. The company has a plan to
implement TPM. The framework of TPM activities developed in the dissertation can
give a guideline for ABC Company to set up and implement the TPM activities that
can improve the safety performance of the company. The framework can also be a
general guideline for medium size companies in manufacturing industry to set up
TPM activities to improve safety performance.
The first step to world-class manufacturing is to implement TPM successfully and to
create a very active organization. When TPM becomes a common practice in daily
production of the ABC Company, it can be said that the company has commenced a
journey to word-class manufacturing.
109
Chapter 9
Recommendations
Based on the results and constraints of the study, it is recommended that:
1. There has been much research on the relationship between safety and quality, and
also between TPM and productivity. The figures of improvement in safety
performance due to implementation of TPM are very often by-products of the
research. Studies on how TPM improves the safety performance are rare. Further
research on this topic is necessary to support the findings of the study.
2. For future research, measuring the safety culture of an organization before and
after implementing TPM; or comparing the safety culture between two
organizations of similar background in the manufacturing field, similar number of
employees, similar size of plants, similar years of OHS management system in
place, similar organization structure and safety structure etc. will give a more
reliable result as well.
3. The framework of TPM activities developed in the study is only a start. The
effectiveness and practicality of the framework have to be confirmed by further
studies.
4. Further studies on how to integrate the existing safety structure of an organization
into the TPM structure are also recommended.
110
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Appendix AThe twelve steps of TPM development (Nakajima 1988, p.55)
Stage Step Details
Prep
arat
ion
1. Announce top management decision to introduce TPM
Statement at TPM lecture in company; articles in company newspaper
2. Launch education and campaign to introduce TPM
Managers: seminars / retreats according to levelGeneral: slide presentations
3. Create organizations to promote TPM
Form special committees at every level to promote TPM; establish central headquarters and assign staff
4. Establish basic TPM policies and goals
Analyze existing conditions; set goals; predict results
5. Formulate master plan for TPM development
Prepare detailed implementation plans for the five foundational activities
Prel
imin
ary
impl
emen
tatio
n 6. Hold TPM kick-off Invite client, affiliated and subcontracting companies
TPM
7. Improve effectiveness of each piece of equipment
Select model equipment; form project teams
8. Develop an autonomous maintenance program
Build diagnosis skills and establish worker certification procedurePromote the 7 steps: initial cleaning, countermeasures at the source of problems, cleaning and lubrication standards,General inspection, autonomous inspection,Organization ad tidiness, full autonomous maintenance
9. Develop a scheduled maintenance program for the maintenance department
Include periodic and predictive maintenance and management of spare parts, tools, blueprints, and schedules
10. Conduct training to improve operation and maintenance skills
Train leaders together; leaders share information with group members
121
impl
eme 11. Develop early equipment
management programMP design (maintenance prevention); commissioning control; LCC analysis
Stab
iliza
tion 12. Perfect TPM implementation
and raise TPM levelsEvaluate for PM prize; set higher goals
122
Appendix B
A 12-stage Western approach for TPM Development (Hartmann 2000)
Stage Details
1. Collect information Collect information through different ways such as
conferences, seminars, literature and consultants.
2. Initial audit and
presentation
Present a proposal to management by a consultant or a
plant personnel.
3. In-plant TPM
training
Distribute significant TPM knowledge to middle
management, maintenance, operators, representatives from
union and human resources department.
4. Study team training Training for team that will conduct TPM feasibility study.
5. Feasibility study Evaluate the condition of equipment, skills of plant
personnel, cleanliness or orderliness of the plant.
6. Feasibility study
presentation
Present to management and the union an installation
strategy and identify a pilot installation. At this point,
management will make a commitment to install TPM and
the meeting can be regarded as the TPM kickoff.
7. Pilot installation Cover 10 to 25% of plant's equipment
8. Plant-wide
installation
Expansion initiatives should begin every 3-6 months until
the whole plant is included.
9. Introduction audit Check if TPM fundamentals are done correctly and
whether the program is on schedule.
10. Progress audit Check if goals are accomplished. Point out existing
deficiencies to bring TPM a successful conclusion.
11. Certification To show the customer that equipment and product quality
123
have been improved and that procedures are in place to
maintain equipment to the highest level.
12. TPM award Award by The International TPM Institutes testifies that
the plant is word-class: highly productive, produces only
top quality product, maintain its equipment in top shape,
and has a culture based on teamwork.
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Appendix CCalculation of OEE (Ravishankar, Burczak & Devore 1992)
OEE = Availability x performance efficiency x Rate of quality
where
Recorded operating time(A) Availability =
Loading time
(B) Performance efficiency = speed efficiency x operating efficiency
theoretical speed effective operating time = x
actual speed planned operating time
theoretical speed x No. of good units made(approx) =
planned operating time
(Number of good units made - rejects)(C) Rate of quality =
Number of good units made
Definition of individual 'time' can be expressed by the below table (HKPC 2000):
Available time
Loading timePlanned
down
time
Planned operating timeSetup and
adjustment
125
time
Recorded operating timeUnplanned
but recorded
downtime
Actual operating timeNo record
minor
stoppage
Effective operating timeReduced
speed
Value-added operating timeReject,
re-make
items
No. of good units madeOEE = approximately Planned operating time x theoretical speed
126
Appendix D
The 5S System
The 5S practice is a basic but powerful technique used to establish and maintain
quality environment in an organization. The English equivalent, their meaning and
typical examples are shown in the table below (Osada 1991):
Japanese English Meaning Typical Example
Seiri Structurize Organization Throw away rubbish
Seiton Systemize Neatness 30-second retrieval of a document
Seiso Sanitize Cleaning Individual cleaning responsibility
Seiketsu Standardize Standardization Transparency of storage
Shitsuke Self-discipline Discipline Do 5-S daily
127
Appendix E
A sample of one point lesson (JIPM 1997)
Theme No Date
ClassificationBasic knowledge
Problem case
Improvement case
Student
Teacher
Date
Line Group Leader :
TPM ONE POINT LESSON ONE POINT LESSON
128
Appendix FSamples of F-tag for operator and maintenance
A B C
TPMOPERATOR
CONTROL NO.
Priority
Equipment:
Found By: by:
Date:
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION:
F-TAG
Add this tag to the relevant equipment
A B C
TPMMAINTENANCE
CONTROL NO.
Priority
Equipment:
Found By: by:
Date:
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION:
F-TAG
Add this tag to the relevant equipment
129
Appendix GReliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- All the 20 questions: Q4 to Q23
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q4 3.0000 .7385 78.0
2. Q5 3.1282 .8583 78.0
3. Q6 3.1667 .9455 78.0
4. Q7 3.3077 .7263 78.0
5. Q8 3.1923 .7739 78.0
6. Q9 3.0769 .8021 78.0
7. Q10 3.2564 .7286 78.0
8. Q11 3.4103 .6920 78.0
9. Q12 3.2436 .8247 78.0
10. Q13 3.1795 .7515 78.0
11. Q14 3.2051 .7448 78.0
12. Q15 3.3846 .6881 78.0
13. Q16 3.2564 .6534 78.0
14. Q17 3.1026 .8914 78.0
15. Q18 3.1923 .8537 78.0
16. Q19 3.4231 .7980 78.0
17. Q20 3.3077 .7263 78.0
18. Q21 3.1667 .8888 78.0
19. Q22 2.9615 .8745 78.0
20. Q23 3.1795 .9362 78.0
Correlation Matrix
130
Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
Q4 1.0000
Q5 .5532 1.0000
Q6 .5394 .5815 1.0000
Q7 .4358 .4151 .3026 1.0000
Q8 .4317 .2752 .2751 .4710 1.0000
Q9 .4385 .4005 .3254 .5162 .4361 1.0000
Q10 .3862 .4660 .3331 .3644 .2108 .4547 1.0000
Q11 .2033 .3914 .3110 .1849 .2145 .2700 .4069
Q12 .5330 .3773 .2637 .2852 .2105 .4621 .4134
Q13 .5148 .4874 .4508 .2068 .2525 .4292 .4841
Q14 .2361 .3240 .0984 .2419 .2461 .2341 .3805
Q15 .2811 .2673 .0998 .1759 .1276 .3222 .2929
Q16 .5652 .5659 .5606 .3242 .3122 .3336 .4330
Q17 .3156 .3221 .3801 .1914 .2911 .4429 .2589
Q18 .2472 .2318 .1368 .1966 .2185 .3954 .2538
Q19 .4407 .4128 .2668 .2206 .2451 .5166 .4588
Q20 .2421 .3526 .3215 .3352 .2168 .3155 .2417
Q21 .1187 .1419 .1056 .0604 .0472 .2915 .0735
Q22 .2614 .3354 .3220 .3460 .2989 .4301 .3011
Q23 .3944 .4559 .3179 .4143 .3819 .5348 .3696
131
Appendix G (continue)
Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17
Q11 1.0000
Q12 .3005 1.0000
Q13 .3061 .4943 1.0000
Q14 .1874 .3616 .3278 1.0000
Q15 .2916 .2905 .3419 .4522 1.0000
Q16 .2813 .3646 .3547 .2641 .1533 1.0000
Q17 .2888 .2306 .4568 .1831 .1466 .3779 1.0000
Q18 .2824 .3753 .4111 .4069 .2925 .2364 .3834
Q19 .1284 .4728 .4997 .3328 .2911 .4119 .3764
Q20 .3399 .3719 .2544 .2179 .1239 .4063 .4722
Q21 .1619 .1033 .2268 .0065 .0849 .1714 .4043
Q22 .1552 .1392 .3071 .1718 .1328 .4493 .5549
Q23 .2657 .3463 .3966 .3563 .2946 .3909 .6002
Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23
1.0000
Q19 .4318 1.0000
Q20 .2804 .3775 1.0000
Q21 .1284 .2838 .3822 1.0000
Q22 .3232 .3586 .3051 .3258 1.0000
Q23 .4600 .3664 .4334 .2289 .5162 1.0000
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 64.1410 90.5383 9.5152 20
132
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q4 61.1410 81.5773 .6308 .6343 .8973
Q5 61.0128 79.8570 .6483 .5774 .8964
Q6 60.9744 80.7786 .5217 .5321 .9003
Q7 60.8333 83.4134 .4973 .5082 .9006
Q8 60.9487 83.5818 .4493 .3964 .9018
Q9 61.0641 80.2166 .6736 .6011 .8959
Q10 60.8846 82.4151 .5740 .5091 .8987
Q11 60.7308 84.5629 .4319 .4191 .9021
Q12 60.8974 81.5997 .5543 .5283 .8991
Q13 60.9615 81.2842 .6412 .5599 .8970
Q14 60.9359 84.0867 .4317 .4262 .9022
Q15 60.7564 85.1996 .3830 .3462 .9032
Q16 60.8846 82.7527 .6190 .5615 .8981
Q17 61.0385 80.1673 .6000 .5941 .8978
Q18 60.9487 82.1012 .4983 .4266 .9007
Q19 60.7179 81.1402 .6094 .5464 .8977
Q20 60.8333 82.9719 .5320 .4958 .8998
Q21 60.9744 84.9604 .2922 .3280 .9067
Q22 61.1795 81.2920 .5379 .4912 .8996
Q23 60.9615 78.5050 .6725 .5786 .8956
Reliability Coefficients 20 items
Alpha = .9041 Standardized item alpha = .9050
133
Appendix H
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Management Incentive: Q4 and Q16
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q4 3.0000 .7385 78.0
2. Q16 3.2564 .6534 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q4 Q16
Q4 1.0000
Q16 .5652 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 6.2564 1.5178 1.2320 2
Item-total Statistics
134
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q4 3.2564 .4269 .5652 .3194 .
Q16 3.0000 .5455 .5652 .3194 .
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .7187 Standardized item alpha = .7222
135
Appendix I
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Management Commitment: Q5 and Q6
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q5 3.1282 .8583 78.0
2. Q6 3.1667 .9455 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q5 Q6
Q5 1.0000
Q6 .5815 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 6.2949 2.5743 1.6044 2
Item-total Statistics
136
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q5 3.1667 .8399 .5815 .3381 .
Q6 3.1282 .7366 .5815 .3381 .
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .7332 Standardized item alpha = .7354
137
Appendix J
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Participation of Management and Worker: Q12 and Q20
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q12 3.2436 .8247 78.0
2. Q20 3.3077 .7263 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q12 Q20
Q12 1.0000
Q20 .3719 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 6.5513 1.6532 1.2858 3
138
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q12 3.3077 .5275 .3719 .1383 .
Q20 3.2436 .6802 .3719 .1383 .
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .5390 Standardized item alpha = .5422
139
Appendix K
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Communication: Q13, Q14, Q18 and Q19
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q13 3.1795 .7515 78.0
2. Q14 3.2051 .7448 78.0
3. Q18 3.1923 .8537 78.0
4. Q19 3.4231 .7980 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q13 Q14 Q18 Q19
Q13 1.0000
Q14 .3278 1.0000
Q18 .4111 .4069 1.0000
Q19 .4997 .3328 .4318 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 13.0000 5.4805 2.3411 4
140
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q13 9.8205 3.4219 .5373 .3086 .6582
Q14 9.7949 3.6457 .4500 .2096 .7057
Q18 9.8077 3.1184 .5417 .2946 .6551
Q19 9.5769 3.2602 .5494 .3226 .6496
Reliability Coefficients 4 items
Alpha = .7287 Standardized item alpha = .7287
Appendix L
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Education and training: Q7, Q8 and Q9
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
141
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q7 3.3077 .7263 78.0
2. Q8 3.1923 .7739 78.0
3. Q9 3.0769 .8021 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q7 Q8 Q9
Q7 1.0000
Q8 .4710 1.0000
Q9 .5162 .4361 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 9.5769 3.4421 1.8553 3
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q7 6.2692 1.7837 .5829 .3411 .6071
Q8 6.3846 1.7722 .5197 .2726 .6787
Q9 6.5000 1.6558 .5536 .3143 .6395
142
Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .7288 Standardized item alpha = .7303
Appendix M
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Working conditions and procedures: Q10, Q11 and Q15
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q10 3.2564 .7286 78.0
2. Q11 3.4103 .6920 78.0
3. Q15 3.3846 .6881 78.0
Correlation Matrix
143
Q10 Q11 Q15
Q10 1.0000
Q11 .4069 1.0000
Q15 .2929 .2916 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 10.0513 2.4649 1.5700 3
Item-total Statistics
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q10 6.7949 1.2301 .4356 .1987 .4515
Q11 6.6410 1.2980 .4363 .1981 .4525
Q15 6.6667 1.4199 .3484 .1214 .5779
Reliability Coefficients 3 items
Alpha = .5974 Standardized item alpha = .5969
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
144
Appendix N
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Morale and Job satisfaction: Q17 and Q21
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q17 3.1026 .8914 78.0
2. Q21 3.1667 .8888 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q17 Q21
Q17 1.0000
Q21 .4043 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 6.2692 2.2253 1.4917 2
Item-total Statistics
145
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q17 3.1667 .7900 .4043 .1635 .
Q21 3.1026 .7945 .4043 .1635 .
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .5758 Standardized item alpha = .5758
146
Appendix O
Reliability analysis of questionnaire result from ABC Company- Attitude and Risk Perception: Q22, and Q23
****** Method 2 (covariance matrix) will be used for this analysis
******
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S - S C A L E (A L P H
A)
Mean Std Dev Cases
1. Q22 2.9615 .8745 78.0
2. Q23 3.1795 .9362 78.0
Correlation Matrix
Q22 Q23
Q22 1.0000
Q23 .5162 1.0000
N of Cases = 78.0
N of
Statistics for Mean Variance Std Dev Variables
Scale 6.1410 2.4863 1.5768 2
Item-total Statistics
147
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
if Item if Item Total Multiple if Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Q22 3.1795 .8765 .5162 .2664 .
Q23 2.9615 .7647 .5162 .2664 .
Reliability Coefficients 2 items
Alpha = .6798 Standardized item alpha = .6809
148
Appendix PQuestionnaire Set A (for management and safety officers) total 3 pages
A. Please fill in the blank or tick at square boxes where appropriate.1. Name of your organization: ______________________________________
(Name will not be disclosed. You may also choose not to fill in the name):
Business (e.g. food manufacturing): ________________________________
2. Your position: ________________________________
3. How many employees are there in your organization and how many of them are production workers? ______ employees ______ production workers
4. Which of the below is best to describe the safety culture of your organization?a. To stay out of trouble with the regulator and senior management. Getting
concerns addressed is often a matter of personal persistence.b. Has a formal safety management system in place. Can move beyond external
prescription and set its own targets and standards.c. Devolves responsibilities to the team level and emphases on local ownership
of health and safety issues and on developing risk awareness. □ a □ b □ c
B. Please circle the number to show your degree of agreement on the below
(5-24) statements. = strongly disagree = disagree = neutral (50% agree) = agree = strongly agree.
(In some statements there are hints bracketed to show how will the strongly disagree be.)
Do you agree your company is acting like below statements?strongly strongly
disagree neutral agree
5. The employer regards safety as an important matter as 1 2 3 4 5others like productivity and quality.
6. Safety goals are pursued proactively and on the 1 2 3 4 5company's initiative. (1 = Safety goals are adapted to comply regulations)
7. Management encourages safe behavior. 1 2 3 4 58. Safety proposals developed are swiftly implemented. 1 2 3 4 5
149
strongly strongly
disagree neutral agree
9. Management is involved in safety activities such as risk 1 2 3 4 5 assessment, accident investigations & promotion
programs.10. Management is well informed about relevant safety 1 2 3 4 5 issues11. Workers are eager to attend safety activities and 1 2 3 4 5
training.12. A lot is learnt from nearly misses. 1 2 3 4 5
(1 = Near misses are not discussed.)13. Information needed to work safety is made available to 1 2 3 4 5
all employees.14. Workers are qualified to actively enhance operational 1 2 3 4 5
safety. (1 = employees are not trained for safety operation.)
15. Workers and supervisors participate in defining safe work 1 2 3 4 5practices.
(1 = these are defined by specialists alone.)16. Workers and supervisors actively involved in removing 1 2 3 4 5
hazards in the working environment.17. Workers will raise concern on machine problems. 1 2 3 4 518. Safety problems on machines are swiftly solved. 1 2 3 4 519. A questioning attitude towards instruction is encouraged. 1 2 3 4 5
(1 = Instructions are not meant to be questioned.)20. Management listens to workers' recommendations and 1 2 3 4 5
will provide feedback.21. The channels for the communication between 1 2 3 4 5
management and workers are efficient and sufficient.22. The managers in your plants really care about safety and 1 2 3 4 5
try to reduce risk levels as much as possible.23. Both management and workers regard safety is everyone's 1 2 3 4 5
responsibility, and safety officers provide support. (1 = Safety is ensured by specially assigned safety officersonly.)
24. Workers are motivated for safety by information and 1 2 3 4 5interesting tasks.(1 = Workers are bound to safety by strict control)
150
C. Please tick at square boxes where appropriate.
25. Is your plant implementing Total Productive Maintenance (TPM)?□ Yes □ No
If your answer is yes, jump to question no. 26.
If your answer is no, end of the questionnaire.
- end -(for those working in companies not implementing TPM)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Below questions (26-30) are for those working in companies implementing TPM
Do you believe (for 26-29):26. the workers are competent to do the maintenance works well? □ Yes □ No27. TPM can reduce the chance of accident caused by equipment? □ Yes □ No28. TPM can increase the self-esteem of workers? □ Yes □ No29. TPM can improve safety culture of your organization? □ Yes □ No
30. Have the safety performance of your plant been improved after implementation of TPM? □ Yes □ NoIf yes, please advise some figures (e.g. accident rate decreases by 50% in 1 year.)__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
- end -(for those working in companies implementing TPM)
151
Appendix QQuestionnaire Set B (for workshop supervisors and workers) total 3 pages
A. Please fill in the blank or tick at square boxes where appropriate. 1. Name of your organization: _________________________________
(will not be disclosed)
Business (e.g. food manufacturing): _________________________________2. Your position: □ workshop supervisor □ line leader □ worker3. What is your education level? □ primary □ secondary
□ technical institute or above
B. Please circle the number to show your degree of agreement on the below (4-23) statements. = strongly disagree = disagree
= neutral (50% agree) = agree = strongly agree.(In some statements there are hints bracketed to show how will the strongly disagree be.)
B1. Do you agree your company is acting like below statements (4-16)? strongly strongly
disagree neutral agree
4. Senior management regards safety as an important. 1 2 3 4 5matters as others like productivity and quality.
5. Management provides enough safety equipment. 1 2 3 4 56. Management can do what they commit. 1 2 3 4 5
(1 = what management committed are usually lip service)7. Accidents and near miss are studied and used as 1 2 3 4 5
training materials.8. Workers have been trained properly, including safety 1 2 3 4 5
precaution as well as operation of the machines.(1 = Workers are seldom trained for safety.)
9. Workers are always trained for the use of safety equipment. 1 2 3 4 510. Management is willing to improve the safety of working 1 2 3 4 5
environment.11. Safety procedures are realistic. 1 2 3 4 512. Management actively participates safety activities. 1 2 3 4 513. Management listens to workers' recommendations and 1 2 3 4 5
will provide feedback.14. Workers are encouraged to question instructions from 1 2 3 4 5
152
management. (1 = Instructions from management cannot be questioned.)
153
strongly strongly
disagree neutral agree
15. There is arrangement to check equipment to make sure 1 2 3 4 5it is free of faults.
16. Which one below is the best to describe the management 1 2 3 4 5of your company?1. Management denies that there are problems or don't want to see them.2. Management admits the fact that there are problems but find excuses for not
being able to solve them.3. Management accepts the fact that there are problems but is unable to solve
them because they don't want to know how to attack them.4. Management wants to see potential problems and for this try to visualize
them. They will attack them by learning proper methods.5. Management will try to solve the problems and after the problems are solved,
measures will be taken to prevent similar incidents occurring again.
B2. Do you agree that you are doing like the below statements (17-23)?
17. You regard safety is everyone's responsibility, and 1 2 3 4 5safety officers provide support.(1 = Safety is the responsibility of management only.)
18. You are easy to communicate with the management. 1 2 3 4 5(1 = You can only discuss safety issues with your
supervisor.)19. Whenever encounter any safety matters, you will report 1 2 3 4 5
to the supervisor or safety officer.(1 = It is no use to report, so you never report.)
20. You are willing to join the safety activities and trainings. 1 2 3 4 5(1 = You are forced to join the safety activities & trainings.)
21. You take care of the machines which you are operating. 1 2 3 4 5(1 = Taking care of the machines is the responsibility
of the maintenance department only.)22. You believe that accidents are preventable. 1 2 3 4 5
(1 = Accidents will happen no matter what you do.)23. You regard compliance with the safety rules is important. 1 2 3 4 5
If not following the rules, accidents may occur.(1 = If take care on the works, even not following the
safety rules, accidents will not occur on you.)
154
C. Please tick at square boxes where appropriate.
24. Is your company implementing Total Productive Maintenance (TPM)□ Yes □ No □ Do not know
If your answer is 'Yes', jump to question no. 27 on the next page.If your answer is 'No' or 'Do not know', continue to question no. 25 and 26
.(Questions 25-26 are for those whose companies are not implementing TPM)(To be answered by production workers only, maintenance people no need to answer)
25. If sufficient training is provided, do you think you can □ Yes □ Nocarry out the routine maintenance works of the machines you are operating, such as lubrication, change over and adjustment of settings of machines.
26. Are you willing to do the above routine maintenance works? □ Yes □ No- end -
(for those working in companies not implementing TPM)-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Questions 27-40 are for those whose companies are implementing TPM)
27. Are you willing to do the routine maintenance jobs as □ Yes □ Norequired by TPM?
28. Do you think you have received sufficient training to □ Yes □ Nocarry out the routine maintenance works?
29. Do you think you are competence and have confident to do □ Yes □ Nocarry out the routine maintenance works as required by TPM?
30. Is your job description clearly distinguishable with that □ Yes □ Noof maintenance people?
31. Do you think TPM can help you to be more familiar with □ Yes □ Nothe machines which you are operating?
32. Do you think TPM can reduce the chances of accidents □ Yes □ Nocaused by equipment?
33. Does TPM provides you a sense of ownership on equipment? □ Yes □ No34. Does TPM provides you a sense of job satisfaction? □ Yes □ No35. Does TPM motivate your self-esteem? □ Yes □ No
- end -(for those working in companies implementing TPM)
155
Appendix RQuestionnaire Set B - for supervisors and workers (Chinese Version)問卷 B (對象: 生產部工場管工及工人) 共 3 頁
甲. 請填上以下資料,及在適當的答案方格內加上 號1. 貴公司名稱: _________________________
(名稱不會公開。)
業務 (例:食品制造) : _________________________________2. 你的職位: □ 管工 □ 組長 □ 工人3. 你的學歷: □ 小學 □ 中學 □ 工業學院或以上乙 請圈出你對下列 (4-23 ) 問題 的同意程度。
=「非常不同意」, = 「不同意」 =「同意一半」。 = 「同意」 = 「非常同意」(有些句子在括號內附加提示,說明 「非常不同意」 會是怎樣的。)
乙 1 你同意 貴公司 的管理層 己做到下列(4-16)各點嗎? 非常不同意 同意一半 非常同意
4. 貴公司的 最高管理層視「職業安全」與 1 2 3 4 5「生產力」及「產品質量」同等重要。
5. 貴公司己提供了足夠的安全設備。 1 2 3 4 5
6. 貴公司高級管理層的承諾都能夠一一實現。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 高層的承諾通常都是說說罷了。)
7. 意外及意外邊緣事故都會加以研究及用作訓練教材。 1 2 3 4 5
8. 所有工人都接受過適當訓練,除了訓練機械操作外, 1 2 3 4 5亦包括安全訓練。 (1 = 工人極少接受安全訓練。)
9. 貴公司的管理層會訓練工人使用安全設備。 1 2 3 4 5
10. 貴公司的管理層致力於改善工作的安全環境。 1 2 3 4 5
11. 貴公司訂下的安全措施是易明的。 1 2 3 4 5
12. 貴公司的管理層積極參加各項安全活動。 1 2 3 4 5156
13. 管理層樂意聽取工人的意見,并會作出回應。 1 2 3 4 5非常不同意 同意一半 非常同意
14. 公司鼓勵員工對管理層的指引發表意見。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 管理層的指引,工人是不能提出任何意見的。)
15. 公司有安排檢查設備,確保設備不會有問題。 1 2 3 4 5
16. 下列那一項最適合形容你的上司或管理層? 1 2 3 4 56. 他們否認有安全問題存在 或 乍作什麼也看不見。7. 他們承認有安全問題存在,但會找藉口說問題不能 解決。8. 他們接受有安全問題存在的事實,但是他們不想
知道怎樣去解決。9. 他們樂於發掘存在的問題,并樂於學習解決的方法。10. 他們會設法解決問題。解決問題後會改善現有的
制度使問題不會再發生。乙 2: 你同意你自己 已經做到下列(17-23)各點嗎?17. 你認為安全是每一個人的責任,由安全主任提供 1 2 3 4 5
支援。 (1 =安全祇是管理層的責任)
18. 你很容易和管理層接觸及討論問題。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 你祇可以和上一級的上司接觸。)
19. 遇到有關安全的事件,你會報告給管工或安全主任。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 報告是沒有用的,所以你不會報告。)
20. 你樂於參加公司舉辦的各項安全活動及訓練。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 你是被公司強迫才參加的。)
21. 你會小心照顧你操作的機械設備 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 照顧機械設備祇是維修部的責任)
22. 你相信意外是可以避免的。 1 2 3 4 5(1 = 意外就是意外,無論你怎樣做,意外都是不能避免的。)
23. 你認為遵守安全規則非常重要,如不遵守, 1 2 3 4 5你是有機會發生意外的。 (1 = 祇要你小心一些,
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就算不遵守安全規則,你也不會發生意外。)
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丙 請選擇合適的答案,在方格內加上 號24. 你的公司有否實行「全員生產保養 TPM」?
□ 有 □ 否 □ 不知道如你的答案是 '有',請跳到第 27 題作答。如你的答案是 '否' 或 '不知道',請繼續作答第 25 及 26 題。
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(以下 25-26 祇供在 沒有實行 「全員生產保養 TPM」公司工作的員工填寫)(由生產部員工作答,維修部員工無需作答。)
25. 如有足夠的訓練,你認為你可以替你操作的機械做 □ 是 □ 否例行保養工作(包括加潤滑油、轉機及調較等)嗎?
26. 你願意做上一題所說的保養工作嗎? □ 是 □ 否- 完 - (在沒有實行「全員生產保養」公司工作的問卷調查在此結束)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(以下 27-35 祇供在 有實行 「全員生產保養 TPM」公司工作的員工填寫)
27. 你願以做「全員生產保養 TPM」制度下的保養工作嗎? □是□否28. 你認為你己接受足夠的訓練去處理日常的保養工作嗎? □是□否29. 你認為你有能力及信心去處理 TPM 制度下的保養 □是□否
工作嗎?30. 你做的保養工作是否與維修部的工作分辨得清楚嗎? □是□否31. 你認為「全員生產保養 TPM」能令你更熟悉你的機械嗎? □是□否32. 你認為「全員生產保養 TPM」可以減少機械引致的 □是□否
意外嗎?33. 「全員生產保養 TPM」能令你覺得你是設備的主人嗎? □是□否34. 「全員生產保養 TPM」能令你增加工作的成功感嗎? □是□否35. 你認為 「全員生產保養 TPM」能增加你的士氣嗎? □是□否
- 完 - (在有實行「全員生產保養」公司工作的問卷調查在此結束)
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